KPTT and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation)
[2020] AATA 5309
•21 December 2020
KPTT and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2020] AATA 5309 (21 December 2020)
Division:Taxation and Commercial Division
File Number(s): 2017/3976-3979
2018/1676-1677
Re: KPTT
APPLICANT
AndCommissioner of Taxation
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President Bernard J McCabe
Member P RansonDate:21 December 2020
Place:Sydney
(1)The applicant is required to establish his taxable income and is to do more than lead evidence addressed to changes of his assessable income.
(2)The applicant is not given leave to amend the grounds of objections pursuant to 14ZZK(a) of the Taxation Administration Act.
(3)The applicant is not permitted to rely upon the further Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions.
...............................SGD.........................................
Deputy President Bernard J McCabe
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application – jurisdictional question – extend the grounds of objection pursuant to s 14ZZK (a) – filing of amended documents.
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)
CASES
AON Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27
BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v PT Bayan Resources TBK (No 2) [2012] WASC 321
Bosanac v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCAFC 116
Energy Australia Yallourn Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Services Union [2017] FCA 1245
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australian and New Zealand Savings Bank Limited (1994) 181 CLR 466; [1994] HCA 58
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614; [1990] HCA 3
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Moignard (2015) 228 FCR 456; [2015] FCA 143
George v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1952) 98 CLR 183; [1952] HCA 21
Khatri v Price (1999) 95 FCR 287
Lighthouse Philatelics Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 32 FCR 148; [1991] FCA 506
Zappia v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCAFC 185REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President Bernard J McCabe
Member Peter Ranson21 December 2020
These reasons address a jurisdictional question the applicant raised in opening submissions at the substantive hearing of the application for review – a hearing that was set down for five days, and which the parties say is expected to run for at least eight. The hearing was derailed by the late-breaking arguments over jurisdiction which the Commissioner of Taxation (and the Tribunal, for that matter) needed time to consider.
After considering the written submissions prepared by the parties and the remarks made by counsel at the hearing, I am satisfied the applicant’s jurisdictional point is misconceived. The hearing, when it resumes, should proceed on the assumption the applicant is required to prove his true taxable income. That would ordinarily entail leading evidence that establishes both his assessable income and allowable deductions (except to the extent the Commissioner concedes that individual items of income or individual deductions are not in dispute). I will discuss below whether the applicant should, at this late stage, be given leave to extend his grounds of objection pursuant to s 14ZZK(a) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (the Administration Act) to permit him to make those arguments at the hearing in circumstances where those concerns were not articulated in the original grounds of objection. I will also discuss whether the applicant should be permitted to file and rely upon a further amended statement of facts, issues and contentions.
HOW WE GOT TO THIS POINT
The arguments over the jurisdictional question (and criticisms over the way in which the jurisdictional question was presented) are best understood if one appreciates the tortured history of the proceedings.
The applicant, Mr KPTT, asked the Tribunal to review objection decisions made in respect of default assessments and companion penalty assessments. The default assessments include amended assessments issued pursuant to s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA36) in respect of the years of income ending on 30 June 2012 and 30 June 2013, and a special assessment pursuant to s 168 of ITAA36 in respect of the 2014 year of income. The penalty assessments imposed administrative penalties in each of those years of income.
The default assessments were issued in the wake of audit investigations. The Commissioner concluded the applicant had not properly reported his income in the returns filed in connection with the 2012 and 2013 years of income. The Commissioner issued amended assessments in respect of those two years pursuant to s 167 ITAA36. The applicant had not filed a return of his own for the 2014 year of income when the Commissioner acted, so the Commissioner’s assessment in that year was not an amended assessment.
I do not need to further discuss the special assessment issued in respect of the 2014 year of income or the penalty assessments for present purposes. Suffice to say they were the subject of objection and the objection decisions relating to those years of income are before the Tribunal. The balance of the discussion in these reasons related to questions over the objection decision in relation to the amended assessments.
The Commissioner amended the 2012 and 2013 assessments by adding amounts to the applicant’s reported assessable income. The additional amounts were calculated with reference to bank transactions uncovered during the audit investigation. The Commissioner was not satisfied with the applicant’s explanation in relation to those transactions. The applicant says the Commissioner did not appear to take issue with the other integers which must be taken into account when assessing the amount of taxable income and the liability to tax for that year.
The applicant objected to the amended assessments. He was dissatisfied with the objection decisions and applied to the Tribunal for review. The application for review was filed on 7 July 2017. The applicant was represented by a firm of solicitors at the time. The parties exchanged statements of facts, issues and contentions. There were a number of case management directions’ hearings, and several interlocutory skirmishes on the way to a hearing set down for December 2019. The progress – such as it was – came to a halt when counsel for the applicant revealed at a case management directions’ hearing on 12 November 2019 that the applicant’s case was bound to fall short because of the way it had been prepared. I was asked to vacate the hearing so the applicant could seek additional evidence and articulate its argument more clearly in an amended statement of facts, issues and contentions. It was also anticipated the applicant would need to seek leave to amend its grounds of objection to accommodate the case he needed to make if he were to succeed before the Tribunal. The Commissioner did not consent to any of this. I agreed to vacate the hearing because it was clear the applicant (or perhaps the applicant’s solicitor) had not appreciated the scope of the challenge. I took that course in the knowledge the Commissioner had already been put to considerable expense in circumstances where the applicant had been given a proper chance to prepare a case, but I was hopeful the delay might permit the Tribunal, with the assistance of the parties, to get at the real issues in the case.
I made directions for the applicant to file additional material and lodge a statement of facts issues and contentions. Alas, there was further delay. On 10 March 2020 the Tribunal directed that:
On or before close of business 17 April 2020, the Applicant must file with the Tribunal and serve on the Respondent a further amended Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions and Appendix A to the amended Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions, including, where necessary, setting out the contentions for which leave under s 14ZZK(a) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) is required
The applicant filed an amended statement of facts, issues and contentions on 17 April 2020. He did not seek leave to extend the grounds of objection within the timeframe contemplated in the direction of 10 March 2020. The Commissioner responded with an amended statement of facts, issues and contentions of his own on 19 June 2020. The matter was set down for a hearing that would run for five days in October 2020. Directions were also made 28 August 2020 for the exchange of written outlines in advance of the hearing.
The applicant’s outline of submissions was delivered to the Commissioner on 25 September 2020. The outline also introduced arguments about the scope of the Tribunal’s review which raised a jurisdictional point that had not been previously mentioned or agitated. The point was formally raised almost in passing during the course of opening oral submissions made by the applicant’s counsel when the hearing commenced. It quickly became clear the applicant was approaching the case in a particular way, and that it was belatedly seeking leave to amend the grounds of objection and file the further amended statement of facts, issues and contentions to make good its case. Mr McGovern QC, the applicant’s counsel, appeared surprised when the Commissioner’s counsel demurred. After providing some written submissions that developed the point, Mr McGovern QC asked for a ruling on the various matters that had arisen and insisted the hearing should not proceed until the question of jurisdiction had been decided. He referred me to authorities which suggest questions of jurisdiction should be clarified before proceeding – something which could have been done conveniently if the issue had been raised in a timely way. Given the hearing had already commenced, I was initially minded to proceed and hear the evidence and decide the jurisdictional question later but Ms Hirschhorn, counsel for the Commissioner, was not immediately able to refer me to authorities that would support that course.[1] After a good deal of unproductive argument, it was agreed the hearing would be adjourned and the Commissioner would have an opportunity to prepare written submissions on the various questions given the Tribunal’s ruling on the applicant’s novel point might have implications for other cases.
[1] In written submissions filed after the adjourned hearing, Ms Hirschhorn was able to identify authorities that may have supported my preferred approach of leaving the jurisdictional question to one side. While the authorities generally recognise the importance of resolving jurisdictional questions in advance of hearing the substantive case, it is permissible in appropriate circumstances to take the jurisdictional question on notice and proceed to hear the substantive case provided the jurisdictional question is then determined as the first order of business in the decision: see, for example, Khatri v Price (1999) 95 FCR 287 at [14] per Katz J; see also Energy Australia Yallourn Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Services Union [2017] FCA 1245 at [51]-[52]. In BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v PT Bayan Resources TBK (No 2) [2012] WASC 321, Pritchard J suggested that considerations such as cost, delay and the likelihood of a multiplicity of appeals might inform the exercise of the discretion as to when the jurisdictional question should be addressed.
I should say at once that I am frustrated by the applicant’s late request for leave to amend the grounds of objection and the application to file a further amended statement of facts, issues and contentions. Directions were made months ago requiring the applicant to finalise those pre-hearing processes. It is unfair to the Commissioner and discourteous to the Tribunal that those applications should be made at the last moment. It is maddening that the Commissioner and the Tribunal would be placed in this position after the hearing in December 2019 was vacated at the applicant’s request so it might get its case in order. I will have more to say about this below after I address the applicant’s jurisdictional point. I will begin that discussion by referring to the rules governing amended assessments and objections.
THE AMENDED ASSESSMENTS AND THE OBJECTION PROCESS
Part IV of ITAA36 contains the provisions relating to returns and assessments. Section 166 empowers the Commissioner to use the information contained in the returns - and any other information available to him – to make an assessment. Section 167 permits the Commissioner to issue a default assessment in defined circumstances, including where he is dissatisfied with the return furnished by the taxpayer. In such a case, s 167 says:
the Commissioner may make an assessment of the amount upon which in his or her judgment income tax ought to be levied, and that amount shall be the taxable income of that person for the purpose of section 166.
The connection between ss 166 and 167 is clear from the terms of s 167 I have quoted. That connection was emphasised by Brennan J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614; [1990] HCA 3 at [6].
A taxpayer may object to an assessment by following the procedure laid down in Part IVC of the Administration Act. Section 14ZU requires that an objection be in the approved form and it must “state…fully and in detail, the grounds that the person relies on” in making the objection. The grounds in a case like this should be directed to establishing the true tax liability of the taxpayer.
Where the assessment in question is an amended assessment, s 14ZV provides:
If the taxation objection is made against a taxation decision, being an assessment or determination that has been amended in any particular, then a person's right to object against the amended assessment or amended determination is limited to a right to object against alterations or additions in respect of, or matters relating to, that particular.
The applicant says s 14ZV has important implications for the scope of the review. He argues the Commissioner’s amended assessment was prepared on the basis certain amounts uncovered during the audit process should have been included in assessable income. The applicant says other aspects of the original assessment (as to deductions, or allowable losses, capital gains, or other matters) were accepted by the Commissioner. The applicant concedes s 14ZV prevents him from objecting to anything in the amended assessment other than the amended particulars – but he says it follows the Commissioner cannot put the applicant to proof on other particulars of the original assessment that were not the subject of amendment. Those particulars must be taken as settled and the parties should focus on the subject matter of the amendment. As the applicant’s counsel explained in written opening submissions at [25]:
…the only question will be whether the Applicant will have established, on the balance of probabilities, that the amounts treated by the Respondent as assessable income by way of amendment should be accepted as assessable income.
Counsel acknowledged (at [25] of the written opening submissions) “the totality of the respondent’s objection decision is before the Tribunal”. As well he might: that much is clear from a range of authorities, including Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australian and New Zealand Savings Bank Limited (1994) 181 CLR 466; [1994] HCA 58 (the ANZ Bank case But counsel also argued s 14ZV served to limit the issues actually in dispute on review (and, perforce, the evidence required to make out the applicant’s case). In that sense, s 14ZV operated as a restraint on the Commissioner and the Tribunal as well as the applicant. On that approach, the Commissioner was not entitled to put the applicant to proof on all aspects of his taxable income – just the particulars that were the subject of the adjustment. It followed the applicant would succeed on the review if he provided adequate explanations of the additional amounts that were included in his assessable income following the audit.
The applicant’s approach proceeds on a misunderstanding of the operation of the statutory scheme. I will explain why. I begin with the power to issue an amended assessment in s 167, which was discussed in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614; [1990] HCA 3. Section 167 permits the Commissioner to determine the amount which becomes the taxable income of the person for the purpose of s 166 in a range of circumstances – including where the Commissioner is not satisfied with the return. In that event, he is able to exercise his judgment to assess the correct amount upon which tax is levied. That amount becomes the taxpayer’s taxable income for the purpose of s 166. In making that assessment, the Commissioner focuses on determining the final figure. He is not required to reach that conclusion by ascertaining the individual components of assessable income and allowable deductions (which is the process that occurs when the assessment is made directly under s 166), and he cannot be required to defend the assessment by reference to those matters: see George v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1952) 98 CLR 183; [1952] HCA 21 at [6] per Kitto J; see also ANZ Bank at 483 per McHugh J and Zappia v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCAFC 185 at [3] per Pagone J.
Once the Commissioner has made the default assessment, the taxpayer bears the onus of establishing the amount referred to in the assessment is excessive. That must be done through the objection process. I have already explained s 14ZU requires the taxpayer to set out comprehensive and detailed grounds of objection which embody the taxpayer’s argument about his true tax liability. But Brennan J explained in Dalco that the question for the Commissioner on objection (or for the Tribunal upon review) “is not whether the grounds have been made out but whether the amount assessed as taxable income is wrong”: at [8]. In that sense, the grounds of objection do not establish the boundaries of the decision-maker’s inquiry which is directed “to ascertain[ing] the true tax liability of the taxpayer under the substantive provisions of the Act”: at [8].
Where it becomes apparent during the Tribunal’s review that the grounds of objection do not adequately address the ultimate question about the taxpayer’s true taxable income, the Tribunal may give leave to the taxpayer to extend those grounds of objection pursuant to s 14ZZK(a) of the Administration Act. In doing so, the Tribunal will consider what have been referred to as the ordinary litigation concerns, including procedural fairness and efficiency.
Which brings me to the applicant’s argument about the constraints imposed under s 14ZV. I have already explained the applicant says the amended assessment – a default assessment issued under s 167 – only changed one of several particulars, being the amount of the assessable income. But it was established in ANZ Bank that there is only ever one particular in an amended assessment issued under s 167: the (final) amount of taxable income. The Commissioner is not required to formulate his assessment by express reference to amounts of assessable income and allowable deductions (the process which he must follow when making an assessment under s 166), so the taxpayer is not restricted to objecting to changes in one or other of those integers of income. As McHugh J explained in ANZ Bank (at 483):
An assessment made under s 167…involves only one component in the assessment – the final figure. …there are no separate components of assessable income on one side or allowable deductions on the other side. An objection to a s 167 assessment, therefore, has to be against the final figure.
That point was taken up by the Full Court in Bosanac v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCAFC 116. In that case, Greenwood, Burley and Colvin JJ explained (at [57]):[2]
In the case of an assessment under s 167 of the ITAA there is a lump sum assessment of taxable income rather than the computational process under s 166 of the ITAA of considering allowable deductions that may produce the taxable income. So, for example, in the case of an assessment under s 166 it is possible for the taxpayer to accept aspects of the calculations (assuming the Commissioner does not seek to advance a different position on the appeal) and focus upon whether certain deductions should have been allowed. Whereas, in the case where the assessment is made under s 167, the taxpayer will have to demonstrate by evidence both sides of the equation because the assessment involves the exercise of a power to make a lump sum assessment of the taxable income based on the information available to the Commissioner. The same will be the case when the objection decision is based on calculations or upholds an assessment on a lump sum basis. However, in either case, the burden to prove that the assessment was excessive could not be discharged without proving the taxable income of the taxpayer…
[2] Curiously, the applicant in Bosanac sought writs of certiorari and mandamus in the High Court rather than seek leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court in the ordinary way: see Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] HCA 41. Nettle J declined to issue the writs and nothing in his reasons disturb the reasoning of the Full Court that I have set out above.
Both parties in these proceedings referred me to Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Moignard (2015) 228 FCR 456; [2015] FCA 143. I do not see how the reasoning in that case assists the applicant here. In Moignard, White J emphasised that s 14ZV did not modify the taxpayer’s obligation to establish his true tax liability: at [101]. His Honour did not need to resolve one of the important questions in this case that was subsequently addressed in Bosanac (i.e. the consequences that flow from an assessment issued under s 167 instead of s 166) but pointed out in any event that s 14ZV should not be regarded as modifying the onus of proof in s 14ZZK. His Honour added (at [103]) if the Commissioner were to raise a question in the course of the appeal over, for example, the appropriateness of deductions when that was not previously an issue, it is unlikely that s 14ZV on its own would ever be an obstacle to the taxpayer providing a response – subject, of course, to the rules of procedural fairness and other litigation concerns.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied the applicant’s jurisdictional question is misconceived. In the absence of the Commissioner agreeing certain matters are not in dispute, the applicant must do all that is required to establish his taxable income. It will not be sufficient for him to focus on explaining the amounts of assessable income that were attributed to him in the audit process and which prompted the issue of the amended assessment under s 167. The Commissioner’s focus in the past on the applicant’s reporting of assessable income does not preclude the Commissioner from putting the applicant to proof on the ultimate question in issue, which is his true liability to tax.
The Commissioner may yet concede certain matters during the course of the litigation process. As a model litigant, the Commissioner must avoid putting the applicant to proof on matters or questions of fact that are not really in dispute. Section 14ZZK of the Administration Act does not absolve the Commissioner of the dual obligation to act as a model litigant and use its best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to make its decision.[3] The Commissioner would be failing in both of those obligations were he to put the applicant to proof on matters that are uncontentious. No doubt the Commissioner will keep those obligations in mind when the hearing resumes.
SHOULD THE APPLICANT NOW BE GIVEN LEAVE TO RELY ON ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF OBJECTION AND RELY UPON A FURTHER AMENDED STATEMENT OF FACTS, ISSUES AND CONTENTIONS?
[3] Section 33(1AA) of the Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (Cth)
Having resolved the jurisdictional question, I turn to consider whether the applicant should be given leave to extend the grounds of objection. I have already explained the power to give leave is found in s 14ZZK(a) of the Administration Act. The history of the predecessor to this provision was discussed by the Full Court in Lighthouse Philatelics Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 32 FCR 148; [1991] FCA 506. In that case, Lockhart, Burchett and Hill JJ explained (at [12]) that before the introduction of the power to give leave, the taxpayer was confined to the grounds stated in his objection. Neither the Commissioner, the Tribunal or the Court could entertain arguments outside those grounds of objection, and there was no power to amend the grounds during the review process. That changed when the predecessor to s 14ZZK(a) was enacted. As the Court explained (at [36]-[37]):
36.…the Tribunal or the Court has power to permit a taxpayer to argue that the taxable income and tax payable are incorrect and "excessive" for reasons not initially advanced, even if those reasons involve, as in the present case, entirely fresh grounds in substitution for the original grounds, or even if they require consideration of matters not considered by the Commissioner in the original assessment process.
37. The decision whether to allow an amendment ought to be made on the same considerations of justice upon which such decisions are regularly made in litigation.
It is important to emphasise the power to give leave is a discretionary one, and there should be good reasons for its exercise. An applicant must not assume leave will be given automatically. In every case, the applicant should be able to explain why the extension of grounds is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances. Those circumstances include the timing and the extent of the detail in the request.
The Commissioner says there are issues with respect to timing and detail. I have already noted the hearing in this matter was initially listed for December 2019, but that listing was vacated at the applicant’s request because of admitted shortcomings in his case. The applicant was thereafter afforded ample opportunities to seek leave to amend the grounds of objection. A specific direction was made on 10 March 2020 [] directing the applicant to seek leave if he sought to expand the grounds of objection by 17 April 2020. That did not occur. The Commissioner proceeded to prepare his case on that basis. The applicant advised the Commissioner of the proposed extended grounds in September 2020, at the same time as he filed his evidence in reply. The delay has not been satisfactorily explained. In all the circumstances, it appears the applicant has simply been dilatory in the preparation of his case, not to mention discourteous. He certainly appears to have disregarded the Tribunal’s directions. That makes orderly case management impossible and frustrates the Tribunal’s achievement of the objective in s 2A of the Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (Cth). I note s 33(1AB) of the Act says it is incumbent on the applicant to use his best endeavours to assist the Tribunal to fulfill the objective in s 2A. That has not occurred in this case.
The Commissioner has also criticised the lack of particularity in at least some of the proposed grounds. The Commissioner pressed two examples:
·the applicant argued his expenses from carrying on his accounting business in the amount of $349,003 were properly deductible under s8-1 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (the “ITAA 1997”) or alternatively some other provision of the ITAA 1997.” The Commissioner says the applicant should be required to specify the relevant statutory provisions;
·the applicant also claimed he had a net trading loss from carrying on his share trading business, and that losses incurred in 2012 could be carried forward to 2013. (It was unclear whether the applicant was pressing that claim after an apparent concession by his counsel at the hearing, but that uncertainty rather underlines the problem.) The Commissioner says the applicant should identify the relevant provisions of the statute upon which he relies to make out that claim.
The Commissioner has a point. The proposed extended grounds do not clearly signal all of the bases on which the applicant now objects to the assessment. If leave is given, there is a risk the Commissioner will be taken by surprise. That would lead to unfairness and further delay. I accept the risk of unfairness might have diminished somewhat given the hearing was vacated to deal with the jurisdiction point. That may provide an opportunity for the applicant to provide further particulars. But that also means the Commissioner and the Tribunal have been forced to accept further delay.
It would not be appropriate to decline leave in order to punish the applicant for his transgression, of course. But the fact remains the applicant has had ample opportunity to present his case.
The High Court’s decision in AON Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 makes clear the Tribunal is not obliged to indulge an applicant who fails to take reasonable steps to present his case. In that case, the High Court criticised the trial judge and the appellate court for their “unduly permissive approach” in the face of applications to adjourn and amend pleadings: per French CJ at [4]. His Honour warned (at [5]):
…there is an irreparable element of unfair prejudice in unnecessarily delaying proceedings. Moreover, the time of the court is a publicly funded resource. Inefficiencies in the use of that resource, arising from the vacation or adjournment of trials, are to be taken into account. So too is the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. Given its nature, the circumstances in which it was sought, and the lack of a satisfactory explanation for seeking it, the amendment to ANU's statement of claim should not have been allowed.
Those observations apply with particular force in the Tribunal because it is a no-costs jurisdiction.
Given the lengthy history of this matter – which includes the vacation of the hearing on two occasions; the non-compliance with case management directions and the absence of satisfactory explanation for the delay; the costs thrown away by the Commissioner; and the shortcomings the Commissioner has identified in some of the proposed extended grounds: I am satisfied it is not appropriate to give leave to extend the grounds of objection. It may be that the applicant can provide additional particulars to the Commissioner between now and the time of the resumed hearing that will assist the Commissioner to properly understand the applicant’s case, but which will not occasion further delay. In that event the Commissioner, as a model litigant, will consider whether he can conveniently consent to better-articulated grounds of objection at the outset of the hearing.
Given that ruling, there does not appear to be good reason to permit the applicant to rely on the further amended statement of facts, issues and contentions.
CONCLUSION
The parties should confer on any additional directions that may be required and provide proposed dates for the resumed hearing listed for 8 days in February 2021.
I certify that the preceding 37 (thirty -seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President Bernard J McCabe
...............................SGD.........................................
Associate
Dated: 21 December 2020
Date(s) of hearing: 26 October 2020 - 28 October 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr David McGovern SC and Mr Ian Young Solicitors for the Applicant: Stratos Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Michelle Hirschhorn and Mr Keni Josifoski Solicitors for the Respondent: Minter Ellison
14
0