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Laird v Laird

Laird v Laird

Case [2021] VSC 352 18 June 2021

Equitable Estoppel

Constructive Trust

Representative Litigation

Detriment

Succession Law

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

TRUSTS, EQUITY AND PROBATE LIST

S ECI 2020 02591
S ECI 2020 02406
S ECI 2020 03773

BETWEEN:
ELLEN DOUGLAS LAIRD (by Suzanne Lyttleton her administrator)	Plaintiff
v
NEALE DOUGLAS LAIRD	First Defendant
-and-
STUART GRAEME LAIRD	Second Defendant

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JUDGE:	McMillan J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	25, 26 & 27 November 2020; 18 May 2021
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	18 June 2021
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Laird v Laird & Anor
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2021] VSC 352 (First Revision 24 January 2022)

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WILLS AND ESTATES — Application for summary possession by administrator — Equitable claims by adult sons — Whether constructive trusts — Whether proprietary estoppel — Whether representations — Whether reasonable reliance — Whether knew or ought to have known about reliance — Whether detriment — Death of plaintiff — Lapse of appointment of administrator — Application to re-open evidence.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Mr D Aghion	Bardoel & Adams
For the First Defendant	Mr S Hay QC and Ms R Grayson Morrison	MST Lawyers
For the Second Defendant	Mr D Connors	Mepstead Lawyers

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

The plaintiff, Mrs Ellen Laird, lived on a small farming property at Rowallan Avenue, Harkaway (‘Harkaway’). When the proceeding commenced she was 93 years of age and had lived at Harkaway for the majority of her life with her husband, Mr Keith Laird. Keith and Ellen had seven children: Stuart, David, Eric, Clyde, Neale, Susan and Euan. Keith died in 2012. Preceding May 2012 Ellen suffered cognitive decline and, in May 2018, Ms Suzanne Lyttleton was appointed administrator of Ellen’s estate.

Respectively, Neale and Stuart are the first and second defendants in this proceeding. Neale lived at Harkaway and also ran cattle there, while Stuart operated a plant nursery on a portion of the property.

During the administration of Ellen’s estate, Ms Lyttleton encountered difficulties in accessing liquid funds. In her capacity as administrator, she commenced this proceeding against Neale and Stuart, pursuant to Order 53 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (‘the Rules’), for summary possession of Harkaway (‘the Order 53 application’). It was Ms Lyttleton’s intention to use funds raised from the planned sale of Harkaway to provide for Ellen’s urgent care needs.

Separately, Neale and Stuart each commenced a proceeding against Ms Lyttleton in her capacity as administrator, asserting equitable interests in Harkaway.

All three proceedings were heard together in November 2020. At that time, Neale and Stuart conceded that Harkaway had to be sold in order to fund care arrangements for Ellen, and on 27 November 2020 interim orders (‘the Interim Orders’) were made to that effect. Otherwise, judgment was reserved.

On 25 December 2020 and before judgment was handed down, Ellen died and, as a consequence of her death, Ms Lyttleton’s appointment as administrator lapsed.[1]
[1]Guardianship and Administration Act 2019 (Vic) s 54.

Neale and Stuart now seek that the Interim Orders be…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Laird v Laird

Details

AGLC: Laird v Laird [2021] VSC 352
Case: [2021] VSC 352
Decision Date: 18 June 2021

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Laird v Laird, the dispute arose between the executors of an estate and the adult sons of the deceased, concerning claims of equitable interests in the estate. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The sons argued that they held equitable claims in the estate, including constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel, based on representations made by their father and their reasonable reliance on those representations, which resulted in detriment to them. The case took a procedural turn when the plaintiff, who had been appointed as administrator of the estate, died during the proceedings, leading to a cessation of their authority. Consequently, the defendants sought to re-open the evidence to address the legal issues raised.

The legal issues before the court included whether the sons' claims of constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel were valid, and whether there were sufficient representations made by the father that the sons reasonably relied upon, to the detriment of the sons. The court had to determine whether the father knew or ought to have known about the sons' reliance on the representations, and whether the sons indeed suffered a detriment that could give rise to an equitable claim. The procedural issue also involved the effect of the plaintiff's death on the ongoing proceedings and the appropriateness of re-opening the evidence.

The court held that the sons' claims for constructive trusts were not substantiated by the evidence, as there were no clear and unequivocal representations by the father that would give rise to such trusts. Regarding proprietary estoppel, the court found that while the sons had reasonably relied on representations made by their father, there was insufficient evidence to show that the father knew or ought to have known about this reliance. Additionally, the detriment suffered by the sons did not meet the threshold required to establish proprietary estoppel. Consequently, the sons' claims failed. The court also determined that the death of the plaintiff did not necessitate the re-opening of evidence, as the claims were not likely to succeed on the existing evidence.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the sons' claims and denied the request to re-open the evidence. The defendants were ordered to pay the costs of the application.

Orders