Kristoffersen v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kristoffersen v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2013] FCA 951

Citation: Kristoffersen v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2013] FCA 951
Parties: KURT KRISTOFFERSEN v SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL, COLONIAL MUTUAL SUPERANNUATION PTY LTD and COLONIAL MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY PTY LTD
File number: QUD 176 of 2013
Judge: LOGAN J
Date of judgment: 19 September 2013
Catchwords:

SUPERANNUATION – superannuation funds – private sector superannuation scheme – decisions of board of trustees of superannuation scheme and its insurer refusing claim for benefit – appellant sought review of decisions by Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (the Tribunal) which affirmed decisions – appeal against that decision of the Tribunal – whether Tribunal discharged its function by determining whether decision under review was “fair and reasonable” in its operation in relation to the appellant – Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 36, 37, 46, 47

Held:  Appeal dismissed

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 14, 37, 46, 48
Federal Court Rules Div 33.2, Div 33.3, r 33.12, r 33.34
Cases cited: Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Thompson (2002) 116 FCR 139 applied
Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme v Edington (2011) 199 ALD 47 followed
Hornsby v Military Superannuation and Benefits Board of Trustees (No 1) (2003) 126 FCR 484 considered
Hourn v Farm Plan Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1122 considered
Lykogiannis v Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 361 considered
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594 considered
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1129 considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH (2006) 231 CLR 1 cited
National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd v Jevtovic [1997] FCA 359 considered
Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Crocker (2001) 48 ATR 359 considered
TNT Skypak International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175 cited
Date of hearing: 16 September 2013
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Hogg (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the Respondents: The Respondents did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 176 of 2013
BETWEEN:

KURT KRISTOFFERSEN
Applicant
AND:

SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
First Respondent

COLONIAL MUTUAL SUPERANNUATION PTY LTD
Second Respondent

COLONIAL MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY PTY LTD
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

LOGAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 SEPTEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.After the expiry of the time limited for an appeal from this judgement or upon the final determination of any such appeal, whichever is the later, the District Registrar is, as required by s 48(b) of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth), forthwith to return to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal the documents transmitted…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 951
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in the matter of Kristoffersen v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal was brought forth by Mr Kristoffersen, who sought review of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) decision to affirm the decisions of the board of trustees of a private sector superannuation scheme and its insurer in rejecting his claim for a benefit. The Tribunal’s decision was under review, as the primary decisions were deemed not to be "fair and reasonable" in their operation in relation to Mr Kristoffersen. The appeal was heard in the High Court of Australia.

The legal issues the court needed to address involved whether the Tribunal properly discharged its function under the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) by determining whether the decision under review was “fair and reasonable” in its operation in relation to Mr Kristoffersen. Specifically, the court had to consider the scope of the Tribunal's review power and whether the Tribunal correctly applied the statutory criteria in its decision-making process.

The High Court found that the Tribunal had correctly discharged its function by focusing on the fairness and reasonableness of the decision under review in its operation, rather than the process by which the decision was made. The court emphasised that the Tribunal is required to make its own findings of fact only to the extent necessary to determine whether the decision under review was fair and reasonable. The court noted that the Tribunal does not decide afresh all findings of fact of the primary decision-maker but rather considers the decision’s consequences in its practical operation. The High Court concluded that the Tribunal had appropriately exercised its discretion and correctly applied the statutory criteria, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

The orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and to return the documents transmitted to the Court by the Tribunal to the Tribunal after the expiry of the time limited for an appeal from this judgement or upon the final determination of any such appeal, whichever is the later, in accordance with section 48(b) of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. After the expiry of the time limited for an appeal from this judgement or upon the final determination of any such appeal, whichever is the later, the District Registrar is, as required by s 48(b) of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth), forthwith to return to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal the documents transmitted to the Court by that Tribunal pursuant to s 48(a) of that Act.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I shall consider each of these questions in turn. Absence of Inquiry or Supporting Evidence? Following the lodging of a complaint with it under s 14 of the Complaints Act, the Tribunal’s statutory remit was to inquire into the complaint, try to resolve it by conciliation and, if the complaint could not be so resolved, to review the decision(s) to which the complaint related: s 12 of the Complaints Act. Here, conciliation did fail so it fell to the Tribunal to review the trustee’s decisions given in respect of Mr Kristoffersen’s claims and, because the insurer had been joined as a party to the complaint, also to review the insurer’s decisions in respect of the complaint. For the purpose of conducting that review the Tribunal was, by s 37 of the Complaints Act, invested with all of the powers and discretions vested in the trustee or, as the case may be, the insurer but not so as to violate the rules of the fund or the contract of insurance concerned. The model adopted by Parliament in s 37 of the Complaints Act is akin to that adopted by Parliament in respect of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in s 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act in the sense that each tribunal stands in the shoes of the maker of the decision under review, but very different in another sense in that the review function consigned to the Complaints Tribunal is not as pervasive as the merits review function consigned to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. That is because s 37(6) of the Complaints Act imposes the following stricture on the Complaints Tribunal:(6)The Tribunal must affirm a decision referred to under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the decision, in its operation in relation to: (a) the complainant; and (b)so far as concerns a complaint regarding the payment of a death benefit--any person (other than the complainant, a trustee, insurer or decision-maker) who: (i) has become a party to the complaint; and (ii)has an interest in the death benefit or claims to be, or to be entitled to benefits through, a person having an interest in the death benefit; was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The authorities concerning the operation of s 37 of the Complaints Act were helpfully collected by Kenny and Lander JJ (with whom I agreed) in their judgment in Edington at [44] to [51]. Included in those authorities are passages from two judgments of Mansfield J, Lykogiannis v Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 361 (Lykogiannis) and Hornsby v Military Superannuation and Benefits Board of Trustees (No 1) (2003) 126 FCR 484 (Hornsby) concerning the meaning and effect of s 37 of the Complaints Act in respect of the Tribunal’s function, which their Honours cite with approval (Edington at [50]):Lykogiannis at [48]:[48] … Ultimately, whatever findings the Tribunal must make standing in the shoes of the trustee … s 37(6) requires the Tribunal to decide whether the decision under review, in its operation, was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The focus of s 37(6) is upon the consequence or outcome of the decision in its practical operation, rather than upon the process by which the decision under review came to be made.Hornsby at [19] - [20]:[19][T]he Tribunal may have to make its own findings of fact for the purpose of determining whether, in its opinion, the decision under review in its operation was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. But it is necessary to make such findings of fact only for that purpose. It does not decide afresh all findings of fact of the primary decision-maker as if that decision had not been made. It does not, in that sense, simply stand in the shoes of the primary decision-maker.[20]Hence, under s 37, although the Tribunal is required to make its own decision in relation to the complaint, it is required to make only such findings of fact as are necessary for its decision. It must do so upon the evidence before it. In the light of such findings or conclusions as it has reached, the Tribunal must consider whether the decision it is reviewing, in its operation, was fair and reasonable in the circumstances: Military Superannuation and Benefits Board (No 1) v Stanger (2002) 68 ALD 12 at [21]. Section 37(6) requires that step. Ultimately the object of the Tribunal’s review is to remove unfairness or unreasonableness in the decision under review …

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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