Kuay-Hoa & Hoa & Ors

[2012] FamCA 1110

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KUAY-HOA & HOA AND ORS [2012] FamCA 1110

FAMILY LAW – Costs

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth)

Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403
London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872
Oscar & Traynor [2008] FamCAFC 158
Re JJT; Ex parte Victoria Legal Aid (1998) 195 CLR 184

APPLICANT: Ms Kuay-Hoa

RESPONDENT:	Mr Hoa
SECOND RESPONDENT:	B Pty Ltd

THIRD RESPONDENT: Mr C

FOURTH RESPONDENT: Ms D

FILE NUMBER: MLC 931 of 2007

DATE DELIVERED: 20 December 2012

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Bennett J

HEARING DATE: By way of written submissions

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms E Swart

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Kennedy Guy

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:	In Person
COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT:	No Appearance
COUNSEL FOR THE THIRD RESPONDENT:	No Appearance

COUNSEL FOR THE FOURTH RESPONDENT: In Person

Orders

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The husband and the second named respondent be and are hereby jointly and separately liable for the wife’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings which were finalised on 16 September 2011 such costs to be calculated:-

   a)on a party/party basis;

   b)so as to exclude any costs incurred for and of and incidental to the application and hearing before Dessau J;

   c)so as to exclude any costs incurred of and incidental to the parenting proceedings; and

   d)so as to exclude the $20,000 conceded by the wife as not recoverable.

2. By not later than 12.00 noon on Friday 1 February 2013 the wife file and serve an itemised costs account in compliance with Rule 19.22 of the Family Law Rules.

3. By not later than Friday 1 March 2013 the husband and the second named respondent each file and serve any notice disputing costs upon which either seek to rely, such notices to be in compliance with Rule 19.23 of the Family Law Rules.

4. The parties attend a costs assessment in this Registry of the Court on Wednesday 20 March 2013 at 11.30 am and such costs assessment proceed regardless of whether any notice disputing costs has been filed or served.

IT IS DIRECTED THAT:

1. This Order and my reasons be sent by electronic means to any email address for any respondent known to the Court.

AND IT IS NOTED BY THE COURT that, in the event that a party fails to attend a hearing or defaults in the filing of documents or things required of him/her, the Court and the Registrar assessing costs may proceed to determine the matter without any input by the non-attending or defaulting party.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Kuay-Hoa & Hoa has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 931 of 2007

Ms Kuay-Hoa

Applicant

And

Mr Hoa

Respondent
And

B Pty Ltd

Second Respondent
And

Mr C

Third Respondent
And

Ms D

Fourth Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(COSTS)

1. On 16 September 2011 I delivered my decision in relation to financial matters after 21 days of a truncated hearing from 11 May 2009 to 26 July 2011.  My orders included:-

   (21)    Any application for costs be filed and served within 21 days and be supported by a written submission of not more than 7 pages (13 point font and 1.5 spacing) and have annexed to it a copy of any account for costs and disbursements which has been rendered to the application for costs and such other memorandum or estimate of costs upon which that party will rely for the purpose of estimating what (if any) funds ought to be withheld from other parties in anticipation of a costs order being made against the order parties (or any of them).

   (22)     Any respondent to an application for costs file and serve any written submissions upon which he/she seeks to rely not more than 21 days after service upon them of the application and such submissions be of not more than 7 pages (13 point font and 1.5 spacing) and specify whether he/she wishes to make oral submissions in addition to written submissions and have annexed to it a copy of any account for costs and disbursements which has been rendered to the application for costs and such other  memorandum or estimate of costs upon which that party will rely for the purpose of estimating what (if any) funds ought to be withheld from other parties in anticipation of a costs order being made against the order parties (or any of them).

   (23)     Any applicant for costs upon whom a response is served, file and serve any reply in writing, such reply to be of not more than 4 pages (13 point font and 1.5 spacing) and specify whether he/she wishes to make oral submissions in addition to written submissions and be filed within 14 days of receipt by him/her of the response.

   (24)     This matter be adjourned to 16 November 2011 at 9.00 am for a determination of what funds (if any) should be withheld from any of the parties pending a determination of any costs application against him/her.

2. On the adjourned date of 16 November 2011 I made a further order which included:-

   (1)      The time for the filing and service of a cost application pursuant to paragraph 21 of the Order made on 16 September 2011 (“the final property order”) be and is hereby extended to 10 October 2011 with the effect that the applicant’s application for costs and submissions as to costs were filed within time.

   (2)      Funds of $190,000 be withheld from any monies to which the husband is entitled pursuant to the final property order, such amount to be held by the wife’s solicitors on behalf of the husband in an interest bearing trust deposit pending a determination of the wife’s application for costs or further order of the Court.

   (3)      I reserve my decision on the wife’s application for costs to a date to be fixed and notified to the parties.

   (4)      I excuse all parties from attending Court for judgment in relation to costs and IT IS DIRECTED that my orders and reasons for decision be sent electronically to any party who does not attend.

3. There was no appearance by or on behalf of the respondent husband or the second, third or fourth respondents at the hearing on 16 November 2011.

   The costs application

4. The wife is the only party who has applied for a costs order in her favour. I have regard to her submissions which were filed on 10 October 2011.

5. Neither the husband nor Ms D filed or served any submissions in response but I am satisfied that they have been accorded procedural fairness.

6. I proceed with the matter on an unopposed basis.

7. By written submission filed on 10 October 2011 the wife seeks costs, in particular:-

   The wife makes an application that the husband and the Second

   Respondent, [B Pty Ltd] jointly and severally

   pay approximately two-thirds of her legal costs incurred in the

   proceedings and that this amount, or such amount as is available, be

   released from the first available sale proceeds, and a further $25,000 be withheld from the parties for the estimated costs of finalising the matter.

   The total costs incurred by the wife in relation to family court proceedings, are set out in the affidavit of Peter Rennick, Solicitor and total $262,899.07. The wife's costs have been costed on the Family Court scale by a costs consultant and the total costs include the children's matters and the divorce proceedings. The wife is seeking an order for costs of the property proceedings in the amount of $178,723.88 with such sum to be deducted from the husband's 52 per cent share of the matrimonial property. The method of calculating the costs sought is set out in the Annexure A (which was included).

   The law

8. Section 117 of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) provides that each party to proceedings under the Act shall bear his or her own costs. The object is to ensure that parties are not deterred from bringing or maintaining legitimate applications for fear of incurring an intolerable financial burden if they lose.[1]  However, the Court retains a discretion to make an order for costs if it is of the opinion there are circumstances that justify that course and it would be just to do so.

   [1]          In the Marriage of Kohn (1977) 30 FLR 175 at 177.

9. In considering whether to make an order the Court must have regard to the matters set out in s.117(2A). The weight to be attached to any of the considerations in subs (2A) is wholly discretionary. The discretion is broad.

10. Whilst no single factor out-ranks any other factor, there is nothing to prevent one or other of them from being the sole foundation for a costs order.[2]  As Kay J observed in Brown & Brown[3] :

    In many cases there will be an outstanding feature . . . that makes an order for costs appropriate, a feature which so dominates the scene that it can outweigh any of the other s 117(2A) considerations.

    [2]          LAC and TRF and LKL [2005] Fam CA 158 at [41].

    [3] (1998) FLC 92-822 at 85,347.

11. Furthermore, Section 117AB of the Act provides that, if the court is satisfied that a party knowingly made a false allegation or statement in the proceedings, the court must order that party to pay some or all of the costs of the other party or parties to the proceedings. In this case, and for reasons stated in my reasons for judgment, I was satisfied that all parties knowingly made false statements and gave evidence falsely.

12. Notably, since the trial concluded and the decision has been delivered, s 117AB has been repealed by the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth) (“the amending legislation”). However, Item 40 in Schedule 1 to the amending legislation provides that s 117AB now does not, under the table in item 2 in Schedule 1 of that Act, apply in proceedings that are instituted after 7 June 2012. The proceedings in respect of which the wife seeks a costs order precede the amending legislation and 7 June 2012 so s 117AB is applicable and I will have regard to it.

The wife’s submissions

1. Notwithstanding that starting position in s117 of the Family Law Act (Cth) that each party bear his or her own costs, the wife says that the circumstances of this case justify the Court making an order for costs in her favour on the basis of s 117(2) of the Act.

2. It is submitted on behalf of the wife the relevant factors under s 117(2A) are ­

   (a) the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings; ­

   (c) the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;

   (e) whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;

   (g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.

3. The wife’s submissions were fairly and responsibly drawn and made concessions where concessions ought to have been made.  In particular, that, as the wife gave some evidence dishonestly, allowance must be made for costs incurred as a result.

4. I accept much of what was submitted on behalf of the wife.

5. I take into account the evidence as it was at the trial and from my reasons for decision[4].

   [4]          [2009] FamCA 1093

6. The wife does not seek to augment her submissions by oral submissions and, by virtue of the other parties not having filed anything in opposition, there is no need for her to respond.

The financial circumstances of the parties: the wife

1. I accept that the wife is in receipt of Centrelink Benefits to support herself and the children.  She will however receive something in the nature of an estimated $980,000 from the sale proceeds of the E Street apartment and the F Street land, subject to sale price, selling costs and capital gains tax. $223,000 of the wife's legal costs bills remain unpaid.  This will reduce her estimated cash entitlement to $757,000.  The wife is also responsible for her post-separation credit card debts which were about $56,000 and the accumulated debt to her brother in law of approximately $100,000.  Payment of these debts reduces her cash entitlement by a further $156,000 to approximately $600,000.

2. The wife will need to rehouse herself and the children with the proceeds of her settlement within a reasonable travelling distance of the children's schools which are located within the suburb of Suburb G in Melbourne.

3. I am satisfied that the wife can ill afford the costs of this proceeding.

The financial circumstances of the parties: the husband

1. At the conclusion of the hearing, the husband was still supporting himself without the assistance of Centrelink, he said by borrowed funds.  Apart from some assistance from Andma Lawyers, now in liquidation, early in the interim stages of the proceedings, the husband did not have legal representation.

2. The husband will receive an estimated cash payment of about $720,000 after sale of the real properties, plus he will retain the H Street commercial property valued at $135,000.  He does not have a significant account for legal costs and in any event his evidence was that he had paid the outstanding account.  The Court was not satisfied that his alleged $223,100 debt to OMI moneylenders actually exists but in any event he would have ample funds to meet his debts, even with the payment of legal costs sought by the wife.

The financial circumstances of the parties: Ms D

1. Ms D did not file a financial statement but gave evidence that she was supported predominantly by cash sent by her parents with various persons from time to time.  She gave evidence that she consulted a lawyer early in her involvement in the proceedings either on her own behalf or on behalf of the company B Pty Ltd and whilst no documents were filed on her behalf by a lawyer, the sworn documents were provided to the wife and annexed to her trial affidavit.  She did not incur significant legal costs in running the proceedings.

2. Notwithstanding that I found that Ms D deliberately made false statements in the proceedings, the wife does not seek a formal order of costs against her.  It was submitted, and I accept, that Ms D is significantly involved in the financial affairs of the husband and an order for costs against the husband and the company would appear to also affect her.

3. The wife did not seek and the Court did not make orders that Ms D's appointment as director of the company be set aside and they have not been. Accordingly, Ms D will be put to some trouble and expense in arranging the affairs of the company to enable the F Street property to be sold and the annual return of the company to be lodged with ASIC and the Australian Taxation Office to enable the Capital Gains Tax to be paid on the sale of F Street.

   The financial circumstances of the Second Respondent, B Pty Ltd

4. Ms D represented the company, the second respondent, in the proceedings and it did not incur any legal costs.  The company shareholding has been returned to the husband pursuant to the orders and the company will retain the H Street property and the rent received on it and the balance of the proceeds from the sale of F Street, after payments for taxes as provided in the orders.  The order for costs sought by the wife will still leave the company financially viable.  The wife seeks that the company be jointly and severally liable for the costs ordered on her behalf which is appropriate given that the assets from which the costs will be paid are the assets of both the husband and the company (of which he holds 100 per cent of the shares pursuant to the orders).

   The financial circumstances of the Third Respondent

5. The third respondent, the husband's father did not participate in the proceedings, nothing is known of his financial circumstances and no order is sought against him for costs.

The conduct of the parties to the proceedings (Section 117(2A)(c))

The husband's conduct

1. I have found that the husband and Ms D ran a case in this Court which was fictional, more make belief than real, in an effort to defeat the wife’s claim to an alteration of property interests.

2. The husband provided no documents of significance by way of financial disclosure.  The wife's solicitor was put to the trouble and expense of obtaining any relevant documents on subpoena and then when confronted with those documents in cross-examination, refused to make any appropriate concession.

3. The husband did more than simply refuse to provide documents to enable the wife to identify the pool of divisible assets.  In particular, through Ms D, the husband was instrumental in creating false financial documents, such as the purported declaration of trust documents in favour of the husband's father.  The husband created a story in defence of the wife's proper claim for an alteration of property interests which occupied weeks of the court's time and which was ultimately found to be a fabrication.

4. The husband's refusal to use the interpreters as directed by the Court significantly extended the hearing time of his evidence in the trial by up to 4 times with a corresponding effect on the wife's costs.

5. The husband's refusal to make appropriate concessions in the witness box when confronted with documentary evidence extended the hearing time and added to the wife's costs.

   Ms D's conduct  

6. Ms D, mainly on behalf of the company but also on her own account, deliberately misled the court about her involvement with the company and the husband's financial affairs.  She lied to a brazen degree.  She created false documents and gave false evidence.  She refused to make appropriate concessions and assisted the husband in his attempt to keep the assets of the company from the wife.

The Company's conduct

1. I accept the wife’ submission that the actions of Ms D as director were the actions of the company.  The company did not produce proper records to the Court.  The company officer (Ms D) lied and deliberately misled the Court.  It is appropriate that the company share the costs of the wife in bringing her claim before the court.

The wife's conduct

1. The wife's conduct must also be criticised.  In particular, she filed a false financial statement at the commencement of the proceedings in which she did not disclose money received from her father into her Citibank account and later invested in shares.  She ultimately conceded in the witness box that she lied in her evidence in explaining what happened to that money.  The false financial statement was significant in that it was the basis of the order for sale of the H Street property to enable the wife’s litigation funding.  Ultimately, the $30,000 received by her was conceded to be appropriately categorised as a partial property settlement rather than litigation funding.  The wife also lied as to particulars of a transaction and maintained that dishonest stance all afternoon of one day of giving evidence.  It was a trivial matter about which to give false evidence.  Ultimately, she explained that having lied once, she thought she must be consistent. 

2. It was submitted that the conduct by the wife, in knowingly giving false evidence, is partly why the wife only seeks that part of her costs be paid and that none of the costs of her previous lawyers in the proceedings before Justice Dessau be the subject of a costs order, they being the proceedings in respect of which the wife filed a false financial statement in which she did not disclose money received from her father which she paid into her Citibank account and later invested in shares.

3. I am satisfied that the wife can ill afford to pay costs which ought not to have been incurred or which were incurred in circumstances in which they should not have been and the money has been wasted.

   Whether any party has been wholly unsuccessful (s117(2A)(e) and other relevant matters (s117(2A)(g))

1. The husband and Ms D on behalf of the company have been wholly unsuccessful in their applications.  Each sought that the wife's financial application be dismissed.  It was not.

2. Frequently it is convenient to discuss, in the context of ss117(2A)(e), whether the case of the party who has been wholly unsuccessful had merit nonetheless. I am satisfied that there was no merit in the position of the husband or Ms D. They conspired to, and did, run a case solely motivated to defeat the wife’s legitimate interests and did so at great cost to the wife.

3. The husband and Ms D both sought that the assets of the company not be included in the pool of divisible assets.  However, they were included.  Both sought that the wife's caveats be removed.  They will not be removed until the properties are sold.

4. The husband sought that the asset pool be found to be negative and said that there were debts against the E Street apartment.  The debt to the National Australia Bank and the debt to DMI in Country I, if it exists, were both treated as post-separation debt.

Other relevant matters

1. It was submitted by the wife that she made a reasonable offer to settle the proceedings at a Conciliation Conference on 12 November 2008 in the amount of $1.1 million.  It is said that the offer was made early in the wife's current solicitors involvement in the proceedings having been engaged by the wife in September 2008 and before the bulk of the legal costs were incurred. Effectively the wife seeks no legal costs from the respondents for the period prior to the November 2008 conciliation conference.  There are circumstances in which regard may be had to such an offer but, as the wife’s likely entitlement is less than the amount for which she said she would settle the action in 2008, I have no regard to the offer.

Effect of s117AB: knowingly giving false evidence

1. Given that all parties lied, the operation of s117AB is that the Court must make an order for all or some of the costs of the other parties to be paid by that party.

2. Significantly, the husband and Ms D on behalf of the second respondent:-

   a.represented themselves;

   b.make no application that the wife pay his or its costs.

3. In the case of Oscar & Traynor [2008] FamCAFC 158 the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia comprised of May, Thackray and Benjamin JJ considered a costs application by the mother who was a litigant in person. Their Honours noted that there was no definition of “costs” in the Act but that in Re JJT; Ex parte Victoria Legal Aid (1998) 195 CLR 184 at p 129, Hayne J said:

   On its face, then, the reference in s 117 to “costs” is a reference to “costs” as that word is ordinarily understood in the law: the amount which the person to whom the order is directed must pay to some party to the litigation as partial indemnity for the professional legal fees and expenses incurred by that party in the course of the litigation.

1. Their Honours further stated: The term “costs” is defined in the Dictionary to the Rules as meaning “… an amount paid or to be paid for work done by a lawyer, and includes expenses.”  The term “expense” is defined in the Dictionary as meaning “… an amount paid to a third party, other than a lawyer, for work done in a case or services provided for a party.”

2. In determining what costs and expenses can be recovered by a self-represented litigant it is instructive to consider the case of Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 in which the majority, comprised of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ, found that “costs” under the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) meant:

   …reimbursement for work done or expenses incurred by a practitioner or practitioner’s employee.  Compensation for the loss of time of a litigant in person cannot be said to constitute costs within the meaning of the rules.

   Their Honours noted the exception that a solicitor who successfully acted for himself would be entitled to

   …the same costs as if he had ex employed a solicitor, except for items such as obtaining instructions or attendances, which were unnecessary because he was his own client.

   Their Honours noted that the justification for that exception as set out in the case of London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 was “somewhat dubious.”

3. In Oscar & Traynor the Full Court went on to outline a number of expenses which had been found to be properly recoverable as costs, which included: court fees; transcript costs on the basis that they cannot also be claimed as costs in connection with the trial; expenses for serving documents; freedom of information fees; fees for searching registers such as an ASIC search fee; appeal book binding; disbursements incurred by a litigation guardian; incidental expenses in relation to photocopying; postage and telephone and facsimile transmissions.  Their Honours further noted that there are “many cases in which a litigant has been awarded costs relating to the legal advice obtained in preparation for a hearing, although they did not have legal representation at the hearing itself.”  Their Honours noted that expenses which had been held not to be recoverable included: travelling costs; parking costs; and meals. 

4. It was submitted, and I accept, that wife's reduction of her costs claim is effectively an allowance of costs to the other non-represented parties in respect of the evidence which she gave falsely.  Further, the wife makes no claim for the costs for the early part of the case, partly due to her own false documents and partly as she would reasonably be expected to bear her own costs of the children's issues and a normally conducted property case.

5. It was submitted, and I accept, that a significant allowance has been made in the calculation of costs sought for these.  The wife also lied in Court in her explanation for the earlier false documents, thereby wasting court time.  Her costs claim is reduced by an estimate of the extra time wasted.

6. I will make an allowance as proposed by the wife.

Exercise of discretion as to costs

1. The discretion which I exercise is broad. The husband and the second respondent, through Ms D, mounted and pursued a case which was spectacularly unsuccessful and extremely costly to the wife giving a great of false evidence along the way.

2. I am satisfied that there are circumstances which justify husband and the second respondent paying the wife’s costs of part of the proceedings.  The part of the proceedings for which they are to pay costs is the remainder after the following are disregarded:-

   a.Cost incurred of and incidental to the application and hearing before Dessau J.;

   b.Cost incurred of and incidental to parenting proceedings;

   c.The $20,000 conceded by the wife as to not be recoverable.

3. I am mindful that the wife capped the disallowance as to costs for parenting proceedings at $5000.  I consider that the wife ought to be responsible for all of her costs associated with the parenting proceedings.

4. It appears that the costs itemised by the wife for the purpose of this application are calculated on a solicitor/client or an indemnity basis.  Having regard to the conduct of the husband and the second respondent, through Ms D, this is a matter which could well have attracted a costs order calculable on a solicitor/client or an indemnity basis.  However, having regard to the false evidence given by the wife, before Dessau J, early in the proceedings, I am satisfied that the just result is that the wife’s costs be recoverable on the more limited basis of party/party.

   Joint and several liability and source of payment

5. The wife seeks that the husband and the second respondent be jointly and severally liable for her costs.  I am satisfied that it is just to make that order.

6. The husband and the second respondent, through Ms D, acted in concert to attempt to defeat the wife’s claim and failed.  I was ultimately satisfied that the assets of the second respondent are the husband’s assets.

7. It is appropriate that the wife’s costs, when assessed, be recoverable from whomsoever of the husband and the second respondent first has funds which can be attached by the wife for that purpose.

8. The wife seeks that the respondents’ liability be satisfied out of the husband’s share of the proceeds of sale of real property which is to occur in accordance with the Order of 16 September 2011.  I accept that it is appropriate.  Indeed, I cannot envisage the liability be satisfied in any other way.  That said, it is a machinery provision and, if costs are recoverable from any other transaction, the wife can seek to be able to execute against another fund to which the husband and/or the second respondent are entitled.

   An assessment of costs

9. I have regard to the affidavit of Mr Rennick sworn 7 October 2011 in which costs are quantified.  Whether or not the husband and Ms D wish to oppose quantum, it is necessary for the costs to be taxed.  Accordingly, I will appoint an assessment conference with Registrar Riddiford on Wednesday 20 March 2013 at 11.00 a.m. and make provision for the filing of itemised costs and a notice disputing costs before then.

10. If any party does not attend the assessment, the assessment should proceed as an unopposed matter.

11. The address which was previously the husband’s address for service is a dwelling which I understand has been vacated by the husband and sold.  It is incumbent on him to file a notice of change of address for service and he has not done so.  Accordingly, my Order and these reasons will be sent to him at his last address for service.  The re-direction of post figured significantly in evidence in the financial proceedings so it is a distinct possibility that this mail could reach the husband but it is no fault of the wife or the Court if it does not. Out of an abundance of caution, I will direct that the reasons and Order also be transmitted to the email address for the husband (if any) last known to the Court.

$25000 to be withheld

1. The wife seeks that a further $25,000 be withheld from the proceeds to which the husband is entitled “for the estimated costs in finalising the matter”.

2. I have little doubt that the wife will incur further costs in finalising the matter. However, it is more appropriate that she make that claim after those costs are incurred and or relatively certain.

3. I will decline this aspect of the application but, in doing so, make clear that such costs can be sought subsequently.

   Conclusion

4. For the above reasons, I make orders set out at the commencement of these reasons.

I certify that the preceding sixty seven (67) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett delivered on 21 December 2012.

Associate:  Ms Janet Durham

Date:  21 December 2012