Kornelis' Kunsthars Producten Industrie B.V. v W.R. Grace & Co.,-Conn

Case

[1992] APO 40

4 August 1992

No judgment structure available for this case.

official notice

decision of a delegate of the commissioner of patents

Application        :   No. 580751 in the name of Kornelis'
  Kunsthars Producten Industrie B.V.

Title             :   Closure Cap

Action            :   Opposition by W.R. Grace & Co,-Conn
under Sec 82

Decision           :   Issued            .  Opposition
  dismissed

patents act 1990

decision of a delegate of the commissioner of patents

Re:Patent Application No. 580751 by KORNELIS' KUNSTHARS

PRODUCTEN INDUSTRIE B.V. and opposition by W.R. GRACE

& CO.,-CONN under Section 82 of the Patents Act 1952

background

Patent application 580751 by Kornelis' Kunsthars Producten Industrie B.V. (Kornelis') was advertised accepted on 2 February 1989. On 17 March 1989 W.R. Grace & Co.,-Conn (Grace) lodged a notice of opposition to the application under sec 59(1) of the Patents Act 1952. Evidence in support was served on 22 March 1990 and evidence in answer on 22 November 1990.

On 11 October 1990 Kornelis' lodged a request to amend under sec 77 of the Patents Act 1952 and, following examination, particulars of the request were advertised on 7 February 1991. Grace subsequently lodged a notice of opposition under sec 82 and served its evidence in support of the opposition on 16 September 1991 (after four unopposed extensions of time). On 9 March 1992 Kornelis' advised the Office that it did not wish to serve evidence in answer.

A hearing to determine the sec 82 opposition took place in Canberra on 25 May 1992. Kornelis' was represented by Mr Fred Schilling, patent attorney with F.B. Rice & Co, and Grace was represented by Mr Paul Jones, patent attorney with Phillips Ormonde & Fitzpatrick.

The sec 82 notice sets out the following grounds of opposition:

"That the amendments as sought are not allowable under
the provisions of Section 78 of the Patents Act in
 that the result of the amendments, if allowed, would
 be that

(a) the specification of the opposed application would
     claim matter not in substance disclosed in the
     specification as lodged;

(b) a claim or claims of the specification of the
     opposed application would not in substance fall
     within the scope of the claims of the
     specification as it existed before amendment;

(c) the specification would not comply with the
     requirements of section 40."

THE SPECIFICATION AS LODGED

The specification as lodged opens by stating that it relates to a process for making a closure cap provided with a gasket in which the gasket is formed by adding plastisol material to an annular space within the closure cap, preheating the closure cap after addition of the plastisol, causing the plastisol to melt completely by the application of further energy and then cooling same to form the gasket.

The specification ends with nine claims, of which claims 1 to 4 read as follows:

"1. A process for making a closure cap provided with a
    gasket from a polypropylene material for a
    container, said closure cap comprising an end wall
    and a circumferential side wall, in which process
    the gasket is formed in the closure cap via a
    melting and a cooling operation by applying in the
    closure cap an amount of plastisol which is shaped
    therein into a gasket configuration at an 
    elevated temperature adjusted after the plastisol
    addition; causing the plastisol shaped into the
    gasket configuration to melt completely by further
    energy supply and then cooling same to form the
    gasket, characterized by starting from an
    integral combination of the closure cap with a
    sealing ring which is connected with the closure 
    cap by means of a number of frangible bridges 
    capable of being broken on the first opening of the
    container and, to form the gasket, carrying out 
    the melting operation by heating the closure cap 
    after addition of the plastisol to a temperature of
    50-110oC and by exposing the resulting plastisol
    shaped into the gasket configuration subsequently,

as is known per se, to microwave energy until the
        plastisol has been completely molten.

2. A process according to claim 1, characterized by
        using a closure cap the end wall of which is
        thinner by 20-50% at the position where the
        gasket is to be formed.

3. A process according to claim 1, characterized in
        that the melting operation is carried out by
        exposing the resulting plastisol shaped into the
        gasket configuration, after heating to 50-110oC,
        to microwave energy having a frequency of 10-200 MHz.

4. A process according to claim 3, characterized in
        that the melting operation is carried out by
        heating the closure cap after addition of the
        plastisol to 100oC within 15-30 sec. and
        completely melting the resulting plastisol
        shaped into the gasket configuration by 3-15 sec.
        exposure to microwave energy having a frequency
        of 27.10-27.15 MHz."

Claims 5 to 8 relate to a closure cap provided with a gasket formed from a plastisol material, and claim 9 relates to a process for closing and sealing a container using the closure cap according to claim 8.  However none of these claims specify the manner in which the gasket is formed.

THE SPECIFICATION AS ACCEPTED

The specification as lodged was amended during examination, the most significant changes being to the claims.  The amended specification contains three claims which read as follows:

"1. A closure cap for a container made from an
    olefin polymer comprising an end wall, a
    circumferential side wall and a sealing ring
    with which the container can be sealably
    closed in conjunction with a locking collar
    disposed around the neck of the container,
    which sealing ring is integrally connected
    with the side wall of the closure cap via
    frangible bridges capable of being broken
    on the first opening of the container,
    characterized in that the end wall is
    internally provided with an annular space
    bounded by two undercuts, said annular
    space is provided with a gasket made from
    a plastisol material and said gasket is
    sealing on the edge of the container neck,
    said end wall having a wall thickness
    decreased by 20-50% at the gasket while the
    closure cap is obtained starting from an
    integral combination of the closure cap with
    the sealing ring, adding an amount of the
    plastisol material to the annular space and,
    to form the gasket, carrying out the melting
    operation by heating the closure cap after
    addition of the plastisol to a temperature of
    50-110oC and by exposing the resulting
    plastisol shaped into the gasket configuration
    subsequently to microwave energy until the
    plastisol has been completely molten.

2. A closure cap according to claim 1, characterized
    in that the inner undercut is tapered in cross-
    section and resilient and has a largest diameter
    to have the sealing of the gasket on the edge of
    the container neck partly in combination with the
    said undercut.

3. A closure cap according to claims 1-2,
    characterized in that the inner diameter of the
    closure cap is up to 100mm."

THE SPECIFICATION AS PROPOSED TO BE AMENDED

The amendments proposed to the specification in the sec 77 request seek to replace the claims as accepted with a new set of claims and to make corresponding changes to the description. The only claims which I need consider for the purposes of this decision are proposed claims 1 and 2 which read as follows:

"1. A closure cap for a container made from an olefin
    polymer comprising an end wall, a circumferential
    side wall and a sealing ring with which the
    container can be sealably closed in conjunction
    with a locking collar disposed around the neck of
    the container, which sealing ring is integrally
    connected with the side wall of the closure cap
    via frangible bridges capable of being broken on
    the first opening of the container, characterized
    in that the end wall is internally provided with an
    annular space bounded by two undercuts, said
    annular space is provided with a gasket made from a
    plastisol material and said gasket is sealing on
    the edge of the container neck, said end wall
    having a wall thickness decreased by 20-50% at the
    gasket, the closure cap produced by a method
    comprising:

starting from an integral combination of the
    closure cap with the sealing ring, adding an amount
    of the plastisol material to the annular space, and

forming the gasket by heating the closure cap after
    addition of the plastisol to a temperature of
    50-110oC and by subsequently exposing the resulting
    plastisol shaped into the gasket configuration to
    microwave energy of a frequency in the range of
    10 to 200 MHz until the plastisol is completely
    molten.

2. A closure cap as defined in claim 1 wherein said
    microwave energy is of a frequency in the range of
    27.10 to 27.15 MHz, said exposing of plastisol is
    for a period of 3 to 15 seconds and said heating of
    the closure cap is to a temperature of about 100oC
    within a period of 15 to 30 seconds."

EVIDENCE

The evidence in support of this opposition consists of a statutory declaration by Kenneth Martin Sinnot.  As I have indicated above, no evidence in answer was lodged.

Mr Sinnot is currently a consultant to a British subsidiary of Grace, having been employed by that company since 1967.  In his declaration, Mr Sinnot makes an analysis and comparison of the original, accepted and amended specifications and comes to the conclusion that the amendments proposed "radically alter the scope and nature of the claims, render the claims confusing and unclear and are not supported by the description".  He bases this conclusion on the assertion that proposed claim 1 refers to "microwave energy of a frequency in the range of 10 to 200 MHz" whereas the term "microwave energy" as used in the specification as lodged and accepted refers to microwave energy within the range 300 to 300,000 MHz.  Also he declares that the wording "microwave energy of a frequency in the range of 10 to 200 MHz" is a contradiction in terms, since a frequency range of 10 to 200 MHz is not a microwave frequency range.  Finally Mr Sinnot asserts that proposed claim 1 is characterized by a combination of features not disclosed in the specification as lodged.

SUBMISSIONS

The major submissions presented to me by Mr Jones and Mr Schilling are for convenience summarised below.

On behalf of Grace, Mr Jones opposed the amendments on the grounds available under sec 78(1), 78(2)(a) and 78(4). In taking Mr Sinnot's declaration further, he submitted that:

1) As a result of the amendments, the specification would claim

matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as

lodged because:

a) the specification as lodged qualified the step of

exposing the plastisol gasket material to microwave

energy as "as is known per se" which, in the context of

the specification and as understood in the art, means

microwave energy in the range of 300 to 300,000 MHz;

b) the disclosure in the specification as lodged of the use
     of microwave energy in the range of 10 to 200 MHz is
     unrelated to the total disclosure of the invention by the
     original specification in which microwave energy is
     defined by reference to the known process as being
     microwave energy in the range of 300 to 300,000 MHz;

c) energy in the frequency range 10 to 200 MHz is radio-
     frequency electromagnetic radiation, not microwave energy
     (a viewpoint apparently shared by Kornelis' own expert in
     the substantive opposition);
   d) proposed claim 1 is a juxtaposition of a number of
     features which may have been independently disclosed in
     the specification as lodged, but which are now rearranged
     in a manner not taught by the specification to form a new
     combination; and

e) proposed claim 1 refers to sealing of the gasket on the
     edge of the container neck for which there is no basis in
     the specification as lodged.

2) As a result of the amendments, the claims of the specification

would not in substance fall within the scope of the claims

before amendment because exposure of the plastisol material to

microwave energy having a frequency of 10 to 200 MHz is not

covered by the claims before amendment in which the plastisol

material was exposed to microwave energy "as is known per se",

i.e., to microwave energy having a frequency of 300 to 300,000

MHz.

3) As a result of the amendments, the specification would not

comply with the requirements of section 40 because:

a) the amendments take a perfectly clear and unambiguous

term in "microwave energy" and render it unclear;

b) the passage  "said gasket is sealing on the edge of the
     container neck" at line 12 of proposed claim 1 is unclear
     as regards what is meant by the "edge" of the container
     neck, and as a matter of construction appears to be
     suggesting that the proposed claims are to a combination of
     a closure cap and a container; and

c) the wording "completely molten" at the final line of
     proposed claim 1 is unclear and perhaps should read
     "completely melted" or "rendered completely molten".

Mr Jones also submitted that Kornelis' had not shown the utmost good faith (Bolesto's Application 20 IPR 469 refers) since it is attempting to claim a different invention under the guise of restricting the claims, and has taken a perfectly clear term and rendered it ambiguous.

In reply, Mr Schilling submitted on behalf of Kornelis' that:

1) It is clear from the specification as lodged when taken as a

whole that the term "microwave energy" is to be construed in a

broad sense since:

a) there is no suggestion that the term as used in the context

of the specification is to be assigned any strict upper and

lower levels of frequency since the specification has

described more than one frequency range as falling within

the microwave energy band;

b) microwave energy is not defined in the specification by
     reference to the prior art: the expression "as is known per
     se" has nothing whatsoever to do with any particular range
     of microwave energy but instead is simply a general
     reference to the technique of applying heat by microwave
      energy as used in the prior art process described by the
     specification;

c) the specification clearly is not confined to a particular
     range of frequencies of microwave energy since it specifies
     microwave energy as encompassing a frequency range of 10 to
     200 MHz which is now put forward as a specific limitation
     of claim 1;

d) further to the above there is no support in the
     specification for a definition that microwave energy is
     energy solely within the range of 300 to 300,000 MHz; and

e) the specification is internally consistent as regards this
     broad meaning of microwave energy.

2) For the purposes of sec 78(1) the issue to be decided is

whether what is claimed is in substance disclosed in the

specification as lodged in terms of the total disclosure of

the invention, not whether what is claimed is supported by a

statement in the description which corresponds precisely word-

for-word with the language of the proposed claims: in the

present situation this issue should be decided in favour of

Kornelis' since all the individual elements of the combination

of proposed claim 1 are disclosed in the original

specification.

3) Mr Sinnot is not a person skilled in the art in Australia and

consequently his evidence is not conclusive as to the meaning

of "microwave energy" in the context of the specification.

4) Kornelis' would be prepared (if so-directed) to clarify or

delete the passage appearing at line 12 of proposed claim 1 to

which Mr Jones has referred, and to amend the wording

"completely molten" in the manner suggested by him.

DECISION

The first ground of opposition advanced on behalf of Grace is that the proposed amendments contravene sec 78(1).

In AMP Incorporated v Commissioner of Patents (1974) AOJP 3224 at page 3227, the High Court, in dealing with the expression "in substance fall within the scope" stated that:

"The substance must appear from the language itself
 interpreted in accordance with ordinary rules of
 interpretation with a knowledge of the prior state
 of the art to which the claim relates."

Under sec 78(1) the question of allowance is related to matter in substance disclosed. I agree with the view taken in Robertshaw Controls Companyv GSA IndustriesLtd (1991) AIPC 90-784 that the comments of the High Court are equally pertinent to the meaning of the term "substance" in the context of sec 78(1).

Thus in considering the disclosure of the specification as lodged, I firstly need to take account of the declaration of Mr Sinnott.  Mr Sinnott declares that he has gained qualifications in chemistry up to the Ph.D. level, majoring in microwave spectroscopy, and subsequently undertook post-doctoral research in this field.  He has had substantial industrial experience in  polymer physics, and is the author or co-author of a number of scientific publications in both fields mentioned above.  He is also the inventor or co-inventor of several overseas patents.
However, while I am prepared to assume that Mr Sinnott is skilled in the art in question, I am unable to conclude from his declaration that he is aware of the prior state of the art in Australia.  I would note in this regard that Mr Sinnott's qualifications and experience were obtained in the United Kingdom and the United States, and not in this country.

Nevertheless the specification as lodged specifically directs attention to a known process in which the closure cap is preheated after addition of the plastisol to a temperature 5-35oC below the melting point of the olefin polymer material from which the cap is made (typically of the order of 120-160oC), and then exposed at this temperature in an oven to microwave energy having a frequency which is not critical from a technical viewpoint but is effectively 300-300,000 MHz.

The specification alleges that this known process cannot be used to produce closure caps which incorporate anti-theft means of the type comprising a sealing ring integral with the cap and connected to its circumferential side wall via a number of frangible bridges, since the high temperatures maintained during the preheating step and subsequently upon exposure to microwave energy soften and deform the sealing ring and the frangible bridges.

The invention primarily seeks to address this problem and on pages 5 and 6 is described in the following terms:

"According to the invention there is provided
 a process of the type specified in the opening
 paragraph, which is characterised by starting
 from an integral combination of the closure cap
 with a sealing ring which is connected with the
 closure cap by means of a number of frangible
 bridges capable of being broken on the first
 opening of the container, and, to form the
 gasket, carrying out the melting operation by
 heating the closure cap after addition of the
 plastisol to a temperature of 50-110oC and by
 exposing the resulting plastisol shaped into
 the gasket configuration subsequently, as is
 known per se, to microwave energy until the
 plastisol has been completely molten."

The step of exposing the resulting gasket-shaped plastisol to microwave energy is also qualified in original claim 1 as being "as is known per se".

In Mr Schilling's opinion this expression when read in the context of the specification as lodged simply indicates that the invention utilises the known technique of completely melting the plastisol by exposure to microwave energy, and does not confine the invention to the use of microwave energy within the frequency range employed in the known process, or any other particular range, for this purpose.

However I do not agree with this view.  The main thrust of the invention is to provide a process for making an anti-theft closure cap of known construction whereby deformation of certain specified features of the cap is avoided.  In my view the specification as lodged does not treat the exposure of the plastisol to microwave energy as playing a significant role in achieving this result.  Rather, the specification leads me to conclude that the required result is achieved by preheating the closure cap after addition of the plastisol to a temperature of 50-110oC which is considerably less than the range of temperatures employed in the known process.  No information is provided by the specification on whether the effectiveness of the lower preheating temperature might be enhanced through the choice of a particular microwave frequency range.  The role attributed to the step of exposing the plastisol to microwave energy is in fact so incidental to the main thrust of the invention that I am unable to conclude that the original disclosure envisages the use of microwave energy for this purpose in a frequency range outside the range described with reference to the known process. Consequently I do not agree with Mr Schilling's view that "as is known per se"  simply qualifies the step of heating the plastisol as one which utilises the known application of microwave energy.  I therefore interpret the expression "microwave energy" in the context of the specification to mean microwave energy in the known range of 300-300,000 MHz.

In reaching this conclusion, I have not overlooked Mr Schilling's further submission that the specification as lodged discloses the step of exposing the plastisol to microwave energy having a frequency of 10-200 MHz and that, as a consequence, the specification when read as a whole (as per Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel 106 CLR 588) provides a basis for the microwave frequency range which Kornelis' now seeks to import into claim 1 by way of amendment.

The use of microwave energy in the range 10-200 MHz is mentioned only briefly in the specification and is not specifically picked up even by the discussion of the illustrated embodiments of the invention.  As I have intimated above, nowhere does the specification attempt to suggest that the invention lies in the discovery that exposure to microwave energy in a frequency range which is substantially lower than the known range effectively avoids deformation of the closure cap, or foreshadow any advantages which may be attributed to the use of this lower frequency range over the known range.  The range of 27.10-27.15 MHz now sought to be inserted into claim 2 is clearly open to a similar objection.

I would add one further comment in this matter.  According to its dictionary meaning (see, for example, Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopaedia (5th Ed.) at pages 921 and 1540), the expression "microwave energy" refers to electromagnetic radiation having a frequency within a range which lies well beyond 10-200 MHz.  This latter range is in fact generally understood to refer to electromagnetic radiation within the radio frequency spectrum, a view evidently shared by Mr Sinnott and also Prof. Beard, Kornelis' own expert in the substantive opposition.  Based upon my earlier interpretation of the specification as lodged, the invention as originally disclosed does not in my opinion contemplate the use of radio-frequency electromagnetic energy.

Accordingly I am satisfied that the proposed amendments are not allowable under sec 78(1) since their effect is to change the nature of the invention to something not asserted as the invention by the specification as lodged (International Playtex Corporation's Application (1969) RPC 362).

Mr Jones contended that the proposed amendments also fail to satisfy sec 78(1) on the grounds that they seek to extract certain individually disclosed features and use them to formulate a new combination not taught by the specification as lodged. I have already found that the step of exposing the plastisol to energy in the range 10-200 MHz is matter not originally disclosed. The other features to which Mr Jones drew my attention essentially relate to constructional details of the closure cap which I consider are properly disclosed as optional features in the specification as lodged.

The second ground of opposition advanced on behalf of Grace is that the proposed amendments contravene sec 78(2).

In considering whether the claims as amended in substance fall within the scope of the claims before amendment, the High Court held in AMP's Application (supra) that the reference to substance imports the kind of test which is appropriate to the question of whether the amendment would bring into infringement anything that was not an infringement prior to the amendment (see also W.J. Voit Rubber Corp's Application (1965) AOJP 1752).

In the present case the claims as they existed before amendment in the context of sec 78(2) are the claims in their accepted form. Claim 1 as accepted refers to exposure of the plastisol to microwave energy but no longer carries the qualifier "as is known per se". However in my view this does not alter my earlier finding that when properly interpreted "microwave energy" means microwave energy in the range 300-300,000 MHz, and I am assisted in this conclusion by the fact that the accepted specification describes the invention in precisely the same terms used in the specification as lodged, and that there is no reference in the later accepted claims to a specific frequency range. Thus the claims before amendment do not embrace the frequency range 10-200 MHz in proposed claim 1 or the range 27.10-27.15 in proposed claim 2. Accordingly, and having regard to the test for infringement, I am satisfied that the proposed amendments are not allowable under sec 78(2).

The final ground of opposition advanced on behalf of Grace is that the proposed amendments contravene sec 78(4).

In my view Mr Jones is correct in his submissions that the amendments to the claims result in the specification not complying with sec 40, particularly insofar as proposed claim 1 refers to microwave energy having a frequency range which is well below the commonly recognised microwave frequency spectrum.  As a result I think that the expression prevents claim 1 from defining with precision the monopoly claimed, so that others may know the exact boundaries of the area within which they will be tresspassers (E.M.I. v Lissen 56 RPC 23). The High Court considered that it is a sufficient ground to refuse an amendment if the amendment introduces uncertainty or ambiguity into the specification (Fabwerke Hoechst AG Vormals Meister Lucius and Bruning v Commissioner of Patents 124 CLR 654). Accordingly I am satisfied that the proposed amendments are not allowable under sec 78(4). I would add however that the alleged deficiency in proposed claim 1 relating to the passage "said gasket is sealing on the edge of the container neck" at line 12 is also present in claim 1 before amendment. Therefore this alleged deficiency is not introduced as a result of the amendment.

CONCLUSION

I have decided that the opposition succeeds on all grounds relied upon.  I therefore refuse to allow the amendments, and I award costs against Kornelis'.

Delegate of the Commissioner of Patents

Patent attorneys for the applicant  :  F.B. Rice & Co.,

Sydney

Patent attorneys for the opponent   :  Phillips Ormonde & Fitzpatrick,

Melbourne

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