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Langridge v R

Langridge v R

Case [2004] TASSC 97 8 September 2004

Suspension of sentence

Criminal Law

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[2004] TASSC 97

CITATION: Langridge v R [2004] TASSC 97

PARTIES:  LANGRIDGE, Jennifer Susan
  v
  R

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (TAS)
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  CCA 117/2003
DELIVERED ON:  8 September 2004
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  26 May, 25, 26 August 2004
JUDGMENT OF:  Underwood, Evans and Blow JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Jurisdiction, practice and procedure – Judgment and punishment – Sentence – Factors to be taken into account – Miscellaneous matters – Delay – First offenders - Suspension of sentence – What matters relevant to exercise of discretion.
R v Percy [1975] Tas SR 62; R v Causby [1984] Tas SR 54, not followed in part.
Dinsdale v R (1999) 2002 CLR 321, applied.
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s7(1).

Aust Dig Criminal Law [853]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  P W Tree SC and K L Baumeler
             Respondent:  A R Jacobs
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Butler McIntyre & Butler
             Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number: [2004] TASSC 97
Number of Paragraphs: 36

Serial No 97/2004
File No CCA 117/2003

JENNIFER SUSAN LANGRIDGE v THE QUEEN

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

UNDERWOOD J
EVANS J
BLOW J
8 September 2004

Order of the Court

Appeal dismissed

Serial No 97/2004
File No CCA 117/2003

JENNIFER SUSAN LANGRIDGE v THE QUEEN

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

UNDERWOOD J
EVANS J
BLOW J
8 September 2004

The issue

The appellant was found guilty of 59 counts of fraud as a clerk or servant, contrary to the Criminal Code, s264. She was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The learned sentencing judge ordered that the appellant not be eligible for parole until she had served one half of that sentence, the minimum period in custody permitted by the Sentencing Act 1997, s17(3). The appellant has appealed against that sentence upon the following grounds:

"1   The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2    The sentence failed to take into account the sentencing regime as expressed in the Sentencing Act.
3    The learned sentencing judge erred in:
(a)rejecting that the crimes were conducted under emotional pressure;
(b)rejecting that the delay in bringing the matter to trial was a relevant consideration.

4 The learned sentencing judge erred by giving insufficient weight to:
(a)the lack of any personal gain to the appellant;
(b)the absence of likelihood of re-offence [sic]

and, by giving excessive weight to;
(c)the appellant's failure to accept criminal responsibility (as distinct from personal responsibility) for the conduct; and
(d)the appellant's failure to make restitution (in circumstances where personal gain was absent).

5 The learned sentencing judge erred by failing to suspend any part of the sentence."

Senior and junior counsel for the appellant addressed argument with respect to grounds 3, 4 and 5. No additional argument addressed grounds 1 and 2. Senior counsel for the appellant, Mr Tree SC, said that the argument put in support of grounds 3, 4 and 5, encompassed the arguments that could be put in support of grounds 1 and 2.

The proceedings on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Langridge v R

Details

AGLC: Langridge v R [2004] TASSC 97
Case: [2004] TASSC 97
Decision Date: 8 September 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Langridge v R involved the appellant, Langridge, who was convicted of obtaining property by deception. The court was required to determine whether the sentence imposed was appropriate, particularly in light of the delay between the offence and the conviction, and the appellant's status as a first offender. The sentencing judge had imposed a sentence of imprisonment, which was to be suspended for two years, taking into account the delay and the appellant's lack of prior criminal history. The respondent, the Crown, appealed the decision, arguing that the sentence was too lenient.

The legal issues before the court included the proper factors to be considered in determining an appropriate sentence, particularly in cases involving delay and first-time offenders. The court had to assess whether the sentence imposed by the primary judge was in accordance with the principles set out in previous cases, and whether the judge had appropriately balanced the various factors in exercising their discretion. The court also needed to consider the role of delay in sentencing and how it should influence the imposition of a sentence, as well as the impact of being a first offender on the sentencing process.

The court found that the primary judge had appropriately considered the relevant factors in determining the sentence. The delay in bringing the matter to trial was a significant factor that warranted leniency, as was the appellant's status as a first offender. The court held that the primary judge had correctly exercised their discretion in imposing a suspended sentence, taking into account the unique circumstances of the case. The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld. The court emphasised that each case must be considered on its own merits, and that the principles of sentencing must be applied flexibly to ensure just outcomes.

Orders