Krupin & Krupin (No 2) - [2024] FedCFamC1F 56

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Krupin & Krupin (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 56

File number:

BRC 5459 of 2014

Judgment of:

HOWARD J

Date of judgment:

9 February 2024

Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Property pool in dispute – Where the applicant makes claim for an equitable interest in property owned by the second respondent – Express trusts – Constructive trusts – Resulting trusts – Equitable estoppel – Where the third respondent makes a claim or claims of equitable interests in properties owned by the applicant, the first respondent and the fourth respondent – A consideration of the contributions based entitlements of the applicant and the first respondent – Contributions – Future needs – Justice and equity.

FAMILY LAW – TRUSTS – Trustee and beneficiary – Fiduciary relationship – Removal of a beneficiary without the beneficiary’s knowledge or consent – Unauthorised transfer of a share in the trustee company.

FAMILY LAW – ADDENDUM – Correction of the Reasons for Judgment pursuant to r 10.14(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1999 (Cth) s 140

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79, 80, 106A

Criminal Code (Qld) s 408C

Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss 11, 12

Cases cited:

Australian Building and Construction Commission v Parker (No 2) [2017] FCA 1082

Baumgartner v Baumgartner [1987] 164 CLR 137

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox 92; 30 ER 42

Eagle & Scarlett (No 2) [2020] FamCAFC 291

Engwirda v Engwirda & Ors [2000] QCA 61

Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41

Housing Commission of NSW v Pastoral Company Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSW LR 378

Huda v Huda (No 2) [2020] FCCA 1804; 61 Fam LR 257

Johansson & Johansson [2022] FedCFamC1A 74

Krupin & Krupin [2022] FedCFamC1A 136

Miller v Sutherland (1990) 14 FamLR 416

Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583;

Napier v Public Trustee (Western Australia) (1980) 55 ALJR 1

Owies and Owies v JJE Nominees Pty Ltd [2022] VSCA 142

Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46

Simpson v Hodges [2007] NSWSC 1230

Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108

Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447

Division:

Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs:

194

Date of last submission/s:

19 July 2023

Date of hearing:

15, 16, 17, 18, 19 May and 19 July 2023

Place:

Brisbane

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr Waterman

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Hofstee Lawyers

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr Jones

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Robert Bax & Associates

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Mr Hartnett

Solicitor for the Second Respondent:

Genuine Legal

Third and Fourth Respondents

Litigants in person

ORDERS

BRC 5459 of 2014

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MR KRUPIN

Applicant

AND:
MS KRUPIN

First Respondent

MS ANGELOFF

Second Respondent

MS PETROV

Third Respondent

B PTY LTD
Fourth Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

HOWARD J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 FEBRUARY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS ON A FINAL BASIS THAT:
1.The Registrar of this Court shall forward a copy of these Reasons for Judgment to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions for consideration as to whether or not the applicant (Mr Krupin) has committed any offence under s 408C of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (or any other offence) as outlined in these Reasons for Judgment and the Registrar of this Court shall make available, as may be required, the full transcript of these proceedings and exhibits and affidavits for inspection by any officers authorised in that behalf by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions or such other department or agency (including the Queensland Police Service and/or the Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions) as directed or requested by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
2.The parties have twenty-one (21) days from today’s date in which to forward to the Court a draft order reflecting the Reasons for Judgment.
3.After the expiration of twenty-one (21) days the Court shall list the matter for further mention and shall hear further from the parties in relation to the wording of the final orders to reflect the Reasons for Judgment.

ORDER MADE 14 FEBRUARY 2024
1.Pursuant to r 10.14(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), the Reasons for Judgment are amended to delete the reference to “all the parties” in paragraph 157 and to change the reference to “the parties to the s 79 property settlement proceedings, namely [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin] (note Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 7)”.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HOWARD J
Amended pursuant to rule 10.14(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) on 14 February 2024.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant Husband and the First Respondent Wife

The applicant husband is Mr Krupin. Mr Krupin was born in 1963 in Country M. He arrived in Australia in 1995 as a permanent resident on a skilled visa. He held both undergraduate and postgraduate qualifications when he arrived in Australia. Mr Krupin became an Australian citizen in 1997.
The first respondent wife is Ms Krupin. Ms Krupin was born in 1979 in Country L. Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin first met over the internet in about 1999. Ms Krupin travelled to Australia in 2000 and they commenced a relationship in that year. Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were married in 2001.
Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin have four children:
(a)Ms V born 2001;
(b)Ms W born 2003;
(c)Ms X born 2005; and
(d)Y born 2007.
Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin separated under one roof on 13 May 2013. In June 2014, Ms Krupin vacated the former matrimonial home. At that point in time, the children lived with Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin in a shared care arrangement – with changeovers occurring on a fortnightly basis. The parents were able to agree on final consent orders in relation to the four children. Those orders were made on 23 March 2016 by Judge Demack.[1] As the children got older they elected to spend more time with one or the other of their parents. Ms X lives with Ms Krupin. Ms X suffers from significant mental health problems. Y lives in a shared care arrangement – two weeks at a time with each parent. The divorce order in respect of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin became effective in 2014.
[1] Those orders were restated on 18 August 2016 by Judge Demack.
The Second Respondent
The second respondent is Ms Angeloff. The second respondent is the maternal grandmother. The second respondent is the mother of the first respondent.
Ms Angeloff was born in 1949 in Country L. Ms Angeloff and her son Mr O moved from Country L to Australia in 2005. One of the reasons that Ms Angeloff and Mr O migrated to Australia was that Mr Krupin had asked both Ms Angeloff and Mr O to move to Australia in order to assist Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin with caring for their four children; to assist with the upkeep of the family home (as both parents were working full-time); to assist with looking after investment properties; and to assist with working on the construction or renovation of houses or other properties in which Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were investing.
Ms Angeloff lived with Mr Krupin, Ms Krupin and the four children from the time that she migrated to Australia – until Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin separated on a final basis.
The Third and Fourth Respondents
The third respondent is Ms Petrov. Ms Petrov married Mr Krupin in 2015. It is said by Ms Petrov that she and Mr Krupin separated in November 2018. In mid-2023 Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin filed a joint application for divorce. This was five days prior to the commencement of the trial. The divorce order took effect in mid-2023. As at the date of the final hearing Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin remained living under one roof in the house situated at E Street, Suburb F QLD (“E Street”). As far as the Court is aware Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin remained living in the same residence throughout the trial and up to the time of the last submissions. I will return to the question of Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin’s separation later in these Reasons for Judgment.
Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin have two children together:
(a)Z born 2016; and
(b)AA born 2020.
Ms Petrov has told the Court that she was a professional in Country M before migrating to Australia. Ms Petrov arrived in Australia as a student and moved into the house at E Street in September 2014 – three months after Ms Krupin left the premises.
Ms Petrov is currently studying. Ms Petrov also has a degree in a different field. There is no evidence as to where those degrees were obtained.
The fourth respondent is B Pty Ltd. B Pty Ltd is the trustee of the Krupin Family Trust. The trust was established by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin in 2003. The trust deed lists Mr Krupin as a “Primary Beneficiary” and also lists Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin as the "primary beneficiaries". Mr Krupin is the Appointor and the Principal of the trust.
B Pty Ltd was incorporated in 2003 by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – for the purpose of acting as the corporate trustee for the trust. Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were both directors of B Pty Ltd until 2017. In 2017, without the knowledge or consent of Ms Krupin, she was removed as a director of B Pty Ltd.
When B Pty Ltd was incorporated, Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin both held one ordinary share each in the company. In 2017, Ms Krupin’s share in B Pty Ltd was transferred to Mr Krupin – without the knowledge or consent of Ms Krupin.
From mid-2017 until late 2017, Mr Krupin was the sole director of B Pty Ltd. In late 2017, Ms Petrov was appointed as a director of B Pty Ltd. Between late 2017 and mid-2019 both Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov were directors of B Pty Ltd. In mid-2019, Mr Krupin ceased being a director of B Pty Ltd. Since that date, Ms Petrov has been the sole director of B Pty Ltd. In mid-2019, Mr Krupin’s two shares in B Pty Ltd (which were then in his name) were transferred to Ms Petrov and since that time Ms Petrov has been the sole shareholder. I note the historical company search of B Pty Ltd dated 6 February 2023 is annexed to the affidavit of Ms Krupin filed 2 March 2023.
THE HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION
The history of this litigation has been summarised by Tree J in Krupin & Krupin [2022] FedCFamC1A 136 at [4] - [13]. It is not necessary to recount that history here again in these reasons. This is the third trial involving these parties.
There are five separate parties involved in the litigation before the court. There are three broad aspects to the litigation. They are as follows:
(a)Proceedings for property settlement under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. It is convenient to refer to the s 79 proceedings as the "matrimonial proceedings” in these reasons;
(b)Mr Krupin claims that a property situated at C Street, Suburb D, Qld (hereinafter referred to as “C Street”), registered in Ms Angeloff’s name, is in fact a property that is owned by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin and accordingly C Street should be included in the property pool for division in the matrimonial proceedings. Ms Angeloff resists this claim, as does Ms Krupin;
(c)A claim by Ms Petrov that she has an equitable interest in G Street, Suburb H (“G Street”). Ms Petrov claims (in her Amended Response document filed 19 January 2023) that G Street is not available for division in the matrimonial proceedings between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. Ms Petrov previously claimed an equitable interest in E Street but abandoned that claim in her most recent Amended Response – the one filed on 19 January 2023. That is the Response document upon which Ms Petrov proceeded to trial. Having abandoned an equitable claim in respect of E Street in her Amended Response document – Ms Petrov, nonetheless, included a paragraph in her written outline of submissions relating to E Street. That is paragraph 40. Those submissions were filed on 14 July 2023. That paragraph appears under the heading “Equitable Interest”. Also under that heading is a reference to G Street. I will address Ms Petrov’s claims later in these reasons.
There is a voluminous amount of material relied upon by the parties in this case. Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit, including annexures, comprises almost 3000 pages of documents. The other parties to the litigation have also included hundreds of pages of documents. I have had regard to the evidence in the case, including the affidavits of the parties (including the annexures to those affidavits) as well as the exhibits that were tendered and the oral testimony of the parties and their submissions. The Court is not required to refer in these Reasons for Judgment to each item of evidence relied upon by the parties. Also, the Court is not required to refer to each argument or submission relied upon by the parties. In Housing Commission of NSW v Pastoral Company Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSW LR 378 (“Tatmar Pastoral”) Mahoney JA stated at pages 385-386, inter alia, as follows:
“It is not the duty of the judge to decide every matter which is raised in argument. He may decide a case in a way which does not require the determination of a particular submission: in such a case he may put it aside or, as Lord Scarman said, merely salute it in passing…”
In Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 (“Whisprun”) Gleeson CJ, McHugh J and Gummow JJ stated at [62], inter alia:
“A judge’s reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge’s failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party’s case.”
The Full Court of this Court has adopted the same approach as outlined in Whisprun: note in particular Eagle & Scarlett (no. 2) [2020] FamCAFC 291 at [103] and note also Johansson & Johansson [2022] FedCFamC1A 74 at [43].
THE REMOVAL OF MS KRUPIN AS A DIRECTOR OF B PTY LTD AND THE TRANSFER OF MS KRUPIN’S SHARE IN B PTY LTD TO MR KRUPIN
B Pty Ltd as trustee for the Krupin Family Trust has been the registered owner of G Street since that property was purchased in 2007. Settlement of the contract to purchase G Street took place in mid-2007. The purchase price was $205,000. The purchase of G Street was funded by cash savings held by the trust; some cash from Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin personally; and an interest only loan in the personal names of Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin. I note the evidence of Ms Krupin in her trial affidavit between paragraphs 194 – 207. I accept all of that evidence from Ms Krupin.
The history of the shareholding in B Pty Ltd is a matter that requires close attention – as does the history of the directorships of that company. B Pty Ltd was incorporated in 2003. Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin (the married couple) incorporated B Pty Ltd for the purpose of acting as the corporate trustee for the Krupin Family Trust. From the date of incorporation until mid-2017 both Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were directors of B Pty Ltd.
In mid-2017, without the knowledge or consent of Ms Krupin, Mr Krupin took steps to remove Ms Krupin as a director of B Pty Ltd. Mr Krupin was the appointor of the Krupin Family Trust. As the appointor, Mr Krupin had the power to appoint and remove trustees. The difficulty I have with Mr Krupin’s conduct in relation the removal of Ms Krupin as a director is that Mr Krupin’s power as appointor did not give him the power to merely remove Ms Krupin as a director of B Pty Ltd. Mr Krupin had, for instance, the power to remove B Pty Ltd as the trustee for the Krupin Family Trust. That did not give him the power to remove Ms Krupin as a director of the company without her knowledge or consent. My attention has not been drawn to, for instance, the Articles of Association in respect of the company – which may have shed some more light on the situation. At the very least – Mr Krupin should have given notice to Ms Krupin of his intention to take the steps that he did.
Of even more concern to the court is what happened next. In mid-2017 Ms Krupin’s one share in B Pty Ltd was “transferred” to Mr Krupin without Ms Krupin’s knowledge or consent. There was oral testimony concerning this issue during the course of the trial. On Tuesday 16 May 2023 Mr Krupin was being cross examined by Ms Petrov. Following certain evidence given by Mr Krupin, I asked Mr Krupin, through the Country M interpreter, certain questions. At page 155 of the transcript of 16 May 2023 I note the following evidence:
“HIS HONOUR:        No, no, no. Please ask; was the wife 50 per cent shareholder in the company that owned [G Street]?
[MR KRUPIN]:          Until 2017, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR:          Until – what happened then?
[MR KRUPIN]:          I moved her out from the board of directors because…
HIS HONOUR:          What about the shareholding?
[MR KRUPIN]:          The same. The shares moved to myself.
HIS HONOUR:          Well, did she transfer her shares to you?
[MR KRUPIN]:          I transferred. It wasn’t her decision.”
Once the above evidence came to light on 16 May 2023, I heard submissions from the parties in relation to the possibility of issuing certain injunctions relating to the property which is the subject of the proceedings. All parties (including Mr Krupin) consented the issuing of the injunctions. Reasons were provided and published on 17 May 2023 and that is the date of the published order.
What Mr Krupin did in mid-2017 by taking steps to “transfer” Ms Krupin’s share in B Pty Ltd to himself is a matter of the gravest concern to this Court. At the forefront of my mind is section 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1999 (Cth) and the comments of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. On his own admission, given under oath during oral testimony on 16 May 2023, Mr Krupin, who was legally represented during the trial, admitted that he “transferred” Ms Krupin’s share in B Pty Ltd to himself. This is dishonest conduct of the highest order. It shows to the Court that Mr Krupin is prepared to take any step in order to secure an advantage for himself. There is, it seems to me, at the very least, a prima facie argument that Mr Krupin’s conduct amounted to fraud within the terms of s 408C of the Queensland Criminal Code and this aspect of the matter will be referred to the appropriate authorities for consideration as to whether criminal charges should be laid against Mr Krupin. I do not consider it necessary to hear further submissions from any party before referring this conduct by Mr Krupin to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. A judge who believes that an offence may have been committed is under a duty to refer the proceedings to the relevant authorities. In Australian Building and Construction Commission v Parker (No 2) [2017] FCA 1082 Flick J considered whether an order should be made referring the conduct of certain parties to litigation to the appropriate director of public prosecutions. Flick J referred to a NSW Supreme Court decision in the matter Simpson v Hodges [2007] NSWSC 1230 (“Simpson v Hodges”), where Hall J stated at paragraphs 268-269 –
“268. A judicial officer who believes that offences have been committed is under a duty to refer the proceedings to the relevant authority: Normandy Woodcutters (above) per Mildren J at [53]. Accordingly, where evidence is given in proceedings in this Court that reasonably suggests that an offence has or may have been committed in relation to proceedings conducted before it, the Court has a duty to refer the proceedings. As Mildren J observed in Normandy Woodcutters (above), referring the papers is not an exercise of judicial power and no findings are made and no injury to anyone’s reputation arises by a mere referral. Nor, as his Honour observed, is the judicial officer required to give anyone an opportunity to be heard in such a matter.
269. In light of the evidence to which I have referred and for the above reasons, the Registrar of this Court will be directed to forward a copy of these reasons for judgment to the Director of Public Prosecutions and to make available, as may be required, the full transcript of these proceedings and exhibits for inspection by any officers authorised in that behalf by the Director of Public Prosecutions.”

I agree with the observations made and the approach taken by Hall J in Simpson v Hodges. I note that Flick J in Australian Building and Construction Commission v Parker (No 2) cited Hall J’s approach with approval. As Hall J stated in Simpson v Hodges, “referring the papers is not an exercise of judicial power and no findings are made and no injury to anyone’s reputation arises by a mere referral.” I also note and accept the observation made by Hall J that a judicial officer is not required to give anyone an opportunity to be heard in such a matter.[2]
[2] See also the decision Huda v Huda (No 2) [2020] FCCA 8104; 61 Fam LR 257.
THE REMOVAL OF MS KRUPIN AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE KRUPIN FAMILY TRUST
Under cross examination by Mr Jones, counsel on behalf of Ms Krupin, Mr Krupin stated at page 66 of the transcript on 15 May 2023:
“[Mr Krupin]: … as it says in trusts documents, she was beneficiary as my wife. As when she ceased being my wife, technically speaking she has no position in the trust anymore, as far as I understand the trust document.”
The deed of trust establishing the Krupin Family Trust is included in the evidence. In the annexures to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit it commences at page 1142. The deed of trust is dated 31 July 2003. The settlor is “Mr BB”. Under the heading “Background” Notation A states:
“A. The Settlor wishes to establish a trust to be known as [Krupin] Family Trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”
In the definition section of the deed of trust it states that “beneficiaries” means the primary beneficiary; the secondary beneficiaries and the tertiary beneficiaries.
The definition section also states “primary beneficiary means [Mr Krupin]”.
The trust deed then states:
“Primary beneficiaries means;
a.The primary beneficiary; and
b.[Ms Krupin], the spouse of the primary beneficiary.”
Ms Krupin is named as one of the primary beneficiaries in the deed of trust. It does describe Ms Krupin as “the spouse of the primary beneficiary” – because that is what she was at the time the deed was executed. Importantly, the deed of trust does not say, merely, “the spouse, from time to time, of the primary beneficiary”. It actually names Ms Krupin.
I have not had the benefit of any helpful submissions in relation to this issue of the removal of Ms Krupin as a beneficiary. It is clear that Ms Krupin was removed as a beneficiary with no notice to Ms Krupin. My own perusal of the deed of trust did not uncover any specific provision relating to the removal of a beneficiary. It is apparent that the definition of “tertiary beneficiaries” in sub paragraph (d)[3] enables the primary beneficiary (“Mr Krupin”) to add additional individuals as a tertiary beneficiary. Mr Krupin can add a beneficiary by deed; by memorandum; or by oral notice to the trustee. It is not clear on the evidence before me whether or not Mr Krupin actually complied with those provisions when he “appointed” Ms Petrov to be a beneficiary under the trust.
[3] Page 1148 to the annexures of Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit.
Having “transferred” Ms Krupin’s share in B Pty Ltd to himself – Mr Krupin began to unilaterally control B Pty Ltd – in that company’s role as the trustee of the Krupin Family Trust. The relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is a fiduciary relationship.[4] (Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at page 68). In the Hospital Products case Gibbs CJ stated, from page 67:
“A person who occupies a fiduciary position may not use that position to gain a profit or advantage for himself, nor may he obtain a benefit by entering into a transaction in conflict with his fiduciary duty, without the informed consent of the person to whom he owes the duty.” This principle – some would prefer to say “these principles” – has been described as “inflexible” (Birtchnell v. Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co. Ltd. (71)) and “fundamental” (Phipps v. Boardman (72))…”
[4] Per Gibbs CJ.
One of the fundamental duties of the trustee is that he must not act in such a way that a conflict arises between his own interests and his duties as a trustee. Once he got control of B Pty Ltd Mr Krupin acted with vindictiveness in removing or purporting to remove Ms Krupin as a beneficiary. This was a step taken by Mr Krupin in the advancement of his own interests at the expense of one of the beneficiaries, namely Ms Krupin. Under the terms of the trust deed there was no specific power granted to the trustee to merely remove a beneficiary. Accordingly, the only way that could be done legally was through the execution of a deed of variation. There is no deed of variation in evidence before the Court, certainly, my attention has not been drawn to one in the thousands of pages of evidence. It was incumbent upon Mr Krupin to lead evidence to prove that his conduct in removing Ms Krupin as a beneficiary was lawful. Mr Krupin has failed in this task. The conclusion I have reached is that Mr Krupin had no authority to remove Ms Krupin as a beneficiary in the manner that he did. Apart from anything else – there was a clear conflict of duty and interest on Mr Krupin’s part (Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46). It is further evidence of dishonest conduct by Mr Krupin.
THE MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS
Just and equitable to make an order
Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin separated on a final basis many years ago (2013). The Court shall not make an order under s 79 unless the Court is satisfied that, in all circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order (s 79(2) of the Act). At paragraph 42 of Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 (“Stanford”) the High Court stated, inter alia:
“...the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife.”
There remains in existence joint property of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. Because of their current circumstances, there will no longer be the common use of the property by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. As the High Court stated further at paragraph 42 in Stanford:
“...the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship. That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship.”
In the case currently before the Court, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied in the matrimonial proceedings. The Court needs to determine what order it should make under s 79. In doing so, the Court will apply s 79(4) of the Act.
THE POOL
The compilation of the property pool available for distribution in the matrimonial proceedings is a task that will require the Court to disentangle and decide the various claims that are made by the parties in these proceedings.
C STREET
It is convenient for the Court to deal firstly with the question as to whether or not the property situated at C Street should be included in the property pool in the matrimonial proceedings. Ms Angeloff is the legal owner of C Street. Mr Krupin’s case in relation to C Street is based on equity. At paragraph 142 of Mr Krupin’s Statement of Claim[5] he pleads “142. The Applicant’s claim is in equity on the alternative bases of an express trust or a constructive trust (and other bases set out later in these submissions, including proprietary estoppel).”
[5] The husband’s Statement of Claim is attached to his Amended Initiating Application filed 14 February 2023.
What those “other bases” are is unclear from Mr Krupin’s Statement of Claim.
Ms Angeloff was a credible witness. Her evidence was largely unchallenged in cross examination. Ms Angeloff moved to Australia in 2005 from Country L. Ms Angeloff’s migration to Australia was at the request and suggestion of her daughter (Ms Krupin) and her son in law (Mr Krupin). The evidence of Ms Angeloff in relation to her migration and the migration of her son to Australia is accepted by the Court. Ms Angeloff and her son moved to Australia to assist Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin in “working on their houses, assist with looking after their investment properties, caring for their children and upkeep of the family home as they both worked full time and overtime”.
Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin paid for some of the expenses associated with the migration to Australia of Ms Angeloff and Mr O. Ms Angeloff cannot read or write English. Further, Ms Angeloff cannot communicate in English. Throughout the course of these proceedings, Ms Angeloff was assisted by an interpreter.
In 2006, Ms Angeloff purchased MM Street, Suburb NN (“MM Street”). The purchase price was $180,000. Settlement of the conveyance occurred in mid-2006. In order to complete the sale Ms Angeloff applied for a loan with a mortgage broker named Ms PP. Ms PP prepared a Loan Interview Diary Note following a meeting that took place between Ms PP, Ms Angeloff, Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin. The interview took place in mid-2006. A written record of this interview prepared by Ms PP is included in the evidence of Ms Angeloff (annexure “MA-04” in the affidavit of Ms Angeloff filed 2 March 2023). Ms Angeloff gives evidence that the interview took place. Ms Krupin confirmed in her cross-examination that this interview took place. I accept this evidence from Ms Angeloff and Ms Krupin. Mr Krupin denies that this interview took place. Mr Krupin maintained his denial during cross examination – even when he was shown the Loan Interview Diary Note of Ms PP which identifies Mr Krupin as having been present at the meeting. I do not accept Mr Krupin’s evidence in relation to this issue. This is another reason I have come to the conclusion that Mr Krupin is not a credible witness. The Loan Interview Diary Note records that the home loan application process was explained to Ms Angeloff. Further, the State Government grant known as the “First Home Owners Grant” was also explained by Ms PP to Ms Angeloff. Ms Angeloff subsequently applied for and did in fact receive the First Home Owners Grant. This is confirmed at annexure “MA-06” in Ms Angeloff’s affidavit[6]. Ms PP specifically records in the “Loan Interview Diary Note” that – “[Ms Angeloff’s] son in law, daughter interpreted in full for their mother in law. All aspects of the loan application explained in detail, including FHOG”.[7]
[6] Letter from the Office of State Revenue dated mid-2006.
[7] FHOG – First Home Owners Grant
The loan application was signed by Ms Angeloff and Ms PP in mid-2006 – the same date as the interview.
Ms PP listed Ms Angeloff as being employed by B Pty Ltd. There is a payslip from B Pty Ltd showing that Ms Angeloff was paid wages by that company. Mr Krupin denied that Ms Angeloff was employed by B Pty Ltd. The view that I have formed is that it is more likely than not that Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin, at least for a period of time, caused payments to be made to Ms Angeloff from B Pty Ltd. This may, for example, have been in respect of work done by Ms Angeloff in one of the capacities outlined by Ms Angeloff in her trial affidavit at paragraph 11. I do not consider it necessary for the Court to come to a precise conclusion regarding the work done by Ms Angeloff for which she received some wages from B Pty Ltd.
Ms PP also noted that Ms Angeloff had a deposit of $35,550 to assist in the purchase of MM Street – having already paid a deposit of $450 at the time the contract was signed.
I accept that Ms Angeloff received a gift from her daughter in the sum of $20,000. I also accept Ms Angeloff’s evidence that Mr Krupin lent $20,000 to Ms Angeloff. These amounts assisted the funding of Ms Angeloff’s deposit for MM Street. QQ Bank granted a loan to Ms Angeloff who then proceeded to purchase MM Street in her name. At paragraph 216 at Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit he states that he had “given” $40,000 to Ms Angeloff. In cross examination[8] Mr Krupin accepted that any amount of $40,000 that he maintained he had “given” to Ms Angeloff had been repaid to him by Ms Angeloff. Mr Krupin asserted in his affidavit that he had “given” $40,000 to Ms Angeloff – but he failed to mention in his trial affidavit that, to the extent that he had “given” any money to Ms Angeloff, that Ms Angeloff had repaid that money to him. Mr Krupin’s evidence in chief in relation to this issue is misleading.
[8] Transcript 16 May 2023, page 119, lines 8-11.
The conveyancing solicitors who acted for Ms Angeloff on the purchase of MM Street were RR Lawyers. Ms Angeloff provided a signed authority to RR Lawyers authorising for those solicitors to take instructions from Mr Krupin in relation to Ms Angeloff’s purchase of MM Street. That signed authority is dated 12 July 2006 and appears at Annexure “MA02” in Ms Angeloff’s trial affidavit. Annexure “MA02” also includes emails between Mr Krupin and RR Lawyers. On 14 June 2006 Mr Krupin wrote to RR Lawyers –
“Hi […]
Please find attached copy of contract, passport with visa for my mother-in-law.
It is principal place of residence for her, so we expect discount on stamp duty.
Can you please help us to get first home owner grant? What is the cost involved?
If you can’t, please give us some directions on course of actions.
Regards, [Mr Krupin].”
Also contained at Annexure “MA02” to Ms Angeloff’s affidavit is an email dated 24 July 2006 from RR Lawyers. That email commences: “Dear [Mr Krupin]”. The email attaches a copy of the Settlement Statement for MM Street for Mr Krupin’s perusal. That email also acknowledges that the “First Home Owners Grant” will be available at settlement.
In relation to the email correspondence contained in Annexure MA02 – Mr Krupin maintained in cross examination that he did not write or author any of the correspondence. Mr Krupin maintained that the email contained above (addressed “Hi […]”) was written by Ms Krupin. I do not believe Mr Krupin in relation to this issue. The authority signed by Ms Angeloff authorised Mr Krupin (not Ms Krupin) to speak to RR Lawyers. That makes sense because Mr Krupin had been in Australia the longest; Mr Krupin was (even on his own case) the financial advisor for the family and Mr Krupin had developed some knowledge or expertise in relation to real estate investment. Further, Ms Krupin would not have referred to Ms Angeloff as her “mother-in-law”.
The evidence shows that Mr Krupin was clearly involved communicating with the mortgage broker (Ms PP) and the conveyancing solicitors (RR Lawyers) during the purchase of MM Street. The email that Mr Krupin sent to RR Lawyers which has been included above is important. In that email Mr Krupin (effectively) represented to the Queensland Office of State Revenue that Ms Angeloff was purchasing MM Street as her principal place of residence and accordingly Mr Krupin expected that Ms Angeloff would receive a discount on stamp duty. Furthermore, in that email, Mr Krupin also told RR Lawyers that Ms Angeloff wanted to receive the First Home Owners Grant. I agree with the submission made on behalf of Ms Angeloff that these representations made by Mr Krupin to RR Lawyers (and to Ms PP) that MM Street was to be Ms Angeloff’s principal place of residence and MM Street was Ms Angeloff’s first home – tends against the suggestion that there was any common intention to create a beneficial interest in favour of Mr Krupin – or in favour of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. The conclusion I have reached is that Ms Angeloff was entitled to the First Home Owners Grant and that she obtained that grant lawfully. Further, MM Street became Ms Angeloff’s principal place of residence – at least for a period of time. Other members of the family also lived in MM Street with Ms Angeloff until a later point in time when the whole family moved to E Street.
If Mr Krupin’s version was to be believed then he is telling the Court that he was involved in the perpetration of a fraud against the Queensland State Government by inappropriately obtaining a First Home Owner’s Grant. In my view this would leave Mr Krupin (in particular) open to another possible prosecution under section 408C of the Queensland Criminal Code. The issue does not arise because I do not believe Mr Krupin’s version of events. Mr Krupin lacks credibility.
I accept the following evidence from Ms Angeloff:
(a)That Ms Angeloff made the mortgage repayments and paid for the council rates and water bills associated with MM Street;
(b)That, shortly after purchasing MM Street – Mr O, Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin helped Ms Angeloff paint the inside of the property and helped install a new small kitchen;
(c)The floors at the property were polished by a contractor but all members of the family had assisted with the cleaning and tidying of the property;
(d)From mid-2006 until early 2007 Ms Angeloff rented rooms in the property to Mr SS – who paid to Ms Angeloff $350 per week in rent;
(e)After Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin sold their property at TT Street – they also moved into MM Street;
(f)Because MM Street was too small to accommodate all members of the family – Mr Krupin and Mr O renovated the property and added two bedrooms and a shower and a toilet downstairs for Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin and their children to occupy;
(g)Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin paid for some of the materials in relation to that renovation however Ms Angeloff was never asked to pay compensation for any labour or effort exerted;
(h)When Ms Angeloff sold MM Street she repaid to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin the costs of any materials that they had purchased in order to renovate that property;
(i)While Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin and their children were living downstairs at Ms Angeloff’s MM Street property – there was in place a written tenancy agreement and Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin paid to Ms Angeloff rent per week ranging between $300 - $380;
(j)Ms Angeloff continued to make the mortgage repayments on MM Street and also to pay for the council rates and other outgoings – including during that period of time when Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were living at MM Street;
(k)When Ms Angeloff moved out of MM Street and moved into the E Street property with the other members of the family – Ms Angeloff continued to rent MM Street and continued to receive the rent.
I accept Ms Angeloff’s evidence that she received rent from Mr SS (initially) and then she received rent from Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin before subsequently receiving rent from another tenant or tenants once she left the property. It is apparent to the Court that Ms Angeloff used rental income received to offset outgoings in respect of MM Street including mortgage repayments, rates and other expenses.
Ms Angeloff sold MM Street in about mid-2009 for over $300,000. I accept the evidence of Ms Angeloff contained at paragraph 53 of her trial affidavit where she states, in relation to the proceeds of sale from MM Street as follows:
“53. a) The proceeds from this sale was approximately $72,295 and I used these funds, inter alia:
i. Expenses paid with regard to the [C Street] property (amounting to $3,203):
a. Loan repayment in the approximate amount of $1,088;
b. Line of Credit account @[…48] in amount of $650;
c. Council Rate Bills in approximate amount of $548;
d. Building and Landlord insurance in amount of $686; and
e. Plumbing Invoice in amount of $231.
ii. Monies paid by way of contribution to the [E Street] property/household:
a. paid council rate bill in amount of $1,228; and
b. transferred $5,000 towards future household expenses.
iii. Paid off [Ms Krupin’s] credit card in the amount of $3,600.
iv. Paid [Mr Krupin’s] credit cards totalling $54,210 to compensate for any remaining expenses from material from repairs at my properties and any outstanding bills owed to him.
v. Paid Counsil rates for [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin’s] properties in the amount of $2,686.
vi. Gifted [Mr O] $2,000.
vii. Gifted [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin] $2,000.”

It is not surprising to the Court that Ms Angeloff, at that point in time, preferred to live with Ms Krupin, Mr Krupin and Ms Angeloff’s grandchildren. Ms Angeloff has very limited English language skills. Further, Ms Krupin had migrated to Australia to assist Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin with caring for their children. It makes sense that Ms Angeloff would have preferred to live with the larger family group.
During the period of time when Ms Angeloff still owned MM Street – she also acquired the property at C Street and a property at N Street, Suburb D. The property at N Street was subsequently sold and its proceeds were (at least in part) used to pay credit card debts of Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin. This occurred in or around mid-2009. I accept the evidence of Ms Angeloff in paragraph 69 of her trial affidavit where she states, in relation to the proceeds of sale for the N Street property, inter alia –
“69. a) The proceeds from the sale were $88,783 and I used these funds, inter alia:
i. I transferred approximately $6,000 to my son [Mr O];
ii. I repaid [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin] the $10,700 that I had borrowed as outlined at paragraph 66;
iii. I paid [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin’s] credit cards in the amount of $56,087, which was repayment for materials and expenses they had paid renovating both the [MM Street] and [C Street] properties and for some outstanding invoices for the [N Street] property;
iv. Approximately $9,460 towards general household expenses; and
viii. Personal expenses.”
In cross examination Mr Krupin accepted that part of the proceeds of sale of the N Street property were used to pay credit cards debts of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin.[9]
[9] Transcript of 16 May 2023, page 127, line 30.
This evidence concerning the payment by Ms Angeloff of the credit cards debts of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin is an important aspect of the evidence and I will return to that evidence later in these Reasons for Judgment.
The evidence of Ms Angeloff is that the equity in MM Street was used by her to help fund the purchase of the C Street property. Mr Krupin agrees that this is what occurred. The ANZ bank granted a loan to Ms Angeloff in the amount of $247,200 in order to assist Ms Angeloff with the acquisition of the C Street property. This involved the refinancing of MM Street and the ANZ bank took security for the loan by way of a first registered mortgage over C Street and a second registered mortgage over MM Street. The purchase price for C Street was around $250,000.
Ms Angeloff’s evidence – that practically the whole of the purchase price for C Street was funded by way of a loan – is supported by documentary evidence. Importantly, there is no evidence whatsoever that Mr Krupin (or, for that matter, Ms Krupin) contributed to the purchase of the C Street property. This enables the Court to rule out the possibility of a resulting trust having been created. In the context of this litigation I consider it prudent to address this issue rather than to ignore it. Mr Krupin has not raised the possibility of a resulting trust. For completeness though I note that in Napier v Public Trustee (Western Australia) (1980) 55 ALJR 1 at page 3 the High Court accepted that there remains in existence in Australian law a presumption that a legal owner holds an estate in land on a resulting trust for the person who advances the purchase money.[10] The High Court relied on the old English case of Dyer v Dyer.[11] As I have already stated, the evidence confirms that almost 100 per cent of the purchase price for C Street was funded by a loan to Ms Angeloff from the ANZ Bank. A presumption of a resulting trust can therefore be excluded from consideration.
[10] Per Gibbs ACJ, Aicken, Mason, Wilson and Murphy JJ.
[11] (1788) 2 Cox 92 at 93; 30 ER 42 at 43 per Lord Chief Baron Eyre.
Mr Krupin maintains that he performed work on the C Street property to the value of $144,700. Mr Krupin states this in paragraph 138 of his trial affidavit. The precise figure ($144,700) can be found at Annexure 44 to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit. The relevant part appears at page 434 of Mr Krupin’s annexures. Mr Krupin provides a one-page summary of the value of improvements that he said he performed in respect of C Street. I do not accept Mr Krupin’s evidence in relation to this issue. I note the evidence of Ms Angeloff between paragraphs 79‑83 of her trial affidavit where she stated:
“[C Street] during [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin’s] relationship
79. The [C Street] property was leased, and I remained living with [Mr Krupin, Ms Krupin] and the children as they still needed help with the home and the caring for the children.
80. I acknowledge that both [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin’s] names were added to the tenancy agreements used for the [C Street] property, however this was only to make it easier to communicate with tenants and any other issues should it be necessary. I was involved with all decisions relating to the [C Street] property. We were family and so it did not seem odd that we would do things this way.
81. [Mr Krupin] did assist with some routine repairs at the [C Street] property, however we lived together as a family and I was cooking, cleaning and caring for the children during this time, unpaid, so it was not out of the ordinary for [Mr Krupin] to help out with some routine repairs to the [C Street] property.
82. [Mr Krupin] was not the only family member to assist with the ongoing maintenance of the [C Street] property, [Ms Krupin, Mr O] and I would do what was required when it was required.
83. [Mr Krupin] would do small jobs in and around my properties without asking for payment. If bigger jobs were required, I would ask [Mr Krupin]. [Mr Krupin] would send me invoices for any bigger work he did on my properties, and I was happy to pay him as I preferred to hire him then try and find someone else to do the work and would have to pay them anyway.”
I accept this evidence from Ms Angeloff.
I note, in particular, that all members of the family (including Mr O) assisted with the ongoing maintenance of the C Street property.
I accept the evidence of Ms Angeloff that it was only after the final separation of the married couple (Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin) that Mr Krupin began to claim that he (or, I infer he and Ms Krupin) were the two owners of the C Street property.
Mr Krupin’s claim which has been summarised in the one-page document at page 434 of the annexures to his trial affidavit (totalling $144,700) in respect of C Street is nothing more than a brief summary which Mr Krupin prepared based on his memory alone. The document was created some years after the work was performed and the document was created around 2014 – after Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin had separated. The document was created, I find, solely for the purpose of Mr Krupin seeking to support his claim in respect of the C Street property. Mr Krupin maintains that the photographs of C Street which commence from page 435 of Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit show the work that he did. I am not persuaded by this contention by Mr Krupin. I do not accept that there is evidence to support Mr Krupin’s assertion that he performed work to the value of $144,700. Mr Krupin does not have appropriate qualifications to provide reliable estimates in relation to building and electrical work; Mr Krupin is not an electrician and could not have properly performed any electrical work. I prefer the evidence of Ms Angeloff that all members of the family (including Mr O in particular) performed work and contributed to the work done on C Street.
Apart from Mr Krupin’s own assertion – there is no other evidence that Mr Krupin performed all of the work that he claims and nor is there any other evidence to confirm that he solely performed the work. Mr Krupin has provided no evidence showing the purchase of materials for use for any construction type work and there is no estimate of the time that he spent on the work. There is nothing contained in the valuation documents prepared by UU Real Estate that could be said to corroborate Mr Krupin’s assertion that the renovations resulted in a higher rental yield for C Street.
It will be apparent that I have come to the conclusion that Mr Krupin is not a reliable witness. I do not accept that Mr Krupin performed work on the C Street property to the extent that he describes. Further, I do not accept that the work performed on the C Street property was done solely by Mr Krupin or even predominantly by Mr Krupin. I do not accept Mr Krupin’s argument that any work he performed on C Street amounts to a contribution by Mr Krupin to the C Street property that would permit him to establish the existence of an interest in the C Street property.
It is apparent from the evidence of Ms Angeloff (which I accept) that following the sale of MM Street in 2009, Ms Angeloff paid approximately $54,210[12] towards Mr Krupin’s credit cards. Further, also in 2009, upon the sale of N Street, Ms Angeloff paid $56,087[13] towards the credit cards of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. The total of those two payments by Ms Angeloff is $110,297. There is documentary evidence to support Ms Angeloff’s evidence of those payments. Ms Angeloff’s bank statements are in evidence and they have been annexed to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit. I note pages 702-704 of the annexures to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit. I accept the evidence of Ms Angeloff that the payment of this total amount of $110,297 to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin was a payment in respect of expenses for materials relating to renovations performed on MM Street, C Street and N Street.
[12] Paragraph 53 of Ms Angeloff’s trial affidavit.
[13] Paragraph 69 of Ms Angeloff’s trial affidavit.
This is a family that would help each other out. Ms Angeloff (and her son) migrated to Australia from Country L to help her daughter (Ms Krupin) and her son-in-law (Mr Krupin) to care for the children of the married couple (Ms Angeloff’s grandchildren) and to help Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin with their other business activities.
In respect of the caring role for the children – there is no evidence that Ms Angeloff was paid for this and nor did she expect to be paid. Mr Krupin performed labour (the value of which has not been adequately proven) including in respect of the C Street property. I do not accept that the labour performed by Mr Krupin in respect of the C Street property thereby means that there was some intention that the C Street property or the renovation of the C Street property was intended to give rise to a “joint endeavour”.
I note that the documentary evidence in relation to C Street is absolutely consistent with the evidence of Ms Angeloff – a reliable witness. There is no documentary evidence that Mr Krupin or Ms Krupin made any payments in respect of C Street. C Street was always tenanted. Ms Angeloff’s bank statements (account ending #...72) from 2009 to 2013 (and for some years after) have been annexed to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit.[14] Those bank statements show:
(a)That rent was received by Ms Angeloff and those transactions were generally described in the bank statements as “agent deposit”;
(b)On a monthly basis the ANZ bank withdrew mortgage repayments and those payments were regular withdrawals described as “[Ms Angeloff]”;
(c)Council rates; insurance costs (VV Insurance); water rates and other bills were paid from the account;
(d)Payments were made by Ms Angeloff to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – in particular to an account described in the bank statements “[Mr and Ms Krupin]”.
[14] Note pages 701-730 of the annexures to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit.
I note, in particular, pages 707-708 of the annexures to Mr Krupin’s affidavit provides an excellent example of rent received and payments made from Ms Angeloff’s account.
I accept the submissions of Ms Angeloff that the evidence – in particular the documentary evidence, does not support the assertion by Mr Krupin that he met ongoing payments in respect of C Street. The ongoing payments in respect of C Street were paid by Ms Angeloff from Ms Angeloff’s account. Whatever money was leftover was transferred by Ms Angeloff to Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin. Ms Angeloff was living with Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin at that point in time and those payments were made (I infer) for family use.
The process outlined above (relating to income received from rental money on the C Street property and disbursements made by Ms Angeloff) was essentially repeated for years and only ended in or about May 2013 – at the time of the separation between Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin. Given the way that this family lived and operated (up until the separation of the married couple) it is not surprising to the Court that any amount by way of rental received by Ms Angeloff in excess of her outgoings on C Street – was made available to Ms Krupin, Mr Krupin the children. Ms Angeloff was living with the family. That had always been the plan from the time Ms Angeloff had migrated to Australia from Country L.
MR KRUPIN’S CLAIM THAT AN EXPRESS TRUST EXISTS IN RELATION TO C STREET
Mr Krupin’s claim that he has an entitlement to C Street by reason of an express trust is without merit. There is no evidence of a written instrument that Mr Krupin has a beneficial interest in C Street. An interest in land in Queensland can only be created if there is a written instrument to support such a contention. It cannot be created by parol. This extends to the declaration of a trust: note Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss 11(1)(a); 11(1)(b); 11(1)(c); 12(1). The Property Law Act in Queensland does not abrogate the principles of equity relating to non-express trusts – in particular constructive trusts, implied trusts and resulting trusts: s 11(2).
I have already earlier dealt with the question of a resulting trust.
Mr Krupin’s claim that an express trust exists must fail.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
In paragraph 114 of his trial affidavit Mr Krupin states that –
“114. It was agreed by all family that I will buy properties in the name of Second Respondent and/or [Mr O] for the purpose of assets protection on conditions that:
a) I would make all decision concerning these properties, pay all the expenses associated with purchase, financing, repairs, renovations, extensions, maintenance, renting of these properties as well as mortgage, rates, water, gas, electricity repayments.
b) I and the First Respondent would receive and distribute all money from rent and sale of these properties.
c) the I and the First Respondent would have exclusive use and control over bank accounts associated with these properties.”
Mr Krupin’s argument that the C Street property was put into the name of Ms Angeloff for the purpose “asset protection” is an argument without merit. It is an argument which is against the weight of the evidence. As I have already noted, there was in existence a family trust.[15] Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin, on many occasions, had purchased properties in the name of the family trust – rather than in Ms Angeloff’s name. If Mr Krupin had been concerned with “asset protection” – then, he could have purchased C Street via the family trust. I do not believe Mr Krupin in relation to this issue. I further note that Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin purchased the property at E Street in their own personal names in 2007. Asset protection was not the sole or even the predominant purpose when deciding on the purchase of the properties.
[15] The Trust was established on 31 July 2003.
Mr Krupin’s evidence that it was agreed “by all family” is problematic for his case. There is no evidence that Mr Krupin spoke directly with Ms Angeloff in relation to this so called “agreement”. Mr Krupin maintains that it would have been inappropriate for him to communicate directly with Ms Angeloff without the presence and assent of Ms Krupin. Once again, I do not accept Mr Krupin’s evidence and his explanations. There are no particulars provided by Mr Krupin as to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the purported agreement. There is no evidence as to where the agreement was formed. There is no evidence as to where the conversation or conversations took place. There is no evidence as to what was said. There is no evidence of the specifics as to the agreement. It must be kept in mind that neither Ms Angeloff nor Ms Krupin accept that an agreement was formed. Ms Angeloff and Ms Krupin deny that any such agreement was formed. I prefer the evidence of Ms Angeloff and Ms Krupin to the evidence of Mr Krupin.
I note the leading High Court authorities in relation to constructive trusts: Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 (“Muschinski v Dodds”); Baumgartner v Baumgartner [1987] 164 CLR 137 (“Baumgartner”). In Baumgartner in the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Wilson and Deane JJ from page 147 – their Honours provided a convenient summary of Muschinski v Dodds and the relevant legal principles in relation to the existence of a constructive trust. From page 147 their Honours stated, inter alia:
“In Muschinski v. Dodds a man and woman who had lived together for three years decided to buy a property on which to erect a prefabricated house and to restore a cottage. The woman was to provide $20,000 from the sale of her house and the man was to pay the cost of construction and improvement from $9,000 he would receive on the finalization of his divorce and from loans. The property was conveyed to them as tenants in common. Although some improvements were made by the man, the erection of the house did not proceed and the parties separated. The woman contributed $25,259.45 and the man $2,549.77 to the purchase and improvement of the property. This Court declared that the parties held their respective legal interests upon trust to repay to each his or her respective contribution and as to the residue for them both in equal shares.
Deane J. (with whom Mason J. agreed) reached this result by applying the general equitable principle which restores to a party contributions which he or she has made to a joint endeavour which fails when the contributions have been made in circumstances in which it was not intended that the other party should enjoy them. His Honour said (at p 620):
“... the principle operates in a case where the substratum of a joint relationship or endeavour is removed without attributable blame and where the benefit of money or other property contributed by one party on the basis and for the purposes of the relationship or endeavour would otherwise be enjoyed by the other party in circumstances in which it was not specifically intended or specially provided that that other party should so enjoy it. The content of the principle is that, in such a case, equity will not permit that other party to assert or retain the benefit of the relevant property to the extent that it would be unconscionable for him so to do: cf. Atwood v. Maude (1868) LR 3 Ch App 369, at pp 374-375 and per Jessel M.R., Lyon v. Tweddell (1881) 17 ChD 529, at p 531.”
His Honour pointed out that the constructive trust serves as a remedy which equity imposes regardless of actual or presumed agreement or intention "to preclude the retention or assertion of beneficial ownership of property to the extent that such retention or assertion would be contrary to equitable principle". See also p 617. In rejecting the notion that a constructive trust will be imposed in accordance with idiosyncratic notions of what is just and fair his Honour acknowledged that general notions of fairness and justice are relevant to the traditional concept of unconscionable conduct, this being a concept which underlies fundamental equitable concepts and doctrines, including the constructive trust.”
The Court is required to consider whether it is unconscionable or unconscientious for Ms Angeloff to assert her legal title. It was incumbent upon Mr Krupin to prove that such an assertion by Ms Angeloff is unconscionable before he can succeed in his claim that there is a constructive trust. Similar considerations must be taken into account when considering the doctrine of equitable estoppel – to which I will return shortly.

Mr Krupin’s case in relation to a constructive trust – apart from the “agreement” argument (which I have rejected) seems also to relate to a “joint enterprise” argument or agreement (presumably implied) – in line with what occurred in Muschinski v Dodds and Baumgartner. For Mr Krupin to succeed what is required is for him to prove that it would be unconscionable for Ms Angeloff to assert her legal title. I have come to the conclusion that it is not unconscionable for Ms Angeloff to assert her legal title. For the following reasons – whatever the contributions that Mr Krupin did make (and they are far from clear) it is not unconscionable for Ms Angeloff to assert her legal title because:
(a)Ms Angeloff migrated to Australia and devoted herself to caring for the grandchildren (the children of Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin); Ms Angeloff performed domestic chores for many many years; Ms Angeloff attended to the upkeep of the family home (ie. whatever residence Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were living in); Ms Angeloff assisted, as necessary, with looking after investment properties owned by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin; Ms Angeloff assisted with renovations including at a property situated at TT Street; Ms Angeloff received an income from B Pty Ltd – but this was only for a limited period of time (as discussed above);
(b)To some extent the family operated on a “communal” basis assisting each other as necessary and, to that end, Mr Krupin, Mr O and other members of the family assisted Ms Angeloff with renovation works in respect of both C Street and MM Street;
(c)Ms Angeloff paid to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin approximately $110,000 for materials and expenses that Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin had incurred renovating both C Street and MM Street and these payments by Ms Angeloff were made in the form of credit card repayments[16];
(d)Between 2009 and 2013 Ms Angeloff contributed to the family’s expenses by making money available to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – in particular to the extent that rental income from C Street exceeded the expenses in relation to that property. I accept that this amount of money totalled approximately $64,000. A convenient summary of the payments made to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin by Ms Angeloff during this period of time is contained in Attachment A to the written submissions filed on behalf of Ms Angeloff. In addition, I note Mr Krupin’s case that because of the labour he contributed to C Street (which I have concluded is of uncertain value) this must necessarily result in a conclusion that the whole of the property (the capital value of C Street) is held on trust for Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. Such an argument ignores that Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin had the benefit of contributions (monetary and otherwise) made by Ms Angeloff to the extended family – including from the proceeds of the rent that she received on C Street over several years. Mr Krupin does not address these issues at all.[17]
[16] I have already accepted this evidence from Ms Angeloff earlier in these reasons for Judgment. I note paragraphs 53(a)(iv) and 69(a)(iii) of Ms Angeloff’s trial affidavit contains some of the evidence in relation to these matters.
[17] Although not directly on point – the decision in the Court of Appeal in Queensland in Engwirda v Engwirda & Ors [2000] QCA 61 is relevant especially at paragraph 24 per Pincus and Davies JJA and Helman J.
As I have already pointed out in these Reasons for Judgment, Mr Krupin has not put before the Court any evidence, for instance from a quantity surveyor, as to the value of any work that he performed on C Street. Evidence from a quantity surveyor could have provided a summary of the work that was done and an estimated value of the work. In Miller v Sutherland (1990) 14 FamLR 416 at 420 reference was made to this kind of evidence (from a quantity surveyor) in a case involving a claim for a constructive trust. Furthermore, I would reiterate that Mr Krupin has provided no documentary evidence in relation to the value of any materials that were used to renovate C Street.
Finally, in relation to this aspect of the case, there is no evidence that the amount that Ms Angeloff actually contributed to the family from the rental income that she received from C Street (between 2009 – 2013) was not sufficient to adequately compensate Mr Krupin for any labour that he did in fact perform on C Street. As I have earlier indicated – it is not unconscionable for Ms Angeloff to assert her legal title in respect of the C Street property. Mr Krupin’s claim for a constructive trust must fail.
MR KRUPIN’S CLAIM BASED ON PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
This aspect of Mr Krupin’s claim comes under the general heading of equitable estoppel.[18] Mr Krupin maintains an argument based on proprietary estoppel[19] rather than a promissory estoppel. These two concepts overlap. The leading High Court decision in this area of the law is Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 (“Walton Stores”). At page 404 Mason CJ and Wilson J stated, inter alia –
“The decision in Crabb [Crabb v. Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179] is consistent with the principle of proprietary estoppel applied in Ramsden v. Dyson [(1866) LR 1 HL 129]. Under that principle a person whose conduct creates or lends force to an assumption by another that he will obtain an interest in the first person's land and on the basis of that expectation the other person alters his position or acts to his detriment, may bring into existence an equity in favour of that other person, the nature and extent of the equity depending on the circumstances. And it should be noted that in Crabb, as in Ramsden v. Dyson, although equity acted by way of recognizing a proprietary interest in the plaintiff, that proprietary interest came into existence as the only appropriate means by which the defendants could be effectively estopped from exercising their existing legal rights.
30. One may therefore discern in the cases a common thread which links them together, namely, the principle that equity will come to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption in relation to which the other party to the transaction has "played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it would be unfair or unjust if he were left free to ignore it": per Dixon J. in Grundt [Grundt v Great Boulder Pty. Gold Mines Ltd. (1937) 59 CLR 64, at p. 675]; see also Thompson [Thompson v. Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507, at p 547]. Equity comes to the relief of such a plaintiff on the footing that it would be unconscionable conduct on the part of the other party to ignore the assumption.”
[18] As opposed to common law estoppel.
[19] Which is also referred to as estoppel by acquiescence.
Proprietary estoppel cases involve a claim by a plaintiff to an interest in another person’s land. Many of the cases of proprietary estoppel (as opposed to promissory estoppel) relate to a plaintiff who has erected a house on land not legally owned by the plaintiff – with the knowledge of the legal owner. A plaintiff in a proprietary estoppel case must prove that the defendant encouraged or induced the plaintiff to take such steps or act in such a way that denying a proprietary interest in the land would be unconscionable.
Brennan J in Walton Stores stated at page 423 inter alia –
“24. It is essential to the existence of an equity created by estoppel that the party who induces the adoption of the assumption or expectation knows or intends that the party who adopts it will act or abstain from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation: see per Lord Denning M.R. in Crabb v. Arun District Council [[1976] Ch 179, at p 188].”
Brennan J went on at page 428 in Walton Stores to conveniently summarise precisely what it is that a plaintiff needs to prove to establish an equitable estoppel of the kind that Mr Krupin seeks to establish (namely a proprietary estoppel).
“In my opinion, to establish an equitable estoppel, it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove that (1) the plaintiff assumed that a particular legal relationship then existed between the plaintiff and the defendant or expected that a particular legal relationship would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationship; (2) the defendant has induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or expectation; (3) the plaintiff acts or abstains from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation; (4) the defendant knew or intended him to do so; (5) the plaintiff's action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled; and (6) the defendant has failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or otherwise.”
The claimant in the present case (Mr Krupin) has failed to prove elements 2, 4, 5 and 6 (at least). Ms Angeloff did not in any way induce Mr Krupin to adopt the assumption or expectation that Mr Krupin claims. There is no evidence of any representation having been made by Ms Angeloff and there is no evidence (that I am prepared to accept) of an agreement of the kind maintained by Mr Krupin that the C Street property was purchased by Ms Angeloff on behalf of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. Neither element 2 nor element 4 have been fulfilled.
Further, as to element 5, there is no evidence that Mr Krupin has suffered or will suffer a detriment as a result of renovation work that he performed on C Street. The Court has accepted the evidence of Ms Angeloff that any materials purchased by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin for the renovation work on C Street has already been paid for by Ms Angeloff. Furthermore, Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin received the benefit of Ms Angeloff’s contributions from the rent that she received on C Street – towards the extended family’s living expenses.
Because there is no detriment whatsoever suffered by Mr Krupin (for the reasons explained above concerning the fifth element of Brennan J’s summary) there was no act or step Ms Angeloff could or should have taken in order to address any purported misapprehension that Mr Krupin may have been under.
In any event, in the particular circumstances of this case even if Mr Krupin had been able to prove all six elements required before an equitable estoppel arises (which he has not) the imposition of a constructive trust would not be appropriate because it would be out of all proportion to any detriment purportedly suffered by Mr Krupin.
At the centre of Mr Krupin’s claim in this regard is his assertion that Ms Angeloff should not receive any entitlement in respect of C Street. Mr Krupin’s arguments completely ignore the fact that Ms Angeloff paid approximately $110,000 towards the credit card debts of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – such payments representing payments for the materials used to renovate C Street (and MM Street and N Street – in which regard note paragraphs 53 and 69 of Ms Angeloff’s trial affidavit). Further, Mr Krupin’s arguments ignore the benefits that Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin received from the approximately $64,000 paid by Ms Angeloff to the married couple between 2009 and 2013. Finally, Mr Krupin’s argument completely ignores the fact that Ms Angeloff has been solely responsible for paying down the mortgage on C Street since it was purchased in 2007.
Mr Krupin’s claim based upon proprietary estoppel must fail.
At one stage it seemed that Mr Krupin was going to run an argument based on a paragraph contained in a letter from Ms Krupin’s solicitor. That letter is addressed to Mr Krupin and is dated 5 May 2014 and it appears at page 523 in the annexures to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit. It contains a representation by Ms Krupin’s solicitor relating to the ownership of C Street. As was correctly pointed out by Mr Hartnett (counsel on behalf of Ms Angeloff) on 18 May 2023 – that evidence cannot be said to give rise to any form of estoppel against Ms Angeloff. It was not a representation made by Ms Angeloff. [20] Further, and in any event, there are text messages from Ms Krupin (including on page 520 of the annexures to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit) where Ms Angeloff makes it very clear that Mr Krupin is not the owner of C Street. I include a reference to this evidence only out of an abundance of caution.
[20] See transcript Thursday 18 May 2023, page 260.
Paragraphs 1-10 contained in Mr Krupin’s Amended Initiating Application filed 14 February 2023 (ie. the orders sought in relation to C Street) must be dismissed.
Further, there will be an order directing that Mr Krupin sign all documents and do all things necessary at Mr Krupin’s sole cost to remove the caveat lodged over C Street within 7 days of the date of delivery of judgment – failing which a Registrar of the Court will be appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Act to execute the necessary documents to remove the caveat.
The C Street property, for the reasons stated, does not form part of the pool of property for distribution in the matrimonial proceedings between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin.
E STREET AND G STREET
It is convenient to deal with E Street and G Street at the same time in these Reasons for Judgment. This is because Ms Petrov, at various times, has made claims in respect of both E Street and G Street.
The valuation of E Street is $950,000. The ANZ Bank is owed $506,720.44. In relation to the history of E Street I note the evidence of Ms Krupin contained in her trial affidavit. I accept the following evidence from Ms Krupin in relation to E Street:
“208. In […] 2007 [Mr Krupin] and I purchased in our joint names the real property at [E Street, Suburb F (E Street)] for $770,000 plus stamp duty and legal fees of approximately $21,414.81.
209. Annexed to this my affidavit and marked [MSK-30] is a copy of the draft settlement statement for the purchase.
210. We funded the purchase of [E Street] using a $5,000 deposit from cash savings, the sale proceeds of [WW Street] and [XX Street] of approximately $170,000 and the balance by way of a further loan from the ANZ bank in our personal names for $616,000 which was then secured against the property.
211. Annexed to this my affidavit and marked [MSK-31] is a copy of the loan offer [Mr Krupin] and I received from the ANZ Bank and which is dated […] 2007.
212. When [Mr Krupin] and I purchased [E Street], we planned to live in it as our home, but also for the [animal] facilities, which was a hobby I was interested in pursuing at the time.
213. [Mr Krupin] and I extensively renovated the house and land at [E Street] between late 2007 and 2013 by:
a. Removing trees, building drainage level, and leveling part of the back and front yard.
b. Connecting town water.
c. Installing a water filter system for the tank water.
d. Fixing blocked and damaged downpipes.
e. Cleaning, fixing and re-painting the roof of the main house.
f. Cleaning and fully retiling the swimming pool.
g. Replacing the pool pump and filtration system.
h. Building a shed for the pool pump.
i. Installing the glass pool fence.
j. Installing a drainage system and laying the sandstone pavers around the pool.
k. Fixing the retaining walls and planting plants around the pool area.
l. Building 2 pergolas […].
m. Laying paving on the North side of the house.
n. Installing a 45 sq meter roof […].
o. Paving the west side of house.
p. Cutting into the rock […] to enable us to build a carport, complete with roof and electricals.
q. Relocating and replacing the Hot water system.
r. Installing a 5,000 KW solar system and connecting it to grid.
s. Cleaning, repairing and building the 150 meters rainwater pipe system.
t. Cleaning and repairing three (3) sewage tanks.
u. Rebuilding the evaporation field for the septic tank sewerage water.
v. Removing, replacing grey water pump, clean grey water tank and reroute grey water.
w. Cleaning up and fixing driveway.
x. Cleaned up and rebuilt approximately 2 km of road on the property.
y. Constructing garden beds.
z. Building rock retaining walls.
aa. Building timber retaining walls.
bb. Levelling the ground for car parking […].
cc. Removing trees & shrubs around the house.
dd. Repainting one bedroom and installing built-in cupboards.
ee. Removing the carpet and laying bamboo flooring in 3 bedrooms.
214. In addition to the above, [Mr Krupin] and I also:
a. Built an industrial shed, 12 x 9 meters in size with fixed internal shelving.
b. Cleaned up and levelling the area around the shed.
c. Renovated the [animal] facility that existed on the [E Street] property at the time we purchased it. We installed power to the [facility], a dual water supply, laid pavers around facility and tiled inside it.
d. Built a fenced and partially roofed [animal] enclosure on the property.
e. Built an [animal enclosure].”
Since 25 June 2014, Mr Krupin has had the exclusive use and occupation of E Street, including the animal facilities – to the exclusion of Ms Krupin. Ms Petrov has lived with Mr Krupin at the E Street property since 2015. Neither Ms Petrov nor Mr Krupin have paid any rental income in respect of the E Street property – notwithstanding the fact that E Street is registered in the names of Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin. From the date of final separation on 25 June 2014 up until the time of the trial – Ms Krupin has had to rent accommodation. Between 25 June 2014 and 24 January 2023 Ms Krupin has paid rent in the sum of $169,950. This evidence is contained in paragraph 351 of her trial affidavit. I accept this evidence. Since early 2018 Ms Krupin has lived at the C Street property – with her mother, Ms Angeloff. Ms Krupin has paid Ms Angeloff rental income during that period of time. I accept the evidence of Ms Krupin contained at paragraph 352 of her trial affidavit.
On average – over the eight and a half year period between June 2014 and January 2023 – Ms Krupin has paid $400 per week by way of rent.
I accept Ms Krupin’s evidence that between the time of separation under one roof (13 May 2013) and 17 January 2023 Ms Krupin has paid an amount totalling $29,569 towards the home loan on E Street. I accept Ms Krupin’s evidence in relation to this which appears at paragraphs 363-365 of her trial affidavit:
“364. From 13 May 2013 until I moved out from [E Street] property on 25 June 2014, I paid $18,343 towards the [E Street] home loan. During that same period, [Mr Krupin] paid $15,695.
365. Between 26 June 2014 until 17 January 2023, I paid $11 ,227 towards the [E Street] home loan from my income and my 50% of the rental income from mine and [Mr Krupin's] jointly owned investment properties.”
MS PETROV’S CLAIMS
The presentation of Ms Petrov’s case is utterly chaotic. In her Amended Response document filed 19 January 2023 Ms Petrov includes a list of 9 orders that she seeks – described as “FINANCIAL ORDERS SOUGHT IN RESPONSE TO INITIATING APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH RESPONDENT FILED ON 4 JANUARY 2023”. This heading is meaningless. The fourth respondent did not file an initiating application. The orders sought relate solely to G Street. The first order sought by Ms Petrov relates to an application for a declaration that B Pty Ltd as trustee for the Krupin Family Trust (and the property at G Street, Suburb H) be excluded from the asset pool in the proceedings between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. There are no orders sought by Ms Petrov in her most recent and up to date Response document (the Amended Response filed 19 January 2023) seeking any orders concerning E Street. In her previous response document filed on 4 January 2023 Ms Petrov sought orders in relation to G Street and E Street – asking the Court that those properties be excluded from the asset pool in the matrimonial proceedings between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. There is a document called “DEFENCE AND CROSS-CLAIM FOR THE THIRD RESPONDENT” attached to the Amended Response of Ms Petrov filed on 4 January 2023. From approximately paragraph 67 of that document Ms Petrov makes a claim that she is entitled to the whole of the interest in the E Street property and in the Krupin Family Trust (presumably including G Street) – on the basis of an express trust or a constructive trust “created by the agreement between her and the applicant”.

Both E Street and G Street are to be included in the matrimonial pool of assets for division pursuant to s 79 in the matrimonial proceedings between Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin.
OTHER ISSUES IN RELATION TO THE POOL
Mr Krupin has maintained that an amount of $110,000 should be included in the property pool in respect of the animals from the family business known as, “ZZ Company”.
Ms Krupin has provided evidence in relation to this issue. Between 2011 and 2013 Ms Krupin bred animals under the registered name “ZZ Company”. Ms Krupin was a sole trader in relation to this business. All of the animals were registered in Ms Krupin’s name. Ms Krupin operated the business from the E Street property where Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were living at the time. There was a purpose built facility situated on the E Street property when Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin purchased that property. Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin improved the facility with a view to Ms Krupin using the facilities to pursue her interest in animals.
From 2012 ZZ Company was producing some income and that income was applied to the joint expenses of the family – including groceries, health costs and expenses for the children. I accept Ms Krupin’s evidence that the income generated from the business during the relationship was paid into Ms Krupin and Mr Krupin’s joint CBA account. Once the money was paid into that account the funds were transferred to pay for various family expenses including the expenses described above and other expenses relating to the E Street property. I accept that Ms Krupin has made proper disclosure in relation to the business.
I accept the following evidence from Ms Krupin in relation to the animals and the facility:
“322. In August 2016, my then rental agreement approved me to keep [some animals] at the property.
323. I could not afford the costs associated with boarding the [animals] and, as my [animals] were getting older, I retired almost all of my breeders in 2016.
324. I asked [Mr Krupin] many times to vacate the [E Street] property to enable me to remain living there where I could continue to breed [animals] and I even caused my solicitor to write to [Mr Krupin] as early as 2 May 2014 in that regard. [Mr Krupin] refused.
325. When I vacated [E Street] property, I had [several breeder animals]. They stayed at the property, as we had a purpose-built […] facility there.
326. [Mr Krupin] agreed to feed the [animals] daily, and when [Mr Krupin] went overseas in [mid] 2014 I agreed to attend at the former home to feed and care for the animals.
327. It was around this time that I asked [Mr Krupin] if l could keep the [animals] at the [E Street] property and proposed that I would attend each day to feed, clean and take care of them. I even offered to pay [Mr Krupin] board. He declined my proposal.
328. [In mid] 2014, the day after [Mr Krupin] returned from his holiday, he told me that I was not permitted to return to the [E Street] property and that if I did, he would call the police and apply for a DVO against me.
329. That evening I collected [some animals] from the property, and the two [birds] and left the property.
330. [Mr Krupin] then asked me to transfer all paperwork for the remaining [animals] into his name. I told him that he would have to look after the [animals] and purchase their food [and supplies] and clean the [animal facility] which, up until that point in time, I was attending to.
331. [The next day Mr Krupin] told me that if I did not transfer all paperwork for the remaining [animals] into his name, he would call the RSPCA and tell them that I had abandoned the [animals]. The effect of this would mean that I would be classified as a bad breeder and not be able to carry out my hobby of breeding [animals].
332. I told [Mr Krupin] that I would collect the [animals], which I did that same day. My mother and I also spent approximately 1.5 hours cleaning the [animal facility], during which [Mr Krupin] continued to harass me, verbally denigrating me and my mum.
333. [Mr Krupin] continued to abuse me, demanding that I provide him with various paperwork. As I was leaving, [Mr Krupin] told me that he had called the police. I told [Mr Krupin] to give my phone number and address to the police and they could contact me.
334. I was not contacted by the police and do not know whether they attended at the property or not.
335. As at the date of signing this affidavit I do not have any breeding [animals] in my possession or control and, further, I have not had breeding [animals] in my possession or control since approximately 2018.”
Ms Krupin was cross-examined about the business. AB Accountants prepared a valuation. It is annexed to the trial affidavit of Mr Krupin. This valuation is annexure 43 to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit. It commences at page 1539 of the husband’s annexures to his trial affidavit.
The expert who prepared the valuation did not prepare an affidavit for these court proceedings. No person from the AB Accountants was available for cross examination. It is very difficult for this Court to ascribe weight to the valuation.
Further, I accept the evidence of Ms Krupin – including the evidence from her oral testimony at page 246 of the transcript of the trial – on Wednesday 17 May 2023. The point made by Ms Krupin is that the animal facility needed particular facilities from which the business could be maintained. Without those facilities the business could not be continued. I infer from this evidence that the value of the animals very much depends upon the ability to breed from those animals. Unless there are proper facilities for breeding to take place then it is difficult to maintain an argument that a valuation for the ZZ Company business in the sum of $110,000 should be added back into the property pool. For the reasons that I have outlined above I do not consider that it is appropriate in the circumstances of this case to include the animal facility in the property pool.
Mr Krupin has also made a submission that an amount should be added back into the property pool for the value of exotic birds in the sum of $29,000. I note Exhibit 7 which contained the property pool sought by Mr Krupin (at that stage). In relation to the exotic birds I note the evidence from Ms Krupin as follows:
“407. I am aware that [Mr Krupin] is claiming as an add back the value of [exotic birds] owned by us during our marriage.
408. I dispute the inclusion of the [birds] in the property pool.
409. During the relationship, in 2011 I purchased [exotic birds] as family pets.
410. I borrowed $4,000 from my mother to fund them, on condition that it would be repaid to her.
411. Whilst the [birds] were originally purchased with the intention of breeding them, none of our [birds] ever bred and did not produce any income.
412. [One bird] died prior to me vacating the [E Street] property in […] 2013.
413. [A pair of birds] flew away in […] 2014. I suspect that a dog or a fox knocked over the cage trying to get to the birds, as the children and I found the cage empty with feathers spread across the ground early one morning.
414. In […] 2015 [Mr Krupin] requested that I remove [another bird] from [E Street] as he no longer wanted to look after it. He sent me a text saying that he will leave the [bird] in a box on the driveway for me to pick up.
415. Annexed to this my Affidavit and marked "[MSK-55]" is a true copy of his text message to me.
416. I was not able to keep the [bird] at my rental property, due to it being so large and noisy so I sold it for $3,000 and gave the funds to my mother to repay the loan from her for the original purchased of the birds.”
I accept this evidence from Ms Krupin. In the circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to include any amount of money in the property pool in relation to the exotic birds.
Mr Krupin seeks that an amount be included as a liability for personal loans made to him by two people namely Mr P and Mr Q. Mr P states that he is owed $73,500. Mr Q maintains that he is owed $48,000. There are no affidavits from either of these people. There is no adequate explanation as to why that is so. In the absence of affidavits, it was not possible for those people to be cross examined. Given my credibility findings against Mr Krupin – I am not prepared to accept that there should be any amount included in the property pool for those personal debts that he has alleged.
Mr Krupin seeks that an amount for credit card debts in his name in the sum of $101,831 be included in the property pool. Ms Krupin has made a submission (in Exhibit 3) admitting credit card debt in Mr Krupin’s name in the sum of $61,649.34. There was no helpful cross examination or submissions in relation to these credit card debts. In the circumstances – I am only prepared to include in the property pool the amount admitted by Ms Krupin – namely the amount of $61,649.34 as credit card debt in the name of Mr Krupin.
Exhibit 7 is the property pool sought by Mr Krupin. I note the following two items listed under the heading “Liabilities – estimated”:
“Centrelink – child care 2008-2011 $16,000
Centrelink – for school $2,450”
In the written submissions provided on behalf of Mr Krupin by his counsel (filed on 30 June 2023), there is no mention of these liabilities. My attention has not been drawn to the evidence relating to those liabilities. It is important to keep in mind that Mr Krupin provided 3000 pages worth of evidence – including his trial affidavit and annexures. It is not the role of the Court to hunt through 3000 pages of a litigant’s affidavit in an attempt to ascertain whether or not he has proved to the satisfaction of the Court that those liabilities are actually owing and that they ought to be included in the property pool. Those liabilities have not been admitted by Ms Krupin. Taking these matters into account and taking into account the fact that I have made serious credibility findings against Mr Krupin – I do not consider that it is appropriate for those liabilities to be included in the property pool.
I will be including amounts in respect of ATO liabilities on behalf of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. Mr Krupin’s ATO liability is $2,450. Ms Krupin’s ATO liability is $24,108.91.
Also listed as a liability by Mr Krupin in Exhibit 7 is an amount allegedly owed to Ms Petrov in the sum of $840,346. It will be apparent from these reasons for judgment that I have taken a particular view of the evidence of what has occurred involving Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov. If it is the case that Ms Petrov agreed to pay Mr Krupin’s obligations – relating to the mortgages and other outgoings on E Street and G Street – that is a matter between Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov. Mr Krupin was ordered by Judge Demack to pay those amounts. There is no proper basis for including as a liability an amount of $840,346 to Ms Petrov. Further, in the written submissions provided by Mr Krupin’s counsel there is not one word devoted to this extremely large liability which is allegedly owed by Mr Krupin to Ms Petrov. There was no mention of this liability in the oral submissions made on behalf of Mr Krupin.
Ms Krupin has sought to include a HH Bank credit card (#...19) in the sum of $8,163.95 as a liability in her name. In addition Ms Krupin seeks a Mastercard (also ending #...19 in the sum of $10,192.49). Given the size of credit card debts that I am including on behalf of Mr Krupin ($61,649. 34) – I consider that it is appropriate and it is just and equitable to include those credit card debts belonging to Ms Krupin. The view that I have formed is that Ms Krupin is a credible witness and her evidence should be accepted in relation to these credit card debts. Accordingly credit card debts in those amounts will be included in the property pool. I note those amounts are included in Exhibit 3 – the pool sought by Ms Krupin.
Ms Krupin has also asked the Court to include as a liability a personal loan she received from a person named Ms U in the sum of $8000 and a personal loan she obtained from her brother, Mr O in the sum of $30,100. I have made it clear that I consider Ms Krupin to be a credible witness. However, I am not satisfied that those loans are going to have to be repaid. Given that I have excluded Mr Krupin’s personal loans from the pool – I consider it appropriate that I do the same in respect of the personal loans sought to be included by Ms Krupin.
I note that Ms Krupin seeks that a child support liability owed to her be included in the pool. I am not going to include any reference to child support liabilities in the pool. The Child Support Agency is in charge of enforcing those debts. Even if it’s not through the Child Support Agency, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to be included in the pool in this case.
I will include the superannuation amounts contained in Exhibit 3 – namely superannuation in Ms Krupin’s name in the sum of $10,135.24 and superannuation in the Mr Krupin’s name in the sum of $2,000
There is a list of bank accounts contained under the heading “Assets” in Exhibit 3. They are very minor amounts. I am not satisfied that they need to be included in the property pool. I will exclude those amounts.
In the absence of an agreement concerning the value of Motor Vehicle 2 – my view is that it should not be included in the pool.
As for the items listed under the heading “Companies and Trust” in Exhibit 3 – in the absence of an agreement – I do not propose including those items. They will be covered by a general order that will be made requiring that the assets of the trust are to be sold and the proceeds divided in accordance with the orders that will be made.
In the absence of agreement concerning the assets listed under the heading “Other” in exhibit 3 – I do not propose including those in the property pool.
The property pool in this case is as follows:

DESCRIPTION

OWNED BY

VALUE

Real Property

E Street, Suburb F

Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin

$950,000

G Street, Suburb H

B Pty Ltd as a trustee

$560,000

J Street, Suburb K

Joint

$35,425.74

Gross Assets

$1,545,425.74

LIABILITIES

REGISTERED TO

VALUE

ANZ Home Loan #...34 (E Street)

Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin

$506,720.44

ANZ Residential Investment Loan #...17 (G Street)

Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin

$163,026

HH Bank Credit Card #...19

Ms Krupin

$8,163.95

Mastercard #...19

Ms Krupin

$10,192.49

FF Bank Credit Card #...51

Mr Krupin

$52,810.36

FF Bank Credit Card #...51

Mr Krupin

$8,838.98

ATO Liability

Mr Krupin

$2,450

ATO Liability

Ms Krupin

$24,108.91

Total Liabilities

$776,311.13

Net Assets

$769,114.61

Superannuation

Ms Krupin’s Superannuation

Ms Krupin

$10,135.24

Mr Krupin’s Superannuation

Mr Krupin

$2,000

TOTAL SUPERANNUATION

$12,135.24

Net Assets + Superannuation

$781,249.85

POOL

Total

Value

Total Assets (including Mr Krupin, Ms Krupin and B Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Krupin Family Trust in relation to G Street)

$1,545,425.74

Total Superannuation

$12,135.24

Total Assets and Superannuation

$1,557,560.98

Less Liabilities

($776,311.13)

Total Net Pool (including Superannuation)

$781,249.85

In the circumstances of this case it is appropriate for the Court to include the G Street asset in the general property pool on behalf of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – even though it is owned by the trust. That is the way that the case has been run by the parties to the s 79 property settlement proceedings, namely Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin (note Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 7). It is convenient and appropriate to take this approach in this particular instance.
Furthermore this is the kind of case where the superannuation should be included in the same pool as the non-superannuation assets.
CONTRIBUTIONS
Whilst Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were together – they both worked very hard for the benefit of the family. Ms Angeloff also provided a large amount of unpaid labour for the benefit of the family – which should properly be seen (in my view, having regarded the circumstances of this case) as a credit on behalf of Ms Krupin. The parties were together for thirteen years and they raised four children.
I have regard to the affidavit evidence of Ms Krupin where she talks extensively of the amount of contributions that she made to the family. I accept Ms Krupin’s evidence.
It is also apparent that Mr Krupin did work hard for the benefit of the family. They pooled their resources; they invested in property; and together, they managed those investments.
I do not propose to consider in any detail the specifics and particulars of the types of contributions made.
It is, of course, the case that many years have elapsed since separation. Ten years between the time of separation and the time of this particular trial. It is important to note that I am talking here about the initial separation under one roof. From at least March 2016 (the date of an Order made by Judge Demack) Mr Krupin was responsible for the payment of mortgages and other outgoings in respect of E Street and G Street. I have indicated that to the extent that Ms Petrov made any payments towards the mortgages, rates and other outgoings to E Street and G Street – these should be credited as contributions made by Mr Krupin.
It is noteworthy, of course, that Ms Petrov did not in fact pay any rent to the owners of the property where she lived – E Street. Essentially, Ms Petrov has lived there for eight years without paying rent – although she has (on her case) paid mortgages and other outgoings.
There has never been any proper form of accounting to Ms Krupin (or the Court) in respect of any rent received between late 2018 and the time of the trial relating to rent received in respect of G Street.
As noted, the payments made towards the mortgages and other outgoings in respect of E Street and G Street should be credited to Mr Krupin as a contribution. Balanced against that is the fact that Ms Krupin has had to pay approximately $170,000 by way of rent to live from the time of separation to the time of the trial.
Such a long time has elapsed since the final separation between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin - this is a difficult case to assess contributions. Counsel on behalf of Mr Krupin (Mr Waterman) made a submission on 19 July 2023 that the contributions based entitlements of the parties should be equal as at the date of the trial. I am uncertain as to what pool of property this submission was based on. Mr Jones (counsel on behalf of Ms Krupin) also submitted that the contributions based entitlements should be equal as at the time of trial. I have already made it clear that payments made by Ms Petrov towards E Street and G Street (I am talking here about mortgage repayments and rates etc) are to be taken into account as contributions on Mr Krupin’s behalf. I have perused the ANZ home loan bank statements for the account ending #...34 (the E Street home loan) and rates notices in respect of E Street. Those documents are annexed to Ms Petrov’s trial affidavit. Those documents provide some concrete and believable evidence in relation to payments made. The presentation of Ms Petrov’s case has been chaotic – but on my assessment of the annexures – approximately $300,000 has been paid by Ms Petrov (or by Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin) in respect of E Street from February 2015 to February 2023.
In relation to G Street – paragraph 54 of Ms Petrov’s affidavit maintains that $323,734 has been spent. However, I note that figure includes more than $210,000 for a renovation. I have already rejected that evidence. That has been referred to extensively earlier in these Reasons for Judgment. On the basis of my own perusal of the bank statements of the ANZ investment loan for G Street (#...17) and the rates notices (which are annexed to the affidavit filed on behalf of B Pty Ltd) – I am satisfied that an amount of approximately $110,000 has been paid out in respect of G Street.
I am looking here at payments made rather than the actual reduction in the principal amount owing. It seems to me that this approach is appropriate. The mortgage repayments had to be made to avoid foreclosure – this includes principal and interest.

I have also come to the conclusion that it is more likely than not that some remedial work was carried out on G Street after the time of final separation. I do note that Mr Krupin performed some remedial work prior to separation. After separation – the view that I have formed is that it is likely that Mr Krupin performed further remedial work on G Street. That would explain why there are no documents relating to the work done. It also explains the incredible evidence provided by Ms Petrov – that she did not know the surname of the builder. I have drawn this inference from the available evidence including:
(a)as noted, Mr Krupin had a long history of performing work of this kind on the family’s investment properties;
(b)despite his claims of poor health – Mr Krupin was able to do sporting activities during this period of time. I will return to this issue shortly; and
(c)Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov lack credibility – so I do not believe their version.
I will add that in my view, it is not even an issue that the Court needs to decide to dispose of the case. It was incumbent on Ms Petrov to prove her assertions about the G Street renovations – but she failed to do so. As I have noted – it does seem to me to be the case that some remedial work was needed at G Street. The value and the extent of the work done has not been proven to the appropriate standard. As I noted earlier in relation to the issue relating to C Street – the evidence of a quantity surveyor could have been obtained to prove the case. There was no such evidence. Because of the lack of evidence and the credibility problems with the evidence of Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin – it is very difficult to make an assessment of the work done in this process that I am now conducting – namely assessing the contributions of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin to the matrimonial property pool. I will point out that I have, in my deliberations taken into account the inference I have drawn that Mr Krupin likely performed remedial work on G Street after separation. It is not possible to precisely quantify that work.
There are so many unanswered questions in this case – including why did Mr Krupin leave G Street untenanted for so long? He had control of the trust and he let the trust property be occupied by squatters. This is clearly a dereliction of his duty as the person who controlled the trustee company. Final separation was in June 2014 but no tenant went into G Street until late 2018 – a very unsatisfactory situation.
I would add at this point that I do not accept the “increase in value” argument pressed by Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin. The evidence is far from conclusive. The property market in that region of Queensland has been steadily rising for many years. I take judicial notice of this fact. It is impossible for the Court to determine whether any increase in value of the property is as a result of improvements performed on the property – or as a result of the improving property market generally.
I am not prepared to take into account other alleged outgoings in respect of E Street or G Street. I am only prepared to consider the bank statements and rates notices. This is not an exercise which is capable of precise calculation. It is impossible to use mathematical calculations in the assessment of contributions – especially when there has been such a long time since the final separation and the Court has no confidence in the credibility of Mr Krupin or Ms Petrov. But in a broad sense the bank statements and rates notices reveal that approximately $400,000 has been spent in respect of E Street and G Street since separation. I reiterate – I have not attempted to precisely calculate exactly what the mortgage payments and rates notices actually total. Further, it has to be remembered that rental income was received on G Street of approximately $150,000 between late 2018 and this trial. That $150,000 – it seems to me – was then utilised and forms part of the approximately $400,000. Neither Ms Petrov nor Mr Krupin paid rent to Ms Krupin in respect of E Street during this period. Ms Krupin has had to pay approximately $170,000 in rent since separation.
It is a near run thing. But, on balance, I have come to the conclusion that there ought to be some adjustment in Mr Krupin’s favour in relation to the question of contributions to the pool of property. There will be a five per cent adjustment in Mr Krupin’s favour. It is impossible to precisely calculate the contributions. There is a long line of authority to support this proposition. I have done my best to take into account the extent of the mortgages paid and rates payments made in the year since separation and my finding concerning remedial work at G Street. And I have taken into account the expenses incurred by Ms Krupin in the years since separation in order to have a dwelling in which to live. Such an assessment is a matter of discretion and I consider that I have adequately explained why it is that I am allocating an extra five per cent towards Mr Krupin in respect of the contributions based entitlements. The contributions based entitlements of the parties at the time of the trial will be assessed as 55 per cent in favour of Mr Krupin and 45 per cent in favour of Ms Krupin.
SECTION 75(2)
Mr Krupin has asked that there be an uplift of at least five per cent in his favour because of his health and his current situation. My attention was drawn to page 1847 of Mr Krupin’s affidavit in relation to Mr Krupin’s health. The evidence to which my attention was drawn seems to be notes from a general practitioner named Dr KK at Suburb LL, Queensland. The evidence is very scarce. That is to say, there is a complaint of chronic pain. These are the comments or complaints made by Mr Krupin to the doctor. My attention has not been drawn to any x-rays, CT scans, MRI’s or expert medical evidence. It may be that in the past Mr Krupin has also suffered from depression and anxiety and there is a mental health plan for him. It may even be that he gets some sort of Centrelink benefit because of health conditions but the documents I have seen appear to be documents that report Mr Krupin’s own complaints relating to his health.
I note Ms Krupin’s evidence in relation to Mr Krupin’s sporting activities. I accept Ms Krupin’s evidence (from paragraph 227 of her trial affidavit) that every year Mr Krupin would spend on average three months away from home travelling around Australia and enjoying his hobby. Of particular note is the fact that Ms Krupin has annexed to her affidavit Annexure MSK-35 which contains a copy of Mr Krupin’s GPS tracked and registered sporting activities in different events across Australia between January 2016 and February 2021. During oral submissions on 19 July 2023 Mr Waterman, Mr Krupin’s counsel, sought and obtained specific instructions from Mr Krupin (in the presence of Mr Krupin’s solicitor) – to the effect that Mr Krupin had not participated in the sport since 2014. I note the transcript of day five, 19 July 2023 at page 19 from line 39. Annexure MSK-35 to the affidavit of Ms Krupin makes it very clear that Mr Krupin has indeed participated in the sport between January 2016 and February 2021. This just adds to Mr Krupin’s credibility problem. To put it another way – Mr Krupin does not tell the truth.
Taking all these matters into account – and noting, as I do, that to participate in the sport likely requires some physical strength – I am not, in the particular circumstances of this case, prepared to allow for any adjustment under s 75(2) of the Act.
I have kept in mind all of the issues and submissions relating to s 75(2) – including the current situation regarding Ms Krupin (including her work and the fact that she has remarried) and I have kept in mind Mr Krupin’s evidence. Mr Krupin’s lack of credibility has been a serious problem for Mr Krupin in this case.
CONCLUSION
I have come to the conclusion that a distribution of the matrimonial property pool (as the Court has found in these Reasons for Judgment) in the proportions of 55 per cent in favour of Mr Krupin and 45 per cent in favour of Ms Krupin – is just and equitable. It is just and equitable to make such an order.
ORDERS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED
To assist the parties I want to make it clear that certain orders will be required.
I note that Ms Krupin seeks final orders that would require Mr Krupin to transfer his interest in E Street to Ms Krupin – for the payment of a specified sum. I do not consider that such an order is appropriate. I do not have any confidence that this will achieve a just and equitable outcome. In relation to E Street there will need to be an order effecting the sale of E Street. I propose to appoint a Trustee for Sale (pursuant to s 80(1)(e) of the Act) to effect the sale of E Street.
The same Trustee for Sale will be appointed to effect the sale of G Street. I take judicial notice of the relatively volatile state of the property market in that region of Queensland and I consider that in order to achieve a just and equitable outcome between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – both E Street and G Street will have to be sold.
There will need to be orders requiring that Mr Krupin (the applicant) and Ms Petrov (the third respondent) vacate E Street within a reasonable period of time.
The money contained in the trust account of Hofstee Lawyers can be used in the meantime by the Trustee for Sale (in respect of the two properties) to pay the mortgage repayments and rates and other outgoings on E Street and G Street. If there is any money left in that trust account after the sale of the two properties then the balance remaining in the Hofstee Lawyers trust account should be distributed to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – 55 per cent – 45 per cent.
There will need to be a declaration to the effect that Ms Petrov does not hold any equitable interest or entitlement in either the E Street property or the G Street property.
There will need to be an order dismissing Ms Petrov’s claims (her response documents). The same goes in respect of the B Pty Ltd response document.
There will need to be a declaration to the effect that neither Mr Krupin nor Ms Krupin have any equitable interest or entitlement in the C Street property and a further declaration that Ms Angeloff is the sole owner (at law and in equity) in respect of the C Street property. The orders and declarations sought by Ms Angeloff relating to C Street will be made.
There will need to be an order to the effect that the costs, fees and outlays of the Trustee for Sale will need to be paid for equally by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. This is appropriate.
The appointment of a Trustee for Sale is essential because of the longstanding animosity between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin – generally and in particular in relation to these proceedings.
Mr Krupin removed Ms Krupin as a beneficiary under the Krupin Family Trust. He did this without Ms Krupin’s knowledge. In my view he did this unlawfully. Mr Jones, counsel for Ms Krupin made some oral submissions on the point. I have already made my conclusion clear that Mr Krupin’s conduct in removing Ms Krupin as a beneficiary (without her knowledge or consent) is another example of dishonest conduct by Mr Krupin. In removing or purporting to remove Ms Krupin as a beneficiary I find that Mr Krupin has not acted in good faith.
I considered taking steps under s 80(1)(k) to reinstate Ms Krupin as a beneficiary and also requiring Ms Petrov to transfer her two shares in B Pty Ltd back to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin respectively (one share each). I also considered removing Ms Petrov as a director of B Pty Ltd and reinstating Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin respectively as directors. I considered removing Mr Krupin as the appointor of the trust – having regard to findings made by the Court relating to the dishonest conduct of Mr Krupin. It seems to me that s 80(1)(k) of the Act is extremely broad and gives power to this Court to take the types of steps I have outlined – for instance authorising variations to the trust deed and the shareholding of B Pty Ltd. On balance I have concluded that the appointment of a trustee for sale will likely avoid the need to take any of those steps. However I will give to the trustee for sale liberty to apply in case further directions and orders are needed to give effect to the Court’s judgment.
I should add that I have not been able to discern the basis of the fourth respondent’s claim – or even if there is a claim. Ms Petrov currently controls the fourth respondent and I have worked on the basis that the interests of the fourth respondent (as currently constituted) align with the interests of Ms Petrov. I have not received any comprehensive assistance from either the fourth respondent or from Ms Petrov on behalf of the fourth respondent – concerning the fourth respondent’s claim or claims (if any).
I will consider the necessity of making any other orders once the parties have had a chance to forward a draft order reflecting the Reasons for Judgment. The parties will only be given 21 days from the day of the delivery of judgment to send to the Court a proposed draft order.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and ninety-four (194) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Howard.

Associate:
Dated: 9 February 2024

File number:	BRC 5459 of 2014
Judgment of:	HOWARD J
Date of judgment:	9 February 2024
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Property pool in dispute – Where the applicant makes claim for an equitable interest in property owned by the second respondent – Express trusts – Constructive trusts – Resulting trusts – Equitable estoppel – Where the third respondent makes a claim or claims of equitable interests in properties owned by the applicant, the first respondent and the fourth respondent – A consideration of the contributions based entitlements of the applicant and the first respondent – Contributions – Future needs – Justice and equity. FAMILY LAW – TRUSTS – Trustee and beneficiary – Fiduciary relationship – Removal of a beneficiary without the beneficiary’s knowledge or consent – Unauthorised transfer of a share in the trustee company. FAMILY LAW – ADDENDUM – Correction of the Reasons for Judgment pursuant to r 10.14(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Legislation:	Evidence Act 1999 (Cth) s 140 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79, 80, 106A Criminal Code (Qld) s 408C Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss 11, 12
Cases cited:	Australian Building and Construction Commission v Parker (No 2) [2017] FCA 1082 Baumgartner v Baumgartner [1987] 164 CLR 137 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox 92; 30 ER 42 Eagle & Scarlett (No 2) [2020] FamCAFC 291 Engwirda v Engwirda & Ors [2000] QCA 61 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 Housing Commission of NSW v Pastoral Company Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSW LR 378 Huda v Huda (No 2) [2020] FCCA 1804; 61 Fam LR 257 Johansson & Johansson [2022] FedCFamC1A 74 Krupin & Krupin [2022] FedCFamC1A 136 Miller v Sutherland (1990) 14 FamLR 416 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; Napier v Public Trustee (Western Australia) (1980) 55 ALJR 1 Owies and Owies v JJE Nominees Pty Ltd [2022] VSCA 142 Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46 Simpson v Hodges [2007] NSWSC 1230 Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	194
Date of last submission/s:	19 July 2023
Date of hearing:	15, 16, 17, 18, 19 May and 19 July 2023
Place:	Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Waterman
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Hofstee Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent:	Mr Jones
Solicitor for the First Respondent:	Robert Bax & Associates
Counsel for the Second Respondent:	Mr Hartnett
Solicitor for the Second Respondent:	Genuine Legal
Third and Fourth Respondents	Litigants in person

BRC 5459 of 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MR KRUPIN Applicant
AND:	MS KRUPIN First Respondent MS ANGELOFF Second Respondent MS PETROV Third Respondent B PTY LTD Fourth Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	HOWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:	9 FEBRUARY 2024

DESCRIPTION		OWNED BY	VALUE
Real Property
E Street, Suburb F		Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin	$950,000
G Street, Suburb H		B Pty Ltd as a trustee	$560,000
J Street, Suburb K		Joint	$35,425.74
Gross Assets			$1,545,425.74
LIABILITIES		REGISTERED TO	VALUE
ANZ Home Loan #...34 (E Street)		Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin	$506,720.44
ANZ Residential Investment Loan #...17 (G Street)		Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin	$163,026
HH Bank Credit Card #...19		Ms Krupin	$8,163.95
Mastercard #...19		Ms Krupin	$10,192.49
FF Bank Credit Card #...51		Mr Krupin	$52,810.36
FF Bank Credit Card #...51		Mr Krupin	$8,838.98
ATO Liability		Mr Krupin	$2,450
ATO Liability		Ms Krupin	$24,108.91
Total Liabilities			$776,311.13
Net Assets			$769,114.61
Superannuation
Ms Krupin’s Superannuation		Ms Krupin	$10,135.24
Mr Krupin’s Superannuation		Mr Krupin	$2,000
TOTAL SUPERANNUATION			$12,135.24
Net Assets + Superannuation			$781,249.85
POOL
Total	Value
Total Assets (including Mr Krupin, Ms Krupin and B Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Krupin Family Trust in relation to G Street)	$1,545,425.74
Total Superannuation	$12,135.24
Total Assets and Superannuation	$1,557,560.98
Less Liabilities	($776,311.13)
Total Net Pool (including Superannuation)	$781,249.85