Langbein v The Queen - [2009] HCATrans 329

[2009] HCATrans 329

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S187 of 2009

B e t w e e n -
MARK LANGBEIN
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GUMMOW J
HAYNE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 11 DECEMBER 2009, AT 2.56 PM

MR G.D. WENDLER: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Saba El-Hanania Lawyers)

MS D.M.L. WOODBURNE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW))

GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Wendler.

MR WENDLER: Your Honours, before I open the application, can I just resolve a couple of preliminary matters. First there is the issue of time. I understand this is not that application for the extension of time.

GUMMOW J: Yes, you need an extension of time.

MR WENDLER: I understand it is not opposed.

GUMMOW J: Is it opposed?

MS WOODBURNE: That is not opposed.

GUMMOW J: You have that extension.

MR WENDLER: Yes, thank you. The other matter briefly, before I move to handle the substance of the application is that it was discovered that the indictment in the application book was not the indictment that sent the applicant to trial. I understand your Honours have the correct indictment.

GUMMOW J: Yes, we do now.

MR WENDLER: I caused that indictment to be inserted in the application book. Can I move then to handle the two special leave areas that comprise this application. They can be described conveniently as the summing‑up function point and the legal relationship between two important sections in criminal practice in this State and generally, namely, section 66(2) and section 108(3) informed by section 192 of the Evidence Act.

Can I deal with the second point first. It is the relationship between those sections which are two exceptions, one being an exception to the hearsay rule, the other an exception to the credibility rule of evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trial judge’s ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence of complaint was erroneous. That finding by the Court of Criminal Appeal is clearly correct. The ruling by the trial judge was contrary to the treatment by this Court of the legal nature of section 66(2) which required that close temporal connection between the ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J: The section has now been amended, has it not?

MR WENDLER: Yes, it has. I have inserted in the authorities list the amended section which came into operation, I think, in January this year but was not in operation at the trial of the applicant. Nevertheless, the amended section still builds in a time requirement as being one of the considerations in relation to the application of the section.

The Court of Criminal Appeal effectively resolved the erroneous evidence ruling by the trial judge by applying the proviso as well as the application of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Langbein v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Langbein v The Queen [2009] HCATrans 329
Case: [2009] HCATrans 329
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Langbein, against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence in criminal proceedings.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior convictions and prior convictions of a co-accused, which the applicant argued were unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded under the rules of evidence.

The High Court analysed the principles governing the admission of evidence of prior convictions, particularly in circumstances where such evidence might be relevant to a fact in issue but also carries a significant risk of prejudice. Their Honours referred to established authorities on the admissibility of such evidence, emphasising the need for a careful balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. The Court ultimately found that the trial judge had not erred in admitting the evidence, as it was considered relevant to establishing a common course of conduct and was properly admitted.

Orders