Knight & Redding - [2025] FedCFamC2F 670

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Knight & Redding [2025] FedCFamC2F 670

File number(s): ADC 650 of 2024

Judgment of: JUDGE PARKER

Date of judgment: 21 May 2025

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – relocation – where Mother seeks to relocate with parties’ three year old child from Adelaide to Canberra – where both parties are committed and competent parents

Legislation:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4, 4AB, 60CA, 60CC, 61DAA, 68B

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 8.15(3)(e)

Cases cited:
A & A: Relocation Approach [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) FLC ¶93-035

AMS & AIF [1999] HCA 26; (1999) 199 CLR 160

B & B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 [1997] FamCA 33; (1997) FLC ¶92-755

Bennett & Bennett [2001] FamCA 462; (2001) FLC ¶93-088

Cubbin & Cutler [2018] FamCAFC 84

Flanagan & Handcock (2002) FLC ¶93-102

Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298

Mallory & Mallory [2022] FedCFamC1F 697

Masoud & Masoud [2016] FamCAFC 24; (2016) FLC ¶93-689

Morgan & Miles [2007] FamCA 1230; (2007) FLC ¶93-343

Murdock & Madden [2011] FamCAFC 219

Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249; (2024) FLC ¶94-230

Quintana & Konigsmann [2025] FedCFamC1A 30

Taylor v Barker [2007] FamCA 1246; (2007) FLC ¶93-345

U & U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238

Willmore & Menendez [2022] FedCFamC1A 73

Division: Division 2 Family Law

Number of paragraphs: 270

Date of hearing: 5-8 May 2025

Place: Adelaide

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Lewis SC with Mr Siklich

Solicitor for the Applicant: Angela Ferdinandy Pty Ltd

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Miller

Solicitor for the Respondent: Resolve Divorce Lawyers
ORDERS

ADC 650 of 2024

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:
MS KNIGHT

Applicant

AND:
MR REDDING

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE PARKER

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2025

UPON NOTING THAT:
A.Pursuant to section 65DA(2) and section 62B of the Family Law Act 1975, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to an comply with an order are set out in Annexure A and the Fact Sheet from the Federal Circuit and Family Court attached hereto and these particulars are included in and form part of these orders.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous parenting orders be discharged.

Decision-making responsibility
2.The parties have joint responsibility for decision-making with respect to major long-term issues for the child X born in 2021 (‘the child’).

Living arrangements
3.The child live with the Mother.
4.The Mother be at liberty to relocate the child’s primary place of residence to Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, from no earlier than June 2026.

Time with each party
5.The child spend time with the Father from the date of these orders until June 2026 as follows:
(a)From the date of these orders, on a fortnightly basis as follows:
(i)In week 1:
A.From 3:00pm until 6:00pm on Wednesday; and
B.From 2:00pm on Friday until 5:00pm on Saturday;

(ii)In week 2:
A.From 3:00pm until 6:00pm on Wednesday; and
B.From 2:00pm on Friday until at 8:00am on Sunday.

(b)From December 2025, on a fortnightly basis as follows:
(i)In week 1, from 2:00pm on Wednesday until 6:00pm on Friday;
(ii)In week 2:
A.From 2:00pm until 6:00pm on Monday; and
B.From 2:00pm on Friday until 5:00pm on Sunday.

(c)From April 2026, on a fortnightly basis as follows:
(i)In week 1, from 2:00pm on Wednesday until 6:00pm on Thursday;
(ii)In week 2:
A.From 2:00pm until 6:00pm on Monday; and
B.From 2:00pm on Friday until 8:00am on Monday.

6.From June 2026, if the Father and the child reside in different cities, the child spend time with the Father in a four-week cycle as follows:
(a)In week one, in Adelaide, from 3:00pm on Friday to 3:00pm on Sunday;
(b)In week three, in Canberra, from the conclusion of school or 3:00pm on Friday to the commencement of school or 8:00am on Monday; and
(c)For an additional weekend in Canberra in any given calendar month should the Father become available to do so, from the conclusion of school or 3:00pm on Friday to the commencement of school or 8:00am on Monday, upon the provision by the Father of no less than 21 days’ written notice to the Mother.

7.From June 2026, if the Father and the child reside in the same city, the child spend time with the Father as follows:
(a)Each alternate weekend, from the conclusion of school or 3:00pm on Friday until the commencement of school or 9:00am on Monday; and
(b)Each intervening week, from the conclusion of school on Wednesday until the commencement of school on Thursday.

School holidays
8.Irrespective of whether the Father and the child reside in the same city, the child spend time with each of the parties during school holidays (with time with the Father to take place in the city of the Father’s residence, subject to provisions for travel otherwise outlined in these orders), as follows:
(a)During the term 3, 2026 school holidays, the child’s regular fortnightly time with the Father be extended to a block of four consecutive nights and the regular time provided for in these orders otherwise continue;
(b)During the long summer holidays in 2026/2027, the child’s regular fortnightly time with the Father be extended to a block of four consecutive nights on two separate occasions and the regular time provided for in these orders otherwise continue;
(c)During the each of the school term holidays in 2027, the child’s regular fortnightly time with the Father be extended to a block of five consecutive nights and the regular time provided for in these orders otherwise continue;
(d)During the long summer holidays in 2027/2028, the child spend a block of six consecutive nights with the Father during each alternate week and the child otherwise remain in the care of the Mother; and
(e)Thereafter, the child spend half of each school holiday period with each parent, such time to be undertaken on a week-about basis during each long summer holiday period.

9.From the 2029/2030 long summer school holidays, the parties shall each be at liberty to suspend the time the child spends with the other during the long summer holidays in order to take a two-week block of time with the child for the purpose of travel upon the provision of no less than 28 days’ notice to the other parent PROVIDED THAT such time does not interfere with the time the other parent would otherwise be spending with the child for any special occasion pursuant to these orders.

Special occasions
10.Irrespective of whether the child and the Father reside in the same city and irrespective of the terms of any other order herein, the child spend time with the parties for Christmas as follows:
(a)In 2025 and each alternate year thereafter, the child shall spend time with the Mother from 10:00am on 23 December until 4:00pm on Boxing Day; and
(b)In 2026 and each alternate year thereafter, the child shall spend time with the Father from 10:00am on 23 December until 4:00pm on Boxing Day.

11.Irrespective of whether the child and the Father reside in the same city and irrespective of the terms of any other order herein, the child spend time with the parties for Easter as follows:
(a)With the Mother in even-numbered years from 6:00pm on Good Friday to 2:00pm on Easter Monday; and
(b)With the Father in odd-numbered years from 6:00pm on Good Friday to 2:00pm on Easter Monday.

12.The child otherwise spend time with each of the parents for special occasions as follows:
(a)For each of Mother’s Day and Father’s Day, if the child would not otherwise be in the care of the relevant parent, that parent be at liberty, upon the provision of 14 days’ notice to the other parent, to swap the weekend in question with another proximate weekend when the child would otherwise be in their care, so as to facilitate him being in their care on the relevant day; and
(b)For each of the parents’ birthdays, if the child would otherwise be in the same city as the relevant parent, he spend time with that parent from 5:00 pm on the day prior to the birthday until 9:00 am the day following the birthday, and he otherwise communicate with that parent by Facetime on the birthday; and
(c)For the child’s birthday:
(i)if the parties are in the same city (irrespective of whether they reside in the same city), the child spend time with the parent in whose care he would not otherwise be, from the conclusion of school until 7:00pm if a school day, and from 2:00pm until 9:00am the following day if not a school day; and
(ii)if the parties are not in the same city, the child communicate with the parent with whom he is not spending time by Facetime.

Other arrangements for time
13.The child spend such further and other time with each of the parties as may be agreed between the parties in writing.
14.In the event that either party is unable to care for the child during their respective periods pursuant to these orders, for a period of or exceeding five nights, then the other party is to be given first option to care for the child, PROVIDED THAT:
(a)if such time occurs during school term time, the child shall be cared for in his city of residence; and
(b)any time spent by the child in the care of the Father pursuant to this order shall not exceed the greatest number of consecutive nights that has otherwise been spent by the child in the care of the Father prior to such time taking place.

Communication
15.The child have Facetime communication with the Father each Tuesday at 5:15pm (Adelaide time) or such other time that the parties may agree in writing.

BY CONSENT:
16.The parties ensure that, in addition to the child’s regular Facetime communication with the Father, the parties each facilitate the child communicating with the other parent (including but not limited to telephone or text message) at any other time the child expresses a wish to do so.

Handovers
17.Handovers which do not take place at the child’s childcare, kindergarten, or school shall take place as follows:
(a)At all times when the child and the Father do not reside in the same city, at the airport in the city in which the time is taking place;
(b)During any period where the child resides in Adelaide, at B Venue;
(c)Otherwise at a location agreed between the parties in writing; and
(d)Both parties are at liberty to have an agent attending on their behalf provided that that person is known to the child.

Costs of travel
18.During any period when the child resides in Canberra and the Father resides in Adelaide, the cost of travel shall be met as follows:
(a)During usual school term time:
(i)The Mother cover any and all costs associated with her travel and the child’s travel to Adelaide to spend time with the Father; and
(ii)The Father cover any and all costs associated with his travel to Canberra.

(b)During school holiday periods and for special occasions the Mother shall pay the cost of the child’s travel to Adelaide, and the Father shall pay the cost of the child’s return travel to Canberra.

Provision of information
19.Each party keep the other informed of:
(a)Their current residential address, mobile and landline telephone numbers and any available email addresses and advise the other party of any change thereto within seven (7) days of such change.
(b)The names and addresses of any treating medical or other health practitioners who treat the child and authorise that practitioner to provide the other party with all information they are lawfully able to provide about the child.
(c)Any extra-curricular activities the child may be involved in, including details of the activity and contact details of the facilitators.

20.In the event of injury, illness or hospitalisation, the parties shall notify each other as follows:
(a)Each party inform the other forthwith by SMS message to the other’s mobile phone in the event of any serious accident, injury, or illness suffered by the child and of all and any medical or other treatment received by him or recommended to him by any health practitioner (including but not limited to any prescription of medication), with each party to be at liberty to visit during any periods when the child may be hospitalised; and

BY THE COURT:
(b)In the event that the child is taken to hospital and/or admitted to hospital, each party inform the other by way of telephone call, and in the event the call is unanswered, by SMS message as soon as practicable.

BY CONSENT:
Injunctions
21.The parties each be restrained by way of injunction from:
(a)Abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking, or otherwise denigrating the other party, their partner, or any member of their family to or in the presence of the child, or allowing any other person to do so;
(b)Discussing with the child these proceedings, child support, any allegations made in the proceedings or any matter of an adult nature likely to place upon him a loyalty demand, including any aspect of his preference with regards to where he shall live, and/or what contact he has with the other parent, or allowing any other person to do so; and
(c)Consuming any illicit substances or alcohol in excess of the legal driving limit of 0.05 whilst the child is in their care.

Miscellaneous
22.Each party shall:
(a)Be at liberty to communicate with and obtain any information or direction concerning the child’s physical and/or mental health and welfare from any general medical practitioner, specialist medical practitioner, psychologist, psychiatrist, counsellor, social worker, and/or other health professional and this order be authority to any said medical practitioner or professional upon whom the child attends to provide to the parties all information they may request with respect to the child and copies of any reports arising; and
(b)Be at liberty to receive or obtain at their own costs any reports, notices, photographs, and any other item or information that is usually provided to parents by any school, education institute, sporting body or extra-curricular activity in which the child may be enrolled or attending and each party authorises by this order any education or extracurricular facility attended by the child to give each party information about the child’s education or extracurricular progress and supply them with copies of reports, photographs, certificates and award obtained by the child (at the requesting party’s expense).

23.Each party by this order authorises:
(a)Any education or extracurricular facility attended by the child to give each party information about the child’s education or extracurricular progress and other related activities and supply them with copies of reports, photographs, certificates and awards obtained by the child (at the requesting party’s expense); and
(b)Any doctor or medical specialist upon whom the child attends to provide to the parties all information they may request with respect to the child and copies of any reports arising.

24.Each party be at liberty to attend all school functions and school sport and related extracurricular activities and events to which parents are ordinarily invited to participate in and/or attend, including but not limited to the child’s first day of school each year, sports days, sporting events, school concerts, school plays, quiz nights, school fund raisers, classroom visits, parent teacher interviews, school excursions and to extend to extracurricular activities regardless of the organising party.

25.Each party give the other at least 21 days’ notice or as much notice as is reasonably practicable in circumstances of emergency in writing, by email, of their intention to take the child more than 200 kilometres out of the area of his residence, and provide by email an itinerary and particulars of the name and address of the location at which he will be staying out of the state, with such travel not to coincide with Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and the parents’ and child’s birthdays, unless the travelling parent has care of the child on those occasions pursuant to these orders.
26.The parties re-engage with Ms C, psychologist, for the purpose of family therapy at such times and for such duration as directed by Ms C.

BY THE COURT:
International travel
27.That from the 2029/2030 long summer school holidays, the parties each be at liberty to take the child outside the Commonwealth of Australia for a 14 day period each year subject to the following:
(a)As far as practical the occasion on which the parties take the child out of Australia coincide with school holiday periods;
(b)The travelling party will give the non-travelling party as much notice as possible of the travelling party’s intention to take the child out of Australia and no less than twenty-eight (28) days written notice of such intention;
(c)The travelling party provide the non-travelling party an itinerary and certified copies of paid return airline tickets to include the departure and return dates, the country or countries to which the travelling party and the child will travel, the approximate dates on which the child will arrive and depart each country and a telephone number and address at which the travelling party and the child can be contacted in each country;
(d)In the event the child does not have a valid Australian Passport at the time of travelling, the parties shall do all things, including providing the other party with any of the child’s original documents required for the purpose of obtaining a Passport, and sign all documents necessary to obtain an Australian Passport at the travelling party’s sole cost and expense.

Other
28.All extant applications are otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE PARKER:
INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are the parties’ competing applications for parenting orders with respect to the child X born in 2021 (‘X’). X was aged approximately three and a half at the time of the trial.
The Applicant Mother, MS KNIGHT(‘the Mother’), was born in 1986 and at the time of the trial was aged 38. The Mother is a medical professional. At the time of the trial, she was engaged in paid employment on a part time basis, working three days per week and occasional Saturdays.

The Respondent Father, MR REDDING (‘the Father’), was born in 1980 and at the time of the trial was aged 44. The Father works on a full-time basis as a sales professional.
The parties engaged in a brief dating relationship and did not cohabit or marry. Their relationship ended shortly after X’s conception.
X has lived with the Mother since his birth. The Father has been actively involved throughout X’s young life. X initially spent time with the Father at the Mother’s home and has been spending time with him separately from the Mother since July 2022, when he was approximately seven months old.
At the time of the trial, pursuant to orders made on 9 October 2024, X was spending time with the Father from 3:00pm until 6:00pm each Wednesday and from 2:00pm on Friday until 5:00pm on Saturday each weekend. Overnight time commenced in early December 2024, when X was three years old.
X otherwise lives with the Mother and with the maternal grandparents (the Mother’s mother and her stepfather, who she identifies as her father), who ordinarily reside in Canberra but have been in Adelaide, where both parties presently reside, to assist the Mother with X’s care, since shortly after his birth.
The Father resides with his partner, MS D.
The primary issue in dispute between the parties relates to the Mother’s desire to relocate to Canberra with X in order to pursue a work opportunity, and to continue to receive the support of her parents, whom she gave evidence will shortly resume their residence in Canberra.
X is an extremely fortunate child. Unlike many children whose parents engage in litigation before this court, X has two loving, competent, committed and child-focused parents and caring and supportive members of his extended family on both sides. He is, by all accounts, a delightful child who is developing in accordance with expected milestones. This is a credit to both of his parents, each of whom has shown a deep commitment to providing him with loving guidance and the best possible opportunities in life notwithstanding that the circumstances between them have made this challenging for them both. It is to be hoped that in considering these reasons, and in their future interactions with, and approach towards, one another, the parties each keep firmly in mind the critical role played by the other in enabling X to be the fortunate and much loved child that he is.
THE PARTIES’ APPLICATIONS
The Mother sought, in summary, that she have sole responsibility for decision-making with respect to major long-term issues pertaining to X and that X reside with her in Canberra and spend time with the Father for two weekends per month in Canberra and one weekend per month in Adelaide. She proposed that the time during each such weekend commence at 2:00pm on Friday to 4:00pm on Saturday and 8:00am to 2:00pm (or 1:00pm for the weekends in Adelaide) on Sunday; and build gradually to 3:00pm on Friday to 6:00pm (or 1:00pm for the weekends in Adelaide) on Sunday from January 2028 (at which time X will be six years old).
The Mother further proposed that X spend additional time with the Father during school holidays commencing in 2027 and building up to seven consecutive nights during each school term holiday period and a week about basis (subject to a provision allowing for suspension) during the long summer holidays from 2029.
In the event that X was required to remain living in Adelaide, the Mother proposed that time between the Father and X commence as 3:00pm to 6:00pm each Wednesday and 4:00pm Friday until 4:00pm Saturday three weekends out of four and build to overnight each alternate Wednesday and 4:00pm Friday to 4:00pm Sunday each alternate weekend (three nights per fortnight) from January 2027 (at which time X will be five years old).
The Father sought, in summary, that the parties have joint-decision making responsibility in relation to all major long-term issues in relation to X, and that X continue to reside in Adelaide, or, in the alternative, that any relocation be delayed until X reached the age of five.
In the event that the parties resided in the same state, the Father sought that X live with the Mother and spend time with the Father in an increasing regime commencing with a continuation of the extant arrangement and gradually building to an equal time arrangement commencing at the time X reaches five years of age.
In the event that the parties reside in different states, the Father proposed that X live with the Mother and spend time with him in week one of a four-week cycle, from 3:00pm on Friday until 3:00pm on Sunday in Adelaide; and in week three of a four-week cycle, from 3:00pm on Friday until 8:00am on Monday in Canberra; with school holiday time to be spent equally between the parties.
ISSUES REQUIRING DETERMINATION
The principal issue for determination by the Court was, in summary, whether the Mother should be permitted to relocate with X from Adelaide, where both parties presently reside, to Canberra. Determination was also required in relation to the time X is to spend in the care of each of his parents, the allocation of responsibility for decisions with respect to major long-term issues, and a range of ancillary matters.
MATERIAL RELIED ON
The Mother relied on the following documents:
(a)Amended Initiating Application filed on 24 March 2025;
(b)Trial affidavit filed 24 March 2025;
(c)Reply affidavit filed 22 April 2025;
(d)Financial Statement filed 24 March 2025;
(e)Notice to Admit filed 17 April 2025;
(f)Psychological report of Dr E dated 8 January 2025; and
(g)Case outline filed 28 April 2025.
The Father relied on the following documents:
(a)Amended Response to Initiating Application filed 7 April 2025;
(b)Trial affidavit filed 7 April 2025;
(c)Financial Statement filed 7 April 2025; and
(d)Affidavit of Ms D (the Father’s partner) filed 7 April 2025; and
(e)Case outline filed 28 April 2025.
The parties each also relied on requests for answers to specific questions and affidavits filed in response thereto.
Each of the parties also tendered documents throughout the course of the hearing. Although each and every aspect of the evidence relied upon by the parties has not been referred to in these reasons, I have had regard to the totality of the evidence before the Court and the submissions of each of the parties.
The operation of rule 8.15(3)(e) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) was dispensed with insofar as it related to the reports of professional witnesses and the reports of such experts were accepted into evidence.
THE PARTIES AND THEIR EVIDENCE
Both of the parties impressed as honest and genuine witnesses. Both were calm, polite, and responsive to the questions asked of them and both made concessions where appropriate. Both also impressed as child-focused and as fully committed to X and his needs. I formed the impression that the areas of difference between the evidence of the parties arose from genuine differences in their recollections, perceptions and perspectives rather than lack of candour or untruthfulness on the part of either of them. The Father’s partner, Ms D, likewise presented as an honest and unproblematic witness.
In accordance with section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), all findings of fact in this judgment are made on the balance of probabilities. I have had regard to the matters outlined in section 140(2) of the Evidence Act, particularly the gravity of the matters alleged, when making such findings.
Although the parties each initially relied on lists of objections to evidence, substantial agreement was able to be reached between them with respect to exclusion of evidence.[1] To the extent that agreement was not able to be reached, the parties jointly invited the Court to exercise caution with respect to the weight to be given to the aspects of the evidence relied on by each of them in relation to which issue was taken, rather than to exclude such evidence. I have, in accordance with that request, taken particular care in considering the weight to be given to those aspects of the evidence before the Court when making the findings outlined throughout these reasons.
[1] As set out in exhibits F14 and M2.
THE FAMILY REPORT
The Court was assisted by a Family Report prepared by clinical psychologist Ms F dated 8 August 2024. Ms F gave evidence and was cross-examined by Counsel for each of the parties. Ms F’s evidence was given in a careful, considered and measured manner. There was no challenge to her expertise or her observations. I give her evidence and her recommendations significant weight.
THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The legislative framework
Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) guides the process of decision-making in relation to the making of parenting orders. Section 60CA of the Act provides that when deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, the Court must consider the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. Section 60CC of the Act sets out how those best interests are to be determined, and includes a list of considerations to be taken into account.
Relocation
There is no separate category of relocation cases.[2] The Court is required to apply the law as it relates to the determination of parenting cases, and determine what orders should be made, having regard to X’s best interests as the paramount consideration.
[2] B & B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 [1997] FamCA 33; (1997) FLC ¶92-755.
The following propositions can be distilled from the relevant authorities:[3]
(a)the best interests of the child are the paramount, but not the sole consideration;
(b)the party wanting to move does not need to provide compelling reasons to do so;
(c)the court must evaluate the competing proposals, considering all the relevant factors and the advantages and disadvantages for the child’s best interests of each proposal;
(d)the question of whether there should be a relocation is not to be treated as a separate or discrete issue to that of the question of the person with whom the child should live;
(e)neither party bears an onus to establish that an order permitting or restraining relocation is in the child’s best interests;
(f)the court is not bound by the parties’ proposals; and
(g)the Court must consider all the relevant factors, including the right of freedom of movement of the parent who wishes to relocate, but parental rights ultimately need to give way to a child’s best interests.
[3] Including AMS & AIF [1999] HCA 26; (1999) 199 CLR 160; A & A: Relocation Approach [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) FLC ¶93-035; U & U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238; Taylor v Barker [2007] FamCA 1246; (2007) FLC ¶93-345; and Morgan & Miles [2007] FamCA 1230; (2007) FLC ¶93-343; as summarised in Mallory & Mallory [2022] FedCFamC1F 697 at [135].
Section 60CC factors
It is not necessary to give express reasons in relation to each and every factor in section 60CC,[4] and I have limited my consideration to those that are of particular relevance to the present case.
What arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of the child and each person who has care of the child
[4] Cubbin & Cutler [2018] FamCAFC 84 at [13]; Willmore & Menendez [2022] FedCFamC1A 73 at [93]; Quintana & Konigsmann [2025] FedCFamC1A 30 at [46].
X’s safety
To Ms F, the Mother expressed concern about the Father’s alcohol and drug use. She described the Father as having had a history of ‘writing himself off’ on Friday and Saturday nights. The Father acknowledged having increased his drinking in the context of stress arising from the unexpected pregnancy. He reported to Ms F that he presently drinks approximately once per week in a social setting and has never been drunk or hung over in X’s presence.
The Mother also gave evidence of historical cocaine use on the part of the Father. The Father deposed that this had occurred on a limited number of occasions prior to X’s birth. He gave unchallenged evidence of having provided a hair follicle test that was negative for all illicit substances during the course of the proceedings. The evidence did not establish that the Father posed a risk to X and despite the issues raised by her, such a finding was not sought by the Mother.
The Father reported to Ms F that he held some concerns about X’s safety in the care of the maternal grandparents. The Father gave unanswered evidence of some unfriendly conduct towards him from the maternal grandmother at handovers but adduced no evidence demonstrating that X was at risk in the care of the maternal grandparents.
The parties’ respective positions each involve X spending significant unsupervised time in the care of the other party without restriction as to the involvement of extended family members. The Family Report suggests that both parents are safe carers for X. In addition, the parties agreed to mutual injunctions restraining them from a range of behaviours including abusing or denigrating the other in X’s presence and consuming any illicit substances or alcohol in excess of the legal driving limit of 0.05 whilst X is in their care. I am satisfied that irrespective of the outcome of the central areas of dispute between the parties, X’s safety will be promoted.
Mother’s safety
The Mother reported to Ms F that she had felt afraid for her safety in the year prior to the assessment as a result of conduct by the Father, and expressed concern that if he was unhappy with the outcome of the dispute, he may harm himself or someone else. She also gave evidence of times the Father had criticised her, such as by suggesting in a critical manner that she was suffering from mental ill health, and described the Father having engaged in dominant and controlling behaviours towards her. Controlling behaviour may fall within the definition of family violence in s 4AB of the Act, which is ‘violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.’
The Father acknowledged having held concerns about the Mother’s mental health shortly after X’s birth, which he linked to his experience of the Mother’s conduct towards him having changed (though he did not assert any current mental health concerns), but denied having engaged in any conduct constituting family violence. He gave evidence of having tried but failed to understand the basis for any suggestion that he posed a risk.
I accept that the Mother may well genuinely have perceived at times that the Father was behaving in a controlling manner and that she was genuine in expressing concerns for her safety. However, a finding as to the exertion of control or the existence of family violence requires more than simply acceptance of the perception of such on the part of the person to whom the impugned behaviour was directed.[5]
[5] Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249; (2024) FLC ¶94-230 at [22], [29], [31] (per McClelland DCJ) and [105], [107] (per Austin & Williams JJ).
The evidence before the Court does not support a finding that the Father behaved towards the Mother at any time in a manner which could objectively be assessed as controlling or that he otherwise represents a risk to the safety of the Mother, himself or any other person. The evidence before the Court, insofar as it demonstrates interactions between the parties, is of polite and respectful communications on the part of the Father, and of him respecting what he understood to be the Mother’s wishes and boundaries with respect to the extent of their contact and communication.
In my view, it is likely that the Mother’s perception of the Father’s conduct arose from the level of distrust between them and their lack of meaningful communication, both of which are discussed in greater detail later in these reasons, together with the Mother’s experience of feeling constrained by the Father with respect to her desire to relocate. In any event, the manner in which the Mother presented her case did not ultimately invite a finding that the Father posed a risk to her safety.
It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that a significant consideration in this proceeding related to her emotional safety. The Mother’s case in this regard was not that her emotional safety was at risk from the Father, but that her emotional wellbeing would be imperilled if she was required to remain in Adelaide contrary to her wishes.
The Mother was clear in her evidence, and I accept, that she would not move from Adelaide without X. As a consequence, an order requiring X to remain living in Adelaide would have the effect that the Mother, who is presently, and who, at least on her case, will always be, his primary caregiver, would also be required to remain in Adelaide.
The asserted risk to the Mother’s emotional safety arising from a refusal of her application to relocate was based on the dual factors of loss of a valuable employment opportunity that has been made available to her and loss of family support arising from the impending return of her parents to Canberra.
Mother’s work opportunity
The Mother’s evidence was that in mid-2023, she had been offered a position as medical professional at G Clinic which is located in Canberra. This was described by the Mother as her ‘dream job’ and a ‘once in a lifetime opportunity,’ which would represent a significant career advancement, enhanced job satisfaction and a culmination of the hard work she had put into her career throughout her adult life. The Mother’s evidence was that the role would also provide significantly greater remuneration than her current role, estimated by her as being at least double her present income, whilst enabling her to continue to work three days per week at least in the short term.
The Mother gave evidence that the extensive training she has undertaken to date has been directed towards obtaining a leadership position and providing cutting edge care, being outcomes which would be made available to her by the acceptance of the position in Canberra. There can be no doubt that Mother is dedicated to and passionate about her career, which she enjoys and finds professionally rewarding, and that it is an important part of her identity.
A subpoena issued to G Clinic resulted in a response to the effect that they had no records of any job offer having been made to the Mother. It was put to the Mother that she had not in fact received a job offer from G Clinic. Her evidence was that she had received an offer and a proposed contract from Ms H, who is the present Director of G Clinic, through an entity known as H Company.
The evidence before the Court included a bundle of documents representing the extent of the written communications the Mother had received with respect to her job offer.[6] It was put to her that she had not in fact been offered a directorship, but merely a training position as consultant on a ‘fee for service’ basis, and not with G Clinic but with H Company. I accept the submission made on behalf of the Mother that nothing turns on the issue of whether the offer was from G Clinic or H Company in circumstances in which the Mother frankly admitted that she was unsure of the precise structure of the relevant entities.
[6] Exhibit F12.
The Mother accepted that the proposed service agreement she had received did not formally list her as a director, and that the sole reference to directorship in the written communications was a mention of a ‘directorship in training’ in a letter from Mr J, business manager for H Company. She gave credible evidence, however, that the verbal communication she had had were to the effect that the training would be undertaken with a view to taking over the directorship presently held by Ms H upon Ms H’s impending retirement, and that there was a high degree of certainty that the training position would culminate in directorship.

The Father urged the Court to interpret the available documents as indicating that the Mother had proactively sought out a position in Canberra rather than having it offered to her. I do not agree that the documents demonstrate with any clarity whether the Mother expressed an interest in the opportunity in Canberra unprompted or whether she did so in response to a suggestion from another. In my view, it matters little. What is important is the current status of the opportunity available to the Mother.
I accept the submission made on behalf of the Father to the effect that the Mother’s evidence with respect to her job opportunity, including the details of the formal arrangements that would be made, her likely work routine and the calculations of her anticipated remuneration, was lacking in particularity and was in part speculative and conclusory, which limits the weight that can be given to that evidence. I also accept the submission of Counsel for the Father that the Mother’s failure to call evidence from Ms H or Mr J with respect to the discussions she had had with them resulted in a lacuna in the evidence with respect to the details of her job opportunity.
However, I also accept the submission made on behalf of the Mother that her evidence of discussions she had with trusted mentors and the understanding she had gained from such discussions was sufficiently reliable to support a finding that the Mother has available to her the career opportunity described by her, at least in a general sense.
It was suggested on behalf of the Father that the Mother’s career options were not restricted to Canberra and there were opportunities for her to pursue in Adelaide, though the Father appropriately acknowledged that this was a matter outside his personal knowledge. It was put to the Mother that there would be plenty of time during the coming years of her career for other opportunities to arise without the need for her to relocate, particularly in light of evidence she had given about the limited number of professionals in Australia with her particular skills and qualifications, and the high regard in which she was held. She did not agree. Her evidence, based on her personal experience of having worked in her field for a number of years, was that such opportunities rarely arise.
It was also submitted on behalf of the Father that the Mother could increase her income substantially by working more days once X became older, and that she had secure employment in Adelaide in a type of work which she found rewarding. It was submitted that the Mother could continue to build her career without moving from Adelaide. Whilst this may be technically accurate, the Father did not establish that the Mother’s career advancement in Adelaide would or could be equivalent to the opportunity presently available to her in Canberra, and in any event, this suggestion did not accommodate the important consideration of the Mother’s autonomy with respect to her life and career choices.
The Mother gave evidence that she was affiliated with K Organisation, and that both the clinic at which she is currently employed and G Clinic were K Organisation clinics. Her evidence was that once affiliated with one provider, it was difficult for someone with her subspecialty to shift to another, which limited the scope of her realistically available future opportunities to clinics associated with K Organisation. She accepted that she is not prohibited by a restraint of trade clause from attempting to transition to a role with one of the other major providers, but gave evidence that to do so would involve severing established ties with mentors and other connections and that such allegiances were important in her field. The suggestion that such roles could be available to the Mother was speculative.
The Mother gave evidence that the only realistic future opportunity in Adelaide comparable to that which was presently available in Canberra would not arise until the retirement of the director of the clinic at which she is presently employed, which she anticipated would not occur for at least a decade in circumstances in which the incumbent had assumed the role in mid- 2024.
There was no expert evidence before the Court with respect to the Mother’s career prospects, which is a matter to which I have regard when considering this issue. The best available evidence is the Mother’s own evidence.
The possibility of an arrangement whereby X remained living in Adelaide and the Mother commuted to Canberra in order to take up the employment opportunity was floated with the Mother in cross-examination, noting in particular that it is the Mother’s intention to continue to work on a part time basis if she is able to take up the employment opportunity in Canberra. She credibly explained that a ‘fly in, fly out’ arrangement would not be suited to the demands of patient care including the need to be available in case of emergencies and to cover for unscheduled unavailability of colleagues as well as to undertake associated tasks such as networking to establish her professional reputation in Canberra. This possibility also did not cater for changes in the Mother’s work days and hours in future, such as when X commences school.
The Mother’s evidence was that if she was unable to take up the position at G Clinic in Canberra, she anticipated experiencing a complete loss of motivation which would have a deleterious impact on her ongoing career promotion and development and would compromise her capacity to perform her role.
The Mother described feeling that taking the opportunity to fill a service gap in Canberra represented performance of a civic duty. She accepted that she did not feel compelled to perform that duty in other locations where similar services were unavailable, but nor did she assert that the feeling of civic duty was her sole or primary motivator in seeking to move to Canberra.
Mother’s support needs
Canberra is the city in which the Mother grew up and is where the maternal grandparents ordinarily reside (albeit they have primarily been in Adelaide since X was born). The Mother also has a number of other family members and long-term friends in Canberra. Although she also has friends in Adelaide, I am satisfied that, subject to the location of her parents, Canberra is the location of the Mother’s main support network.
The maternal grandparents came to Adelaide from Canberra to support the Mother after X’s birth and are plainly a very significant support to her and X, both in terms of practical day to day support with managing the demands of parenting a toddler together with the Mother’s demanding work commitments (noting that her work is of a nature where it is not possible to leave early on short notice in the event of illness or other unexpected event involving a child), and in terms of emotional support.
The Mother gave evidence that the maternal grandparents intended to return to Canberra shortly after the conclusion of the court proceedings, which would leave her without their significant support. Her evidence was that their time in Adelaide had always been intended to be temporary. The Mother gave unchallenged evidence that her stepfather’s brother, with whom he was very close, had been diagnosed with an illness shortly prior to the trial and was gravely ill, which had added to the need for her parents to return to Canberra in the near future.
To Ms F, the Mother expressed concern that she would be unable to manage what she is currently managing without the support of her parents, noting the demanding nature of her work (which includes heavy emotional demands). She gave evidence of a likely need to reduce the days she works if she did not have the day-to-day support of her parents, which could impact on her career development. She credibly denied that her passion for her career would preclude her from reducing her work hours, explaining the importance of recognising and acting upon any inability to fulfil her duties to an acceptable standard.
The Mother accepted that she had managed the care of X during the six or seven occasions per year when her parents had travelled back to Canberra for periods ranging from a few days to a week since they have been staying with her. She also accepted that the need for backup carers would reduce as X commences kindergarten in 2026 and then school in 2027, but emphasised that her parents provide her with emotional as well as physical support.
The Mother told Dr E, upon whose psychological assessment she relied, that if she was unable to relocate but lost the support of her parents, the likely consequential reduction in her work days might lead to the need to downsize her home due to inability to afford her mortgage repayments.
However, she accepted under cross-examination that she presently holds funds in an offset account with a sufficient balance to discharge the mortgage liability encumbering her home, and it is from the funds held in the offset account that the mortgage repayments are presently met. It is therefore clear that a reduction in work hours would not lead directly to a need to sell her home. Dr E gave evidence that this factor had not weighed as heavily in her assessment of the emotional impact on the Mother if her parents returned to Canberra as the other factors she had considered.
The Mother accepted that her current income enables her to provide herself and X with a comfortable standard of living, with a surplus of income over expenditure, even without consideration of the child support paid by the Father, which could be expected to increase if the Mother’s income was reduced. She also accepted that she could still meet her living expenses if she was working two days each week rather than three, and that the need for reduced working days would be obviated upon X’s commencement at school in 2027.
It cannot, therefore, be concluded that either the reduction in available family support or the need to forego the employment opportunity in Canberra with its enhanced remunerative benefits would cause the Mother (or X) to need to move house or to suffer financial detriment.
The Mother did not call either of her parents to give evidence and provided no proper explanation for her failure to do so. Counsel for the Father sought that the Court draw an inference that if the Mother’s relocation application were refused, her parents would remain in Adelaide and continue to support her as they had done since X’s birth. It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that evidence from her parents was not required, and that the evidence of the Mother herself, together with the independent documentary evidence before the Court, was sufficient to establish that they would be returning to Canberra.
The Mother rejected the proposition that her parents would stay in Adelaide and continue to support her if they perceived that she continued to require their assistance and gave credible (albeit hearsay) evidence that her parents would be returning to Canberra. She emphasised that they had already made significant personal sacrifices in order to support her, that her uncle was very unwell, that they had other children and grandchildren in Canberra, and that they needed to return to Canberra to resume their lives there.
It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that the Notice to Admit filed by her on 17 April 2025, and the various documents annexed thereto (the authenticity of which was not disputed), demonstrated clearly that the Mother’s parents had always intended to return to Canberra. Those documents demonstrate that they remain enrolled on the electoral roll in Canberra, their address remains their home address in Canberra for the purposes of the Australian Taxation Office, and they continue to receive their mail there (subject to a redirection to the Mother’s address in Adelaide). I accept that these documents demonstrate that the maternal grandparents’ presence in Adelaide was not intended by them to be a permanent move. They do not, however, address the imminence of their return to Canberra.
The rule in Jones v Dunkel[7] enables the Court to draw an inference arising from the unexplained failure of a party to call a person to give evidence with respect to an issue, that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party's case. It does not enable the Court to infer that any such evidence would have been unfavourable to the party’s case and it cannot be used to fill evidentiary gaps. The rule does not require a party to call each and every person who might give evidence on a particular point,[8] and I am conscious of the cautions with respect to the use of the rule in parenting cases as outlined by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Murdock & Madden.[9]
[7] [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.
[8] Masoud & Masoud [2016] FamCAFC 24; (2016) FLC ¶93-689 at [52].
[9] [2011] FamCAFC 219.
I am not prepared to infer, as sought by the Father, that the Mother’s parents will remain in Adelaide if she is not permitted to relocate with X to Canberra. This is particularly so in light of my observations of the Mother herself as a truthful and reliable witness. I have regard, however, to the lack of evidence from the maternal grandparents, and the inability of Counsel for the Father to cross-examine them about their intentions, and also decline to find that they will move back to Canberra immediately upon the conclusion of the proceedings irrespective of their outcome.
In my view, the most likely available inference arising from the evidence before the Court is that the maternal grandparents will return to Canberra at some stage in the future, but that they have yet to make firm plans or arrangements to do so, and the outcome of the proceedings will be likely be relevant to the decisions made by them in this regard.
The evidence does not exclude the possibility that the maternal grandparents would remain in Adelaide for a finite specified time if the Mother’s relocation were permitted to take place at a specified later date rather than immediately (as proposed by the Father as an alternative position), albeit that they may well travel to Canberra more frequently or for longer periods than they have done in the past in light of the illness of the Mother’s uncle. The Mother’s failure to call the maternal grandparents to give evidence precludes the lack of certainty in this regard from being interpreted in her favour.
When interviewed by Ms F and at the time his affidavit evidence was filed, the Father appeared not to be fully cognisant of the importance to the Mother of her relationships with her family. This is perhaps unsurprising in circumstances in which the parties’ relationship was of extremely limited duration and their interactions over the past few years have been limited to matters directly relevant to X and his day to day needs. To his credit, by the time he gave his oral evidence, having had the benefit of the reply material filed on behalf of the Mother and time for reflection, the Father had come to recognise and accept the importance of those relationships and accepted that his perception had not been accurate.
The Mother acknowledged that since X’s birth, she had been able to travel interstate with him on approximately 16 occasions, that many such trips had been to Canberra, and that she had been able to do so freely without any obstruction from the Father, even when accommodating the travel had necessitated rearrangement of X’s regular time with him. She accepted that she had been able to visit family and friends, and that they had visited her, and that as a consequence, X had built relationships with them.
The Father suggested to Ms F that he could provide the Mother with the support she would be missing if her parents returned to Canberra and that he would be there for anything she needed. It was also put to the Mother that if the Father spent additional time caring for X, which he is not only willing but eager to do, this would alleviate the impact of the absence of her parents on her ability to maintain her work hours.
I do not doubt that the Father was entirely genuine in extending such an offer and that he would willingly provide, and would indeed jump at the opportunity to provide, any practical support requested of him by the Mother with respect to X’s care. It is clear, however, that the relationship between the parties is not such that the Father would be able to provide the Mother with emotional support or with any meaningful support beyond physical care of X.
In the witness box, Dr E confirmed her opinion that although it might go some way towards easing the problem, the Father being available to provide practical support would not overcome the impact on Mother’s emotional wellbeing arising from lack of availability of her parents in circumstances in which he was not a source of emotional support for her. I accept that assessment.
Ms F opined, and I accept, that for all of his positive intentions, the Father cannot offer the support the Mother needs to continue to offer the high level care she has been providing to X and also continue her work. In the witness box, she explained that the Father would not be able to provide the reassurance the Mother needed for her emotional wellbeing or alleviate the pressures on her in circumstances in which the state of the relationship between the parties was not conducive to an easy exchange of information, did not allow for easy ad hoc arrangements, was characterised by a lack of trust, and involved the risk of conflict.
Furthermore, the evidence before the Court with respect to the Father’s work commitments left some doubt as to the extent to which he could be available without prior notice in the event that X needed to be picked up from childcare or immediately required care on short notice, while the ability of the maternal grandparents to do so was identified as a factor in the emotional wellbeing derived by the Mother from the support provided by her parents.
The Mother eschewed the suggestion that the emotional support she receives from her parents could be obtained by way of Facetime or other communication methods and emphasised the importance of physically being with them. She also disagreed with the suggestion that she could obtain the requisite level of support by way of regular travel to Canberra if she remained in Adelaide. Dr E likewise indicated that whether regular travel to Canberra would be positive for the Mother’s emotional wellbeing depended on where her parents were, as she ‘needs to be where her family is in an ongoing way.’ I accept that there is a qualitative difference between regular communication and visits and consistent physical presence when it comes to emotional support of the type received by the Mother from her parents.
Dr E, who undertook a psychological assessment of the Mother, emphasised the importance of the ability the Mother has had to continue her training in the knowledge that her son is safely cared for by loving grandparents who can provide regular backup if necessary. She explained that that knowing there is a contingency plan for X’s care allows the Mother to focus on her work, which she is often unable to leave on short notice.
I accept that the combination of physical and emotional availability that has been provided by her parents to date has a value to the Mother that is greater than the sum of its parts, in that there is emotional security to be derived from the peace of mind that comes with being able to rely on persons with whom she shares a close and wholly trusting relationship when practical and physical assistance is required with X’s care.
Counsel for the Father submitted, and I accept, that as X grows older, he will commence school and will spend increased time with the Father, with the result that the burden on the Mother will decrease. However, the evidence does not support a conclusion that it will decrease to the point where the Mother will not require support in managing both her parenting commitments and the demands of her work.

The Father gave evidence, in the context of cross-examination with respect to his ability to travel to or move to Canberra, of the need for him to be available to his partner to support her with the care of any children they might have, and of the need for her to be close to her family and support network in such circumstances. The same considerations are relevant to the Mother and her need for support in the care of X.
Risks to Mother’s mental health
It is not a matter of contention that the Mother does not presently suffer from mental ill-health and that she has functioned at a high level without mental health struggles during the time she has been living in Adelaide, which has been approximately 12 years, of which nine have been without her parents. Although the Mother had engaged psychologists, this had been for the purposes of self-care and stress management rather than for management of any mental health condition.
The Mother attended upon psychologist Ms L commencing in February 2024, which coincided with the commencement of the proceedings. She credibly denied that she had commenced this engagement strategically for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in the proceedings, and gave evidence that she had previously engaged with a different psychologist. The Mother’s evidence, which I accept, was that the primary focus of her engagement with Ms L had been the development of strategies for coping with things that were outside her control.
The Mother’s evidence was that being required to remain in Adelaide against her will would cause her considerable distress which would likely adversely impact her parenting. She also anticipated a significant psychological impact on her arising from an inability to pursue her career in the manner in which she seeks to do so, describing the prospect of loss of the opportunity in Canberra as ‘disastrous.’ She anticipated that her mental health could deteriorate to the point where she would need to reduce her work hours, even if the Father were available to take up more of the physical care of X.
To Ms F, the Mother expressed a concern that she may develop depression if she was unable to relocate. She described seeing a psychologist to manage the stress of her current situation but anticipated that it would be far worse if she was not able to move. The Mother reported that if she were unable to take up the career opportunity represented by the position in Canberra, she would feel that her autonomy and freedom had been taken from her, together with the many years of hard work that she has dedicated to building her career to this point. She described feeling trapped.
As already mentioned, the Mother relied on a report of clinical and forensic psychologist Dr E. Dr E was not a treating practitioner and was engaged solely by the Mother’s solicitor rather than as a single expert. The Mother’s evidence was that she had tried to obtain a report from her treating psychologist, Ms L, but Ms L had refused on the basis of the therapeutic nature of her engagement with the Mother, and had also recently retired.
No objection was taken to the Mother’s reliance on Dr E’s report, but it was submitted on behalf of the Father that Dr E was a ‘barracker’ on behalf of the Mother. Dr E accepted that she had taken at face value the matters she had been told by the Mother and those contained within the letter of instruction she had received from the Mother’s solicitors, in relation to which the Father had no input. I have regard to that fact when assessing the contents of her report and her evidence. I do not, however, accept the submission that no weight can be placed on Dr E’s evidence as a result of her unilateral engagement on behalf of the Mother. Dr E had no prior or ongoing professional relationship with the Mother and impressed as measured and as acting consistently with her professional obligations as an expert witness.
Dr E’s opinion was that the Mother’s emotional safety, well-being, and happiness would be supported by her being able to relocate to Canberra. She considered that the Mother would benefit psychologically from relocating so that she and X could continue to benefit from their regular practical and emotional support. She opined that having her family around her in Canberra, where she feels accepted and loved, would enable the Mother to thrive and flourish vocationally and personally as she moved forward with her career. She also considered that moving to Canberra would allow the Mother to practise medicine ‘safely and wholeheartedly.’ In Dr E’s opinion, relocating to Canberra would enable the Mother to be the happiest and most content she could be by allowing both the daily support of her parents and the ability to fully apply her specialist medical skills.
Dr E considered that being unable to relocate to Canberra would impact the Mother’s wellbeing, which, in turn, would impact on X. She also foreshadowed a risk that preventing the Mother from relocating to Canberra could lead to the Mother resenting X, leading to a reduction in their emotional connection and attachment. She emphasised the importance of mothers’ wellbeing for the wellbeing of their children in developmental psychology research, explaining that if the Mother were required to remain in Adelaide, she would be unhappy, X would feel this unhappiness in his exchanges with her, and their emotional connection would be diminished.
Dr E referred to the ‘dual blow’ to the Mother of the loss of family support and the job opportunity, and opined that it would impact the Mother psychologically. She considered it likely that the Mother would develop an adjustment disorder with depressed mood, with likely symptoms including low mood and feelings of hopelessness, which would likely become ossified into a general sense of malaise. Dr E opined that these symptoms could lead to the development of major depression in due course.
Dr E predicted that the impact of not being able to move to Canberra on the Mother’s functioning, work performance, and parenting capacity could lead to the Mother developing a sense of pointlessness, powerlessness and hopelessness about her ongoing situation. In the witness box, she foreshadowed that although the Mother would very likely obtain help if she needed it and would likely be diligent in following recommendations as to treatment, the impact on her would be an ongoing problem for her.
Dr E’s evidence was that if the Court was not satisfied that the Mother’s parents would return to Canberra if she was unable to do so, this would assist the Mother but would not resolve the issue because the issue of progression of the Mother’s career would not have been addressed. Although she accepted that it was possible that if lack of family support, being one of the two identified stressors, were resolved, it was less likely that the Mother would develop an adjustment disorder, she described this proposition as ‘clutching at straws a little.’
The Mother gave evidence to the effect, and I accept, that the likely fallout of being unable to take up the employment opportunity in Canberra in terms of her emotional wellbeing would increase her need for emotional support from her parents, thus compounding the impact on her of the loss of that support.
Ms F opined that the Mother’s emotional safety would be supported by her being able to relocate, which would ensure continued access to the support of her parents, allow her proximity to other family and friends, and allow her to pursue the career opportunity that has arisen for her. She considered the risk to the Mother’s wellbeing, and indirectly to X, as his primary caregiver, if she was not able to take up the opportunity, to be significant. In the witness box, Ms F foreshadowed risks to the Mother’s functioning if the application to relocate was refused.
Ms F’s evidence was that in the context of maternal unhappiness, or worse, depression, there was a host of risk factors for a child’s functioning, including risks to their development; risks to their social and emotional functioning; risks that they could become withdrawn, inattentive, irritable, or reactive; risks that the level of sensitivity and consistency they received in caregiving could be compromised; risks that the child themselves could show signs of anxiety or internalising behaviours, or have difficulty with forming or maintaining friendships or peer interactions; risks of cognitive impacts; and risks of impacts on their educational attainment. Although she accepted that the availability and attentiveness of the Father was a protective factor, her opinion remained that X would be at risk of these identified adverse outcomes if the Mother were unable to move with him to Canberra.
I am satisfied that the Mother’s emotional safety, and as a consequence, X’s, would best be promoted by being able to reside in Canberra.
The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child
X is a very young child. It is not a matter of dispute that the Mother is and has always been his primary carer and he is heavily reliant on her for his physical and emotional needs. Although he has had some physical health difficulties, including febrile convulsions, Ms F indicated no concern as to X’s development and progress.
The Mother reported to Ms F that X is a sensitive child who finds changes to his routine difficult and can become anxious. She reported that X is less happy and settled than normal when he returns from spending time with the Father, and that his behaviour is sometimes dysregulated, including acting out in ways such as kicking her dog and hitting himself in the head. She also reported that he presents as less confident and more bothered by things than usual, that he speaks less than usual, and that his sleep is more disturbed (though her evidence was that X has always had ‘terrible trouble’ sleeping). The Father, on the other hand, described X as being happy to enter his care, resistant to leaving and wanting to stay longer.
It is my impression that the evidence of both parties in relation to these issues was truthful and that these issues do not indicate any deficit in the parenting provided by either of them. Rather, as Ms F observed, X likely finds transitions between his two homes challenging, which is not unusual for a child of his age, who is still developing skills with respect to emotional regulation, particularly when those homes are likely different and the coparenting relationship is strained. This emphasises the need for caution in ensuring that X’s parenting arrangements continue to be formulated in a careful and developmentally appropriate manner.
Ms F opined that X would be able to manage and benefit from longer blocks of time with the Father as he became older.
The capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs
The Mother presented to Ms F as a considered, calm, child-focused parent, who was knowledgeable, reflective and sensitive. Ms F held no concerns about her capacity to meet X’s needs. This accords with my own observation of the Mother when she gave her evidence.
Ms F described the Father having presented as a loving and committed father who wants only the best for X and to be involved in his life and support his development. She also assessed him as knowledgeable about X and sensitive to his needs, and as committed to his role as X’s father. Again, Ms F’s observation was consistent with my own.
It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that the Father was and had always been fixated on the issue of the time he spent with X, and was focused on numbers or quantity, rather than quality, in terms of the amount of time he and X spend together. In particular, it was submitted that the Father was fixated on ultimately achieving an outcome of equal time, considered by him to be an entitlement. It was further submitted that he was angry and hostile towards the Mother for his failure to achieve his desired outcome.
It is plain that the Father has consistently longed for more time with X, that he has been acutely aware of the precise amount of time they spend together, and that he has long hoped for an ultimate outcome of equal time. However, in my view, this is not a case in which the Father is fixated on achieving a predetermined outcome out of self-interest or a sense of entitlement without proper regard to X’s interests or lived experience. Rather, it is the Father’s genuine view that X’s best interests would be served by increases in the amount of time they spend together, ultimately culminating in an equal shared arrangement, in light of the close and loving nature of their relationship.
In particular, the Father is to be commended for the patient, careful and child-focused approach adopted by him as reflected in his agreement to incremental and developmentally appropriate steps in conjunction with the assistance of Ms C, a clinical psychologist jointly engaged by the parties to undertake family therapy, notwithstanding his own longing for significantly more time with X.
The Father’s willingness and ability to put X’s needs ahead of his own desire with respect to time with him is reflected in the fact that he has accommodated the Mother travelling interstate with X on numerous occasions notwithstanding disruption to the routine for X’s time with him. It was also demonstrated when, in March 2025, when X had been sick, he agreed to the Mother’s request that he return to her overnight during what would otherwise have been overnight time in the care of the Father.
In addition, far from being solely fixated on time, the records of communications between the parties demonstrate that the Father has been actively engaged and interested in a very wide range of topics pertaining to X’s development and wellbeing. Furthermore, those communications indicate that the Father’s approach towards the Mother is calm, polite and respectful, not angry and hostile. I do not accept the submission that the evidence supports a conclusion that the polite communications consistently engaged in by the Father masked resentment towards the Mother.
The parties each acknowledged aspects of the parenting capacity of the other. For example, to Ms F, the Mother acknowledged the Father’s willingness to provide her with practical support, while the Father indicated that he did not hold concerns about the Mother’s capacity to meet X’s needs. In the witness box, the Mother confirmed that she made no criticism of the care provided by the Father to X and that X was well settled in the Father’s care in the current arrangement.
The Mother told Ms F that she was committed to ensuring that X had a relationship with his father, and that she took her responsibility to facilitate this seriously. She also expressed recognition of the importance of X’s relationships with his father and extended paternal family members as being part of his identity and sense of self.
The Mother described making efforts to ensure that she was always positive and encouraging and exhibited recognition of the risks to X of doing otherwise. She expressed to Ms F an intention to do all she could to support X’s relationship with the Father if she were permitted to relocate, including facilitating travel. In the witness box, she presented as cognisant of the challenges for X’s relationship with the Father inherent in her proposal and as genuine in her commitment to minimising the impact of those challenges.
The Father alleged to Ms F that the Mother was ‘hellbent’ on limiting his relationship with X, and that her desire to relocate was a ‘by product’ of this. He suggested to Ms F that the Mother did not genuinely want to move to Canberra and was seeking to do so in order to maintain primary care of X. In the witness box, the Father moderated this position somewhat, accepting that the Mother’s perspective was that her reasons for her proposed move were valid but expressing a view that the Mother had ‘convinced herself’ of this, and confirming his disagreement with her perspective on the basis that the sacrifice in terms of X’s interests was too great.
The Father relied on the fact that the Mother had been living in Adelaide since January 2013, some 12 years prior to the trial, when she was 26 years of age. He emphasised that she had forged her entire career in Adelaide, commencing with her internship, had undertaken significant and careful work geared towards securing and undertaking specialist medical training in Adelaide, and had aligned herself professionally with an organisation she knew to have a clinic in Adelaide but which had not, to her knowledge, had a presence in Canberra.
The Father also pointed to comments he said the Mother had made to him which were indicative of an intention to continue to reside in Adelaide in the long term, including a reference to having found her ‘dream home.’ The Father gave evidence in the witness box that the Mother had spoken to him about her aim of rising up the ranks within the clinic at which she currently works in Adelaide, though he conceded that such discussions had taken place in 2021, at a time when she had had no knowledge of the existence of the opportunity she now wishes to pursue.
The Mother denied that she had evinced an intention to remain in Adelaide permanently. Her evidence was that she had lived in Adelaide for the purpose of completing her specialist medical training and that her subspeciality training, (which she has now completed save for the requirement to complete written and oral exams), had not been available in Canberra, and could only realistically have been undertaken by her in Adelaide, where her established contacts and mentors were based.
The Mother’s evidence was that she had indicated to the Father on a number of occasions commencing prior to X’s birth that there would be a potential need for her to move interstate for a period of six to 12 months for the purpose of training (being a proposition with which the Father agreed), but she acknowledged that she had not raised the prospect of a permanent move with him prior to the G Clinic directorship opportunity having arisen.
In my view, little turns on the issue of intentions previously held by the Mother. As Ms F observed, having a child is a life changing event. This, together with the more recent development of the emergence of the career opportunity that has been made available to the Mother, mean that it cannot be inferred that any previous representations as to an intention to reside in Adelaide in the long term are suggestive of any lack of genuineness or ill intent on the part of the Mother with respect to her present desire to relocate.
It was put to the Mother that she had actively pursued the job opportunity in Canberra, with the intention of putting distance between the Father and X and minimising the role the Father could play in X’s day-to-day life. She credibly denied that allegation.
The Father relied on a number of examples of occasions upon which he considered the Mother had acted to exclude him from involvement in X’s life or had demonstrated that she did not value his role as X’s father. These instances formed the basis of a submission that the risk posed to the maintenance of the relationship between X and his father in the context of the tyranny of distance, where X and the Father would be wholly reliant on the Mother communicating with the Father, was simply too great. Those examples included the following:
(a)Following X’s birth, the Mother resisted him being given the Father’s surname or a hyphenated surname including the Father’s surname. This ultimately resulted in tribunal proceedings after the Mother registered X’s surname as her own surname and Births, Deaths and Marriages subsequently amended the registration to be a hyphenated surname, which change was challenged by the Mother. I accept the Mother’s evidence that she registered X’s name prior to agreement having been reached in order to avoid a fine and to obtain Medicare coverage for him, and not because she simply felt entitled to act unilaterally with respect to issues relating to X or because she considered X to be her child alone. I also accept her evidence that she has since come to accept the decision made by the tribunal to retain the hyphenated surname. However, it remains the case that she actively resisted the inclusion of the Father’s surname for X other than as a middle name.
(b)The Mother enrolled X in childcare using her surname despite having been on notice that Births, Deaths and Marriages had registered his name with a hyphenated surname at the time she did so.[10]
(c)The Mother did not advise the Father of the name of the childcare centre attended by X until April 2024,[11] and even then refused to provide details of X’s attendance there, despite X having commenced attending childcare two years earlier in April 2022 and despite multiple enquiries having been made through the parties’ respective lawyers from as early as February 2022 about childcare specifically and X’s routine and care arrangements more generally.[12] I accept the submission made on behalf of the Father that the Mother was evasive in relation to the Father’s queries concerning this issue.
(d)The Mother did not include the Father’s name or contact details on X’s childcare enrolment form, nor on a child profile form completed at the time of his enrolment, which she acknowledged gave the impression that he did not exist.[13]
(e)At around the time the Father was eventually given the details of the childcare centre, the Mother raised with the managing director of the centre a concern about the potential for the Father attending to collect X, following which an action plan was developed to cater to such a contingency. In this context, the Mother provided the childcare centre with a photograph she had taken of the Father during a Facetime call with X without his consent.[14] This was despite the Father not having removed or attempted to remove X from the care of the Mother or any third party at any time in the past, nor having threatened to do so.
(f)Between September 2023 and February 2025, the Mother and the maternal grandmother each signed a number of ‘incident, injury, trauma and illness’ records at the childcare centre upon which X’s surname was recorded as being the Mother’s surname,[15] which suggested that the childcare centre still had X’s surname recorded as that surname despite the registration of his hyphenated surname. The Mother’s evidence in this regard was that she had not checked the records carefully before signing them at pick up, but had informed the childcare centre of X’s correct surname when his updated birth certificate had been issued in October 2022. The Father accepted that documents produced by the childcare centre pursuant to a subpoena supported this evidence.
(g)In November 2022 and September 2023, the Mother provided the childcare centre with medical certificates in X’s name on which the Mother’s surname was recorded as his surname. The Mother credibly denied having maintained his details at the medical clinic with her surname, and indicated that she had provided the clinic with the updated Medicare card showing X’s correct surname once it had been issued. The Father accepted that documents produced by the childcare centre pursuant to subpoena indicated that the Mother had provided the centre with certificates of immunisation upon which X’s surname was correctly recorded.
(h)In October 2022, when X suffered the first of what would be a number of medical episodes and was taken to hospital by ambulance and admitted, the Mother did not inform the Father for a period of four days. The Mother’s evidence was that her priority had been caring for X, and that she had considered that this important information should be conveyed to the Father in person and she had advised him and given him a pamphlet containing information about those medical episodes designed to be easily understandable for parents when she had next seen him at a handover.
(i)The Mother advised the Father of her relocation proposal by text message after the parties’ first joint session with Ms C, rather than raising it during the session that day.
[10] Exhibits F3, F4 and F5.
[11] Exhibit F13.
[12] Exhibits F1, F2 and F7.
[13] Exhibits F4 and F5.
[14] Exhibit F8.
[15] Exhibit F9.

With respect to Easter, by the conclusion of the trial, the Court was informed that the parties had agreed that the time would ultimately build up to a block of four nights with each parent in alternating years, and that X would spend Easter with the party with whom he was not spending Christmas in the same calendar year. Counsel for the parties indicated that they did not agree on the year from which such an arrangement would take effect, nor on how the provisions for Easter would interact with the provisions for school holiday time.
The Father’s proposal was that X spend time with each of the parties from 6:00pm on Good Friday until 2:00pm on Easter Monday in alternating years, commencing with the Mother in 2026, such that the first such four-night block with the Father would not take place until 2027, at which time X will be five years old, and will already have been spending blocks of four nights with the Father during school holidays pursuant to the orders. In my view, this proposal is developmentally appropriate in light of Ms F’s evidence and is in X’s best interests.
The Father proposed that the time for Easter occur notwithstanding any other order, such that it took precedence over the orders for school holidays when Easter fell during school holidays. No specific alternative proposal in this regard was articulated by the Mother. I am satisfied that the Father’s proposal is in X’s best interests as it ensures that time for the special occasion of Easter is spent evenly between his parents.
The Father did not seek orders specifying time for other special occasions if the parties resided in different cities, but in the event that they resided in the same city, he sought provision for time on New Year’s Eve, the parties’ birthdays, X’s birthday, Mother’s Day and Father’s Day.
The Mother sought provision for time on Mother’s Day, Father’s Day and X’s birthday irrespective of whether the parties resided in the same city.
In my view, specific provision for New Year’s Eve would be unnecessarily disruptive in relation to the long summer holiday arrangements, particularly noting its proximity to Christmas, and X’s best interests would be served by X remaining in the care of the parent with whom he will already be spending time, which accords with the Mother’s proposal. There was no evidence before the Court suggesting that New Year’s Eve was an occasion of any particular significance to the Father or his family.
With respect to Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, the parties’ birthdays, and X’s birthday, it is in my view unwise to attempt to set out prescriptive arrangements for time with each of the parents which will cater for all of the various permutations and configurations that might arise having regard to the different possibilities with respect to each of the parties’ living arrangements and availability to travel and how these occasions will interact with X’s regular arrangements, including travel arrangements and school holiday arrangements, from time to time. In my view, the course that will best meet X’s best interests and accommodate the desire of each of the parents to spend time with him for these occasions to the maximum extent possible will be for the orders to provide as follows:
(a)For each of Mother’s Day and Father’s Day, if X would not otherwise be in the care of the relevant parent, that parent be at liberty, upon the provision of 14 days’ notice to the other parent, to swap the weekend in question with another proximate weekend when X would otherwise be in their care, so as to facilitate him being in their care on the relevant day;
(b)For each of the parents’ birthdays, if X would otherwise be in the same city as the relevant parent, he spend time with that parent from 5:00pm on the day prior to the birthday until 9:00am the day following the birthday, and he otherwise communicate with that parent by Facetime on the birthday; and
(c)For X’s birthday, if the parties are in the same city (irrespective of whether they reside in the same city), X spend time with the parent in whose care he would not otherwise be, from the conclusion of school until 7:00pm if a school day, and from 2:00pm until 9:00am the following day if not a school day; and he otherwise communicate with the parent in whose care he would not otherwise be by Facetime on the birthday.
The Father otherwise sought that for any other special occasion or event, X spend time with the parties as agreed between them in writing, provided that at least 7 days’ notice is given, with a notation that consent not be unreasonably withheld. In circumstances in which such a notation would not be binding and the orders will already provide that X spend such further and other time with each of the parties as may be agreed between them in writing more generally, I do not consider such an additional provision to be necessary. In my view, the parties are both sufficiently child-focused to navigate the need for flexibility when unexpected occasions arise.
COMMUNICATION
The parties agreed that if the Father and X were residing in different cities, they would communicate by Facetime each Tuesday at 5:15pm (Adelaide time) or at such other time as the parties may agree in writing, being a continuation of the current arrangement. They also agreed that they would each facilitate additional communication with the parent with whom X was not spending time at any other time he expressed a wish to do so. I agree that such arrangements are in X’s best interests.
The Court was informed that the parties did not agree on the question of the Facetime communication which would occur between X and the Father in the event that they resided in the same city. In that event, the Mother sought that the regular Facetime calls cease from January 2027, while the Father sought that they continue.
X’s regular Facetime communication with his father has been a feature of his weekly routine since he was eight months of age and has likely contributed to the strong bond they now share. As X becomes older, he will become more and more able to conduct the calls himself, without the need for active and hands-on engagement from the Mother. He will also be able to engage in an increasing range of conversations and activities by way of Facetime as he grows older. Irrespective of the Father’s living arrangements and his proximity to X’s place of residence, Facetime calls will allow X to ‘check in’ with his father and have him more actively involved in his day-to-day life and routine. I am satisfied that it is in X’s best interests that these calls continue.
MAJOR LONG-TERM DECISION-MAKING
The poor state of the parties’ coparenting relationship, as already discussed, is a factor which weighs against the parties sharing responsibility for decision-making with respect to major long-term issues. The parties have already engaged in conflict with respect to major long-term issues including not only the relocation issue but the question of X’s surname, being an issue in relation to which the parties hold differing recollections as to the extent to which agreement was initially reached, and in relation not which they were ultimately unable to agree, resulting in tribunal proceedings.
Notwithstanding this, the evidence reveals that there has consistently been what Ms F described as ‘a level of functional communication’ between the parties with respect to issues pertaining to X’s interests. Ms F observed that the parties had managed to shield X from conflict and that both were aware of their obligations and responsibilities to ensure that he was not impacted. Ms F gave evidence that joint decision-making did not appear to be entirely unworkable to the point where no decision would be able to be made.
It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that if X was residing in Canberra with her, she should have sole responsibility for making decisions with respect to X; and that she had already demonstrated a willingness to provide the Father with detailed information about X, such that the Court could have confidence that she would continue to do so. The orders she sought included provision for her to keep the Father informed in a timely manner of all long-term decisions made by her.
Ms F suggested that if the parties were living in different states, then given that the Mother would be physically located in the relevant place and would know the schools and other relevant institutions, it may be best for her to have the final decision-making authority, but she recommended that the Father be able to ‘feed in’ to such decisions.
Although the Mother expressed concern about the need to make decisions about X’s medical care quickly, the need to consult with respect to major long-term issues would not preclude her from making immediate short-term decisions in emergency circumstances.
It was submitted on behalf of the Father that vesting sole decision-making in the Mother would remove him from significant aspects of X’s life, and have the effect of sidelining him, which would not serve X’s best interests. Ms F agreed that joint decision-making responsibility would facilitate the Father being informed and engaged.
In my view, the need to promote, rather than diminish, the Father’s ability to take active involvement in parenting is greater than it would otherwise be in circumstances in which the distance between the parties’ homes will prevent him from taking active involvement in parenting X in some other ways.
Counsel for the Father submitted that the Court should view the parties’ coparenting relationship in light of their mutual commitment to prioritise X and his needs, and in terms of their demonstrated capacity, rather than the current low ebb in their dynamic at the conclusion of emotionally draining litigation, particularly given that their engagement in family therapy had been paused for a lengthy period, thus depriving them of the opportunity to work on their coparenting communication and develop it beyond the strained and artificial context of written communications.
The Father’s Counsel emphasised that the communications between the parties as demonstrated in the evidence before the Court were respectful, flexible and child-focused. The Father, in particular, it was submitted, had consistently attempted to keep the peace, had made genuine efforts to work with the Mother and cooperate with her wishes, and had been conciliatory in his approach. It was also submitted that it was evident that both parties genuinely wanted to be ‘on the same page.’ I accept these submissions. I note also that the Father is a highly motivated and interested parent.
In my view, X’s best interests will be served by the parties having joint responsibility for major long-term decisions. X is fortunate enough to have two genuinely child-focused and committed parents. His father will already potentially be less involved in important aspects of X’s life than would ideally be the case as a result of the distance between them. I am satisfied that the Father’s ongoing involvement in the making of major long-term decisions will assist with mitigating the impact of that on X and will thereby serve his best interests.
OTHER MATTERS
Handovers
The parties agreed that if X was residing in Canberra and the Father in Adelaide, all handovers which did not take place at X’s childcare, kindergarten, or school would take place at the airport in the city in which the time was taking place, or at such other place as agreed between the parties in writing, with both parties being at liberty to have an agent attending on their behalf provided that that person was known to the child.
The parties also reached agreement as to a location for handover prior to X’s commencement at school in the event that he remained living in Adelaide, and agreed that in such circumstances, handovers would take place at school from the time X commenced school.
I am satisfied that the arrangements agreed to by the parties with respect to handovers are in X’s best interests. However, the orders will be slightly reworded to ensure that they cater for all potential contingencies including handovers in Canberra in the event that the Father moves there or spends additional time there, and any non-school handovers that do not involve air travel.
Cost of travel
The parties agreed that in the event that the Mother’s relocation application was successful, the Mother would cover any and all costs associated with her travel and X’s travel to Adelaide to spend time with the Father during school terms, and the Father would cover any and all costs associated with his own travel to Canberra. They also agreed that in relation to travel for school holidays and special occasions, the Mother would pay the cost of X’s travel to Adelaide, and the Father would pay the cost of his return travel to Canberra. I am satisfied that such provision is in X’s best interests, having regard to the parties’ respective financial circumstances.
Injunctions
Each of the parties sought injunctions which were opposed by the other. The power to grant such an injunction is found in subsection 68B(2) of the Act, which provides, in summary, that the Court may grant an injunction in relation to a child in any case in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient to do so. Although the paramountcy principle in section 60CA does not apply to the granting of an injunction, X’s best interests are a relevant consideration.[25]
[25] Bennett & Bennett [2001] FamCA 462; (2001) FLC ¶93-088; Flanagan & Handcock (2002) FLC ¶93-102.
In the event that the Mother succeeded in her relocation application, the Father sought an injunction restraining her from moving with X to any location other than Canberra or Adelaide. The Mother confirmed that she had no intention of moving from Canberra to anywhere else or seeking to do so. I accept that evidence, noting in particular that Canberra is the Mother’s city of origin and is where her family resides. It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that the proposed injunction would impose a restriction on the Mother’s freedom of movement to which the Father would not also be subject.
Clearly, it would not be in X’s best interests for the Mother to move with him to any location of her choosing without reference to the Father. However, in my view, in light of the other orders being made, the injunction sought by the Father is otiose and it is therefore not just or convenient to grant it.
In this regard, the order for joint decision-making responsibility requires that the parties consult with one another and make a genuine effort to reach a joint decision before any such decision is made in relation to major long-term issues, including changes to X’s living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for him to spend time with the Father and changes to X’s school.[26]
[26] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 4 (definition of ‘major long-term issues’), 61DAA.
Furthermore, the orders for time which are to be made contain specific reference to time occurring in Adelaide and in Canberra. As such, any proposed change to X’s city of residence would necessitate variations to those orders. As a consequence, the Mother would be required by the terms of the orders that are to be made either to reach agreement with the Father or to make further application to the Court in the event of the development of any proposal to move to any other location with X.
The Mother sought mutual injunctions restraining the parties from attending at or remaining in the vicinity of the residence or workplace of the other or allowing their partner or members of their family to do so. She accepted that neither the Father nor any members of his family had done anything inappropriate in that regard. I accept the submission of Counsel for the Father that there is no evidence to support the making of such an injunction.
The Mother also sought an injunction restraining the parties from communicating with each other, other than by email. This proposed injunction included prohibitions on communication by telephone or text message. The Mother gave no evidence of any conduct on behalf of the Father that would appear to be linked to any basis for such an injunction. Again, I accept the submission of Counsel for the Father that there is no evidence to support such an injunction.
The Mother sought that the parties each be restrained from making appointments for X for any activity while he was living with the other, save in an emergency. The basis for such an injunction was not apparent from the evidence relied on by the Mother. Counsel for the Father submitted that the proposed injunction was vague and uncertain and therefore apt to give rise to conflict between the parties. I accept that submission. A literal interpretation of the proposed order would prohibit the Father from making any appointments for X for any purpose at any time, noting that he will be at all times ‘living with’ the Mother even when he is spending time in the care of the Father.
For these reasons, I am not satisfied that it is in X’s best interests, nor just or convenient, to grant any of the injunctions sought by either of the parties (other than those sought by consent, which are discussed below).
Notification of hospitalisation
The Father sought an order providing that in the event that X is taken to and/or admitted to hospital, each party inform the other by way of telephone call, and in the event the call is unanswered, by text message, as soon as practicable. This provision was opposed by the Mother, but the basis for this opposition was not made clear.
In my view, it is in X’s best interests that each of his parents be notified immediately (and in the manner most likely to facilitate immediate receipt of the information) of any hospitalisation. The order would appear to be necessary to ensure that this occurs in light of the previous incident involving the Father not having learned for a period of four days after X was taken to hospital by ambulance.
First option to care for X
The Father proposed an order providing that in the event that either party is unable to care for X during any period pursuant to the orders that X is scheduled to be in their care for a period of or exceeding five nights, then the other party be given first option to care for him. This proposal was put on the basis that if this occurred during school time, any such caring would occur in the city in which X resides.
It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that this could result in X travelling to Adelaide for the purpose of spending time with the Father, the first option to care for him being given to the Mother, and X not actually spending time with the Father at all. However, the absence of such an order could also result in X travelling to Adelaide but spending no time with the Father if the Father were not available, with the only difference being that in such circumstances, he would not necessarily be returned to the Mother’s care.
Given the closeness of X’s relationship with each of his parents and their parenting competence, I consider it in his best interests to enable each of the parties to have the first option to care for him if the other is unable to do so for an extended time. In the case of the Father, in the event that the Father is able to do so, this is likely to provide a valuable opportunity to provide additional care for X, which may mitigate some of the impact of the reduction in their ability to spend time together which will arise from the Mother’s relocation. I consider the five day trigger to be a reasonable condition, as it will prevent the provision from causing undue interference with the parties’ ability to make their own plans for X’s care to cater for short term absences.
The order will include a provision that any period of time spent by X with the Father pursuant to such an option is not to exceed the greatest number of consecutive nights he has previously spent in his care at the relevant time, so as to ensure that the provision does not undermine the carefully considered and developmentally appropriate build-up of time with the Father that is otherwise provided for in the orders.
Substantial availability

The Mother sought an order requiring that the Father be ‘substantially available’ when caring for X. The purported basis for such an order was not clear and was somewhat difficult to reconcile with the Mother’s own extensive (and unobjectionable) use of childcare and family members to care for X as a result of her own work commitments.
The Father’s evidence, which I accept, was that he intended to care for X personally during the time that X spends in his care, but that he may rely on his partner and family at times, or, as a last resort, childcare. The letter from the Father’s employer as discussed above[27] suggests that the Father is likely to be able to manage to be personally available to provide care to X most of the time. There is no basis on the evidence for concluding or even suspecting that he would not do so to the maximum extent consistent with his other commitments.
[27] Exhibit M8.
There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the Father is anything other than committed to spending time with X and eager to spend as much time caring for him as possible. I do not consider such an order to be warranted or in X’s best interests.
School enrolment
The Father sought an order providing that neither party take any steps to enrol X in any school that has not been agreed to by the other party. It was submitted on behalf of the Mother that this represented ‘inappropriate gatekeeping’ by the Father. I do not agree. Not only is the Father an actively involved and child-focused parent, but the application was made in circumstances in which he has, in the past, been denied information about X’s childcare arrangements despite multiple requests, and in which he was not named on the enrolment form for X’s childcare. In those circumstances, the Father’s perception of the need for such an order is understandable.
In my view, however, such an order is unnecessary in light of the order for joint decision-making, which requires consultative decision-making in relation to schooling. It could also operate to X’s detriment, as it would prevent him from attending any school at all while an agreement was negotiated in the event of an impasse. Such an order will not be made.
Domestic travel
The Father sought an order providing for each party to be at liberty to travel interstate with X upon the provision of notice and specified information pertaining to the proposed travel, provided that the travel did not coincide with specified special occasions, unless otherwise agreed. In my view, the ability of the parties to travel interstate with X is provided for by the order that is to be made by consent with respect to the provision of notice for travel and there is no utility in, and indeed a risk of confusion arising from, the inclusion of a further order in relation to this issue.
International travel
The Father proposed that from 2028 (X’s seventh birthday), the parties each be at liberty to travel with him outside Australia for a 14 day period each year upon conditions including the travel coinciding with school holidays wherever practical, and the provision of notice and other information. He also sought associated orders with respect to obtaining a passport for X.
In the witness box, the Mother agreed that the opportunity to travel with each of his parents was something X would enjoy. In light of the competence and child-focus of each of the parents, I consider that it would be in X’s best interests for him to have this opportunity. For the same reasons as given above with respect to the suspension of each party’s time for the purpose of travel, I am of the view that X’s best interests would be served by that opportunity being available from the 2029/2030 long summer holidays.
Miscellaneous
The parties otherwise reached agreement in relation to a range of matters, including provision for each of them to keep the other informed of their contact details and important information pertaining to X; mutual injunctions restraining them from abusing or denigrating the other or the other’s family, discussing the proceeding or any dispute between them with X, or consuming illicit drugs or alcohol to excess while X is in their care; each being at liberty to obtain documents and information relating to X, such as medical information and school-related documents; each being at liberty to attend school-related events and extra-curricular activities; and conditions relating to domestic travel with X. I am satisfied that such orders are in X’s best interests.
CONCLUSION
Having regard to all of the considerations as outlined above, I make orders as set out at the commencement of these reasons, which I am satisfied are in X’s best interests.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and seventy (270) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Parker.
Associate:
Dated: 21 May 2025

File number(s):	ADC 650 of 2024
Judgment of:	JUDGE PARKER
Date of judgment:	21 May 2025
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – relocation – where Mother seeks to relocate with parties’ three year old child from Adelaide to Canberra – where both parties are committed and competent parents
Legislation:	Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4, 4AB, 60CA, 60CC, 61DAA, 68B Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 8.15(3)(e)
Cases cited:	A & A: Relocation Approach [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) FLC ¶93-035 AMS & AIF [1999] HCA 26; (1999) 199 CLR 160 B & B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 [1997] FamCA 33; (1997) FLC ¶92-755 Bennett & Bennett [2001] FamCA 462; (2001) FLC ¶93-088 Cubbin & Cutler [2018] FamCAFC 84 Flanagan & Handcock (2002) FLC ¶93-102 Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 Mallory & Mallory [2022] FedCFamC1F 697 Masoud & Masoud [2016] FamCAFC 24; (2016) FLC ¶93-689 Morgan & Miles [2007] FamCA 1230; (2007) FLC ¶93-343 Murdock & Madden [2011] FamCAFC 219 Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249; (2024) FLC ¶94-230 Quintana & Konigsmann [2025] FedCFamC1A 30 Taylor v Barker [2007] FamCA 1246; (2007) FLC ¶93-345 U & U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238 Willmore & Menendez [2022] FedCFamC1A 73
Division:	Division 2 Family Law
Number of paragraphs:	270
Date of hearing:	5-8 May 2025
Place:	Adelaide
Counsel for the Applicant:	Ms Lewis SC with Mr Siklich
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Angela Ferdinandy Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Miller
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Resolve Divorce Lawyers

ADC 650 of 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:	MS KNIGHT Applicant
AND:	MR REDDING Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE PARKER
DATE OF ORDER:	21 MAY 2025