FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Larney v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 700
Appeal from: Larney v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2707 File number: WAD 368 of 2018 Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 21 May 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs refusing the Appellant a partner visa – whether Tribunal misidentified information to be considered under Public Interest Criterion 4020 – whether Tribunal misconstrued Public Interest Criterion 4020 – whether Tribunal erred in finding that the Appellant had previously been in a de facto relationship and had provided information that was false or misleading in a material particular – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5CB
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 4
Cases cited: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 93 ALJR 252
Minister forImmigration and Border Protection v SZOXP [2014] FCCA 565; 285 FLR 384
SZOXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 69; 231 FCR 1
Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 42; 220 FCR 169
Date of hearing: 26 February and 16 April 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 113 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Liu Solicitor for the Appellant: Nandan Vaityte Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P R Macliver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 368 of 2018 BETWEEN: SAMUEL JEWEL LARNEY
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 MAY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.Orders (1) and (2) made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 1 August 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:
(a)The decision of the Second Respondent dated 3 November 2017 be quashed.
(b)The matter be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, for redetermination according to law.
(c)There be no order as to costs.
3.The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KERR J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing an application for a constitutional writ in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 3 November 2017 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (Minister) not to grant the appellant a Partner (Temporary) (Class…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 700
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Orders (1) and (2) made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 1 August 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:
(a) The decision of the Second Respondent dated 3 November 2017 be quashed.
(b) The matter be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, for redetermination according to law.
(c) There be no order as to costs.
3. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially arose when Mr Larney's application for a Partner visa was refused by the Minister's delegate on 2 November 2016. He then sought judicial review of this decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed his application for judicial review on 1 August 2018. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Mr Larney appealed to the Federal Court. The appeal was heard and determined by the Federal Court, which allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court. The case was remitted to the AAT for redetermination according to law.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal’s misstatement of the information Mr Larney had given to the Minister then led it to focus not on his actual answer but whether his imputed (but incorrectly described) answer was relevantly false and misleading. In doing so, I am satisfied that the Tribunal fell into legal error by failing to address the question properly before it and instead addressing a different question: whether Mr Larney misled the Minister by stating that he had not previously been in a de facto relationship as defined in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) or the Regulations. That that unfortunate elision occurred is evident both from the Tribunal’s reasons and in the manner it undertook its review. Thus at [13] of its reasons the Tribunal observed as follows:[T]he Tribunal is prepared to accept that the parties never formally married but that does not preclude the existence of a de facto relationship as defined in the Migration legislation. Neither does the fact that the parties may not have lived together. Cohabitation does not define the relationship. That was also the focus of the hearing. As the transcript reveals, the Tribunal’s focus was on whether Mr Larney had been in a de facto relationship. I infer that in the mind of the Tribunal, that was to be determined not by the social mores of Ghana but as such a relationship is defined in the Migration Act and Regulations as it had referred to at [13] of its reasons. Thus, during the hearing, the Tribunal observed as follows:[Y]ou don’t have to live with someone … under the same roof to be in a de facto relationship. You do need to have a mutual commitment to the relationship, and it seems that at some point there was that commitment. (p 21) The same reasoning is the focus of the Tribunal’s conclusion at [25] in which, having evaluated the evidence before it, it stated:While the Tribunal accepts that such a relationship no longer exists, and may have ceased to exist by the time the applicant made the application for the Partner visa, the Tribunal is of the view that the applicant and the mother of his children had a de facto relationship in the past. It was Mr Larney’s failure to mention that relationship which the Tribunal found was misleading at [26]. Even assuming that the Tribunal’s findings at [26] should be understood to have referred not to an omission (for which neither party contends) but as a positive finding of Mr Larney having made an affirmative statement in his application which was false in a material particular. The only possible inference open is that the Tribunal’s ultimate finding was based on it having wrongly understood Mr Larney’s actual statement to have been that he had never previously been married or in a de facto relationship, the falsity of the which was established having regard to how a de facto relationship is “defined in the Migration legislation”. That was a red herring. I am therefore satisfied that the primary judge was correct to have rejected the grounds of review Mr Liu pressed on Mr Larney’s behalf in the court below. Those grounds were premised on the Tribunal having erred in law in its understanding of how the Migration Act defined a de facto relationship, and in its application of that understanding. That, properly understood, was never the dispositive issue before the Tribunal.