Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 42   

Appeal from: Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2020] SAIRC 1
File number: SAD 75 of 2020
Judgment of: WHITE, CHARLESWORTH AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 24 March 2021
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from a decision of the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia refusing an application to reopen proceedings – whether the IRCSA erred in the exercise of the discretion – Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 178 and 179 – appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) Act 2009 (Cth)

Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)

Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)

Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment (No 2) Act 1990 (Cth) s 10

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 79

Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth)

Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992 (Cth)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 178, 179, 720, 848, 850, 853

Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) s 3(1)

Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 16

Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) ss 14, 154, 174

Statutes Amendment (South Australia Employment Tribunal) Act 2016 (SA) s 69(2)  

Cases cited:

Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield [2005] HCA 38; (2005) 223 CLR 251

Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 67; (2014) 314 ALR 84

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541

Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd v GF Heublein and Bro Inc (1960) 103 CLR 422

Croft v Lukins [2004] SAIRC 58

De L v Director‑General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (No 2) (1997) 190 CLR 207

Drewniak v Air Bags Australia Pty Ltd [2004] SAIRC 37

Egan v Department of Human Services [2003] SAIRC 50

Hanafin v Distinctive Data Services (1993) 60 SAIR 408

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Kronen v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FMCA 1019

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2009] FMCA 808

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2016] SAIRC 23

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2016] SASCFC 8; (2016) 124 SASR 427

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2017] SAET 156

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 136; (2018) 264 FCR 408

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (CMI Toyota) [2008] FCAFC 171; (2008) 171 FCR 521

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (CMI Toyota) [2009] HCASL 25

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (CMI Toyota) [2009] HCASL 168

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2006] SAIRC 31

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2006] SAIRC 85

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2017] FCA 33; (2017) 251 FCR 282

Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2020] SAIRC 1

Kronen v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 1463; (2012) 213 FCR 495

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd involved the appellant, who sought payment of superannuation contributions from the respondent, Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (CMI). The proceedings were originally lodged in the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia (IRCSA) in 2005, but the appellant subsequently appealed the IRCSA's decision, arguing that the court had erred in its exercise of discretion. The central issue before the court was whether the IRCSA had jurisdiction to determine the appellant's claim for superannuation contributions and, if not, whether the appellant had an accrued or acquired right to have the claim heard and determined by the IRCSA.

The court found that the IRCSA had indeed lacked jurisdiction to determine the superannuation claim, as established in the 2008 Full Court decision. This decision was final and could not be ignored. The appellant argued that he had an accrued or acquired right to have the IRCSA hear and determine his claim, citing the principle that once a court is properly seized of a matter, it is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction to determine the rights and liabilities in issue. However, the court found that this principle only applied when the court in question had jurisdiction over the matter. As the IRCSA did not have jurisdiction in this case, the appellant did not have an accrued right to have the claim heard and determined by the IRCSA.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's claim for superannuation contributions was not within the jurisdiction of the IRCSA, and that the appellant did not have an accrued right to have the claim heard and determined by the IRCSA. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with no further orders made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There was little difference between the parties as to the course of the steps taken by the appellant to date in the pursuit of his claim for payment of the superannuation contributions.The 2006 decision of the IRCSA As already noted, the appellant’s employment with CMI ceased on 3 November 2000. On 11 July 2005, he lodged an application in the IRCSA claiming two forms of payment said to be due to him under the Vehicle Industry – Repair, Services and Retail Award 1983 (the Award). The first was an underpayment of wages (said to be approximately $59,000) resulting from the non‑payment of overtime. The second was underpayment of superannuation contributions (said to be approximately $6,000). Although the appellant did not refer to either s 178 or s 179 in his application, he did not make any claim for the imposition of a pecuniary penalty, being the primary relief for which s 178 provides. By its amended filed answer to the appellant’s claim, CMI contended, amongst other things, that the SAIRC did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appellant’s claim for superannuation contributions and referred to previous decisions of the IRCSA in support. The appellant’s application was heard by an Industrial Magistrate who delivered judgment on 12 May 2006: Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2006] SAIRC 31. The Magistrate dealt with the challenge to the IRCSA’s jurisdiction with respect to the claim for superannuation contributions as a preliminary point but summarised his conclusion in the judgment:[7]Mr Law, as agent for CMI Toyota, contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to deal with that part of the applicant’s claim relating to superannuation payments.[8]The applicant submitted that although the Court may have no jurisdiction to order the payment of superannuation contributions, it was able to proceed to determine what was the appropriate gross sum to be used when calculating superannuation contributions.[9]I determined that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Federal Award that is binding upon the parties (see below). Accordingly I indicated that I would proceed to determine what was the appropriate gross sum to be used for calculating superannuation contributions. The Industrial Magistrate then rejected the appellant’s claim for underpayment of wages and gave an interpretation of the Award, the effect of which was that the Award had not obliged CMI to make the superannuation contributions claimed by the appellant (as commission payments were not included in the amounts on which the superannuation contributions were to be calculated). Although it is evident that there was some confusion in the IRCSA as to the jurisdiction it was exercising with respect to the superannuation claim, the transcript of the hearing in the IRCSA indicates an understanding by the Magistrate that, with respect to the claim for unpaid overtime, it was s 179 of the WR Act which was the source of his jurisdiction. The transcript also indicates that the appellant confirmed to the Magistrate that, on the “superannuation issue”, what he sought was an “interpretation of the Award”. He explained to the Industrial Magistrate:The Taxation Office has essentially asked if there is no jurisdiction of the court – sorry, to award any unpaid superannuation to me the court – or that I should ask the court at least to rule on the interpretation of the Award or make findings on the interpretation of the Award, which I ask.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant’s Secondary Argument was to the effect that the Senior Judge had erred in failing to recognise that he had an “accrued or acquired right” to have the IRCSA determine his superannuation claim, with the consequence that it had been subject to a distinct “obligation” to allow the reopening and to proceed to determine his claim finally. He contended that, by having filed an application in the IRCSA in 2005 which included a claim with respect to the superannuation contributions, he had acquired the right to have the IRCSA determine that claim. Although the IRCSA had given an interpretation of the Award provision concerning superannuation contributions in its 2006 decision, it had not made an order with respect to that claim. The consequence, the appellant submitted, was that until such time as the claim had been upheld, dismissed or struck out, the requirements to be met for a reopening were less burdensome than is ordinarily the case. Consideration of the “Secondary Argument” The appellant seemed to be invoking the principle that, once a court is properly seized of the matter, it is obliged (subject to limited and well‑recognised exceptions) to exercise its jurisdiction to determine the rights and liabilities in issue: Re Macks; ex parte Saint [2000] HCA 62, (2000) 204 CLR 158 at [53] (Gaudron J); R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd [1949] HCA 33, (1949) 78 CLR 389 at 400‑1; and Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd v GF Heublein and Bro Inc (1960) 103 CLR 422 at 426 (Kitto J). However, this principle applies only when the court in question does have jurisdiction in respect of the matter. The difficulty for the appellant is that this Court found in Kronen Full Court 2008 that the IRCSA lacked jurisdiction on his application to deal with his superannuation claim. That decision stands and is final. It cannot be ignored. It follows therefore that the appellant does not have an accrued right to have the IRCSA hear and determine a claim over which it lacks jurisdiction. In support of the “Secondary Argument” in the IRCSA, the appellant had referred to Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield [2005] HCA 38; (2005) 223 CLR 251. In that case, the High Court held (relevantly) that the pleading by a plaintiff of facts sufficient to enliven a claim under the Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) Act 2009 (Cth) (the Carriers Liability Act) meant that such an action had been commenced within the requisite two year period even though the plaintiff had pleaded those facts with a view to supporting different causes of action. That is to say, the action under the Carriers Liability Act could be said to have been brought within the limitation period because of the pleading of facts to support it, even though the cause of action had not been expressly identified in the pleading. The appellant did not advance, at least expressly, the same submissions on the appeal but, on the issue being drawn to his attention, did not seem to abandon it. The submission seemed to be that his 2005 application had been sufficient to raise a claim under s 178.