Larney v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Larney v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 700

Appeal from: Larney v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2707
File number: WAD 368 of 2018
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 21 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs refusing the Appellant a partner visa – whether Tribunal misidentified information to be considered under Public Interest Criterion 4020 – whether Tribunal misconstrued Public Interest Criterion 4020 – whether Tribunal erred in finding that the Appellant had previously been in a de facto relationship and had provided information that was false or misleading in a material particular – appeal allowed  
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5CB

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 4

Cases cited:

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 93 ALJR 252

Minister forImmigration and Border Protection v SZOXP [2014] FCCA 565; 285 FLR 384

SZOXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 69; 231 FCR 1

Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 42; 220 FCR 169

Date of hearing: 26 February and 16 April 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 113
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Liu
Solicitor for the Appellant: Nandan Vaityte Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P R Macliver
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 368 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SAMUEL JEWEL LARNEY

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.Orders (1) and (2) made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 1 August 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

(a)The decision of the Second Respondent dated 3 November 2017 be quashed.

(b)The matter be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, for redetermination according to law.

(c)There be no order as to costs.

3.The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KERR J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing an application for a constitutional writ in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 3 November 2017 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (Minister) not to grant the appellant a Partner (Temporary) (Class…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 700
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mr Larney, the appellant, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed his application for judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT had affirmed the decision of the Minister for Home Affairs’ delegate, who refused Mr Larney a partner visa. The primary legal issue was whether the AAT misidentified the information to be considered under Public Interest Criterion 4020, whether it misconstrued the criterion, and if it erred in finding that Mr Larney had previously been in a de facto relationship and provided false or misleading information in a material particular. The court held that the AAT misstated the information provided by Mr Larney and focused on whether his imputed answer was relevantly false and misleading, instead of the actual answer. The court found that the AAT fell into legal error by addressing a different question and failed to address the question properly before it. The court held that the appeal should be allowed, the decision of the AAT should be quashed, and the matter should be remitted to the AAT, differently constituted, for redetermination according to law. There was no order as to costs, and the Minister paid the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Orders (1) and (2) made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 1 August 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) The decision of the Second Respondent dated 3 November 2017 be quashed.

(b) The matter be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, for redetermination according to law.

(c) There be no order as to costs.

3. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Larney, a Ghanaian national, applied for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). His application was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on the grounds that he did not meet the public interest criteria. Specifically, it was found that Mr Larney had not disclosed a prior relationship with the mother of his two children, which the delegate considered to be misleading and false information. Mr Larney sought a judicial review of this decision in the Federal Circuit Court, which was dismissed. He then appealed to the Federal Court, arguing that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had misidentified the information to be considered under Public Interest Criterion 4020 and misconstrued the criterion itself. He further contended that the AAT erred in finding that he had been in a de facto relationship and provided false or misleading information.

The matter initially arose when Mr Larney's application for a Partner visa was refused by the Minister's delegate on 2 November 2016. He then sought judicial review of this decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed his application for judicial review on 1 August 2018. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Mr Larney appealed to the Federal Court. The appeal was heard and determined by the Federal Court, which allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court. The case was remitted to the AAT for redetermination according to law.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister’s delegate was not persuaded by that evidence. On 2 November 2016 Mr Larney was advised that his application for a Partner visa had been refused. He was provided with a copy of the Delegate’s reasons for decision. The decision maker, after having referred to the above materials, reasoned as follows:I have considered all of the circumstances relevant to your application and conclude, for the following reasons, that they are not compelling:Whilst you may not have entered into a legal marriage with the mother of your two children, of which there is no evidence in support of this either way, the fact that you had two children with the same person between 2010 and 2013, indicates to me that your relationship with this person was worthy of disclosure. Your failure to disclose the true composition of your family when applying for your previous 457 visa, combined with the information reported to the Department by your previous employer, and the subsequent inconsistencies identified in your current partner visa application leads me to believe that you have intentionally provided false and misleading information to the Department since you lodged your initial 457 visa.You make further claims that the mother of your children has since married someone else, your parents have guardianship over your children and you returned to Australia after your employment had been terminated, because you had another prospective employer who was prepared to take over your sponsorship. However, your claims have not been substantiated by any evidence.In your response, you have not identified any compelling and compassionate circumstances that affect the interests of Australia or compelling circumstances that affect the interest of an Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident or an Eligible New Zealand citizen. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that such circumstances exist. I am therefore not satisfied that you meet the waiver requirements of PIC 4020(4).I therefore find that you do not meet the public interest criteria 4020, subclause 4020(1) or 4020(4) and as such you cannot satisfy clause 820.226 in Schedule 2 of the regulations on the date I made my decision.DecisionAs you do not meet clause 820.226, I find that you do not meet the criteria for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 820) [visa]. Therefore I refuse your application for a Partner (Residence)(Class BS) visa.Tribunal review of the Delegate’s decision Mr Larney exercised his right to seek merits review of the decision in the Tribunal. His migration agent filed written submissions inter alia as follows:6. Arguments for the applicant satisfying Subclause 4020(1)a.Mr Larney provided a statutory declaration to the Department to explain away his relationship with the mother of his two children. They were not in any affinal relationship. They never lived together. They knew each other because they lived in the same suburb. He only had two sexual encounters with her which resulted in the birth of their first child.When he returned to Ghana in December 2012 they met and had sex which resulted in the birth of their second child. Their children live with Mr Larney’s mother. The mother of his children sent both children to his mother a month after their birth. He has no relationship with him.Having a child with someone does not necessarily mean you have an affinal relationship (de facto or Partner relationship with them). Their two sexual encounters which the case officer consider as a relationship did not last for more than three weeks. This cannot be considered as a relationship.They had a brief (not more than three weeks) sexual encounter in 2010 and 2012. This cannot be considered as a relationship. They never lived under the same roof for even a day.…b.Mr Larney explained in his statutory declaration to the Department that it was his former employer who called the Department to inform them about the none [sic] disclosure of his child and wife to the Departmen [sic] in his 457 visa applicationt [sic]. They did that because they thought it would be good for him to have his child with him in Australia and bringing the mother of the child along would make life easier for him. He is not privy to the information his employer disclosed to the Department. He was not asked to sign any form and provide evidence of his relationship.This conversion [sic] is not a basis for concluding that he had a relationship with the mother of his child.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal’s misstatement of the information Mr Larney had given to the Minister then led it to focus not on his actual answer but whether his imputed (but incorrectly described) answer was relevantly false and misleading. In doing so, I am satisfied that the Tribunal fell into legal error by failing to address the question properly before it and instead addressing a different question: whether Mr Larney misled the Minister by stating that he had not previously been in a de facto relationship as defined in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) or the Regulations. That that unfortunate elision occurred is evident both from the Tribunal’s reasons and in the manner it undertook its review. Thus at [13] of its reasons the Tribunal observed as follows:[T]he Tribunal is prepared to accept that the parties never formally married but that does not preclude the existence of a de facto relationship as defined in the Migration legislation. Neither does the fact that the parties may not have lived together. Cohabitation does not define the relationship. That was also the focus of the hearing. As the transcript reveals, the Tribunal’s focus was on whether Mr Larney had been in a de facto relationship. I infer that in the mind of the Tribunal, that was to be determined not by the social mores of Ghana but as such a relationship is defined in the Migration Act and Regulations as it had referred to at [13] of its reasons. Thus, during the hearing, the Tribunal observed as follows:[Y]ou don’t have to live with someone … under the same roof to be in a de facto relationship. You do need to have a mutual commitment to the relationship, and it seems that at some point there was that commitment. (p 21) The same reasoning is the focus of the Tribunal’s conclusion at [25] in which, having evaluated the evidence before it, it stated:While the Tribunal accepts that such a relationship no longer exists, and may have ceased to exist by the time the applicant made the application for the Partner visa, the Tribunal is of the view that the applicant and the mother of his children had a de facto relationship in the past. It was Mr Larney’s failure to mention that relationship which the Tribunal found was misleading at [26]. Even assuming that the Tribunal’s findings at [26] should be understood to have referred not to an omission (for which neither party contends) but as a positive finding of Mr Larney having made an affirmative statement in his application which was false in a material particular. The only possible inference open is that the Tribunal’s ultimate finding was based on it having wrongly understood Mr Larney’s actual statement to have been that he had never previously been married or in a de facto relationship, the falsity of the which was established having regard to how a de facto relationship is “defined in the Migration legislation”. That was a red herring. I am therefore satisfied that the primary judge was correct to have rejected the grounds of review Mr Liu pressed on Mr Larney’s behalf in the court below. Those grounds were premised on the Tribunal having erred in law in its understanding of how the Migration Act defined a de facto relationship, and in its application of that understanding. That, properly understood, was never the dispositive issue before the Tribunal.