KNIGHT and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE - [2010] WASAT 104

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL

ACT: FIREARMS ACT 1973 (WA)

CITATION: KNIGHT and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2010] WASAT 104

MEMBER: DR B DE VILLIERS (MEMBER)

HEARD: 28 JUNE 2010

DELIVERED : 19 JULY 2010

FILE NO/S: CC 273 of 2010

BETWEEN: ANTHONY KNIGHT
Applicant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent

Catchwords:

Firearms Revocation of firearm licence Fit and proper Relevance of previous convictions Previous proceedings in the Magistrates Court Estoppel and res judicata Does a decision under the Sentencing Act in the Magistrates Court preclude the State Administrative Tribunal to conduct a proceeding under the Firearms Act as to whether Mr Knight is a 'fit and proper person' to be licensed - Discretion of licensing officer Public interest

Legislation:

Firearms Act 1973 (WA), s 11, s 20
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 106
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1), s 27(3), s 29(1), s 29(3), s 29(5)

Result:

The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to these proceedings
The application for review fails
The decision of the Commissioner of Police to revoke the firearm licence of Mr Knight is affirmed
The application is dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Mr A Skerritt
Respondent: Senior Constable S Bagley (Representative)

Solicitors:

Applicant: Alana Padmanabham
Respondent: Commissioner of Police

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446
Parkin v James (1905) 2 CLR 315

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary of Tribunal's decision

Mr Anthony Knight sought a review of a decision by a licensing officer, acting under the Firearms Act 1973 (WA), to revoke his firearm licence and to refuse to add additional firearms to the licence. Mr Knight had been granted a firearm licence in 1995. In September 2009 he applied for two additional firearms to be added to the licence. The licensing officer revoked the existing licence and refused the two applications for additional firearms on the grounds that the licensing officer had formed the view that Mr Knight was no longer a fit and proper person to be licensed.
Mr Andrew Skerritt contended on behalf of Mr Knight that the decision of the licensing officer should be set aside, principally for two reasons: firstly, the offences which triggered the decision of the Commissioner of Police had been the subject of proceedings in the Magistrates Court and the licence was not revoked as part of those proceedings - the Tribunal is therefore estopped by the working of res judicata (a matter previously decided) to deal with the matter again. The licensing officer therefore acted without authorisation when the decision to revoke the licence was made - secondly, Mr Knight had provided acceptable explanations for the incidents that caused his convictions and he is a fit and proper person to be licensed.
Senior Constable Simon Bagley, for the Commissioner of Police, explained that the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) authorises the licensing officer to revoke a firearm's licence if he is satisfied that, if the person had applied at that stage for a licence, it would be refused. The licensing officer could therefore revoke a licence at any time, even after it had been granted. Senior Constable Bagley contended that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in these proceedings remained alive since the Magistrates Court only dealt with the matter under the Sentencing Act1995 (WA) and never considered the fit and proper issues under the Firearms Act. In fact, Mr Skerritt explicitly requested the Magistrates Court not to revoke the licence on the basis that the Tribunal could in due course deal with the fit and proper aspect. It is therefore inexplicable why Mr Skerritt would in these proceedings contend that the Magistrates Court had disposed of the matter. Secondly, if the record of Mr Knight is reviewed, it is reasonable to form the opinion that he is not a fit and proper person to be licensed. Mr Knight has had convictions related to possession of an unlicensed firearm, breach of a violence restraining order, stalking, and three counts of failure to ensure safekeeping of firearms/ammunition.
The Tribunal accepted the contentions of Senior Constable Bagley and found that:
a)The Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the matter on the basis that the Magistrates Court did not consider the fitness and properness of Mr Knight to be licensed and the Court did not make any findings under the Firearms Act; and
b)The record of Mr Knight is such that the Tribunal formed the opinion that he is not a fit and proper person to be licensed.
The Tribunal therefore affirmed the decision of the licensing officer to revoke the firearms licence of Mr Knight and to refuse to add two new firearms to it. The application was therefore dismissed.

Issue

Mr Anthony Knight seeks a review of a decision of the Commissioner of Police (Commissioner) to revoke a firearm licence and to refuse to add additional firearms to the licence on grounds that the Commissioner is of the opinion that Mr Knight is not a fit and proper person to be licensed.

Background

The application for review of the decision was lodged on 25 February 2010. The first directions hearing took place on 25 March 2010. The hearing was set down for 11 May 2010. At the request of the parties, the proceedings were adjourned and the hearing ultimately occurred on 28 June 2010. Both parties made written and oral submissions, and Mr Knight provided character references.
At the hearing, the parties indicated that they would be satisfied for the Tribunal to decide the matter on the papers. The Tribunal, nevertheless, invited the parties to make oral submissions in regard to particularly the estoppel/res judicata contentions. The parties were satisfied that as far as the question of fit and proper is concerned, the decision should be made on the papers.
The decision was reserved on 28 June 2010.

Summary of facts

The facts are well set out in the respective written and oral submissions. The Tribunal has taken all of the information, submissions, character references and evidence into account before coming to its decision.
The facts can be briefly summarised as follows.
Mr Knight was granted a firearm's licence in 1995. At the time he had one conviction of possessing an unlicensed firearm and ammunition.
Mr Knight sought, in September 2009, to have additional firearms added to his licence. This application was refused by the Commissioner on 17 February 2010. At the same time as refusing the addition of the additional firearms to the firearm's licence, the Commissioner also revoked the licence.
Mr Knight's criminal record is as follows:
•1988 possess unlicensed firearms and ammunition;
•2000 possession of firearm without licence;
•2000 failure to keep firearm safe;
•2000 breach of violence restraining order;
•2000 stalking; and
•2008 failure to keep ammunition/firearm safely (two counts).
Mr Knight applied for a review of the decision on 15 April 2010.

Statutory framework

The Tribunal will briefly summarise the statutory framework within which the review occurs.
The licence to acquire a firearm, or to continue to hold a firearm, is not a right, but a privilege; hence the regulatory regime imposed by Parliament whereby the obligation is on the applicant to demonstrate why he should be licensed. It is particularly in instances where a person has a history of, or a tendency towards, violence or offences against the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (Firearms Act) where Parliament expects the licensing officer to demonstrate vigilance when assessing an application; hence the inclusion into the Firearms Act of the provisions of s 11(2); s 11(3) and s 11(6).
The Tribunal has, in accordance with s 29(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) the same jurisdiction, functions and discretions as those of the licensing officer.
The Tribunal is not limited to the statement of reasons given by the licensing officer (s 27(3) SAT Act). The Tribunal may also take into account any additional or new information that was not at the disposal of the licensing officer at the time when the decision was made (s 27(1) SAT Act). The objective of the Tribunal is to arrive at the best and preferable decision.
The review hearing is therefore de novo (s 27(1) SAT Act) and is not confined to the matters and information that were before the licensing officer at the time of the decision.
The powers of the Tribunal, according to s 29(3) of the SAT Act, are to:
a)affirm the decision;
b)vary the decision; or
c)set aside the decision,
and to make appropriate orders.
The decision of the Tribunal is regarded as a decision of the licensing officer (s 29(5) SAT Act).
The discretion of the Tribunal must be exercised within the context of the provisions of the Firearms Act. The question as to whether Mr Knight is a fit and proper person to hold a firearm's licence must therefore be determined within the framework and objectives of the enabling Act.
Section 11(1) of the Firearms Act provides that the licensing officer, or in this case the Tribunal, cannot grant an approval if the Tribunal is of the 'opinion' that the person is not a fit and proper person to hold a licence.
Section 11(2) of the Firearms Act provides that the licensing officer may take into account whether the person has 'a history of, or a tendency towards, violent behaviour' when forming an opinion if the person is fit and proper to be licensed.
Section 11(3) of the Firearms Act provides that the licensing officer 'has sufficient grounds for forming an opinion that a person is not fit and proper' to be licensed if, within a five year period before the application, the person was convicted of an offence involving violence. The licensing officer is, however, not limited to take into account only convictions recorded in the last five years (s 11(5) Firearms Act).
Section 11(3) of the Firearms Act also provides that the Commissioner has sufficient grounds for 'forming an opinion that a person is not fit and proper' to hold a firearm if, within a period of five years, the person was convicted of an offence against the Firearms Act.
Section 11(5) of the Firearms Act provides that, regardless of the provisions of s 11(3), the licensing officer may form an opinion that a person is fit and proper to hold a licence.
Section 11(3) and s 11(5) therefore confirm the discretion of the Tribunal to take into account all relevant information before forming an opinion that a person is fit and proper to be licensed.
Section 20 of the Firearms Act provides that the licensing officer may revoke a firearm's licence if it is satisfied that the person holding the licence 'could not', because of s 11, 'be granted the approval or permit or issued a licence', as the case requires, 'if the person were then applying for it'.

Two questions to be determined

The Tribunal must determine two questions in these proceedings, namely:
a)Do the findings of the Magistrates Court stop the Tribunal from dealing with the matter on the basis of res judicata?
b)If the Tribunal is not estopped from dealing with the matter, is Mr Knight, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a fit and proper person to hold a licence for a firearm?

Do the findings of the Magistrates Court stop the Tribunal from dealing with the matter on the basis of res judicata or issue estoppel

Issue estoppel refers to a final determination that has been made on an issue, be it in fact or in law, so that it cannot thereafter be raised by the same parties or be considered by another court or tribunal. While issue estoppel relates to a specific issue, res judicata relates to an entire claim (Butterworths Business and Law Dictionary (1st ed, 1997) LexisNexis Butterworths; Blair & Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Curran (Adams' Will) (1939) 62 CLR 464 (Blair) and Parkin v James (1905) 2 CLR 315.
In these proceedings, Mr Knight relies on res judicata.
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999) defines res judicata as 'An issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision' and 'An affirmative defence barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction and that could have been but was not raised in the first suit'.
Res judicata applies by operation of law and not within the discretion of a court or tribunal (Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary (1997)).
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (6th ed, 2000, Sweet & Maxwell) emphasises that res judicata is based on two separate statements; firstly, that parties to a judgment are disputed from litigating again on the same facts that were considered in the judgment, and secondly, if a party seeks to provide new facts, which, if they had been provided in the first proceedings, would or might have affected the outcome thereof.
In the matter of Blair, Dixon J described issue estoppel as follows:
A judicial determination directly involving an issue of law or of fact disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies (at 531).
The principle of res judicata, where once a matter has been litigated it cannot be re-opened, was explained as follows in Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 (at 446) by Fullagar J:
When an action has been brought and judgment entered in that action, no other proceedings can thereafter be maintained on the same cause of action.
In order to determine if all questions of law and fact had been dealt with in a previous proceeding, the Tribunal is 'entitled to look at the judge's reasons for his decision …' (Words and Phrases Legally Defined (3rd ed, 1990) Butterworths).
Mr Skerritt contended that in earlier proceedings in the Magistrates Court, the question of whether Mr Knight was a fit and proper person to be licensed was exhaustively and conclusively dealt with. He contended that Magistrate Campione decided not to revoke the licence but, rather, to impose a sizeable fine. In doing so, Mr Skerritt contended, the Magistrate accepted that Mr Knight continues to be a fit and proper person to be licensed. The Tribunal is therefore precluded from reopening the question.
Senior Constable Bagley contended that although the Commissioner requested the Magistrate to revoke the licence, the Magistrate accepted the contentions of Mr Skerritt not to revoke the licence but to leave it to the State Administrative Tribunal to consider. According to Senior Constable Bagley, Mr Skerritt specifically requested the Magistrate not to make a finding whether Mr Knight is a fit and proper person to hold a firearm licence, but to allow the licensing officer to exercise its discretion under s 11 of the Firearms Act and, if Mr Knight disagreed with the decision of the licensing officer, for the Tribunal to consider an application for review. It is therefore not proper for Mr Skerritt to contend in these proceedings before the Tribunal that the matter has conclusively been dealt with under the Firearms Act.
The Tribunal was provided with a transcript of proceedings in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia on 22 April 2008 and 29 April 2008. The transcripts were in regard to the matter of Police and Anthony Glen Knight (KH 543 and KH 544 of 2008). The charges against Mr Knight were for failing to ensure the safekeeping of a firearm and ammunition. The prosecutor requested that Mr Knight's firearm's licence be revoked pursuant to s 106 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), since it would have been the fourth conviction for a firearm's offence.
Mr Skerritt acted for Mr Knight in those proceedings.
Mr Skerritt requested Magistrate Campione not to revoke the firearm's licence. Mr Skerritt contended as follows:
I say that because if the [C]ommissioner is of the opinion that as a result of this offence, pursuant to section 11 of the Firearms Act, that Mr Knight is no longer a fit and proper person or that it's not in the interests of public safety that Mr Knight hold a firearm[,] then the [C]ommissioner has the power to revoke is [sic] licence and then an application can be made to the SAT by Mr Knight to review that. (T: 7, 22.04.08)
Mr Skerritt then went on to say:
So I think in those circumstances there is a solid argument to say, look, this is a matter that if the [C]ommissioner wishes to pursue revocation of the licence of Mr Knight then that should be done by the normal proceeds through an application or via revocation by the [C]ommissioner which she has the power to do [in] any event after a plea of guilty has been entered in relation to an offence under the act and then the matter can be ventilated before the State Administrative Tribunal and that course of action if it is contested by Mr Knight will generate costs and further penalty on him in any event as it's a no cost jurisdiction (T: 7 8, 22.04.08) (Tribunal emphasis)
During the hearing before the Tribunal, the Tribunal enquired from Mr Skerritt, firstly, why he did not in his oral submissions draw the attention of the Tribunal to the submissions he had made to the Magistrate and, secondly, why he did not explain to the Tribunal what could be seen as an inconsistency between the submissions he made to the Magistrate and his reliance in these proceedings on res judicata.
Mr Skerritt explained that it was his interpretation of the findings of the Magistrate that his (Mr Skerritt's) submissions were not accepted; namely, for the question of revocation under the Firearms Act to be dealt with in later proceedings before the State Administrative Tribunal. Mr Skerritt suggested that the transcript of proceedings in the Magistrates Court showed that the Magistrate had rejected his contentions and had made a final decision regarding the fit and properness of Mr Knight to be licensed.
Senior Constable Bagley challenged this reply of Mr Skerritt and drew the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the Magistrate had only dealt with possible disqualification of Mr Knight under the Sentencing Act as part of a sentence. According to Senior Constable Bagley, the Magistrate at no stage dealt with the question of whether Mr Knight is a fit and proper person to be licensed. From this, it appears, Senior Constable Bagley says, that the Magistrate had in fact accepted the contention of Mr Skerritt by not dealing with possible revocation, since the State Administrative Tribunal was the appropriate forum for such a proceeding.
In the oral reasons for decision handed down on 29 April 2008, Magistrate Campione said the following about the possible suspension of the firearm licence:
In terms of penalty a fine is the appropriate penalty today but I guess the greater question for you is whether I exercise my discretion under the Sentencing Act and suspend your firearm licence for any period of time. In terms of financial penalty, you will be fined $1500 for each of the offences before the court today. You will also be ordered to pay costs of $110.20.
However, given the gaps in your offending, the fact that the prosecution they're not even asserting that there is any nefarious or criminal activity associated with this, it's a case where you say that you were ignorant of what was required of you. Although ignorance is no excuse at law, you made a poor decision but given that I am ultimately persuaded by the weight of the evidence before me that you are a sports shooter, the value of the rifles is some $10,000 I'm told and the value of ammunition I think a couple of thousand dollars I was told, I'm not going to grant the prosecution request. (T: 3, 29.04.08)
The Tribunal commented during the hearing that it was surprised that Mr Skerritt had put a proposition to the Magistrate and then put a completely different proposition to the Tribunal. The Tribunal raised with Mr Skerritt what appeared to be a failure on his part to bring the apparent inconsistency to the attention of the Tribunal and to explain the reasons for it.

Mr Skerritt contended that the Magistrate had not accepted his proposition for the fit and proper question to be dealt with by the licensing officer and the State Administrative Tribunal. Mr Skerritt said that the Magistrate had rejected his argument and explicitly made a finding that the licence was not going to be revoked.
The Tribunal does not accept Mr Skerritt's interpretation of Magistrate Campione's decision.
The following appears from a close reading of the transcript of proceedings in the Magistrates Court:
•The police sought a disqualification of Mr Knight's firearms licence pursuant to s 106 of the Sentencing Act.
•No mention was made by the police of a revocation under the Firearms Act or a revocation on the basis of the Commissioner not being satisfied that Mr Knight is a fit and proper person to be licensed.
•Mr Skerritt contended that it would not be appropriate for the licence to be revoked and the firearms to be forfeited. He proposed that the question of revocation be dealt with under s 11 of the Firearms Act by the Commissioner and, on review, the State Administrative Tribunal.
•Mr Skerritt, who is well versed in the provisions of the Firearms Act and often appears in the Tribunal in firearm related matters, explained to Magistrate Campione that if the Commissioner were to find that Mr Knight was no longer a fit and proper person to be licensed, the matter could be dealt with in separate proceedings before the State Administrative Tribunal.
•Magistrate Campione said that under the discretion pursuant to the Sentencing Act, the licence was not revoked or suspended.
•Magistrate Campione made no mention of the fit and properness of Mr Knight to be licensed. Magistrate Campione only dealt with the possible disqualification as part of a proper sentence for the convictions.
•Magistrate Campione made no finding under the Firearms Act.
The Tribunal rejects the contention of Mr Skerritt that these proceedings should be struck out on the basis that the doctrine of res judicata applies.
There is no indication that in the Magistrates Court proceedings the question, the subject of these proceedings, namely, if Mr Knight was a fit and proper person to be licensed, had been dealt with. In fact, it appears as if Magistrate Campione had accepted the contention of Mr Skerritt that the licence should not be revoked under the Sentencing Act on the basis that the fit and properness of Mr Knight could be 'ventilated before the State Administrative Tribunal'.
The Tribunal further rejects the contention of Mr Skerritt in para 35 of his submissions dated 25 June 2010, that 'The issue of the Applicant's fitness to have a firearm[']s licence has also been addressed and adjudicated upon by the learned sentencing magistrate'.
The insistence of Mr Skerritt during oral submissions that the matter had been fully and finally dealt with by Magistrate Campione was unhelpful.
The Tribunal therefore finds as follows in regard to the question under consideration:
•The possible revocation of Mr Knight's firearm licence under s 11 of the Firearms Act, on the basis that he was no longer a fit and proper person to be licensed, had not been dealt with by Magistrate Campione.
•There was no power for Magistrate Campione under the Sentencing Act to consider the fit and properness of Mr Knight to continue to be licensed. The Magistrate was constrained by considerations in the Sentencing Act.
•The Commissioner should not be estopped from exercising its powers under the Firearms Act.
•The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to these proceedings since the question of Mr Knight's continued licensing under the Firearms Act is quite different from the sentencing regime under the Sentencing Act.
The application for an order that the Commissioner be estopped from revoking the firearm licence should therefore be dismissed.

Is Mr Knight, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a fit and proper person to be licensed to hold a firearm?

The Tribunal must exercise its discretion regarding the question before it by taking into account all the information available in the proceedings. Such information includes the written and oral submissions made by the parties, the transcript of proceedings of the Magistrates Court, Mr Knight's criminal record, and character references provided on behalf of Mr Knight. Mr Knight did not give evidence in the proceedings.
The evidence shows that Mr Knight is a keen firearms sportsman. The Commissioner does not take issue with the genuine nature of his reasons to possess a firearm. Magistrate Campione also referred to Mr Knight's active involvement in the sport of shooting.
The Magistrate, however, made some criticism of Mr Knight and commented that for a person so well versed in the use of firearms, one would expect a great awareness of the legal standards that are associated with possession of firearms. Magistrate Campione observed as follows:
I guess it's a bit of a double-edged sword for you because I would expect that someone who is used to being around guns exercises commonsense and complies with the letter of the law'. (T: 2, 29.04.08)
Mr Skerritt correctly pointed out that the purpose of the words 'fit and proper' are to bestow unto the Tribunal a 'wide scope of judgment and to ascertain the suitability of a person to undertake a particular activity based on a determination of that person's previous conduct, character or reputation' (para 40 of Mr Skerritt's submissions dated 25 June 2010).
Mr Skerritt then considered the background of Mr Knight and came to the conclusion that:
… it is clear that the offending does not amount to the Applicant not being a fit and proper person, especially given the administrative nature of the offending in 2008. This is also in keeping with the finding of the learned sentencing magistrate in 2008. (Tribunal emphasis) (Paragraph 44 of Mr Skerritt's submissions dated 25 June 2010.)
It is not clear to the Tribunal what Mr Skerritt describes as an 'administrative nature of offending'. The statement of material facts, to which Mr Knight pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court, described the facts of what happened on 19 February 2008 as follows:
At about 9.30pm on Saturday the 16th of February 2008, the accused [Mr Knight] and others were drinking in the common area. A verbal altercation has ensued. In an attempt to control the situation the accused has turned the electricity off to one of the other employees units. This has had the opposite effect to what the accused had anticipated.
The altercation escalated to the point where there was some pushing and shoving.
Police and Toll management attended and spoke with all parties at length. Several of the employees claimed that they were concerned that the accused possibly had firearms stored on the premises.
…
Management conducted a search of the premises and requested that Police re-attend the premises.
At 9.45pm on Saturday the 16th of February 2008, Police were shown to a broken fibreglass shipping container. Inside the container Police located several firearms, ammunition and boxes of reloading equipment, and associated firearm items. The items clearly belonged to the accused as his name was on some of the boxes and his WA Sporting Shooters Licence was located amongst the items.
Police seized the firearms and ammunition, conveying them to the Karratha Police Station. The accused was later spoken to and admitted storing the firearms at his employer[']s premises without any formal permission. The container in which the firearms were stored was not an approved firearms cabinet. Despite the accused placing a padlock on the door it was easily removed allowing access to the five firearms and 5377 rounds of ammunition.
The offence attracted a fine of $3,000 which, according to Mr Skerritt, is in the higher scale of penalties for similar offences. How Mr Skerritt can describe the offences as 'administrative', and then further say such categorisation is 'in keeping' with the findings of Magistrate Campione, escapes logic.
On proper reflection of the criminal record of Mr Knight, it appears that he has had several offences under the Firearms Act, as well as offences involving breach of a violence restraining order and stalking. Itښappears from the uncontested submissions of the Commissioner that, in February 2000, Mr Knight was arrested for unlawful stalking in relation to a violence restraining order and that, within a period of a month after the order had been issued, he contacted the complainant on at least 103 occasions.
It further appears that Mr Knight had failed, in 1999, to declare possession of an unlicensed firearm to police after he had been required, pursuant to a violence restraining order, to surrender all his firearms. The firearm was located where it was buried close to his house.
Mr Knight was convicted as recently as April 2008 for further offences under the Firearms Act for failing to keep safe a firearm and ammunition. It appears from the transcript of reasons of Magistrate Campione's decision that Mr Knight did not give evidence but that his counsel, Mr Skerritt, explained to the court that Mr Knight was not entirely aware of his responsibilities under the Firearms Act. Magistrate Campione replied as follows to Mr Skerritt's contention:
I also had trouble with the explanation afforded by your counsel of ignorance given that it's your second conviction under this very section for the same offence. Although Mr Skerritt, without enlightening me further, told me that the circumstances of your conviction earlier were markedly different from this.' (T: 2, 29.04.08)
Mr Knight did not give evidence during the Tribunal proceedings. It is therefore not possible to gauge whether he has indeed learned a lesson from his previous convictions, whether he is showing remorse, and whether he realises the wrongful nature of his failure to comply with the Firearms Act.
The Tribunal is left with the distinct impression of a man who has repeatedly breached important sections of the Firearms Act, who has been convicted but who continues to offend.
The public would, with justification, be concerned if Mr Knight were to retain his firearm licence. Being licensed to possess a firearm is a major trust bestowed on a person by the public through the office of the licensing officer. A licensee must act in accordance with the trust, otherwise a licence can be revoked. The repeated firearm offences of Mr Knight, and his failure to keep firearms and ammunition in proper places of safety, place serious question marks over his fitness and properness to continue to be licensed. He may be very well versed in the actual handling of a firearm, and he may be a keen sportsman when it comes to shooting, but that does not release him from basic safety requirements.
The Tribunal concurs with Magistrate Campione that Mr Knight's experience with firearms is a doubleedged sword. It is acknowledged that he has vast experience in handling firearms, but it is also stressed that he should then have been aware of the statutory duties to keep firearms and ammunition in an approved place of safety.
The Tribunal was provided with letters of reference on behalf of Mr Knight. No one was called to give evidence or to be crossexamined.
Mr Brokas speaks of his good friendship with Mr Knight. Mr Williams says he is aware of the proceedings before the Tribunal but that Mr Knight is an honourable person who can be trusted with firearms. Mr Ryan also speaks of Mr Knight as a friend and a person who uses firearms responsibly. Mr Nantel says he met Mr Knight as his lawnmower man and they have become good friends. Mr Regan is a retired police officer and says he knows Mr Knight well and has often assisted him to maintain safety and security arrangements for the firearms. Mr Tonkin is a fellow gun club member with Mr Knight and says that Mr Knight is a responsible person with a firearm and he does not pose a risk to anyone. Mr Filippi also knows Mr Knight, in the context of a gun club membership, and says that he has always found Mr Knight to be responsible in the handling of firearms. Mr James says he has spent time with Mr Knight on a shooting range and he found Mr Knight to be safe and conscientious in handling firearms.
The Tribunal might have been impressed with these references had it been the first time that Mr Knight had been convicted under the Firearms Act and if the Tribunal had heard from Mr Knight personally about feeling remorse for what had happened.
The contrary applies. Mr Knight did not give evidence and the Tribunal is left with the impression of a person who has been convicted several times under the Firearms Act but who fails to learn from his errors. None of the character witnesses acknowledged that they had full knowledge of the entirety of Mr Knight's criminal record. The value of their references is therefore very limited. The public's concern with the nature, number and recentness of these offences outweigh the positive attributes given by the referees.
The Tribunal is of the very firm opinion that, in light of all the information available to it, Mr Knight is not a person who, if he applied today for a firearm's licence, would be successful. The Tribunal is of the opinion that Mr Knight is not a fit and proper person to be licensed to hold a firearm. The Commissioner made the correct decision by withdrawing the firearm's licence and refusing to add additional firearms to it.
An order should therefore be made to dismiss the application.

Orders

1.The application by Mr Knight that the decision of the Commissioner of Police to revoke his firearms licence be estopped, on the basis of res judicata, is dismissed.
2.The application for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Police is dismissed.
3.The decision of the Commissioner of Police to revoke the firearm licence of Mr Knight and to refuse to add additional firearms to the licence is affirmed.
4.The application is dismissed.

I certify that this and the preceding [79] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
DR B DE VILLIERS, MEMBER