Knight v State of Victoria

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Knight v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 369

Citation: Knight v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 369
Parties: JULIAN KNIGHT v STATE OF VICTORIA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and COMMISSIONER, CORRECTIONS VICTORIA
File number: VID 514 of 2013
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 11 April 2014
Catchwords: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Legislation purporting to validate decision to impose a levy on tobacco products in Victorian prisons – whether contravenes a limit arising by implication from Ch III of the Constitution – whether imposes a tax in the nature of an excise, contrary to s 90 of the Constitution – no contravention of Ch III – tobacco levy not a tax and therefore not contrary to s 90 – applicant’s constitutional challenges fail.
Legislation:

Constitution ch III, s 90
Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) ss 6A, 7, 8A, 21, 112C
Corrections Further Amendment Act 2013 (Vic) ss 1, 3
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 191
Public Administration Act 2004 (Vic) Part 3
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 21

Corrections Regulations 2009 (Vic) reg 31
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 4.12

Cases cited: Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth (1988) 165 CLR 462
Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines International Ltd (1999) 202 CLR 133; [1999] HCA 62
Anderson’s Pty Ltd v Victoria (1964) 111 CLR 353
Attorney-General (Vic) v Knight [2004] VSC 407
Australian Capital Territory v Queanbeyan City Council (2010) 188 FCR 541; [2010] FCAFC 124
Australian Education Union v Fair Work Australia (2012) 246 CLR 117; [2012] HCA 19
Commissioner for Revenue (ACT) v Kithock (2000) 102 FCR 42; [2000] FCA 1098
Commonwealth v South Australia (1926) 38 CLR 408
Dickenson’s ArcadePty Ltd v Tasmania (1974) 130 CLR 177
General Practitioners Society in Australiav Commonwealth (1980) 145 CLR 532
Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465
Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314
Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v Victoria (1983) 151 CLR 599
Holly v Scott, 434 F 3d 287 (4th Cir, 2006)
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1
Knight v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2011] VSC 571
Knight v Secretary, Department of Justice [2012] VSC 613
Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363; [2004] HCA 34
Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263
Parton v Milk Board (Vic) (1949) 80 CLR 229
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2
Queanbeyan City Council v ACTEW Corporation Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 530; [2011] HCA 40
R v Humby; Ex parte Rooney (1973) 129 CLR 231
R v Knight [1989] VR 705
Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271
Re Macks; Ex parte Saint (2000) 204 CLR 158; [2000] HCA 62
Roy Morgan Research Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 244 CLR 97; [2011] HCA 35
South…
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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 369
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Knight v State of Victoria, the applicant, Knight, challenged the validity of a tobacco levy imposed on tobacco products sold to prisoners by the State of Victoria. The levy was initially implemented following a decision made in 1993, which was later challenged and found invalid due to the uncertainty of the decision-maker. The applicant argued that the tobacco levy was an excise and that its imposition violated the principles of the Constitution, particularly s 90, which prohibits the imposition of excise duties without unanimous agreement from the States. Additionally, the applicant contended that the remedial legislation, s 112C(2), infringed upon the principles set out in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales and Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions, impairing the independence of the Supreme Court.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of s 112C(2) of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) and whether it was compatible with Ch III of the Constitution. The applicant argued that the section's language, "was validly imposed", provided immunity from challenge and thus, contravened the principles of judicial independence. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that s 112C(2) did not confer any privative effect, nor did it impair the independence of the Supreme Court. The court was required to determine whether the applicant's arguments had merit and whether the remedial legislation was consistent with the Constitution.

The court found that the applicant's arguments were without merit. The court held that s 112C(2) did not confer any privative effect, and therefore, could not be construed as insulating the 1993 decision or subsequent decisions from judicial review. The court also found that there was no impairment of the independence of the Supreme Court, as the section did not confer any functions on the court. The court relied on the principles set out in Kirk and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth to conclude that statutory language would not be construed in a way that permitted the legislature to insulate decisions from judicial scrutiny.

The court dismissed the applicant's claims, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. The orders of the court were that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of the proceeding in the Supreme Court and of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

How these recommendations were implemented is opaque. The agreed statement states:On 24 March 1993, either the then General Manager, Prison Operations within the State’s Department of Justice or the then Director of Correctional Services purported to make a decision directing the governors of each public prison to implement the recommendations of the Taskforce described at paragraph 22 above (the 1993 Decision). The uncertainty of the decision-maker was the central issue in the proceeding before McMillan J. The State could not prove who made the decision and it was for this reason the Court found the decision invalid. It remains the case the State cannot identify the decision-maker and, in this proceeding, the State was able only to submit that it was either the then General Manager, Prison Operations within the State’s Department of Justice or the then Director of Correctional Services. The identity of the decision-maker is not material in this proceeding, other than to explain the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision and the remedial legislation which became s 112C(2). When the decision was implemented, a centralised financial recording system relating to products purchased by prisons from suppliers and then on-sold to prisoners was used to record each prisoner’s canteen purchases. It was called “SPEND”. The tobacco levy was to be calculated and recorded using the SPEND system. After the decision was implemented and until mid-June 2004, all prisons sold tobacco products at one of two prices. Either tobacco products were sold at 90% of the recommended retail price for those products, published from time to time in the Australian Retail Tobacconists Journal or, if the tobacco product was supplied to the prisons at more than 90% of the recommended retail price, then the products were sold at whatever the cost price actually was. Any margin between the price at which State-run prisons purchased a tobacco product and the price at which it was sold to prisoners was then allocated by the relevant prison governor to a Tobacco Levy Trust Fund (TLT Fund), as the Smoke Free Work Environment Policy contemplated. This is the first decision challenged by the applicant. I shall call it “the 1993 decision”. The 1993 decision was also the subject of challenge before McMillan J. On 8 April 2004, the then Acting Commissioner made a decision effective immediately to increase the price at which tobacco products were sold to prisoners to the recommended retail price of the products published in the Australian Retail Tobacconists Journal from time to time. Any margin between the price at which prisons purchased tobacco products and sold them to prisoners would continue to be paid into the TLT Fund to be spent only on prisoner health programs and facilities, particularly those relating to assisting prisoners to stop smoking. The decision is not recorded in any documentary evidence before the Court. A “Commissioner’s Requirement” was issued at the same time. The requirement contained many directions and policies about working towards a totally smoke-free environment within prisons. It contained plans relating to health promotion and smoking cessation programs for prisoners. The Commissioner’s Requirement provided that the Smoke Free Work Environment Policy would apply to State-run prisons on the date of issue and to Port Phillip Prison and Fulham Prison (both operated pursuant to contractual arrangements) on “dates to be fixed”. This document does not refer to the levy. The legal status of a “Commissioner’s Requirement” remains unclear from the evidence, the Corrections Act or the Corrections Regulations. However, it appears to have been treated as having some kind of legal force and effect.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant also submits s 112C(2) infringes the principles in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1, and in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. It infringes the former principle because it immunises the 1993 decision from challenge on the grounds of jurisdictional error. It infringes the latter by impairing both the reality and the appearance of decisional independence of the Supreme Court.Consideration The applicant’s Ch III arguments should be rejected. The applicant’s construction argument turns on an asserted difference in the use of the phrase “was validly imposed” in s 112C(2) from the language in the other subsections. There is no doubt different language is employed in subs (2), but the difference is not as material as the applicant suggests. I accept the respondents’ submission that the phrase “was validly imposed” is not the same as a statute saying (impermissibly) that a charge “was valid” where a court had decided it was not. That is because the formulation in the statute looks to the manner in which the charge was imposed, thus addressing the defect identified by McMillan J. The defect her Honour identified was that neither the person who imposed the charge, nor the statutory authority to impose it, could be identified, and the charge therefore was invalid. Her Honour’s decision was a decision about the process by which the charge was imposed and the absence of identifiable statutory authority. That is what s 112C(2) seeks to correct. Putting to one side questions of estoppel and res judicata, s 112C(2) does not preclude other challenges to the ongoing imposition of the charge. For example, if a prisoner other than the applicant had sought to bring a proceeding raising the question that the charge is an excise imposed contrary to s 90 of the Constitution, s 112C(2) would not prevent such a proceeding. Indeed, in this proceeding the respondents have not sought to rely on s 112C(2) in answer to the applicant’s case on s 90, although they obviously have relied on issue estoppel by reason of McMillan J’s decision. I also accept the respondents’ submissions that there is no incompatibility or impairment, in the Kable sense, arising by reason of the operation of s 112C(2) and the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or of this Court (to the extent it has one at least in its accrued jurisdiction). Section 112C(2) is not a provision which confers functions on a court at all: in that sense there is no occasion to consider issues of incompatibility or impairment: South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 39 at [69] per French CJ. The applicant’s reliance on the principles set out in Kirk 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1 sought to characterise s 112C(2) as having a privative operation. He submitted its terms would protect or immunise the 1993 decision, and the subsequent decisions relying on or extending it, from judicial review. What is clear from both Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2, and from Kirk 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1, is that statutory language which may appear to have a privative effect will not be construed in a way which permits the legislature to insulate decisions from judicial scrutiny in terms of whether those decisions are within jurisdiction. As a matter of construction, statutory provisions will (to the extent possible) be interpreted in a way which does not produce this effect. If, hypothetically, a privative provision were unambiguously and unmistakably to confer such immunity, it is likely to be found invalid as it would be contrary to the jurisdiction conferred by Ch III of the Constitution on courts exercising federal jurisdiction, and on courts with a constitutionally recognised role in the judicial hierarchy in Australia. The construction of s 112C(2) should be approached from this perspective.