FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Knight v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 369
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 369
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of s 112C(2) of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) and whether it was compatible with Ch III of the Constitution. The applicant argued that the section's language, "was validly imposed", provided immunity from challenge and thus, contravened the principles of judicial independence. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that s 112C(2) did not confer any privative effect, nor did it impair the independence of the Supreme Court. The court was required to determine whether the applicant's arguments had merit and whether the remedial legislation was consistent with the Constitution.
The court found that the applicant's arguments were without merit. The court held that s 112C(2) did not confer any privative effect, and therefore, could not be construed as insulating the 1993 decision or subsequent decisions from judicial review. The court also found that there was no impairment of the independence of the Supreme Court, as the section did not confer any functions on the court. The court relied on the principles set out in Kirk and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth to conclude that statutory language would not be construed in a way that permitted the legislature to insulate decisions from judicial scrutiny.
The court dismissed the applicant's claims, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. The orders of the court were that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of the proceeding in the Supreme Court and of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant also submits s 112C(2) infringes the principles in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1, and in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. It infringes the former principle because it immunises the 1993 decision from challenge on the grounds of jurisdictional error. It infringes the latter by impairing both the reality and the appearance of decisional independence of the Supreme Court.Consideration The applicant’s Ch III arguments should be rejected. The applicant’s construction argument turns on an asserted difference in the use of the phrase “was validly imposed” in s 112C(2) from the language in the other subsections. There is no doubt different language is employed in subs (2), but the difference is not as material as the applicant suggests. I accept the respondents’ submission that the phrase “was validly imposed” is not the same as a statute saying (impermissibly) that a charge “was valid” where a court had decided it was not. That is because the formulation in the statute looks to the manner in which the charge was imposed, thus addressing the defect identified by McMillan J. The defect her Honour identified was that neither the person who imposed the charge, nor the statutory authority to impose it, could be identified, and the charge therefore was invalid. Her Honour’s decision was a decision about the process by which the charge was imposed and the absence of identifiable statutory authority. That is what s 112C(2) seeks to correct. Putting to one side questions of estoppel and res judicata, s 112C(2) does not preclude other challenges to the ongoing imposition of the charge. For example, if a prisoner other than the applicant had sought to bring a proceeding raising the question that the charge is an excise imposed contrary to s 90 of the Constitution, s 112C(2) would not prevent such a proceeding. Indeed, in this proceeding the respondents have not sought to rely on s 112C(2) in answer to the applicant’s case on s 90, although they obviously have relied on issue estoppel by reason of McMillan J’s decision. I also accept the respondents’ submissions that there is no incompatibility or impairment, in the Kable sense, arising by reason of the operation of s 112C(2) and the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or of this Court (to the extent it has one at least in its accrued jurisdiction). Section 112C(2) is not a provision which confers functions on a court at all: in that sense there is no occasion to consider issues of incompatibility or impairment: South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 39 at [69] per French CJ. The applicant’s reliance on the principles set out in Kirk 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1 sought to characterise s 112C(2) as having a privative operation. He submitted its terms would protect or immunise the 1993 decision, and the subsequent decisions relying on or extending it, from judicial review. What is clear from both Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2, and from Kirk 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1, is that statutory language which may appear to have a privative effect will not be construed in a way which permits the legislature to insulate decisions from judicial scrutiny in terms of whether those decisions are within jurisdiction. As a matter of construction, statutory provisions will (to the extent possible) be interpreted in a way which does not produce this effect. If, hypothetically, a privative provision were unambiguously and unmistakably to confer such immunity, it is likely to be found invalid as it would be contrary to the jurisdiction conferred by Ch III of the Constitution on courts exercising federal jurisdiction, and on courts with a constitutionally recognised role in the judicial hierarchy in Australia. The construction of s 112C(2) should be approached from this perspective.