Kohn v Sallmann - [1965] HCA 59

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ.

KOHN v. SALLMANN

(1965) 113 CLR 628

19 November 1965

Vehicles and Traffic

Vehicles and Traffic—Regulation of traffic—Right of way at intersection—Driver entering an intersection to give way in certain circumstances—"Entering an intersection from a highway"—Road Traffic Act 1958 (Vict.)—Road Traffic Regulations 1960, regs. 402 (7), 601 (2), (3).

Decisions

November 19.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. This is an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria dismissing an appeal by a plaintiff in an action tried by a jury in which a verdict was returned for the defendant. The appellant seeks a new trial of the action on the ground of a significant misdirection by the trial judge. The misdirection of which complaint is made is said to arise out of a misconstruction placed by the trial judge and confirmed by the Full Court upon a traffic regulation made under the Road Traffic Act 1958 (Vict.). (at p630)

2. The appellant was driving a motor car along a highway in Melbourne known as Alma Road and the respondent was driving a motor car in a street intersecting at right angles with Alma Road named Alexandra Street. Their two vehicles came into collision at a time when the vehicle driven by the respondent was considerably more than half-way across the intersection and the vehicle driven by the appellant was less than a quarter of the way across the intersection in its own direction. "Give Way" signs stood in Alexandra Street some distance southward of the southern property line of Alma Road. It may not be possible from the evidence to determine the precise distance between the traffic sign and that property line but it appears to have been of the order of fifteen feet at the least. Included in the acts of negligence on which the appellant relied was the alleged failure of the respondent to give way to the appellant's vehicle moving easterly in Alma Road. (at p630)

3. In his charge to the jury the learned trial judge instructed them that if they came to the conclusion that the appellant's vehicle was crossing the eastern property line of Alexandra Street at the time that the respondent's vehicle was crossing the southern property line of Alma Road, the appellant's vehicle would have had the right of way and the respondent would have been obliged under the Road Traffic Regulations to give way ; but if they were of opinion that the respondent's vehicle was either crossing that property line of Alma Road or had in fact wholly crossed it so as to have entered the intersection before the appellant's vehicle had actually reached the property line on the eastern side of Alexandra Street, the respondent's vehicle would have had the right of way. (at p630)

4. In my opinion, if this direction of the learned trial judge was wrong there must be a new trial. It is…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Kohn v Sallmann

Details

AGLC: Kohn v Sallmann [1965] HCA 59
Case: [1965] HCA 59
Decision Date: 19 November 1965

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Kohn v Sallmann*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a clause in a lease agreement, specifically whether it granted the tenant an option to renew the lease. The landlord contended that the clause did not create a binding option, while the tenant argued it did.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the wording of the lease agreement created a legally enforceable option for the tenant to renew the lease for a further term. This required the Court to consider the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly in relation to clauses that appear to grant a right or privilege to one party.

The Court analysed the language of the relevant clause, focusing on the precise wording used to describe the tenant's entitlement to a further term. It applied established principles of contract law, which require an option to be sufficiently certain and unequivocal to be enforceable. The Court found that the language used in the lease did not create a binding obligation on the landlord to grant a renewal, nor did it provide the tenant with a clear and unconditional right to demand one. Instead, the clause was interpreted as merely expressing a hope or intention that a renewal might be granted, subject to further agreement between the parties.

Consequently, the High Court held that no option to renew the lease had been created. The appeal was dismissed.

Orders