Krupin & Krupin (No 2) - [2024] FedCFamC1A 146

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Krupin & Krupin (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 146

Appeal from: Krupin & Krupin(No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 154

Appeal number: NAA 86 of 2024

File number: BRC 5459 of 2014

Judgment of: ALDRIDGE, JARRETT & CAMPTON JJ

Date of judgment: 28 August 2024

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Appeal from the dismissal of equitable claims and from orders adjusting property – Where the third and fourth respondents do not appeal from the dismissal of their equitable claims but support the appeal – Grounds of appeal assert bias, a denial of natural justice, a failure to afford procedural fairness, failures to consider material considerations, taking into account irrelevant considerations, errors of fact, and errors of weight – Where the number of errors alleged are vast – Where an error of fact is established but is not material to the final determination – Where the appellant seeks to re-run his case at trial on appeal – Where no ground of appeal is successful – Appeal dismissed – Costs ordered in a fixed sum.

Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 79, 102NA, 117

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 26, 28

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 3.09, 13.23, Sch 3

Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss 11, 12

Cases cited:
Aitken & Aitken (2023) FLC 94-142; [2023] FedCFamC1A 69

Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621; [1953] HCA 25

Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 166 FCR 415; [2008] FCAFC 30

Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191; [1990] FamCA 148

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design& Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55

Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296; [1971] HCA 54

Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63

Haward & Haward (2023) FLC 94-147; [2023] FedCFamC1A 99

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Jess & Jess (No 5) (2024) FLC 94-190; [2024] FedCFamC1A 85

Katsilis v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1977) 18 ALR 181

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; [1985] HCA 81

Krupin & Krupin (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 56

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28

Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3

OP v TP (Conduct of Counsel) (2002) 30 Fam LR 281; [2002] FamCA 1155

Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110

Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550; [2016] HCA 22

Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63

Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439; [2001] HCA 12

Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291; [1998] HCA 56

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; [1979] HCA 9

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48

Yarrow & Yarrow [2022] FedCFamC1A 135

Number of paragraphs: 135

Date of hearing: 27 June 2024

Place: Heard in Brisbane, delivered in Perth

The Appellant: Litigant in person

The First, Second, and Third Respondents: Litigants in person

Representative for the Fourth Respondent: The third respondent on behalf of the fourth respondent
ORDERS

NAA 86 of 2024
BRC 5459 of 2014

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION

BETWEEN:
MR KRUPIN

Appellant

AND:
MS KRUPIN

First Respondent

MS ANGELOFF

Second Respondent

MS PETROV (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ALDRIDGE, JARRETT & CAMPTON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

28 AUGUST 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Notice of Appeal is dismissed.
2.Within 21 days the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,019.40.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Krupin & Krupin has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALDRIDGE, JARRETT & CAMPTON JJ:

By way of Notice of Appeal filed 12 April 2024, as amended on 24 May 2024, Mr Krupin appeals from orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) on 18 March 2024. The orders dismissed equitable claims to real property and adjusted property pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) as to 55 per cent to Mr Krupin and 45 per cent to Ms Krupin.
The reasons for judgment were delivered on 9 February 2024 (Krupin & Krupin (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 56), at which point the parties were given the opportunity to submit a set of proposed orders reflecting the reasons ahead of final orders being made. These reasons are the basis of the orders made on 18 March 2024 and this appeal. Where we refer to the primary judge’s reasons, we are referring to those February 2024 reasons.
Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin married in 2001, separating under one roof on 13 May 2013 while living in their home at E Street, Suburb F, Queensland (“the E Street property”). Ms Krupin vacated the home in June 2014. They were divorced in late 2014. Ms Krupin resists the appeal.
Ms Angeloff is Ms Krupin’s mother. She is the legal owner of a property at C Street, Suburb D, Queensland (“the C Street property”). Mr Krupin unsuccessfully asserted that he held an equitable interest in that property. Ms Angeloff resists the appeal.
Ms Petrov commenced cohabitation with Mr Krupin on 21 September 2014 at the E Street property. She and Mr Krupin married in late 2015. Both said they separated in November 2018, albeit they each continued to live at the E Street property up to the time of the trial. The primary judge found (at [115]) that Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov had not separated. Ms Petrov contended that she held equitable interests in the E Street property and to another property at G Street, Suburb H, Queensland (“the G Street property”). These claims were dismissed. Ms Petrov did not appeal from the dismissal of her claims. She supports the appeal.
B Pty Ltd is the corporate trustee of the Krupin Family Trust (“the Trust”). It owned the G Street property. B Pty Ltd claimed that the property was not available for division between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin but was unsuccessful. B Pty Ltd did not appeal from the dismissal of its claim. B Pty Ltd supports the appeal. Ms Petrov appeared in person on behalf of B Pty Ltd at the hearing of the appeal with leave pursuant to r 3.09 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”).
For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed.
THE ORDERS SUBJECT TO APPEAL
The orders made 18 March 2024 broadly provide for:
(a)The appointment of an independent solicitor as trustee for the sale of both the E Street property and the G Street property and for the proceeds of sales to be applied:
(i)In paying out any mortgage secured on the property sold;
(ii)In paying selling costs (including those of the trustee);
(iii)In paying any capital gains tax arising from the sale of the G Street property; and then
(iv)By way of a calculation, in payment to Mr Krupin so he would receive 55 per cent of the determined property of he and Ms Krupin, and for Ms Krupin to receive the balance.
(b)A declaration that Ms Angeloff holds the sole legal and beneficial interest in the C Street property, dismissing Mr Krupin’s claim made to that property; and
(c)The dismissal of Ms Petrov and B Pty Ltd’s claims made to the E Street property and the G Street property.
On 23 April 2024, the orders as to the sale of the real properties were stayed pending determination of this appeal.
THE APPEAL
There is a presumption at law that a primary judge’s decision is correct, the onus resting on the appellant to show otherwise (Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621). The Amended Notice of Appeal records ten grounds, being:
1.        There was a denial of natural justice…
2.        The Judge made a decision that was plainly wrong, unreasonable or unjust…
3.        The ineffective assistance of Counsel…
4.        The Judge failed to accord procedural fairness…
5.The Judge failed to consider relevant material that have influenced the outcome of the proceeding…
6.The Judge considered facts that could not be supported by evidence and/or irrelevant…
7.The Judge has made an error of facts, that have influenced the outcome of the proceeding…
8.        The Judge was biased…
9.        The Judge gave inadequate reasons for the decision…
10.      The abuse of discretion by the Judge…
Each ground then goes on to refer to a number of identified paragraphs of the reasons. In total, 102 paragraphs out of the 194 paragraphs of the judgment are said to be affected by error. It does not specify the nexus between each identified paragraph of the reasons and the ground under which the paragraph number is recorded. As recently observed by this Court in Jess & Jess (No 5) (2024) FLC 94-190 (Alstergren CJ, Austin & Williams JJ):
44.It is timely to recite the tenet that multiple grounds of appeal can conceal an essential ground (Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85 at [49]). Indeed, we are entitled to be circumspect about the merit of all grounds when they are pleaded in such a loquacious and confounding way (Tame v NSW (2002) 211 CLR 317 at 345; Penrith Whitewater Stadium Ltd v Lesvos Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 103 at [8]).
Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument is drafted in a narrative style. It repeats the same dissatisfactions and complaints under multiple grounds. It appears that the major complaint is that the contentions of Mr Krupin, Ms Petrov and B Pty Ltd were not accepted. That, of itself, does not establish error.
Mr Krupin and Ms Angeloff made no oral submissions. The oral submissions of Ms Krupin did not engage with any of the grounds of appeal. Ms Petrov’s oral submissions comprised dissatisfaction and complaints with the conclusory findings of the primary judge without identifying the reasons for those complaints. The submissions were peppered with unnecessary personal criticisms of Ms Krupin unrelated to the grounds of appeal, and Ms Petrov’s own views as to fairness that aligned with those of Mr Krupin.
The two Appeal Books total 5,685 pages in length. The transcript is 462 pages. References in the written submissions to the contents of the Appeal Books were scattered. Fewer were made to the transcript.
Unless an error is reasonably obvious, the onus is on the appellant to identify the error. As the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia said in Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 166 FCR 415 (affirmed by the Full Court of this Court in Haward & Haward (2023) FLC 94-147):
3.…This basic principle imposes an obligation upon an appellant to identify where error is to be found in a judgment under appeal, whether it be an error of fact, law or general principle. It is not necessary for an appeal court to hunt through all the material at first instance and recanvass every aspect of it unless an occasion arises for suspecting, on reasonable grounds (generally those provided by the appellant), that such an examination may yield a conclusion of appellable error.
(Emphasis added)
Doing the best we can on the material before us, we do not intend on addressing every contention of error individually. Rather, as we understand them, they will be determined by way of each of the nominated grounds of appeal.
For example, Ground 7 asserts errors of fact made by the primary judge and identifies 15 paragraphs of the reasons that are said to contain the errors. Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument only refers to nine of them. In the absence of submissions, it is not for us to trawl through the extensive evidence to try to net probative material that bears on the matters. The obligation falls squarely on Mr Krupin to provide a Summary of Argument which identifies each error, identifies the finding that it is contended should have been made, explains why the finding is in error, and refers to the relevant evidence (r 13.23(3) of the Rules).
Additionally, Mr Krupin asserts throughout the Summary of Argument when dealing with other grounds that the primary judge overlooked, ignored, disregarded, or dismissed evidence, usually simply by stating so or that another position should have been found without specific reference to the evidence. Sometimes, it is apparent that there was no evidence at all (see for example the references to [47], [177], and [179] under Ground 3 and the introduction to Ground 4). We will not take such bald assertions as an invitation to gather what Mr Krupin might consider to be the relevant evidence.
In saying so we bear in mind four things. First, the primary judge described the evidence called by Mr Krupin, Ms Petrov, and B Pty Ltd, despite its volume, as being incomplete and incapable of establishing their contentions. No ground of appeal challenges that broad finding.
Second, the evidence of Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff was preferred and accepted whereas the evidence of the other parties was not. Nothing that has been identified by Mr Krupin supported the assertion that the primary judge erred in fact, or demonstrates that the primary judge was wrong in the manner identified in Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550 (“Robinson Helicopter Co”). Appealable error is not demonstrated by an appellant’s desire for their evidence on topics to have been accepted.
Third, we repeat that the content of none of the 102 challenged paragraphs is redolent of a reasonably ascertained error and accordingly, even as a self-represented litigant, the onus is on Mr Krupin to identify and demonstrate error.
Finally, as we shortly demonstrate, many of the key findings of the primary judge are not challenged in the appeal.
We have not considered extraneous material that goes beyond the scope of the identified grounds.
Country M language interpreters were available to all parties at the hearing of the appeal by way of audio-visual link.
BACKGROUND
Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin have four children, three of whom are over 18 years of age and one of whom was born in 2007 and is approaching 17 years of age. There are two children of the marriage of Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov, being eight and four years of age.
The primary judge found (at [6] and [43]) that one of the reasons Ms Angeloff migrated to Australia from Country L with her son in 2005, was at the request of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin to assist them in looking after their children, with maintenance of the family home and investment properties, and to work on the construction and/or renovation of other real properties in which Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin were investing.
Before turning to the grounds themselves it is useful first to identify the various claims that were made against the properties which we have already identified.
Mr Krupin’s equitable claim to the C Street Property
Mr Krupin claimed Ms Angeloff held her legal interest in the C Street property for him and Ms Krupin by way of express or constructive trust. He alternatively made an argument in proprietary estoppel.
Mr Krupin’s case at trial was that Ms Angeloff had insufficient funds when she migrated from Country L to acquire real property for her own benefit. He said that “It was agreed by all family” that Ms Angeloff would hold real properties the benefit of him and Ms Krupin “for the purpose of assets protection” (Mr Krupin’s affidavit filed 24 February 2023, paragraph 114).
To give this claim context, in mid-2006 Ms Angeloff purchased a property at MM Street, Suburb NN, Queensland (“the MM Street property”) for $180,000. It was uncontroversial that the acquisition was funded by a mortgage taken out by Ms Angeloff secured on the property and by $40,000 advanced to her by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. It was disputed at trial as to whether that advance was by way of a $20,000 gift from Ms Krupin and a $20,000 loan from Mr Krupin, or a $40,000 loan from Mr Krupin. Mr Krupin conceded in cross-examination that $40,000 was subsequently “given back” to him by Ms Angeloff (Transcript 16 May 2023, p.119 lines 8–15), albeit there was some uncertainty as to whether $5,000 remained outstanding.
While Ms Angeloff was the owner of the MM Street property, she acquired the C Street property for $249,451, and another property at N Street, Suburb D, Queensland (“the N Street property”) (at [59]). Mr Krupin conceded at trial (at [62]) that the equity in the MM Street property was used to facilitate the acquisition of the C Street property by an ANZ loan of $247,200 obtained by Ms Angeloff collaterally secured against both properties.
Mr Krupin said that he and Ms Krupin received rent from the real properties held by Ms Angeloff, paid the mortgages and outgoings on those properties, and funded the cost of their renovations, including that he completed improvements to the C Street property to the value of $144,700.
The primary judge found that Mr Krupin:
(a)Had not established the contended agreement (at [83]), because:
(i)The express agreement as contended by Mr Krupin as to the C Street property was, at its highest, oral, and not reduced to writing, and pursuant to s 11 and s 12 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) an interest in land in Queensland can only be created if there is a written instrument to support such a contention. This finding is not challenged on appeal; and
(ii)There was no direct evidence of fact and terms of oral agreement made entered by “all family”. There was no evidence adduced as to any conversation between Mr Krupin and Ms Angeloff as to the C Street property. There was no evidence adduced as to who comprised the parties to the oral agreement, when or where the agreement was entered, or of the contents and terms of the agreement. The primary judge preferred the evidence of both Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff that no such oral agreement was entered. The primary judge recorded at [43] that the evidence of Ms Angeloff was largely unchallenged at trial.
These conclusions are challenged by way of Ground 9, contending inadequate reasons;
(b)Mr Krupin had not established his contentions that he and Ms Krupin received the rents from the real properties held by Ms Angeloff, that he and Ms Krupin had paid the mortgages and outgoings on those properties, or that he has funded the cost of their renovations, including that he completed improvements to the C Street property to the value of $144,700 (at [67], [77], [80], [82], and [88]). The primary judge preferred the evidence of Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff on these subject matters. Ms Angeloff’s bank statements recorded that she received the rent payments and she paid the mortgage and rates from her bank account. The N Street property was sold by Ms Angeloff in mid‑2009. The MM Street property was sold in mid-2009 for $317,000. The primary judge accepted the evidence of Ms Angeloff (at [57] and [71]) that $110,000 from the net proceeds of the sales she received was applied to the credit card debts of Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin, those debts being incurred to meet the costs of materials used in the renovations of the MM Street, N Street, and C Street properties. The remaining proceeds were applied by Ms Angeloff by way of a gift to her son and to her other personal expenses;
(c)It was not unconscionable for Ms Angeloff to assert her legal and equitable interest in the property because any work Mr Krupin did to the property was minor, and because she paid for the materials, assisted Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin with their household and children, and she provided additional funds to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin for their household, in which she was also an occupant. Mr Krupin had therefore not established any detriment; and
(d)Mr Krupin did not establish a number of fundamental elements of the proprietary estoppel claim.

Mr Krupin challenges on appeal some of the subsidiary findings leading to the conclusion that he had not established his claim to the C Street property.
Ms Petrov’s claim to the E Street property
In or around late-2007 Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin jointly purchased the E Street property for $770,000 funded by cash savings, the sale proceeds of two of their other real properties and a mortgage loan secured over the E Street property. Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin renovated the property and the animal facility that was on the property. From 25 June 2014 Mr Krupin had unrestricted use of the property and its animal facilities to the exclusion of Ms Krupin (at [105]). Ms Petrov commenced occupying the E Street property with Mr Krupin from September 2014.
On 11 November 2014 Mr Krupin initiated the s 79 proceedings in the then Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Ms Krupin filed a Response on 20 January 2015 seeking different orders adjusting property.
On 23 March 2016 orders were made for Mr Krupin to be solely responsible for and to pay the mortgages, rates, and outgoings for the E Street property.
Ms Petrov claimed at trial that Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin held the whole of their legal interest in the E Street property for her by way of express trust or a constructive trust, grounded from an oral agreement made between she and Mr Krupin. Ms Petrov said that she relied on this agreement when making payments for the mortgage, rates, and other outgoings for the E Street property.
The primary judge found Ms Petrov had not established her case (at [118]) because:
(a)The absence of a written instrument to support an interest in land in Queensland (at [122]). This finding is not challenged on appeal;
(b)She did not establish the fact of an oral agreement between herself and Mr Krupin (at [115]–[116]);
(c)The other owner at law of the E Street property, being Ms Krupin, was not a party to the contended agreement (at [118]). This finding was not challenged on appeal;
(d)Ms Krupin made no representation to induce reliance by Ms Petrov (at [121]). This finding was not challenged on appeal;
(e)She was aware of the fact and terms of the orders made 23 March 2016 requiring Mr Krupin to pay the mortgage, rates, and other outgoings on the E Street property (at [117]);
(f)If there was an agreement between Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov as to Mr Krupin transferring his interests in property to Ms Petrov, that was a matter between them (at [116]);
(g)She did not prove her case that her mother, Ms YY, provided a loan of $657,000 to assist Ms Petrov in maintaining the E Street and G Street properties (at [126]–[129]). At its highest, Ms Petrov adduced a hearsay statutory declaration from Ms YY stating that she has provided most of the $657,000 to Ms Petrov as cash withdrawn from her own account through ATMs whilst Ms YY was visiting Australia. The primary judge did not accept this evidence. Ms YY did not provide an affidavit and was not available for cross-examination. No bank records of Ms YY were adduced to establish that she held that amount of funds. No bank records were adduced by Ms Petrov verifying receipt of the funds or as to their use and application. None of the primary judge’s findings on these matters were challenged on appeal;
(h)She and Mr Krupin had occupied the E Street property from 2014 up to the date of the trial (at [10]). This finding was not challenged on appeal;
(i)Any mortgage payments she made on the E Street property were considered and weighed as a contribution made by Mr Krupin (at [117] and [163]). This approach was not challenged on appeal; and
(j)To the extent that she had paid mortgages, rates, and other outgoings, in the circumstances, they were not of the kind that would give rise to an equitable interest, including by way of “joint endeavour”, “common intention” or “agreement” between Ms Krupin and Ms Petrov (at [118]).
Mr Krupin challenges some of the subsidiary findings on appeal leading to the conclusion that Ms Petrov had not established her case as to the E Street property.
Ms Petrov’s claim to the G Street property
The Trust was established by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin by deed in July 2003. Mr Krupin was, and remains, the appointor of the Trust. The deed provides the appointor with an unfettered discretion to appoint and remove the trustee of the Trust. It empowers the trustee with an unfettered discretion to distribute the income and capital of the Trust to a broad range of categories of beneficiaries. Power exists to vary the identity of or classes of beneficiaries. Mr Krupin was and remains the primary beneficiary of the Trust.
The G Street property was acquired by the trustee in mid-2007 for $205,000, funded by some cash savings held by the Trust, cash injected by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin, and the proceeds of an interest only loan obtained personally by Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin.
On 23 March 2016 orders were made for Mr Krupin to be solely responsible for and to pay the mortgages, rates, and outgoings on the G Street property.
Ms Petrov claimed that Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin (and not the trustee) held the G Street property on either express or constructive trust for her grounded from an oral agreement made between she and Mr Krupin. She claimed the oral agreement led her to make payments to the mortgage, rates, and other outgoings of that property between February 2015 and February 2023, and to expend $210,000 in renovations to that property.
Ms Petrov was aware of the terms of the G Street mortgage payment orders made 23 March 2016. She had personally (not the Trust) received the rent produced by the G Street property from 2018 until the trial.
The primary judge found she had not established her case (at [118]), including:
(a)She had not established there was an agreement between she and Mr Krupin, or she and the Trust;
(b)She had not established that she had spent $210,000 on renovations to the G Street property (at [112]); and
(c)To the extent that she had directly received the rent generated by the property in the sum of $150,000 and then used these funds to pay mortgages, rates, and other outgoings, they were not of the kind that would give rise to an equitable interest.
Mr Krupin challenges subsidiary findings on appeal leading to the dismissal of this claim.
The litigation history
Property settlement orders were made on 13 October 2017 but were, apparently never entered and were “lost”. They were set aside on 12 March 2020. Further orders were made on 4 March 2022 however, were subsequently set aside on appeal on 1 September 2022.
On 7 September 2022 the proceeding was transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1).
On 27 October 2022 trial directions and another s 102NA order was made as follows:
THE COURT ORDERS UNTIL FURTHER ORDER:
…
7.That pursuant to s 102NA(1)(c)(iv) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):
a.The [appellant MR KRUPIN] not be permitted to personally cross-examine the First Respondent [MS KRUPIN]; and
b.The First Respondent [MS KRUPIN] not be permitted to personally cross-examine the [appellant MR KRUPIN].
…
9.That these proceedings be set down for final hearing for not more than five (5) days commencing at 10.00am on 13 March 2023 in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1)…
…
12.That each party file and serve on each other party no later than 4.00pm on 20 February 2023:
a. one (1) consolidated Affidavit of evidence in chief of that party;
…
15.That no party shall be entitled to rely upon any affidavit material not filed in accordance with these directions without the leave of the Court.
(Emphasis in original)
There was no appeal from, or challenge to, the orders made 27 October 2022.
On 7 February 2023, an order was made granting leave pursuant to r 3.09 of the Rules for Ms Petrov to represent B Pty Ltd at trial. The third s 79 trial was conducted over six days before the primary judge from 15 to 19 May 2023, and on 19 July 2023.
As is apparent from the reasons of the primary judge, and as we have already noted, the evidence offered up by Mr Krupin, Ms Petrov, and B Pty Ltd was chaotic and, despite its volume, did not contain the material necessary for them to prove their respective cases. Mr Krupin did not seek to refer to it in his submissions.
The final relief sought by each party
The relief prosecuted by Mr Krupin before the primary judge was haphazard and in part irregular. It was subject to variations absent notice during the trial. In cross-examination, Mr Krupin abandoned his primary relief as to the G Street property:
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: Might I ask this, [Mr Krupin]. It’s your case that the entirety of [G] Street should be transferred, I’m assuming, to yourself?
THE INTERPRETER ([MR KRUPIN]): No.
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: Well, who do you wish the title of [G] Street to be transferred to?
[MR KRUPIN]: It should not be transferred to anyone. It’s already transferred to [Ms Petrov] now, she is the director or sole director of the company
…
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: Now, you – the orders that you are seeking include the transfer of title of that property from the family trust to someone else. You don’t - - -
THE INTERPRETER ([MR KRUPIN]): No.
[MR KRUPIN]: [Ms Petrov] already did it through the company.
…
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: - - - of the date of receiving documents [Ms Krupin] will do all acts and sign all documents to transfer her right, title and interest in the property at [G] Street, [Suburb H], but it doesn’t actually say - - -
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: To whom.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Yes.
THE INTERPRETER ([MR KRUPIN]): For me, it’s unimportant
(Transcript 15 May 2024, p.63 line 45 to p.65 line 32)
At the conclusion of the evidence the orders sought by Mr Krupin remained uncertain (Transcript 19 July 2023, p.22 lines 16–37). He was provided with seven days to identify those orders sought with precision. On 26 July 2023 he filed written submissions for:
(a)The C Street property to be “included in the family assets pool”, for the sale of that property and for its proceeds of the sale to be paid into a solicitor’s trust account and be distributed pursuant to Court orders;
(b)Ms Krupin to transfer her interest in the E Street property (without identifying the person to benefit from the transfer – implicitly to either he and Ms Petrov, or to he alone); and
(c)Ms Krupin to transfer her interest in the G Street property to the Trust.
Ms Krupin sought for Mr Krupin to transfer his interest to her in both the E Street and G Street properties, that she pay Mr Krupin the sum of $405,472, and that Ms Petrov, in her capacity as director of B Pty Ltd and B Pty Ltd in its capacity as trustee for the Trust, transfer to her its interest in the G Street property. She opposed Mr Krupin’s relief sought as to the C Street property.
Ms Angeloff sought for the C Street property not to be included in the overall property pool available for distribution between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin, and for the Court to order Mr Krupin to do all things necessary to remove the caveat from the C Street property.
Ms Petrov sought:
(a)For the C Street property to be “included into family assets pool” and for the E Street property to be “quarantined as [Mr Krupin’s] post separation contributions and excluded from the [Krupin] family assets pool”;
(b)Within six months, for she and Mr Krupin to refinance the existing mortgage on the E Street property and that Ms Krupin transfer her interest in that property to Mr Krupin. In the alternative, she sought that the E Street property be transferred to her and she thereafter refinance the existing mortgage;
(c)The G Street property be “quarantined as [Mr Krupin’s] post separation contributions and excluded from the [Krupin] family assets pool” and for Ms Krupin to subsequently transfer her interest in the property (with no recipient specified). In the alternative, she sought that the G Street property be transferred to her and she thereafter refinance the existing mortgage;
(d)For a valuation for the animal facility be included in “the family assets pool”; and
(e)For Mr Krupin to receive 60 per cent of the property of he and Ms Krupin.
B Pty Ltd sought for:
(a)The G Street property to be excluded from “the [Krupin] family assets pool”;
(b)Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin to be removed as primary beneficiaries from the deed establishing the Trust;
(c)Mr Krupin to do all things to be removed as an appointor of the Trust;
(d)Ms Petrov to be replaced as the appointor;
(e)Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov’s children to be included as a primary beneficiaries of the Trust; and
(f)Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin to transfer all their interest in the G Street property to an unidentified person (again, implicitly it was sought to be transferred to either the Trust, Ms Petrov alone, or Ms Petrov and Mr Krupin).
Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov filed a joint application for divorce in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) in May 2023, shortly prior to the commencement of the third trial before the primary judge. The divorce order took effect in August 2023.
The judgment was published on 9 February 2024. An order was made directing the parties to forward to the Court draft orders reflecting the reasons within 21 days. The proceeding was listed on 13 March 2024 as to the form of orders sought and final orders were made on 18 March 2024.
THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The grounds as to bias, a denial of natural justice, and an absence procedural fairness will be addressed first as they go to the integrity of the hearing and the administration of justice (Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design& Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at [117]; Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [9]–[10]).
Ground 8 – “The Judge was biased”
Ground 8 did not identify the contended bias as being actual or apprehended. Each is established by different principles and facts. Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument did not particularise the contended bias. His election not to make oral submissions marooned the ground.
The specified paragraphs of the primary judge’s reasons said to support the ground were those averse to Mr Krupin’s case or the case of Ms Petrov and B Pty Ltd. His Summary of Argument recorded that these paragraphs were said to “ignore”, “disregard”, or “overlook” oral or documentary evidence so as to “reflect a concerning bias”.
Mr Krupin submitted that credibility findings made against him (see [26], [36], and [45]) and the primary judge’s preference for the evidence of Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff in the event of a conflict with his evidence was alleged to “suggest a pattern of bias”.
The parties to this matter set the parameters of the factual issues in contest at the trial. Faced with juxtaposing oral and affidavit evidence from different parties, it is the task of a trial judge to determine the facts, often by ascribing differing weight to the evidence given by different witnesses. Bias is not inferred because a judge finds a preference for the evidence of one witness over another, in the event of their evidence being in conflict.
The conclusory credibility findings themselves are not otherwise challenged in the appeal except by way of the bias ground or Ground 9 as to inadequate reasons. The subsidiary findings grounding the credibility findings of Mr Krupin and as to the evidence of Ms Petrov (at [111] and [112]) were open and amply supported by comprehensive and detailed reasons after the conclusion of all the evidence. In so far as these complaints as to these subsidiary findings are repeated in Ground 7 or Ground 9, they are rejected.
Mr Krupin failed to identify what gave rise to the fact or apprehension that the primary judge would not decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits. The ground has no merit and fails.
Ground 1 – “There was a denial of natural justice”
Natural justice requires each party to be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case (see Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291 at [77]). It therefore is directed to the procedure of the hearing, and not the result. The integers of this ground as submitted by Mr Krupin are:
(a)Orders should have been based on material and valuations adduced at the final hearing in 2016, not as at the date of the trial in 2023;
(b)That it was “unjust” to order a sale of the E Street property without giving Mr Krupin the opportunity to refinance the property; and
(c)The orders to sell the E Street and G Street properties were “unreasonable”.
As to the first particular of the ground, in his Case Outline document for trial filed 6 March 2023 at page 27 Mr Krupin submitted that “It would be common sense to use valuation of all assets together with associated liabilities on the moment when they have been transferred into possession of each Party”. Mr Krupin had every opportunity to progress this contention over the course of the trial and elected to abandon it at the conclusion of the trial. His balance sheet identifying the property interests of the parties (Exhibit 7) sought findings as to the current values of assets and liabilities at the final day of the trial. His submissions sought to ground the contribution finding by including the consideration and evaluation of his contributions to the property of the parties up to the time of the trial, focusing on funds he had borrowed to fund the family property portfolio preserving the G Street and E Street properties.
The particular has no merit as to a denial of natural justice. It also fails where raised in Grounds 2, 4, 5, and 9. This complaint did not form part of Mr Krupin’s case as finally prosecuted at first instance, it is now too late to raise it. He is bound by the conduct of his case at trial (Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68 (“Metwally”) at 71). The primary judge, as sought by both Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin, made findings as to the property of the parties and their values as at the date of the trial and evaluated the myriad of their respective contributions to that property up to the time of the trial.
Some context by way of background is required as to the second and third particulars of the ground, being the denial of the opportunity for Mr Krupin to refinance the mortgages secured on the E Street and G Street properties, and for those properties to be sold. The disputes between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin as to the transfer and retention of the E Street and G Street properties, and the capacity of each party to refinance the existing mortgage securities on each property, was the subject of orders made on 4 November 2015, as amended 12 November 2015. The interests of Ms Petrov and B Pty Ltd were identified during case management of the proceeding by the primary judge, when another direction was made that any party wishing to refinance the properties provide the Court with evidence of their capacity to do so (Transcript 15 May 2023, p.10 lines 26–29 and Transcript 17 May 2023, p.177 line 31 to p.178 line 6).
The issues subject to complaint were ventilated during the oral evidence of each of Mr Krupin, Ms Krupin, and Ms Petrov at the trial in the following exchanges:
(a)During the cross-examination of Mr Krupin, the exchange as outlined above at [53] as to the transfer of the title of G Street to Ms Petrov;
(b)Between counsel for Ms Krupin and the primary judge:
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: Your Honour will recall that he indicated previously when setting down directions for this trial that if one of the parties or both of the parties were to obtain conditional preapproval for refinancing, they were to provide that material to the court.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: What does your client want to do that she needs preapproval of a loan?
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: She wishes to refinance the two mortgages and take over the responsibility of those mortgages.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Yes. Which properties are they?
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: There’s two properties. [E Street], and [G] Street.
…
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: And you client’s obtained conditional preapproval because she’d like to, at the end of this, buy out whoever else is listed on those title deeds.
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: That’s correct.
(Emphasis added) (Transcript 15 May 2023, p.10 line 26 to p.11 line 16)
(c)During the cross-examination of Ms Krupin:
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: …In relation to the funding, if you’re successful in your application to retain the [C] Street debt and other property, if Mr – your current husband, you’ve given some evidence in relation to his income.
…
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: Okay. The – her current husband has put up money to refinance the property that [Ms Krupin] wants to retain.
THE INTERPRETER [(MS KRUPIN)]: Yes, she wants to retain it.
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: Yes.
THE INTERPRETER [(MS KRUPIN)]: Yes, correct. Yes.
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: And Mr [R], your current husband, he’s the person putting up the bulk of the funds, isn’t he, in relation to having that – to carrying that – to retaining that property? He has put up the main amount of money, hasn’t he?
THE INTERPRETER [(MS KRUPIN)]: Yes. His income, as being part of the family, is helping for us to get bank - - -
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: Sure.
THE INTERPRETER [(MS KRUPIN)]: - - - approval for a loan.
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: And his income, as you set out in your material, is 180,000 per annum; is that right?
[MS KRUPIN]: That’s correct.
(Transcript 17 May 2023, p.230 lines 10–47)
(d)Between Ms Petrov and the primary judge:
THE INTERPRETER ([MS PETROV]): Yes. During the whole trial – during the whole process, I was asking to refinance those properties so that I could still keep them.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Yes.
THE INTERPRETER ([MS PETROV]): And I’ve got these letters of preapproval.
…
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Okay. So in relation to your letters of preapproval, [counsel for Mr Krupin], you should listen to this. This is another issue about preapproval letters. In relation to your – that is to say, [Ms Petrov and B Pty Ltd’s] letters of preapproval that had not yet annexed to an affidavit, I’m going to reserve my decision on whether I allow you to put them in too, okay? Because they should have been part of your trial affidavit. Tell that. Thank you. All right.
(Emphasis added) (Transcript 15 May 2023, p.15 line 25 to p.16 line 4)
(e)The next day, between the primary judge and Ms Petrov:
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: The claim by [Ms Petrov] is for an equitable interest, is that right, in two properties?
THE INTERPRETER ([MS PETROV]): No. What I’m claiming – I’m claiming – I want the [E Street property] and [G Street property] to be in my name, in – my property. To recognise as my property.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Believe me, she’s claiming an equitable interest. I understand what she wants the court to do, but, at the moment, [G] Street is registered in the name of [B Pty Ltd], isn’t it?
[MS PETROV]: Yes, your Honour.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: And [E Street] is in the name of [Mr Krupin] and [Ms Krupin], is it?
[MS PETROV]: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: So, currently, they’re in the name of someone else other than [Ms Petrov]. You better translate it for me.
[MS PETROV]: Yes, your Honour.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Right. So your argument is that you have an equitable interest in those properties and that the court should make an order that those properties be transferred to [Ms Petrov]. Please interpret. Okay.
THE INTERPRETER ([MS PETROV]): Yes, absolutely right.
(Emphasis added) (Transcript 16 May 2023, p.149 line 30 to p.150 line 11)
(f)During cross-examination of Ms Petrov:
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: And in regards to [G] Street, the current balance of the mortgage is $163,000.
THE INTERPRETER [(MS PETROV)]: That will be reduced on the 25th.
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: All right. Okay.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: So, is it about $163,000 now?
[MS PETROV]: Yes.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Yes. Is that a yes?
[MS PETROV]: Yes.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Thank you. Yes, [counsel for Ms Krupin].
[COUNSEL FOR MS KRUPIN]: So, in effect, these two loan approval documents, if successful, would only allow you to refinance the properties. Is that the case?
THE INTERPRETER [(MS PETROV)]: Yes. That’s what the court asked about.
(Emphasis added) (Transcript 19 May 2023, p.43 line 46 to p.44 line 18)

Mr Krupin’s evidence was that he was 60 years old and in compromised health. He said he had been in receipt of a Centrelink benefit since August 2016. Ms Petrov’s evidence was that her income was approximately $30,000 in the last financial year (Transcript 19 May 2023, p.4 line 1).
Mr Krupin elected not to adduce evidence of any capacity for refinancing the existing two mortgages on the E Street and G Street properties ($506,720 and $163,026 respectively, having a combined value of $669,746), or to pay his other contended liabilities of $840,346 (then making a total of $1,510,092). Nor did he adduce evidence that he would thereafter be able to make any cash adjustive payment to Ms Krupin implementing paragraph 31 of his final Minute of Order for them each to receive 50 per cent of the property amenable to adjustment. He was aware of the primary judge’s enquiries on this subject matter ventilated before and during the trial.
Mr Krupin had ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his case as to his capacity to refinance the mortgages and make the adjusting payment to Ms Krupin. His failure to do so permits the concluding inference that, if he had adduced evidence on that topic, it would not have supported his case (Katsilis v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1977) 18 ALR 181 at 197).
Ms Petrov’s evidence at its highest was that she could refinance the existing mortgages only. She adduced no evidence that she could also fund an adjusting payment to Ms Krupin on behalf of Mr Krupin if requested to do so as a condition of retention of the real properties in specie. Moreover, her claim to the G Street and E Street properties was dismissed. Her relief to achieve the transfer of the real properties in her favour and to refinance the mortgages became otiose.
The sale of the G Street property and the distribution of its proceeds was consistent with the way Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin conducted their cases, being as if the real property was their own property, notwithstanding that it was that of the Trust (at [157]). The reasons record the primary judge considering Ms Krupin receiving both the G Street property and the E Street property in specie by way of an adjusting order between she and Mr Krupin, however it was determined that it would not achieve a just and equitable outcome, having regard to market volatility (at [182]–[183]), the longstanding animosity between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin (at [190]) and the unilateral conduct of Mr Krupin in administering the Trust (at [191]).
In the event the conclusion as to Mr Krupin being adequately placed on notice as to the possible sale of the real properties is in error, Mr Krupin did not identify on appeal how the orders for sale effected any injustice of any kind (whether by way of procedural unfairness or otherwise) having regard to the evidence in his case or absence thereof. In that sense, the primary judge’s decision was inevitable (Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141).
Other particulars contained in Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument under this heading included the removal of the C Street property “from the property pool in 2015” by way of “false statements, fake documents, and perjury, [that] was largely disregarded”, and the primary judge failing to prioritise both the welfare of children and acknowledge Ms Petrov’s “investments into [G Street] and [E Street]”. These do not occasion a denial of natural justice. They are incompetent integers to support this ground.
No error is discernible by reference to this ground. It fails.
Ground 4 – “The Judge failed to accord procedural fairness”
Procedural fairness requires each party to be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present their case (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 582). Procedural fairness is concerned only with the fairness of the hearing; not the fairness of the outcome (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [25]).
The first particular of this ground arises from the reasons at [17(c)], where the primary judge said:
17.There are five separate parties involved in the litigation before the court. There are three broad aspects to the litigation. They are as follows:
…
(c)A claim by Ms Petrov that she has an equitable interest in G Street, Suburb H (“G Street”). Ms Petrov claims (in her Amended Response document filed 19 January 2023) that G Street is not available for division in the matrimonial proceedings between Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. Ms Petrov previously claimed an equitable interest in E Street but abandoned that claim in her most recent Amended Response – the one filed on 19 January 2023. That is the Response document upon which Ms Petrov proceeded to trial. Having abandoned an equitable claim in respect of E Street in her Amended Response document – Ms Petrov, nonetheless, included a paragraph in her written outline of submissions relating to E Street. That is paragraph 40. Those submissions were filed on 14 July 2023. That paragraph appears under the heading “Equitable Interest”. Also under that heading is a reference to G Street. I will address Ms Petrov’s claims later in these reasons.
(Bold and italics emphasis added)
The trial judge was in error when he said that Ms Petrov had abandoned an equitable claim in respect of the E Street property. Mr Krupin correctly identifies that the Amended Response to an Initiating Application filed on 19 January 2023 was that of B Pty Ltd not of Ms Petrov. The Response document upon which Ms Petrov proceeded to trial was filed on 4 January 2023.
A failure to afford procedural fairness must be material before it invites appellate intervention. A breach is only material if it operates to deny a party an opportunity to give evidence or make arguments and thereby to deprive that party of the possibility of a different and more favourable outcome (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421 at [2]). That is explicitly not the case in this matter. The primary judge in the reasons, goes on to say:
110.…Given that Ms Petrov went to trial relying upon her Amended Response filed 19 January 2023 and noting that document sought no orders in relation to the E Street property – one option to the Court is to dismiss Ms Petrov’s claim in respect of the E Street property on the basis that she appears to have abandoned the claim in her Amended Response document. Given the history of this matter I consider it more prudent for the Court to consider Ms Petrov’s claims against both E Street and G Street, notwithstanding that she currently seeks no orders in respect of E Street.
(Emphasis added)
The substance of Ms Petrov’s equitable claims as to the E Street property, being by way of express trust or constructive trust, was clearly identified (at [108]) and was considered and determined (at [113]–[120]). Her equitable claim as to the G Street property was similarly considered and determined (at [113]–[129]). There is no suggestion that she was not heard on her claims. Any error at [17], or otherwise, in the identification of her relief is not material. It did not influence the conclusion of the primary judge. This particular of the ground fails.
The second particular of the ground is recorded in Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument as:
[Mr Krupin] was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the claims made in the affidavits of [Ms Krupin] and [Ms Angeloff]. Orders from the Judge specifying reliance on only one affidavit… and there was no permission granted to submit responses to the affidavits of other parties. Due to the ineffective assistance of the Council [sic], [Mr Krupin] was not afforded the chance to respond orally or in writing to the false and baseless claims made by [Ms Krupin] and [Ms Angeloff].
The particular of this alleged error is twofold. Firstly, the complaint is not that the parties were only permitted to rely on one affidavit, but that Mr Krupin was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the evidence of Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff, either orally or in writing. The trial directions made 27 October 2022, being seven months prior to the trial, were not the subject of challenge. No application was made on behalf of Mr Krupin prior to the trial, or during the trial, for leave to adduce evidence in reply, either orally or by way of affidavit. No failure to afford procedural fairness on this subject matter is established. The second aspect, the “ineffective assistance” of counsel, is considered in Ground 3.
The third particular to support this ground is Mr Krupin being “denied the right to represent himself and cross-examine witnesses”. On 27 October 2022 s 102NA(1)(c)(iv) orders were made applying to both Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin. On 12 December 2022 a further s 102NA order was made applying to Mr Krupin and Ms Angeloff. There is no suggestion that Mr Krupin’s submissions against either of the orders at the time they were made were not heard. Simply, they were not accepted. No complaint was made by Mr Krupin from the time the order was made on 12 December 2022 until after the conclusion of the trial. Mr Krupin cannot now complain about those decisions in this appeal simply because they were made contrary to his wishes. No denial of procedural fairness therefore can be made out.
The fourth particular of the ground is that Mr Krupin’s Application in a Proceeding filed 7 December 2022 seeking disclosure from Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff was left undetermined, without a hearing. An order was made on 12 December 2022 listing the Application in a Proceeding for hearing on 7 February 2023. There is no evidence that any agitation of the Application in a Proceeding was raised by Mr Krupin on 7 February 2023. No transcript of the proceedings on that day formed part of the appeal. No orders were made relating to the Application on that day. The only reference to the Application in a Proceeding filed 7 December 2022 during the trial was on 15 May 2023, the first day, when Mr Krupin implicitly abandoned the prosecution of the Application in a Proceeding filed 7 December 2022 by not reading the evidence in support of it by way of the following exchange:
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: I’ve made some progress, your Honour. In relation to the affidavit of 7 December [2022] from [Mr Krupin] - - -
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: [Mr Krupin]. Yes.
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: - - - that’s not relied upon.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: You don’t need that? Good. I didn’t think you did.
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: No. Thank you…
(Transcript 15 May 2023, p.18 lines 28–37)
We were not taken to any other reference to the Application in a Proceeding filed 7 December 2022 during the appeal. It was dismissed by Order 29 made 18 March 2024. This particular of the ground fails.
The fifth particular of the ground is directed to [194] of the reasons, being a complaint as to the primary judge directing the parties to forward to the Court draft orders to reflect the reasons for judgment. The reality of this complaint is that Mr Krupin simply disagrees with that direction. The particular of the ground fails.
The balance of material relied upon by Mr Krupin in support of this ground focuses on findings that were not in accordance with those as sought by him or Ms Petrov, or are challenges as to weight. None of those complaints advance a denial of procedural fairness. They are unrelated to the way the trial was conducted.
The ground as to a denial of procedural fairness fails.
Ground 3 – “The ineffective assistance of Counsel”
Mr Krupin complains that his counsel conducted an ineffective cross-examination of Ms Angeloff and failed to make arguments implementing instructions provided. This distinct ground of appeal as to competency of counsel is an aspect of procedure.
In OP v TP (Conduct of Counsel) (2002) 30 Fam LR 281, the Full Court observed:
123.We think that it clearly emerges from the cases that we have cited that in criminal and child protection cases the incompetence of counsel can operate to constitute a miscarriage of justice in a number of ways. If the incompetence is of such a nature as to so affect the conduct of the trial that it ceases to be a fair trial then that, of itself, can require the ordering of a retrial, regardless of whether the result is apparently fair.
124.On the other hand, from a procedural point of view the trial may appear to be regular, but incorrect or unjustified tactical decisions made by counsel may have had the effect of producing an unfair result. If this be the situation it is necessary for an appellant to establish, not only that the decisions were wrong or incompetent, but that their effect was likely to have brought about a different result if they had not been made.
To establish the complaint Mr Krupin must demonstrate both that his counsel was incompetent, and that their conduct caused a miscarriage of justice. The conduct must accordingly go beyond that of “ineffective assistance” as alleged by Mr Krupin.
Mr Krupin’s particulars as to this ground are by broad summary, absent any specifics. The “arguments” he instructed counsel to make are unknown. He submitted that he instructed his counsel to question Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff “in a manner that would expose their lack of credibility and false claims” (Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument filed 24 May 2024, p.3–4). He said that his counsel failed to provide “evidence of [Mr Krupin]’s truthfulness” (Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument filed 24 May 2024, p.4). The content of the instructions, and the identity of and contents of any documents provided, either to Mr Krupin’s solicitors or to his counsel, are unknown. Mr Krupin’s own largely uncontroversial historical conduct undermined his “truthfulness”, being, in part, the foundation for which the primary judge made adverse credibility findings against him.
Mr Krupin submitted that his contended $840,346 debt to Ms Petrov was erroneously excluded from the balance sheet by the primary judge due to his counsel not addressing those debts in written or oral submissions. Mr Krupin prepared the Case Outline document filed on his behalf on 6 March 2023. He also had the opportunity to read and endorse the written submissions after the conclusion of the evidence as prepared by counsel and filed on his behalf on 30 June 2023, and the draft balance sheet tendered on his behalf on 18 May 2023 (Exhibit 7). He makes no complaint on appeal as to the content of those documents.
The s 102NA orders only applied to the cross-examination of Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff. It was Mr Krupin’s forensic decision to engage counsel to prepare the written submissions, to make oral submissions, and otherwise represent him throughout the trial.
Mr Krupin failed to demonstrate that any forensic decisions of his counsel were in any way incompetent, nor did he point us to any conduct of his counsel that was even mildly persuasive in convincing us as to any incompetence. Consequently, no question of a miscarriage of justice arises. Ground 3 does not succeed.
Ground 7 – “The Judge has made an error of facts, that have influenced the outcome of the proceeding”
To succeed on this ground, Mr Krupin must establish that the findings subject to challenge were not reasonably open on the evidence (Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 at 304). Appeal courts do not lightly interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge “unless they are demonstrated to be wrong by ‘incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony’, or they are ‘glaringly improbable’ or ‘contrary to compelling inferences’” (Robinson Helicopter Co at [43]). The difficulty in challenging findings of fact extends to “findings of secondary facts”, which are based on “inferences from primary facts” (Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129 at [55]).
Mr Krupin’s complaints as to factual error for the purposes of this ground that we have already determined when dealing with Grounds 1 and 4 above, will not be canvassed again.
The Trust
By way of context, the finding at [26], as to Mr Krupin’s transfer of Ms Krupin’s share in B Pty Ltd to himself in August 2017 absent Ms Krupin’s knowledge or consent, was Ms Krupin’s evidence and was conceded by Mr Krupin’s admission in cross-examination:
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: No, no, no. Please ask; was [Ms Krupin] 50 per cent shareholder in the company that owned [G] Street?
THE INTERPRETER ([MR KRUPIN]): Until 2017, your Honour.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Until – what happened then?
THE INTERPRETER ([MR KRUPIN]): I moved her out from the board of directors because - - -
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: What about the shareholding?
THE INTERPRETER ([MR KRUPIN]): The same. The shares moved to myself.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Well, did she transfer her shares to you?
THE INTERPRETER ([MR KRUPIN]): I transferred. It wasn’t ..... decision.
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: All right.
(Emphasis added) (Transcript 16 May 2023, p.155 lines 28–46).
The primary judge found that Mr Krupin had, or purported to have, removed Ms Krupin as a beneficiary of the Trust and that he did not have power to do so. Mr Krupin contended that these findings were wrong because there was no evidence that Ms Krupin was not, at the time of the hearing, a beneficiary. That implicitly accepts the second finding.
The fact that he attempted to do so was supported by Mr Krupin’s concessions in cross‑examination where he said Ms Krupin “has no position in the [T]rust any more, as far as I understand the trust document” (Transcript 15 May 2023, p.66 line 30), the absence of evidence adduced as to the Trust as to any consideration being given to a distribution to Ms Krupin and the absence of documentation adduced by Mr Krupin, Ms Petrov, or B Pty Ltd on this topic. It was incumbent on Mr Krupin or B Pty Ltd to lead evidence to establish the lawful character of Mr Krupin’s conduct in the management of the Trust. The primary judge recorded that they failed to do so. It is not open to displace a factual finding by establishing a different view. The finding that Mr Krupin would use his control of the Trust to advance his own interests at the expense of Ms Krupin was open and available on Mr Krupin’s evidence alone. Simply because the subsidiary factual findings supporting the conclusion did not accord with the views of Mr Krupin does not render the findings to be in error. They were plainly open on the evidence.
The C Street property
A series of subsidiary findings are said to be in error underscoring the conclusion dismissing Mr Krupin’s equitable claims to the C Street property.
Mr Krupin challenges the finding at [48] that Ms Angeloff had a deposit of $35,550 to assist with the purchase of the MM Street property. Mr Krupin contends that he paid the deposit for MM Street. This complaint is an example of the circumlocution of many parts the appeal. The mortgage broker’s note refers to the deposit being held by Ms Angeloff in her bank account. It is Mr Krupin’s case that he loaned $40,000 to Ms Angeloff, being the deposit, that she repaid him this advance and that Ms Angeloff borrowed the balance of funds to acquire the property by way of mortgage. On Mr Krupin’s case, Ms Angeloff acquired the MM Street property, and subsequently the C Street property, using her own funds obtained by way of loans. The challenge is, and was always, otiose and immaterial.
Mr Krupin also challenged related findings at [77] and [86(d)], that the rental income received from the C Street property was received by Ms Angeloff, who paid the mortgage and outgoings of the property from the rent and then made payments of the excess to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin from time to time, to a value of up to $64,000. As to this finding, Mr Krupin submitted in his affidavit filed 24 February 2023 that:
114.It was agreed by all family that I will buy properties in the name of [Ms Angeloff] and/or [Ms Angeloff’s son] for the purpose of assets protection on conditions that:
…
b)I and [Ms Krupin] would receive and distribute all money from rent and sale of these properties.
(Emphasis added)

There was no particularity as to the parties to the agreement, where it was made, what was said, or by whom. Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff denied the existence of any such agreement. The primary judge rejected the notion promoted by Mr Krupin that the property was acquired in the name of Ms Angeloff for “asset protection purposes”. This was in circumstances where there was no explanation in Mr Krupin’s case as to the reasons (at or about the time of the acquisition of the property) he and Ms Krupin held the G Street property in the Trust (and that Trust was not used to acquire the C Street property) and acquired the E Street property personally. Ms Angeloff’s bank statements verified that the rent from the C Street property was deposited into her account and that the mortgage and outgoings were paid from her account. It was therefore open to the primary judge to prefer the evidence of Ms Krupin and Ms Angeloff on this subject matter, supported by the bank statements (at [75]). It cannot be established that the findings were not reasonably open to the primary judge.
The E Street property
Mr Krupin challenges the findings at [113] and [167], being the calculation of the primary judge to ground the finding that Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov had paid approximately $300,000 by way of mortgage payments and outgoings for E Street from February 2015 to February 2023. Mr Krupin submits that such calculation omits payments he had made for the E Street and G Street properties for the periods of May 2014 to February 2015, and “from February 2023 to the present day”. That submission is undeniably correct. The challenge is aimless.
Ground 7 has no merit and fails.
Ground 5 – “The Judge failed to consider relevant material that have influenced the outcome of the proceeding”
Mr Krupin uses various descriptors to complain that the primary judge “failed to consider”, “failed to adequately consider”, or “ignored” a relevant consideration. To the extent that the complaint is that the primary judge did not “adequately consider”, that falls short of a failure to take into account a relevant consideration. In so far as the ground repeats the contended errors identified in Grounds 1, 4, and 7 already dealt with by us, they will not be considered again here.
A fundamental part of this complaint is that Mr Krupin relied upon a trial affidavit of some 3,000 pages inclusive of annexures, and that the primary judge did not identify, or sufficiently identify, the entirety of that evidence in the reasons. The complaint is hollow. The primary judge, on the first day of the trial, said:
[THE PRIMARY JUDGE]: Just for reference for the information of, in particular, the counsel for [Mr Krupin] and [Mr Krupin] and his lawyers, in relation to this affidavit, Mr [AD], that has about 3000 pages in it, keep in mind that I have no intention to reading the entirety of those annexures unless I’m taken to them in the evidence, more particularly, in the submissions.
[COUNSEL FOR MR KRUPIN]: Yes.
(Emphasis added) (Transcript 15 May 2023, p.36 lines 38–44)
Mr Krupin was required to explicitly take the primary judge to specific documents and page references in the annexures to his affidavit to be read. In so far as he failed to identify in his Summary of Argument such evidence, those complaints will not be further entertained. Additionally, in so far as he did not do so at trial, he cannot now complain that the primary judge did not consider those documents (Metwally). A primary judge is not required to refer in reasons for judgment to each item of evidence, argument, or submission relied upon by the parties (Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [62]).
The following complaints, relevant to this ground and identified in the Summary of Argument, are prosecuted by Mr Krupin under a false pretence. The primary judge’s reasons clearly demonstrate that the subject matter of each complaint identified in Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument for the purpose of this ground were explicitly considered and were either the subject of findings or the rejection of contentions. In particular:
(a)The primary judge ignored the animal facility enterprise “taken by [Ms Krupin] in 2014” that operated prior to separation at the E Street property from the property amenable to adjustment between the parties 10 years later in 2024. Mr Krupin said he adduced, and the primary judge ignored, what he describes as a valuation report of the animal facility by AB Accountants dated 8 August 2016. The complaint as to the material being ignored is specious in circumstances where the primary judge considered it and rejected the contention as to an addback as sought by Mr Krupin, saying:
137.Ms Krupin was cross-examined about the business. AB Accountants prepared a valuation. It is annexed to the trial affidavit of Mr Krupin. This valuation is annexure 43 to Mr Krupin’s trial affidavit. It commences at page 1539 of [Mr Krupin’s] annexures to his trial affidavit.
138.The expert who prepared the valuation did not prepare an affidavit for these court proceedings. No person from the AB Accountants was available for cross examination. It is very difficult for this Court to ascribe weight to the valuation.
139.Further, I accept the evidence of Ms Krupin – including the evidence from her oral testimony at page 246 of the transcript of the trial – on Wednesday 17 May 2023. The point made by Ms Krupin is that the animal facility needed particular facilities from which the business could be maintained. Without those facilities the business could not be continued. I infer from this evidence that the value of the animals very much depends upon the ability to breed from those animals. Unless there are proper facilities for breeding to take place then it is difficult to maintain an argument that a valuation for the ZZ Company business in the sum of $110,000 should be added back into the property pool. For the reasons that I have outlined above I do not consider that it is appropriate in the circumstances of this case to include the animal facility in the property pool.
(Emphasis added)
(b)Mr Krupin complains that the primary judge (at [140]–[141]) accepted Ms Krupin’s “claims and speculations regarding [birds] as evidence”. Mr Krupin sought an add back against Ms Krupin valued at $29,000, being his assertion as to the value of birds retained by her at separation in 2014. The primary judge did not accept Mr Krupin’s lay opinion as to the value of the birds and declined the add back as sought. Mr Krupin, in his Summary of Argument, said that Ms Krupin did not contest the fact that “she disposed of all [birds] in 2014–2015”. This submission is perverse. It does not reflect the evidence of Ms Krupin as accepted by the primary judge, being that one bird died, two flew away from the cage after it was knocked over (suspectedly by a dog or fox), and one was sold for $3,000, paid to Ms Angeloff as part repayment of a loan she made to Mr Krupin and Ms Krupin of $4,000 to fund the purchase of the birds. It was open to the primary judge to accept the evidence of Ms Krupin. The primary judge’s discretion to reject as an add back the deceased or lost birds from some 10 years ago at the value ascribed by Mr Krupin, absent expert evidence, was an inevitable conclusion. Mr Krupin failed to state why this conclusion was wrong; and
(c)Mr Krupin submitted “family debts” were “ignored” because they were not included as liabilities in the balance sheet of the property of the parties. This complaint does not accurately reflect the primary judge’s reasons. Two credit card liabilities of Mr Krupin were included in the balance sheet (at [156]), totalling over $61,000. The primary judge at [142]–[147] identified the other liabilities subject to complaint, including the alleged debt to Ms Petrov of $840,346, and determined that there was an insufficient evidentiary foundation promoted by Mr Krupin to establish the integrity of the fact of the debts and their quantum. As recorded in these reasons, the primary judge considered and weighed the payments made on behalf of Mr Krupin to the mortgage and outgoings on the E Street property as a contribution in his case (at [117]). Mr Krupin’s case was deficient as to adducing evidence as to the use and application of the alleged advanced funds. The primary judge also records that Mr Krupin failed to identify evidence to ground the fact and quantum of Centrelink debts. The conclusions of the primary judge are a function of the evidentiary failures of Mr Krupin. All evidence must be weighed and assessed having regard to the capacities of the parties to adduce and contradict it (Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439 at [36]). The alleged liabilities subject to complaint were not “ignored” as alleged. They were considered and determined.
The complaints made under this ground, being:
(a)The “counterfeit” payslips of Ms Angeloff (at [47]);
(b)Mr Krupin and not Ms Angeloff funding the shortfall in income produced by Ms Angeloff’s properties (at [107]);
(c)“[I]gnoring” the evidence of the “list of work with estimated values” as asserted by Mr Krupin that were undertaken to the C Street property (at [68]–[69]);
(d)“[O]verlooking” of bank statements (at [47]);
(e)Ignoring of the orders made 4 November 2015 and 23 March 2016 as to Mr Krupin being responsible for paying the mortgage and outgoings on the E Street and G Street properties (originally raised under Ground 4);
(f)The finding at [119(f)] that Ms Petrov has not at any time accounted to Ms Krupin for the proceeds of rental income received on the G Street property; and
(g)The evidence Ms Petrov provided as to the costs she expended in the “development, renovation, and repairs” to the G Street property being “overlooked”;
were explicitly and comprehensively considered by the primary judge. Detailed reasons were provided as to why each finding of fact subject to complaint was made, or as to why each complained contention of Mr Krupin was not accepted.
This ground is a device to mask a complaint that the findings were not those as prosecuted by Mr Krupin, or his contentions not accepted. The ground is devoid of merit and fails.
Ground 6 – “The Judge considered facts that could not be supported by evidence and/or irrelevant”
Mr Krupin submitted that the consideration at [119(c)], that Ms Krupin has had to pay approximately $170,000 by way of rent from the time of separation to the time of trial while Mr Krupin continued to have the occupation of the E Street property, was irrelevant. These integers were uncontroversial post separation facts plainly relevant to the weighing of post separation contributions.
The complaints and particulars as to factual errors to support this ground were repeated from those dealt with in Grounds 1, 4, 5, and 7. No other subject matter was identified as to the primary judge taking into account an irrelevant consideration. This ground fails.
Ground 2 – “The Judge made a decision that was plainly wrong, unreasonable or unjust”
In so far as this ground contends that the primary judge’s decision as to the dismissal of the equitable claims of Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov was plainly wrong, unreasonable, or unjust, it is not established. For all the reasons discussed above, Mr Krupin and Ms Petrov did not make out the requirements for establishing their equitable claims. In that instance, the principle requiring that errors identified on appeal be corrected according to the standard identified in Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 553, is not met.
The weight given to evidence in the exercise of discretion pursuant to s 79 of the Act is a matter quintessentially for the primary judge. That an appellate court might have arrived at a different outcome by virtue of affording different weight to various matters does not justify the reversal of the decision of the primary judge (Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 at 519).
In support of his contention that the exercise of discretion pursuant to s 79 of the Act was “plainly wrong”, Mr Krupin repeated the contended failures and errors determined in the earlier grounds. It is his view that the s 79 decision of the primary judge was the wrong outcome and hence, implicitly, that it was unreasonable and unjust. An appeal is not an opportunity for an appellant to re-run their case, attempting to convince the appellate court that absent appealable error, it should nonetheless come to a different conclusion. That is what Mr Krupin is trying to do in this appeal. This part of the ground is no more than a bare complaint that Mr Krupin received less than he viewed as just and equitable. The reasons establish that the property division ostensibly falls comfortably within the discretionary range and is not a manifestly unjust outcome (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499).
The ground fails.
Ground 9 – “The Judge gave inadequate reasons for the decision”
The purpose of providing reasons is to ensure that the parties understand why a decision was made (Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191 (“Bennett”)). The Full Court has confirmed many times that reasons need only be adequate, and adequacy depends on the circumstances. Reasons will be inadequate if the appellate court is unable to ascertain those reasons for the decision and if justice is not seen to be done (Yarrow & Yarrow [2022] FedCFamC1A 135 at [17], quoting the Full Court in Bennett). Reasons may, however, also be inadequate if they fail to refer to “cogent evidence that is relevant to an issue that is of significance in the proceedings” (Aitken & Aitken (2023) FLC 94-142 at [42]).
Mr Krupin’s written submissions on this ground again repeated his complaints made under other grounds. As recorded earlier in determining those grounds, the reasons are clear as to identifying the basis for the decision, and the extent to which the parties’ submissions were understood and accepted. The pathway of reasoning by which the primary judge made the factual, legal, and final decisions were both discernible and clear, and such reasons do justice to the issues posed by the parties in this proceeding (Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110).
Any complaint as to a failure to provide adequate reasons cannot be maintained. Ground 9 fails.
Ground 10 – “The abuse of discretion by the Judge”
This ground’s illumination in Mr Krupin’s Summary of Argument was that the primary judge “failed to utilise [sic] his power to obtain additional evidence, such as a quantity surveyor report for [G Street] and [C Street]”, implicitly, to assist Mr Krupin’s case. The complaint is that the primary judge failed to employ forensic processes available to Mr Krupin in the conduct of his case to assist Mr Krupin’s case. The balance of the Summary of Argument by way of this ground is a further reconfiguration of the complaints determined in earlier grounds. As constructed and prosecuted, this is not a competent ground of appeal and is rejected.
The Summary of Argument by way of this ground is a further reconfiguration of the complaints already determined in earlier grounds.
Mr Krupin also raises, under Ground 5 of his Summary of Argument, that the primary judge “failed to utilise [sic] his power to obtain additional evidence, such as a quantity surveyor report for [G Street] and [C Street]”, implicitly, to assist Mr Krupin’s case. The complaint is that the primary judge failed to employ forensic processes available to Mr Krupin in the conduct of his case to assist Mr Krupin’s case. As constructed and prosecuted, this is not a competent ground of appeal and is rejected.
CONCLUSION AS TO THE APPEAL
For all the above reasons, the appeal fails. The Notice of Appeal filed 12 April 2024, as amended on 24 May 2024, will be dismissed.
COSTS
In the event the appeal was unsuccessful, Ms Krupin sought for Mr Krupin to pay her costs incurred in obtaining advice to resist the appeal including the drafting of her Summary of Argument at the scale prescribed in Sch 3 of the Rules, fixed in the sum of $4,019.40. Ms Angeloff did not seek for Mr Krupin to pay any of her costs for the hearing of the appeal.
The relevant principles as to costs are well settled. While the starting position established by s 117(1) of the Act is that each party pays their own costs, s 117(2) allows the Court to make such orders as to costs as it considers just if there are circumstances which justify it doing so. In considering what order for costs, if any, should be made, the Court is required to have regard to the matters set out in s 117(2A) of the Act and give weight as it considers appropriate to any relevant factor. It is well settled that no single factor in s 117(2A) has priority, nor must more than one factor be satisfied. Rather, any one factor may be sufficient.
Mr Krupin’s financial circumstances, whereby he will receive 55 per cent of the property of he and Ms Krupin, does not militate against the making of a costs order. By the dismissal of this appeal, Mr Krupin has been wholly unsuccessful. The circumstances justify the making of a costs order in favour of Ms Krupin.
Mr Krupin did not dispute the fact of, or the reasonableness of, the quantum of Ms Krupin’s costs sought. It is just for Mr Krupin to pay her costs in the fixed sum as sought. Such order will be made.

I certify that the preceding one-hundred and thirty-five (135) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Aldridge, Jarrett & Campton.
Associate:
Dated: 28 August 2024
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

NAA 86 of 2024
BRC 5459 of 2014

Respondents

Fourth Respondent:

B PTY LTD

NAA 86 of 2024 BRC 5459 of 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BETWEEN:	MR KRUPIN Appellant
AND:	MS KRUPIN First Respondent MS ANGELOFF Second Respondent MS PETROV (and another named in the Schedule) Third Respondent

Appeal from:	Krupin & Krupin(No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 154
Appeal number:	NAA 86 of 2024
File number:	BRC 5459 of 2014
Judgment of:	ALDRIDGE, JARRETT & CAMPTON JJ
Date of judgment:	28 August 2024
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Appeal from the dismissal of equitable claims and from orders adjusting property – Where the third and fourth respondents do not appeal from the dismissal of their equitable claims but support the appeal – Grounds of appeal assert bias, a denial of natural justice, a failure to afford procedural fairness, failures to consider material considerations, taking into account irrelevant considerations, errors of fact, and errors of weight – Where the number of errors alleged are vast – Where an error of fact is established but is not material to the final determination – Where the appellant seeks to re-run his case at trial on appeal – Where no ground of appeal is successful – Appeal dismissed – Costs ordered in a fixed sum.
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 79, 102NA, 117 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 26, 28 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 3.09, 13.23, Sch 3 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss 11, 12
Cases cited:	Aitken & Aitken (2023) FLC 94-142; [2023] FedCFamC1A 69 Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621; [1953] HCA 25 Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 166 FCR 415; [2008] FCAFC 30 Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191; [1990] FamCA 148 Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design& Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55 Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296; [1971] HCA 54 Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63 Haward & Haward (2023) FLC 94-147; [2023] FedCFamC1A 99 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 Jess & Jess (No 5) (2024) FLC 94-190; [2024] FedCFamC1A 85 Katsilis v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1977) 18 ALR 181 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; [1985] HCA 81 Krupin & Krupin (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 56 Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28 Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3 OP v TP (Conduct of Counsel) (2002) 30 Fam LR 281; [2002] FamCA 1155 Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550; [2016] HCA 22 Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63 Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439; [2001] HCA 12 Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291; [1998] HCA 56 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; [1979] HCA 9 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48 Yarrow & Yarrow [2022] FedCFamC1A 135
Number of paragraphs:	135
Date of hearing:	27 June 2024
Place:	Heard in Brisbane, delivered in Perth
The Appellant:	Litigant in person
The First, Second, and Third Respondents:	Litigants in person
Representative for the Fourth Respondent:	The third respondent on behalf of the fourth respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	ALDRIDGE, JARRETT & CAMPTON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	28 AUGUST 2024

NAA 86 of 2024 BRC 5459 of 2014
Respondents
Fourth Respondent:	B PTY LTD