Hourn v Farm Plan Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hourn v Farm Plan Pty Limited [2003] FCA 1122

SUPERANNUATION – Superannuation Complaints Tribunal – appeal – decision of trustee to pay benefit from fund to deceased’s companion – whether Tribunal failed to have sufficient regard or give sufficient weight to evidence – such ground fails to raise a question of law – whether Tribunal failed to carry out duty to inquire – no such duty existed in the circumstances

Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) s 11, 12, 24, 25, 36, 37, 45, 46

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 applied
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 cited
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 applied
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 cited
McAuliffe v Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609 cited
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Minister for Immigration Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 applied
Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 referred to
Roy v Sturgeon (1986) 11 NSWLR 454 cited
Videto v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 cited
Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 977 considered

PETER JAMES HOURN v FARM PLAN PTY LIMITED and TANYA KLENE
W421 of 2001

RD NICHOLSON J
16 OCTOBER 2003
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W421 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

PETER JAMES HOURN
APPLICANT

AND:

FARM PLAN PTY LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT

TANYA KLENE
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

RD NICHOLSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 OCTOBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal from the decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal given on 30 October 2000 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W421 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

PETER JAMES HOURN
APPLICANT

AND:

FARM PLAN PTY LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT

TANYA KLENE
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

RD NICHOLSON J

DATE:

16 OCTOBER 2003

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an ‘appeal’ brought in reliance on ss 45 and 46 of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) (‘the Act’) from a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) given on 30 October 2000 whereby the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the first respondent. That decision was to pay a death benefit of $31 700 to the second respondent as the deceased’s ‘companion’.

    BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES

  2. On 29 November 1996 Peter John Hourn, the son of the applicant died.  He was aged 28 years.  At the time of his death he was a member of the Australian Primary Superannuation Fund (‘the Fund’).  A benefit of $31 700 was due to him from the Fund. 

  3. On 24 July 1997 the first respondent as trustee of the Fund proposed that…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 1122
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hourn v Farm Plan Pty Ltd is an appeal brought under sections 45 and 46 of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) against a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision by Farm Plan Pty Ltd, as trustee of the Australian Primary Superannuation Fund, to pay a death benefit of $31,700 to the deceased's companion. The applicant, the deceased's father, objected to the decision, arguing that the Tribunal did not sufficiently consider certain evidence and made errors in its determination. The central issues for the court were whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the evidence regarding the financial dependence and de facto relationship between the deceased and the companion, and whether the Tribunal failed to make necessary inquiries.

The court examined whether the Tribunal's failure to sufficiently regard certain evidence amounted to an error of law. Drawing on established legal principles, the court noted that while the weight or regard given to evidence is not a question of law, the identification of relevant evidence and the addressing of pertinent questions based on that evidence are. The court found that the Tribunal had considered all relevant evidence and addressed the correct questions. Although the Tribunal had the power to make further inquiries, it was not obligated to do so, and its decision did not constitute an error of law.

Consequently, the court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed. The Tribunal's decision was affirmed, and the court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the application. This decision highlights the importance of correctly identifying and considering relevant evidence in administrative decisions, while also acknowledging the discretion afforded to tribunals in deciding whether to undertake further inquiries.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal from the decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal given on 30 October 2000 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an ‘appeal’ brought in reliance on ss 45 and 46 of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) (‘the Act’) from a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) given on 30 October 2000 whereby the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the first respondent. That decision was to pay a death benefit of $31 700 to the second respondent as the deceased’s ‘companion’. BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES On 29 November 1996 Peter John Hourn, the son of the applicant died. He was aged 28 years. At the time of his death he was a member of the Australian Primary Superannuation Fund (‘the Fund’). A benefit of $31 700 was due to him from the Fund. On 24 July 1997 the first respondent as trustee of the Fund proposed that all of the benefit go to the second respondent. After seeking further information from the parties, it then proposed that 50% be paid to the applicant and 50% to the second respondent. The applicant objected to this split. The minutes of the meeting of the first respondent held on 29 January 1998 record that the directors of the first respondent concluded from the evidence on hand that a de facto relationship existed between the deceased and the second respondent and that she was financially dependent to some extent on him, despite the applicant as the father of the deceased questioning that fact. It was noted there were no children as a result of the de facto relationship. The first respondent’s decision was that it was reasonable and fair that the benefit should be paid as to 50% to the second respondent and 50% to the applicant. This decision was objected to by the applicant’s letters of 20 March 1998 and 15 April 1998 and the first respondent’s letter of 10 April 1998. On 28 April 1998 the first respondent reconsidered the matter and decided to pay the whole of the death benefit to the second respondent. In the minutes of the first respondent on that date it was recorded:‘After weighing up the evidence, the Trustee considered that [the second respondent] had proved that she was in an ongoing de facto relationship with the deceased. In addition she had been emotionally and financially dependent on the deceased at the time of his death which was not the case of the father. The Trustee resolved to allocate the insured benefit 100% to [the second respondent] in the knowledge that she may need to make application for Testator’s Family Maintenance within the Supreme Court should this matter be further disputed.’ On 9 June 1998 the applicant objected to that decision. On 20 August 1998 the first respondent reaffirmed the decision to pay all the benefit to the second respondent. RELEVANT TRUST DEED PROVISIONS The Trust Deed in effect at the date of death was that amended to 4 March 1996. Clause 1.1 of the Deed provided the following definitions:‘‘Dependant’ means:(a) a Spouse;(b) a Child; and(c)any other person who the Trustee determines was dependent on a Member, or whom the Member has a legal or moral obligation to support, at the relevant date.…‘Relevant Law’ means:(a) the SIS Act;(b) the Tax Act; and(c)any other Commonwealth or State law or administrative rulings, circulars, or guidelines which govern superannuation and which apply to he Fund or any other present, future or proposed legal requirements which the Trustee is legally obliged to comply with or which the Trustee must comply with to obtain the maximum Tax concessions available to the Fund.‘SIS’ means the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth)‘Spouse’ means, in relation to a Member:(a) a husband, wife, widower or widow of the Member; and (b)a person who, though not legally married to the Member, in the opinion of the Trustee lives or lived with the Member as at the relevant date on a bona fide domestic basis as the husband or wife of that Member;‘Tax Act’ means the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The grounds of appeal as amended during the hearing focus on two issues. The first is that Tribunal failed to have sufficient regard or give sufficient weight to independent evidence which supported the conclusion that there was no financial dependence and no de facto relationship between the deceased and the second respondent. The second is that the Tribunal erred in making a determination which overlooked relevant matters and in particular failed to make inquiries of a specified kind. ALLEGED FAILURE TO HAVE SUFFICIENT REGARD OR GIVE SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO EVIDENCEWHETHER ERROR OF LAW It is submitted for the first respondent that this ground of appeal can be simply disposed of on the basis that it goes to the ‘weight’ or ‘regard’ which the applicant contends ought to have been given to certain aspects of the evidence and that such issues are not ‘a question of law’ within the meaning of s 46 of the Act. No submissions were made referring to appropriate authority. I take my guidance from what was said by Mason CJ in the oft-cited passage in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 355 – 357:‘The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law: McPhee v S Bennet Ltd (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 8 at p 9; Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126 at pp 137 – 138. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law: Australian Gas Light; Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 at pp 8-9. This is because, before the inference is drawn, there is the preliminary question whether the evidence reasonably admits of different conclusions: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Broken Hill South Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 150 at pp 155, 157, 160. So, in the context of judicial review, it has been accepted that the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law: Sinclair v Maryborough Mining Warden.But it is said that “[t]here is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact”: Waterford v The Commonwealth, per Brennan J. Similarly, Menzies J observed in Reg v District Court; Ex parte White:“Even if the reasoning whereby the Court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, this would not amount to an error of law on the face of the record. To establish some faulty (e.g. illogical) inference of fact would not disclose and error of law.”Thus, at common law, according to the Australian authorities, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as there is some basis for an inference – in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open – even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place.’ Mason CJ continued at 356 by referring to statements in English cases which support a ‘no sufficient evidence’ test and noted that no occasion had then arisen to determine whether these were expressive of what is or should be the law of Australia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The result is that in the present case the Tribunal identified all of the relevant evidence to which it had regard. It addressed itself to the right questions on that evidence. The Tribunal had a power to make further inquiry but it was not obliged to exercise it nor was its decision in error of law as a consequence.CONCLUSION For these reasons I consider the application by way of appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.