| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL | |
| S EAPCI 2022 0117 | |
| LANSHAN PTY LTD (ACN 159 606 818) | Applicant |
| v | |
| F3 ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 163 104 578) | Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | KENNEDY, WALKER and MACAULAY JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 15 March 2024 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 11 April 2024 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2024] VSCA 59 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2022] VCC 1850 (Judge Marks) |
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PROPERTY – LEASE – LICENCE – Agreement granting use ‘to the exclusion of all others’ of car parking spaces and facilities for a 99-year period – Whether judge erred in construing agreement as a lease rather than a licence – Meaning of ‘facilities’ not to encompass driveways between car parking spaces – Lessor not excluded from using driveways to gain access to retained land – Agreement granted a lease of car parking spaces.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where new matter raised for first time in oral submissions on application for leave to appeal – Further evidence might have been adduced to address new point – Applicant not permitted to raise new argument.
CONTRACT – Default notice – Alleged failure to maintain required public liability insurance – Reasonable person would not understand what default was alleged – Notice defective – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal dismissed.
Radaich v Smith (1959) 101 CLR 209; Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491; FPM Constructions Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340; Diploma Constructions Pty Ltd v Marula Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 229; Yan v Zhang [2018] VSC 694, applied.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicant: | Mr S Hopper | ||
| Respondent: | Mr E Gisonda | ||
| Solicitors | |||
| Applicant: | Mahons with Yuncken & Yuncken Lawyers | ||
| Respondent: | Merton Lawyers | ||
KENNEDY JA
WALKER JA
MACAULAY JA:
The applicant owns property on which a motel is situated (the ‘Motel Property’). That property includes a car parking area. The respondent owns an adjacent property on which a restaurant operates (the ‘Adjacent Property’). By a written agreement the applicant granted the respondent exclusive rights to use 105 ‘car parking spaces and facilities’ located on the Motel Property (the ‘Licence Agreement’). A dispute has since arisen as to whether the Licence Agreement grants a lease over the relevant property, or merely a licence, and whether it has been validly terminated.
The judge found that the Licence Agreement granted exclusive possession of the car parking spaces and facilities to the respondent and was therefore a lease.[1] She considered that the ‘facilities’ encompassed the roadway between the ‘car parking spaces’. She also found that the Licence Agreement had not been terminated.
[1]The applicant had also sought declaratory relief to the effect that it was not bound by the Licence Agreement (because it was not a party to the original Licence Agreement). The judge found that the Licence Agreement bound the parties. That issue is not being pursued on the application for leave to appeal.
The judge dismissed the applicant’s claim (order 2), gave judgment on the counterclaim (order 1), and…
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- Case
- [2024] VSCA 59
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal raised two primary legal issues. The first was whether the trial judge correctly interpreted the agreement as a lease rather than a licence. The second issue was whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the term "facilities" did not encompass the driveways between the car parking spaces, and whether this meant Lanshan could use these driveways for access to their retained land. Additionally, Lanshan sought to introduce new arguments during the appeal process, which F3 objected to.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in construing the agreement as a lease. The court determined that the term "facilities" did not include the driveways, and the lessor was not excluded from using these driveways to gain access to their retained land. Furthermore, the court found that the agreement clearly granted a lease of the car parking spaces. Regarding the new matter raised by Lanshan, the Court of Appeal held that it was not permissible to introduce new arguments at the appeal stage, and the appeal was dismissed.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that the agreement was a lease of the car parking spaces and facilities, excluding all others for a 99-year period. The court also disallowed Lanshan's attempt to introduce new arguments during the appeal process.
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