FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 42
Appeal from: Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2020] SAIRC 1 File number: SAD 75 of 2020 Judgment of: WHITE, CHARLESWORTH AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ Date of judgment: 24 March 2021 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from a decision of the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia refusing an application to reopen proceedings – whether the IRCSA erred in the exercise of the discretion – Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 178 and 179 – appeal dismissed. Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) Act 2009 (Cth)
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment (No 2) Act 1990 (Cth) s 10
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 79
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth)
Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 178, 179, 720, 848, 850, 853
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) s 3(1)
Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 16
Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) ss 14, 154, 174
Statutes Amendment (South Australia Employment Tribunal) Act 2016 (SA) s 69(2)
Cases cited: Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield [2005] HCA 38; (2005) 223 CLR 251
Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 67; (2014) 314 ALR 84
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541
Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd v GF Heublein and Bro Inc (1960) 103 CLR 422
Croft v Lukins [2004] SAIRC 58
De L v Director‑General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (No 2) (1997) 190 CLR 207
Drewniak v Air Bags Australia Pty Ltd [2004] SAIRC 37
Egan v Department of Human Services [2003] SAIRC 50
Hanafin v Distinctive Data Services (1993) 60 SAIR 408
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kronen v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FMCA 1019
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2009] FMCA 808
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2016] SAIRC 23
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2016] SASCFC 8; (2016) 124 SASR 427
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2017] SAET 156
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 136; (2018) 264 FCR 408
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (CMI Toyota) [2008] FCAFC 171; (2008) 171 FCR 521
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (CMI Toyota) [2009] HCASL 25
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (CMI Toyota) [2009] HCASL 168
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2006] SAIRC 31
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2006] SAIRC 85
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2017] FCA 33; (2017) 251 FCR 282
Kronen v Commercial Motor Industries Pty Ltd (t/as CMI Toyota) [2020] SAIRC 1
Kronen v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 1463; (2012) 213 FCR 495
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- Case
- [2021] FCAFC 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the IRCSA had indeed lacked jurisdiction to determine the superannuation claim, as established in the 2008 Full Court decision. This decision was final and could not be ignored. The appellant argued that he had an accrued or acquired right to have the IRCSA hear and determine his claim, citing the principle that once a court is properly seized of a matter, it is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction to determine the rights and liabilities in issue. However, the court found that this principle only applied when the court in question had jurisdiction over the matter. As the IRCSA did not have jurisdiction in this case, the appellant did not have an accrued right to have the claim heard and determined by the IRCSA.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's claim for superannuation contributions was not within the jurisdiction of the IRCSA, and that the appellant did not have an accrued right to have the claim heard and determined by the IRCSA. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with no further orders made.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant’s Secondary Argument was to the effect that the Senior Judge had erred in failing to recognise that he had an “accrued or acquired right” to have the IRCSA determine his superannuation claim, with the consequence that it had been subject to a distinct “obligation” to allow the reopening and to proceed to determine his claim finally. He contended that, by having filed an application in the IRCSA in 2005 which included a claim with respect to the superannuation contributions, he had acquired the right to have the IRCSA determine that claim. Although the IRCSA had given an interpretation of the Award provision concerning superannuation contributions in its 2006 decision, it had not made an order with respect to that claim. The consequence, the appellant submitted, was that until such time as the claim had been upheld, dismissed or struck out, the requirements to be met for a reopening were less burdensome than is ordinarily the case. Consideration of the “Secondary Argument” The appellant seemed to be invoking the principle that, once a court is properly seized of the matter, it is obliged (subject to limited and well‑recognised exceptions) to exercise its jurisdiction to determine the rights and liabilities in issue: Re Macks; ex parte Saint [2000] HCA 62, (2000) 204 CLR 158 at [53] (Gaudron J); R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd [1949] HCA 33, (1949) 78 CLR 389 at 400‑1; and Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd v GF Heublein and Bro Inc (1960) 103 CLR 422 at 426 (Kitto J). However, this principle applies only when the court in question does have jurisdiction in respect of the matter. The difficulty for the appellant is that this Court found in Kronen Full Court 2008 that the IRCSA lacked jurisdiction on his application to deal with his superannuation claim. That decision stands and is final. It cannot be ignored. It follows therefore that the appellant does not have an accrued right to have the IRCSA hear and determine a claim over which it lacks jurisdiction. In support of the “Secondary Argument” in the IRCSA, the appellant had referred to Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield [2005] HCA 38; (2005) 223 CLR 251. In that case, the High Court held (relevantly) that the pleading by a plaintiff of facts sufficient to enliven a claim under the Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) Act 2009 (Cth) (the Carriers Liability Act) meant that such an action had been commenced within the requisite two year period even though the plaintiff had pleaded those facts with a view to supporting different causes of action. That is to say, the action under the Carriers Liability Act could be said to have been brought within the limitation period because of the pleading of facts to support it, even though the cause of action had not been expressly identified in the pleading. The appellant did not advance, at least expressly, the same submissions on the appeal but, on the issue being drawn to his attention, did not seem to abandon it. The submission seemed to be that his 2005 application had been sufficient to raise a claim under s 178.