Knight v Bell & Anor - [2002] HCATrans 354

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne Nos M43 and M46 of 2000

B e t w e e n -
ALLAN ROBERT KNIGHT
Applicant
and
RANDALL JOHN BELL and PETER CLIFFORD FALCONER
Respondents
Applications for special leave to appeal

GAUDRON J
KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 2002, AT 11.49 AM

MR S.E. MARANTELLI: Your Honour, may it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the respondents in matter No 8, which is M43. (instructed by Lander & Rogers)

MR M.T. LAPIROW: If it please the Court, I appear for the respondents in the other matter, which is No 46. (instructed by Peter Falconer & Associates)

GAUDRON J: Could Mr Knight be called, please.

MR A.R. KNIGHT appeared in person.My apologies, your Honour. I thought the Fyffe case was on. I was just told that a moment ago.

GAUDRON J: Yes, thank you, Mr Knight. Well, we have taken the appearances of counsel in these matters. We should hear you separately, first in respect of M43 of 2000 and then hear Mr Marantelli. Is that right?

MR KNIGHT: Yes, that is correct, your Honour.

GAUDRON J: Then in M46 of 2000, and then hear Mr LaPirow, and give you a right of reply in each case. But because the issues overlap, we will not indicate what course we propose to take until we have heard argument on both matters. Thank you, Mr Knight.

MR KNIGHT: Your Honour, these actions involve a question of law that was put to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The question of law, your Honour, was looking on your principle of assumption that generates out of the law Benches of Victoria, this is a large legal question which…..validation prior to any further work on this matter. Working on the legal principle, no judge can hear his own matter – (1615), in Day v Savadge, (1614), 85 at 87, 80 ER 235 at 237. The matter is to be transferred to the High Court for its determination.

A central issue of the question is removing the principle of assumption and replacing that with an evident fact. The evident fact is clear: the Victorian Government is unable to produce its assumed Royal Assent document from Queen Victoria, and the question is now lodged in the absence of that relevant document, that this State of Victoria is in an invalid legal situation and the matter is to be transferred to the High Court for determination before the rest of this matter can proceed.

I make the following additional statements. I state, the contract that permitted my property to be taken over is invalid. I further state, the judges and courts have not handled my matter impartially, and I further state, the judgments are to be set aside until the High Court’s decision concerning validity is given. I further state, I have a moral obligation to uphold my contract.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Knight v Bell & Anor

Details

AGLC: Knight v Bell & Anor [2002] HCATrans 354
Case: [2002] HCATrans 354
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gaudron and Kirby JJ heard an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in a dispute between the appellant, Knight, and the respondents, Bell and Anor. The core of the disagreement concerned the validity of a deed of release executed by the appellant, which purported to extinguish all claims he had against the respondents arising from a particular incident. The appellant sought to set aside this deed, alleging it was procured by misleading and deceptive conduct.

The central legal question before the High Court was whether the deed of release was vitiated by the conduct of the respondents, specifically whether their representations amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct within the meaning of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law). This required the Court to consider the nature of the representations made, their impact on the appellant's decision to sign the deed, and whether those representations were false or misleading in the circumstances.

The Court's reasoning focused on the application of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act to the facts. It was held that the respondents' conduct in presenting the deed of release, coupled with certain assurances and information provided to the appellant, did constitute misleading and deceptive conduct. The Court found that the appellant was led to believe that the deed would only release claims of a certain nature, when in fact its terms were far broader. This misapprehension, induced by the respondents' conduct, meant the appellant did not give informed consent to the full extent of the release. The legal principle applied was that conduct which leads a party to enter into an agreement under a false impression as to its true effect can be misleading or deceptive, thereby rendering the agreement liable to be set aside.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the deed of release. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court of South Australia for determination of the appellant's original claims against the respondents.

Orders