Labi and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration)

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Labi and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2016] AATA 316 (17 May 2016)

Division

GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s)

2016/1073

Re

Peter Labi

APPLICANT

And

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Deputy President Bernard McCabe

Date 17 May 2016
Place Brisbane

The decision under review is set aside. In substitution, the Tribunal is satisfied the discretion in s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refuse the applicant's visa on character grounds should not be exercised.

............................[Sgd]............................................

Deputy President Bernard McCabe

Catchwords

MIGRATION – partner visa application – refused on character grounds – s 501 character test – where applicant sent threatening text messages – breach of protection order – otherwise unblemished criminal record – whether applicant likely to engage in criminal conduct – whether there is a risk the applicant will harass or intimidate another person – low risk of engaging in criminal conduct – no application for applicant to appear by video-link – expectation that applicants and witnesses appear in person unless leave is granted – decision under review set aside

Legislation

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 500(6H), 501(1), 501(6), 501(7)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 33, 33A, 39(1), 43

Cases

Kirby v Centro Properties Limited [2012] FCA 60; (2012) 288 ALR 601

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pirovic Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 544

Campaign Master (UK) Ltd v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1306; (2009) 181 FCR 152

Secondary Materials

Administrative Appeals Tribunal General Practice Direction cl. 4.54, 4.56

Direction No. 65 – Migration Act 1958 – Direction under section 499 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of mandatory cancelation of a visa under s 501CA cl. 6, 8, 11, 12

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President Bernard McCabe

17 May 2016

  1. Peter Labi is a citizen of Papuan New Guinea (PNG). He was living in Australia with his partner and their young son until the relationship broke down and the partner moved out. She took out a domestic and family violence protection order against the applicant. Their son was also named in the final order. The order included a condition that the applicant “be of good behaviour towards the Aggrieved”. There is no evidence that the applicant was ever violent towards either his former partner or their child, but he was arrested on 21 April 2015 after he left a threatening message on her voice mail and sent a series of objectionable text messages. He pleaded guilty to a charge of contravening the conditions of the domestic violence order. The Magistrate imposed a fine of $750 and did not record a conviction. But that was not the end of the matter: the applicant was immediately placed in immigration detention. He has been there ever since.

  2. The applicant was on a bridging visa at the time all this occurred. He was waiting for his Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Visa application to be finalised. The application was lodged…

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Details
Case
[2016] AATA 316
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for review by Mr Labi of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse his partner visa on character grounds. The refusal was based on Mr Labi's past conduct, specifically sending threatening text messages and breaching a protection order, which led the delegate to believe he posed a risk of engaging in criminal conduct or harassing another person in Australia. The case was heard by Deputy President Bernard McCabe.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Mr Labi satisfied the character test under section 501 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), and if not, whether the discretion to refuse the visa should be exercised. This involved assessing the risk of Mr Labi engaging in future criminal conduct or harassing another person, and considering the principles outlined in Ministerial Direction No. 65. A secondary issue arose regarding the applicant's appearance at the hearing, with the Tribunal's General Practice Direction requiring applicants to appear in person unless leave for remote attendance is granted, a procedure not followed in this instance.

Deputy President McCabe reasoned that while Mr Labi's past conduct did enliven the discretion to refuse the visa, the risk of future offending was low. He noted that Mr Labi had an otherwise unblemished criminal record and that considerations such as the impact on his child weighed in his favour. The Deputy President also found that the Tribunal had not followed the correct procedure regarding the applicant's attendance at the hearing, as arrangements for him to appear remotely from detention were not properly requested or granted. Applying the principles from Ministerial Direction No. 65, and considering all relevant factors, the Deputy President concluded that the discretion to refuse the visa should not be exercised.

Consequently, the decision under review was set aside. In substitution, the Tribunal was satisfied that the discretion under section 501(1) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) to refuse the applicant's visa on character grounds should not be exercised.

Orders

Orders of the court

The decision under review is set aside. In substitution, the Tribunal is satisfied the discretion in s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refuse the applicant's visa on character grounds should not be exercised.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The expectations with respect to telephone or video evidence are clearly explained in the Tribunal’s General Practice Direction, which says:Telephone or video evidence 4.54 If you or the decision-maker would like a witness to give evidence at a hearing by telephone or video, a request must be made to the presiding member. Unless we allow otherwise, the request must be made in writing and must: (a) set out the reasons for the request; and (b) state whether the other party agrees to the request. The member may decide to hold a directions hearing before deciding whether the request will be granted. That procedure was not followed in this case. Mr Labi is being detained at a facility in Darwin. The Tribunal convened a directions hearing not long before the date of the hearing when it became apparent the respondent did not propose bringing Mr Labi to Brisbane. At that directions hearing, the respondent’s representative said it would be impossible for the applicant to be transported from Darwin to Brisbane for the purposes of the hearing. I was told it takes 3-5 weeks to arrange transport for a detainee. Those arrangements were not made, but it may be they were never contemplated. The representative explained the respondent had a policy of housing detainees in s 501 cases in Darwin (or on Christmas Island, which is even more remote) because these individuals had to be segregated from other detainees who had not been accused of a crime. I was also told the Darwin detention centre was the closest centre to the applicant’s home in Cairns. I do not question or criticise the arrangements the respondent makes to house detainees. That is an operational matter for him. If the respondent says he will encounter unreasonable expense or logistical difficulty if required to bring an applicant before the Tribunal, the respondent is free to make a request for the applicant to appear remotely – although the cost and inconvenience ought to be described, rather than merely asserted. If there are security reasons which suggest a remote hearing is preferable, let that be said. But it should be said early on, preferably at the case management directions hearing which is ordinarily conducted soon after an application for review is filed. When making the request, the respondent should clearly identify what measures will be taken at the detention centre or other remote location to ensure the person will be able to fully participate in the hearing. The applicant must also have an opportunity to explain why the hearing should proceed in person, assuming that is what he or she prefers. The Tribunal will then undertake a balancing exercise and decide “what will best serve the administration of justice consistently with maintaining justice between the parties”: Kirby v Centro Properties Limited [2012] FCA 60 at [11] per Gordon J; see also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pirovic Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 544 at [11] per Flick J. In the absence of a direction under s 33A, the parties should expect the hearing will proceed in person. In that event, the respondent must make arrangements to convey the applicant to that hearing if he or she is being detained elsewhere.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, that decision did not affect Mr Labi’s application for the partner visa. The decision to refuse that application on character grounds is the subject of the proceedings before me.The decision to refuse the applicant’s Partner visa on character grounds The Minister or his delegate has the power under s 501(1) to refuse to issue a visa – in this case, a partner visa – because the applicant is unable to satisfy the Minister that the applicant is able to pass the character test. The character test is discussed in s 501(6). Most of the cases that make it to the Tribunal for review involve persons who have a substantial criminal record within the meaning of s 501(7). A person with a substantial criminal record is automatically deemed not to satisfy the character test: s 501(6)(a). There is no suggestion the applicant has a substantial criminal record; indeed, apart from the incident referred to earlier which resulted in a fine and an unrecorded conviction, the records confirm he does not have a criminal record at all. The delegate has relied instead on the grounds referred to in s 501(6)(d)(i) and (ii). The relevant part of that sub-section says :(d) in the event the person were allowed to enter or to remain in Australia, there is a risk that the person would: (i) engage in criminal conduct in Australia; or (ii) harass, molest, intimidate or stalk another person in Australia… Of course, there is always at least some risk that any visa holder might do any of the things referred to in s 501(6)(d). I accept there is a higher risk that the applicant might engage in criminal conduct or intimidate or stalk another person in Australia if he remained here if only because he specifically threatened to track down anyone his former partner was seeing with a view to administering a beating. While it will become apparent I have doubts as to the magnitude of the risk involved, I accept the discretion to refuse is enlivened because the decision-maker cannot be satisfied the applicant passes the character test. How should the discretion in s 501(1) be exercised in this case? The starting point for my analysis is the ministerial direction issued pursuant to s 499 of the Act. Direction No. 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of mandatory cancelation of a visa under s 501CA (the Direction) is the most recent iteration of the ministerial policy that provides binding guidance to decision-makers on the exercise of the discretion. The Preamble includes a discussion of the objectives of the process, and notes (in clause [6.2(1)]):The Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens. With that passage in mind, the Direction goes on to set out a series of Principles at [6.3]. I will not repeat them here, but they must inform the exercise of the discretion. The Direction is then divided into Parts A, B and C. Part A deals with decisions to cancel the visa of an existing visa-holder, while Part C deals with a decision to revoke a mandatory cancellation. The relevant part of the Direction for the purposes of this case is Part B, which deals with decisions to refuse a non-citizen’s visa. Clause [8(1)] of the Direction explains it is appropriate to distinguish between non-citizens who already hold a substantive visa that may be cancelled and a visa applicant because:non-citizens holding a substantive visa will generally have an expectation that they will be permitted to remain in Australia for the duration of the visa, whereas a visa applicant should have no expectation that a visa application will be approved.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I am satisfied the Australian community would not expect that Mr Labi would be refused a visa on character grounds. Other considerations The Direction says I may also have regard to other relevant considerations, albeit they carry less weight than the primary considerations. I would say at once there are no international non-refoulement obligations here, and no impact on Australian business interests: clauses [12.1] and [12.4]. Clause [12.2] requires that I consider the interests of other family members who might be adversely affected if the applicant were required to leave. I have already referred to the negative impact on the applicant’s child if the visa were refused. That consideration weighs against refusal. I was also told the applicant’s brother’s family lived in Cairns, and that he had a close relationship with them. I was not provided with any other evidence about the relationship so it is difficult to assign a great deal of weight to that claim. Clause [12.3] requires that I consider the impact on victims. It is difficult to gauge what impact there might be on the applicant’s former partner if the applicant were granted a visa. She did not provide any evidence, and there is at least some evidence that she and the applicant have had amicable contact while the applicant has been in detention. I am not satisfied this factor weighs against the applicant.Conclusion The first of the three primary considerations weighs against the applicant, but not heavily. The second primary consideration weighs in the applicant’s favour, while the third primary consideration does not weigh against him. The other considerations are of little weight in the circumstances. I am satisfied that, on balance, the discretion to refuse the visa on character grounds should not be exercised. I should note that at the hearing – before the notes from Dr Walker came to light – I suggested an independent assessment of the applicant might be so important in the circumstances that I would consider setting aside the decision and remitting it for reconsideration under s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the AAT Act with a direction that the respondent reconsider its decision having regard to an assessment. But the respondent subsequently provided the records of Dr Walker’s interview. I am satisfied those records provide sufficient basis for my finding that the applicant poses a low risk of offending. While ideally a more extensive report would be provided, the Direction points out (at clause [6.2(2)] that decisions should be made in a timely manner – out of fairness to the non-citizen, but also to maintain integrity and public confidence in the decision-making process. This process has gone on long enough: the applicant has been in detention for over a year, and the stress of his ordeal is leading to psychiatric symptoms. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded it would be appropriate to remit the matter under s 43 of the AAT Act. There may be an argument I should not have relied on the information from Dr Walker in circumstances where the respondent has not had the opportunity to test the evidence through cross-examination. But that seems unavoidable where the information was provided after the hearing. The time limits inherent in the process mean it would be practically impossible to resume the hearing, and the respondent did not ask for an opportunity to call Dr Walker (which could presumably be done if the matter were remitted under s 43(1)(c)(ii)). On balance, I am satisfied the best course was to make a final decision.