Kobelt v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 84 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kobelt v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] FCAFC 18

Appeal from:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt [2016] FCA 1327

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt [2016] FCA 1561

File number: SAD 18 of 2017
Judges: BESANKO, GILMOUR AND WIGNEY JJ
Date of judgment: 15 February 2018
Catchwords:

CONSUMER LAW – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant contravened s 29(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) by engaging in credit activity within the meaning of s 6(1) of the National Credit Act when selling second-hand vehicles by way of a book-up without holding a licence to engage in that credit activity – whether the purchase of second-hand motor vehicles under the appellant’s book-up system fell within the terms of s 11 of the National Credit Code (contained in Schedule 1 of the National Credit Act) – whether there was a charge for the appellant’s provision of credit within s 5(1)(c) of the National Credit Code

CONSUMER LAW – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had contravened s 12CB(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) in that, in connection with the supply of financial services to customers, the appellant engaged in a system of conduct or pattern of behaviour which was unconscionable – whether the appellant’s conduct was unconscionable within the meaning of s 12CC(1) of the ASIC Act – where customers are indigenous residents of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Lands (APY Lands), and in most cases, have very limited or no assets, limited net income and low levels of financial literacy – where the book-up system is neither recent nor unique – where the book-up system has advantages to customers in terms of alleviating the disadvantages associated with demand sharing and “boom and bust” expenditure – where no undue influence or exerted undue influence – where no dishonest use of debit cards or personal identification numbers (PINs) – where no dishonest maintenance of records by the appellant – where customers have low levels of financial literacy, but basic understanding of the book-up system – where customers voluntarily enter into the book-up arrangements – where customers understand the basic elements of the book-up arrangements – where conduct is not predatory in the relevant sense

CONSUMER LAW – whether the primary judge erred in granting an injunction against the appellant under s 12GD(1) of the ASIC Act

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether the orders made by the primary judge ought to be set aside – whether an order by the primary judge that the Amended Originating Application brought by the respondent ought to be dismissed

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth))

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12CB, 12CC, 12GD

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 3, 6, 29, 131

National Credit Code ss 5, 11, 13, 17, 204

Second-Hand…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kobelt v Australian Securities and Investments Commission and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kobelt v Australian Securities and Investments Commission involves the appellant, Mr Kobelt, who sells second-hand vehicles in Mintabie, South Australia, under a book-up system, where customers purchase goods on credit and repay the amount over time. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) brought proceedings against Mr Kobelt, alleging that he contravened consumer credit laws and engaged in unconscionable conduct. The primary judge found in ASIC’s favour, and Mr Kobelt appealed to the court.

The court was required to decide whether the primary judge was correct in finding that Mr Kobelt contravened section 29(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 by engaging in credit activity without a licence. The court also needed to determine if the purchase of second-hand motor vehicles under the appellant’s book-up system fell within the terms of section 11 of the National Credit Code. Additionally, the court considered whether there was a charge for the appellant’s provision of credit within section 5(1)(c) of the National Credit Code. The court further examined whether the primary judge erred in finding that Mr Kobelt engaged in unconscionable conduct under section 12CB(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, and if the primary judge was correct in granting an injunction against Mr Kobelt under section 12GD(1) of the ASIC Act.

The court held that the primary judge was correct in finding that Mr Kobelt contravened section 29(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act by engaging in credit activity without a licence. The court found that the book-up system used by Mr Kobelt constituted credit activity, as the customers did not have immediate access to the funds used to purchase the goods. The court also held that the primary judge was incorrect in finding that Mr Kobelt engaged in unconscionable conduct. The court found that the book-up system was not predatory, and the customers understood the basic elements of the arrangement. The court further held that the primary judge erred in granting an injunction against Mr Kobelt, as the injunction included elements not part of the pleaded system.

The court ordered the appeal to be adjourned to a date and time during the week commencing 19 February 2018 to hear the parties as to final orders, including costs. The final orders will be determined after hearing from the parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be adjourned to a date and time during the week commencing 19 February 2018 (to be fixed) for the purpose of hearing the parties as to final orders, including costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Kobelt now appeals to this Court. He seeks an order that the orders made by the primary judge be set aside and an order that the Amended Originating Application brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) be dismissed. The appellant will have to amend his Notice of Appeal to include a challenge to the orders made by the primary judge as to penalty and costs. We cannot see any reason why such an amendment would not be allowed.THE FACTS GENERALLY The primary judge set out a general statement of facts. He then made further findings of fact in the context of his consideration of the particular causes of action brought by ASIC. The following is taken from the primary judge’s general statement of facts. The appellant conducts a general store at Mintabie under the name “Nobbys Mintabie General Store” (Nobbys). Mintabie is in the far north of South Australia, a distance of approximately 1,100 km north of Adelaide. Mintabie is located on an opal field which is part of an area excised by lease to the Government of South Australia from the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Lands (APY Lands). The appellant sells second-hand motor vehicles and provides credit to customers by way of “book-up” as part of his business. Mintabie is part of a gazetted precious stones field (opals) and is, in effect, an enclave within the southern portion of the APY Lands. It is 45 km west of Marla, which is located on the Stuart Highway. The appellant went to Mintabie in the early 1980s. At that time, the town had a population of about 1,800 people. Most of the population of Mintabie were of European descent and were engaged in opal mining in one form or another. Mintabie continued as an active opal field until the early 2000s. The amount of opal mining has declined and, by the time of trial, the permanent population of Mintabie was about 70 people. The appellant has been operating Nobbys since the mid-1980s. He does so with the assistance of his partner, Sonia Kobelt, his son, Timothy Kobelt and some employees. Nobbys sells a range of goods, including food, groceries, general goods, fuel and second‑hand motor vehicles. There are two other general stores in Mintabie known as Sam’s and Scrooge’s. A significant aspect of Nobbys’ business since 2000 has been the sale of second-hand motor vehicles. Most purchasers purchase the motor vehicles on book-up, although some pay cash. Between 6 July 2011 and 31 October 2012, the appellant sold 105 motor vehicles to 92 customers under the book-up system. Most of the sales were to Aboriginal residents of the APY Lands (Anangu) at a price of between $2,500 and $7,800. The average and median prices were $5,600 and $5,800 respectively. In most cases, the statutory duty to repair defects in s 23 of the Second-Hand Vehicle Dealers Act 1995 (SA) did not apply to the transactions because the vehicles had already been driven 200,000 km before sale. The purchasers of the vehicles sold on book-up usually paid a deposit which varied between $440 and $3,500.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The primary judge nevertheless accepted the appellant’s submissions that the Nobbys’ customers did understand that they could purchase a vehicle or other goods from Nobbys on credit. They understood that the credit arrangement involved them paying later for the vehicle or goods by their providing the appellant with their key card and PIN and authorising him to use it to withdraw money from their bank account as it became available. They understood that the disadvantage arising from the arrangement of them not having access to money for the necessities of life could be addressed by the appellant advancing further credit from time to time. The primary judge accepted that the Nobbys’ customers had an awareness of these aspects of the arrangement at the time they entered into book-up with Nobbys and chose voluntarily to do so. He accepted that it was probable that there were some amongst the 117 customers who had had a reasonable education, who were reasonably articulate and who had some financial awareness, but whom, nevertheless, found the appellant’s book-up arrangements, at least for a time, to be convenient. The primary judge said that, on his assessment, the number of customers satisfying this description was limited. The Appellant’s Evidence The primary judge described the appellant’s background and working history. He noted that the appellant had had a limited education and that he himself had lived in a remote community for significant parts of his working life. He had an unsophisticated approach to many matters and this was manifest, among other things, in his book-up arrangements. The primary judge said that, nevertheless, he had the firm impression during the appellant’s evidence that he had a keen appreciation of where his interests lay in the litigation. The primary judge said that he accepted much of the appellant’s evidence, but there were several aspects of it which caused him to have doubts about his overall reliability. He referred to his earlier findings whereby he rejected the appellant’s evidence that he had ceased charging a reduced price for motor vehicles sold for cash (and not on book-up) in about mid‑2011. He reiterated that he did not consider this was a matter about which he could be honestly mistaken. He also rejected the appellant’s evidence that he had heard his Anangu customers talking about extra money coming into their accounts before 14 December 2010 when the CBA “glitch” occurred. The primary judge said that there were other matters causing him to doubt the reliability of aspects of the appellant’s evidence. First, the primary judge did not accept the appellant’s evidence about whether he charged for a cash advance. He did not regard this part of the appellant’s evidence as truthful and he made a finding that the appellant did charge at least some of his customers at least 10% of the amount he advanced in cash, or which he had outlaid on their behalf. Secondly, the primary judge referred to cases involving Ms Pearson, Mr Pearson, Mr Doolan and Mr Clothier where the appellant made withdrawals, either more frequently than authorised, or in larger amounts than were authorised.Use of Book-Up by Others

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the circumstances I would prefer not to express any concluded view as to the precise form of an appropriate injunction, and in particular whether the terms of the injunction should have included any of the other pleaded elements of the book-up system, including what I have described as the circumstances elements. I incline towards the view, however, that an injunction which included elements relating to Mr Kobelt’s knowledge or state of mind, and the circumstances of the customers, would be problematic for a number of reasons. It would also be problematic to include conduct that was not part of the pleaded system. That would include, for example, the failure to provide proper account statements (see paragraph 2.5 of the declaration) and the provision of credit of a “particularly expensive kind” (see paragraph 2.7 of the declaration). CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION Like Besanko and Gilmour JJ, I reject Mr Kobelt’s challenge to the primary judge’s conclusion that he contravened s 29(1) of the National Credit Act, and uphold Mr Kobelt’s challenge to the primary judge’s conclusion that he engaged in unconscionable conduct contrary to s 12CB(1) of the ASIC Act. I agree with the order proposed by Besanko and Gilmour JJ. I also share their Honours’ provisional views, subject to hearing from the parties, concerning the final orders that may be appropriate to dispose of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established