Lagrange and Comcare (Compensation) [2021] AATA 4369 (25 November 2021)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Numbers: 2021/1783
2021/2281
Re:Diana Lagrange
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President Boyle
Date:25 November 2021
Place:Perth
Pursuant to s 42B(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the applications are dismissed.
...[SGD].....................................................................
Deputy President Boyle
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for dismissal (AAT Act s 42B(1)) – whether application is vexatious – costs: applicability of SRC Act sub-ss 67(1), (2), (8) – Tribunal’s powers statutory – circumstances of the case do not meet the requirements of SRC Act sub-ss 67(2) or (8) – under current program Applicant receives what she sought – no practical purpose would be served by a successful review of the decision the subject of the applications – proceedings have become frivolous – applications dismissed
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A(b), 33(1)(b), 42B, 42B(1), 42B(1)(a)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) ord 59
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 37, 62(1) 62(2), 62(5) 67, 67(1), 67(2), 67(8)
CASES
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 406
Fearnley v Australian Fisheries Management Authority [2006] FCAFC 3; (2006) 94 ALD 519
Flahive and Comcare [2021] AATA 2444
Greczanik and Australian Postal Corporation [1994] AATA 160
Lees v Comcare [1999] FCA 753; (1999) ALD 84
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2007] FCAFC 59; (2007) FCR 525
Williams and Australian Electoral Commission [1995] AATA 160; (1995) 38 ALD 366
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President Boyle
25 November 2021
THE APPLICATION
The Respondent seeks dismissal of the two applications under s 42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) on the basis that the applications are frivolous and/or vexatious.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are largely taken from the Respondent’s dismissal submissions dated 17 August 2021. They appear not to be contested by the Applicant.
The Applicant was employed as an “emergency and remote registered nurse” when she fell and suffered an injury.
The Respondent has accepted liability under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (SRC Act) for “contusion of hip and thigh (left)” with a date of injury of 16 May 2012 (the injury).
The Applicant was paid incapacity payments for a limited period in 2012, for 13 weeks in 2017 and significant periods of incapacity in 2018 following surgery.
Following her injury in 2012, the Applicant continued to work in the casual pool at the Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital (emergency department) as well as engaging in various remote work at Wheatstone and Queensland, until July 2017 when she had her first surgery.
Following that surgery, a work trial rehabilitation program was organised pursuant to s 37 of the SRC…
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- Lagrange and Comcare (Compensation) [2021] AATA 4369
- Case
- [2021] AATA 4369
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the applications had become frivolous or vexatious, and whether there was any practical purpose in continuing the review. The Tribunal considered its powers under section 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1993 (Cth), which are limited to reviewing a reviewable decision. The Tribunal noted that the rehabilitation plans under review had expired, and that a new program was being developed which incorporated the Applicant's desired goal.
Deputy President Boyle P reasoned that the Tribunal's jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the specific decisions that were the subject of the reviewable decision, which in this case related to expired rehabilitation plans. The Tribunal accepted submissions that a review of these expired plans would serve no practical purpose, as the Applicant was now receiving what she sought through the new program. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the proceedings had become frivolous, even if not initially instituted vexatiously, as there was no longer any benefit to be gained by retrospectively altering the wording of the expired plans.
The Tribunal ordered that the applications for review be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Respondent’s written submissions filed on 17 August 2021 were to the following effect:(a)The powers of the Tribunal under s 43(1) of the AAT Act are powers for the purpose of reviewing the reviewable decision, not powers that may be exercised at large.[24] (b)The Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to this application is limited to reviewing plans which have now expired. In accordance with the decision in Lees, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the current plan which has not been the subject of a reviewable decision.(c)The Tribunal is therefore left in a situation where it is asked to make changes to two plans which are no longer in existence and therefore there is no longer any practical purpose proceeding with this review.(d)The applications should be dismissed because they have become frivolous or vexatious.[25](e)The applications, whilst not instituted vexatiously, have now become vexatious as there is no practical purpose in the Tribunal retrospectively changing the language used in a plan which has now ceased to exist.(f)Any change to the wording of the expired plan, including the requested change to the wording of the goal of the plan, would not be a decision that is more favourable to the Applicant, because the change would have no practical effect. This is because any change to the expired plan would not provide any benefit to the Applicant and no additional rehabilitation would be available, nor would there be any additional compensation payable.[24] Citing Lees at [39].[25] Citing Flahive at [16]–[18].CONSIDERATION At the hearing Mr Lourey succinctly described the Applicant’s position as follows:The program that is now being developed by the parties is directed towards that goal, so my client’s approach to this is that the subject matter of her application has indeed fallen away because the respondent is giving her, or is in the process of giving her what she has sought from the outset, which is a program with the content consistent of returning her to that pre injury role.My friend made submissions in relation to this not being a reconsideration of its own motion. One can easily understand why the [R]espondent would choose to characterise it as such, but the point is, sir, the application was necessary to get the respondent to focus on the issues that my client was agitating, which is, (1), a goal of the return to work program; and (2), activities in a program consistent with the achievement of that goal.Now, with the changes taking effect and the development of content particular to that goal, the subject matter of the application as brought did fall away, but what this boils down to is, it’s about costs. My client met the costs. My client has sought legal assistance to effect the change in what was happening on the ground that she desired, and she’s been successful with that. The characterisation of the matter in the way my friend’s client’s chosen to do through my friend’s submissions, my client disagrees vehemently, sir. She should not be deprived of her costs of this application on the basis of anything that’s now claimed by the [R]espondent.[26][26] transcript at 10.