Klasson & Borisov (No 2) - [2025] FedCFamC1F 306

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Klasson & Borisov (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 306

File number(s): SYC 2878 of 2022

Judgment of: CURRAN J

Date of judgment: 9 May 2025

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Where child has been living with father – Where the mother has been spending supervised day time with the child – Where on final day mother agreed for father to have sole-decision making – Where father accepted mother was not a safety risk and did not require supervision – Where father sought limited spend time orders – Where orders made for incremental increase in time with mother and immediate overnight time are in the child’s best interest – Where mother sought orders to change child’s name to include her surname – Where such an order is not in the best interest of the child – Where parties sought various injunctive orders

Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), pt VII, ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 64B, 117

Convention on the Rights of the Child

Cases cited:
A v B (No 2) [2003] FMCAfam 530

Adamson & Adamson [2014] 51 Fam LR 626; [2014] FamCA 232

Beach and Semmler (1979) FLC 90-692

Carlson & Fluvium [2012] FamCA 32

Chapman and Palmer (1978) 34 FLR 405

Line v Line (1997)136 FLR 149

Reynolds & Sherman [2016] FamCAFC 240

Zachariah & Zachariah [2017] FamCA 482

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 289

Date of last submission/s: 21 February 2025

Date of hearing: 17-21 February 2025

Place: Sydney

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Tabbernor

Solicitor for the Applicant: Gibson Howlin Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Adams-Nash

Solicitor for the Respondent: Opal Legal

Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Jackson

Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Brian Samuel & Associates
ORDERS

SYC 2878 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MR KLASSON

Applicant

AND:
MS BORISOV

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:

CURRAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MAY 2025

ON A FINAL BASIS THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous parenting orders between the parties are hereby discharged.

Decision making
2.The father shall have sole long-term decision-making responsibility for the child, X born in 2021 ("the child").
3.Prior to the father making a decision in respect of any major long-term issue pursuant to Order 2 herein:
(a)The father shall notify the mother in writing with notice of his intention to make any long-term decision ("the proposed decision") for the child at least fourteen (14) days prior to making a decision;
(b)The mother shall provide one (1) written response to the father's proposed decision within seven (7) days of receiving the proposed decision;
(c)The father shall consider the mother's response to the proposed decision and inform the mother of his ultimate decision within seven (7) days of making the decision; and
(d)In the event that the mother does not provide a written response to the father in accordance with Order 3(b) herein the father is authorised by these orders to make the proposed decision.

Live with
4.The child shall live with the father.

Spend time
5.From the date of these Orders until the child commences school the child shall spend time with the mother as follows:
(a)For a period of eight (8) weeks from the date of these orders as follows:
(i)From 10.00am until 2.00pm each Wednesday and Thursday.
(ii)Each alternate weekend from 10.00am on Saturday until 5.00pm on Sunday commencing on Saturday 10 May 2025.

(b)Upon conclusion of the period referred to in Order 5(a) above for a further period of eight (8) weeks as follows:
(i)From 10.00am until 2.00pm each Wednesday and Thursday.
(ii)Each alternate weekend from 3.00pm on Friday until 5.00pm on Sunday commencing on Friday 4 July 2025.

(c)Upon conclusion of the period referred to in Order 5(b) as follows:
(i)From 10.00am until 2.00pm each Wednesday and Thursday.
(ii)Each alternate weekend from 3.00pm on Friday until 9.00am on Monday commencing on Friday 29 August 2025.

(d)From the commencement of 2026 as follows:
(i)From 9.00am each Wednesday until 9.00am the following morning.
(ii)Each alternate weekend from 3.00pm on Friday until 9.00am on Monday.

6.Upon the child commencing school the child shall spend time with the mother during the school term as follows:
(a)Each alternate weekend from the conclusion of school on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday or the commencement of school on the Tuesday if that weekend is a long weekend or a pupil free day; and
(b)Each week from the conclusion of school on Wednesday until the commencement of school on Thursday.

School Holidays
7.Upon the child commencing primary school, during the school holiday periods, the time arrangements as set out in Order 6 are suspended.
8.Unless otherwise agreed by the mother and father in writing, the child shall spend school holidays with the mother and the father from the date of these Orders as follows:
(a)In the school term holidays at the end of terms 1, 2 and 3:
(i)In even numbered years, with the mother from 3.00pm or after school on the last day of student attendance until 3.00pm on the middle Saturday and with the father from 3.00pm on the middle Saturday until return to school on the first day of the following term.
(ii)In odd numbered years with the father from 3.00pm or after school on the last day of student attendance until 3.00pm on the middle Saturday and with the mother from 3.00pm on the middle Saturday until return to school on the first day of the following term.

(b)In the longer summer holidays:
(i)During the summer school holidays in 2027/2028 on a week about basis with the changeover being at 3.00pm on Friday.
(ii)During the summer school holidays thereafter as follows:
A.In even numbered years for a period of three (3) weeks commencing at 3.00pm or the conclusion of school on the last day of student attendance until 3.00pm on the same day three (3) weeks later with the mother, and from 3.00pm on the day three (3) weeks after the conclusion of student attendance at school, until return to school for the new school term with the father; and
B.In odd numbered years for a period of three (3) weeks commencing at 3.00pm or the conclusion of school on the last day of student attendance until 3.00pm on the same day three (3) weeks later with the father, and from 3.00pm on the day three (3) weeks after the conclusion of student attendance at school, until return to school for the new school term with the mother.

Special Occasions
9.The child's time in Orders 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be suspended to facilitate the special occasion arrangements provided for in Order 10.
10.The child shall spend time with the mother and father during special occasions as follows:
(a)The child shall spend time with the father from 5.00pm on the Saturday before Father's Day to 5:00 pm on Father's Day.
(b)Commencing in 2026 the child shall spend time with the mother from 5.00pm on the Saturday before Mother's Day to 5.00pm on Mother's Day.
(c)On the child's birthday, being 7 October, in each year:
(i)If the child's birthday falls on a daycare/preschool/ school day, the child spend time with the parent with whom he is not currently living, from 3.00pm until 7.00pm.
(ii)If the child's birthday falls on a weekend or a day when the child is not at school, the child spend time with the parent with whom he is not current living, from 9.00am until 2.00pm that day.

(d)On the father's birthday as follows:
(i)If the father's birthday falls on a daycare/preschool/school day, the child spend time with the father from after daycare/preschool/school until 7.00pm, if the child is not already in his care.
(ii)If the father's birthday falls on a weekend, the child spend time with the father from 9.00am until 2.00pm that day, if the child is not already in his care.

(e)On the mother's birthday as follows:
(i)If the mother's birthday falls on a daycare/preschool/school day, the child spend time with the mother from after daycare/preschool/school until 7.00pm, if the child is not already in her care.
(ii)If the mother's birthday falls on a weekend, the child spend time with the mother from 9.00am until 2.00pm that day, if the child is not already in her care.

(f)During Christmas, as agreed between the parties in writing and in the absence of such agreement:
(i)In odd numbered years with the mother from 4.00pm Christmas Eve until 4.00pm on Christmas Day and with the father from 4.00pm Christmas Day until 4.00pm Boxing Day.
(ii)In even numbered years with the father from 4.00pm Christmas Eve until 4.00pm on Christmas Day and with the mother from 4.00pm Christmas Day until 4.00pm Boxing Day.

(g)During Easter, as agreed between the parties in writing and in the absence of such agreement:
(i)In odd numbered years with the mother from 5.00pm on Holy Thursday to 5.00pm on Easter Saturday and with the father from 5.00pm on Easter Saturday until 5.00pm on Easter Monday.
(ii)In even numbered years with the father from 5.00pm on Holy Thursday to 5.00pm on Easter Saturday and with the mother from 5.00pm on Easter Saturday until 5.00pm on Easter Monday.

Changeover
11.All changeovers shall, on daycare/preschool/school days, take place at the child's daycare/preschool/school or otherwise changeover shall occur in the Restaurant at McDonald's Suburb F.

Enrolment and attendance at daycare/preschool/school
12.Upon the father enrolling the child in daycare/preschool/school he shall:
(a)Notify the mother in writing by parenting App message, all details in respect of the enrolment, including the name of the daycare/preschool/school;
(b)Include the mother's details (including her contact details) on any enrolment form; and
(c)Take all steps to authorise the daycare/preschool/school to provide the mother directly all information ordinarily available to parents.

13.Both parents be entitled to attend any daycare/preschool/school or extra-curricular activity to which parents are invited, including but not limited to parent-teacher interviews, assemblies, excursions, concerts and sports days.

Overseas Travel
14.The mother and the father are permitted to travel outside of the Commonwealth of Australia with the child, provided that:
(a)Such travel is not to occur before Christmas 2028.
(b)No less than thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of departure the travelling parent must provide the other parent with written details of the proposed travel including all destinations of travel, dates and methods of travel;
(c)No less than fourteen (14) days of the intended date of departure the travelling parent must provide the other parent with a detailed and complete itinerary showing the following information:
(i)Dates and methods of travel (including flight and ship number, departure and arrival);
(ii)All destinations of travel; and
(iii)Addresses of all accommodation where the child will be residing.

(d)Any period of proposed travel by the travelling parent must be during a period when the child would otherwise be living or spending time with such parent pursuant to these Orders unless otherwise agreed to by the parents in writing.

Australian Passport
15.On or before December 2028, the father is to do all things and sign all documents necessary, including but not limited to completing and signing forms, attending interviews, obtaining passport photos, and paying any application monies for the issuing of or renewal of an Australian passport for the child, and shall ensure that from that time the child has a valid passport.
16.The father shall provide a certified copy of the child's passport to the mother within fourteen (14) day of obtaining the passport.
17.The father shall hold the hold the child's passport and is to provide the passport to the mother within seven (7) days of a request for the passport to be made available for travel.
18.The mother is required to return the passport to the father within seven (7) days of her return from overseas travel with the child.

Mother's Mental health
19.In the event that the mother is hospitalised (whether on a voluntary or involuntary basis) for treatment of her mental health she (whether personally or through a third party) shall take all steps to inform the father of the hospitalisation forthwith and as soon as practicable.
20.The mother is at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders to her treating health professionals.

Injunctions
Non-denigration
21.The mother and father are restrained by way of injunction from:
(a)Denigrating the other parent or the other parent's partner or family members in the presence or hearing of the child, and in the event that any third party is engaging in such conduct they shall take all steps to remove the child from the hearing of that person immediately; and
(b)Discussing these proceedings (including the content of any Court documents or allegations made by each party in these proceedings) with the child or in his presence.

Consuming illicit substance
22.The mother and father are restrained by way of injunction from consuming any illegal drugs or substances or permitting or authorising any other person from doing so whilst the child is in each party's care.

Calling other persons "mum" or "mummy"
23.The father is restrained from encouraging the child to refer to anyone other than the mother as "mum" or "mummy" or any other term for mother and from allowing any other person to encourage the child to do so.

Relocating Child's Residence
24.Each parent be restrained by injunction from relocating the child's residence with them further than fifty (50) kilometres from the residence of the other parent.

Information Sharing
25.This Order is an authority for the mother and father to obtain information from any treating medical practitioner, hospital and/or health care professional, daycare/preschool/school or extracurricular activity concerning the child.
26.The mother and father are at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders to the child's daycare/preschool/school and any treating medical practitioners or persons that the child may attend for therapy and/or counselling.
27.The father is at liberty to provide a copy of the judgment in these proceedings to any person that the child may attend upon for the purpose of counselling and/or therapy.
28.The mother and father are at liberty to provide a copy of the Orders and judgment in these proceedings to any person they may attend upon for the purpose of counselling and/or therapy.

Health and wellbeing
29.Upon the father making any specialist medical appointment for the child, the father shall:
(a)Inform the mother of the appointment, including the name of the treater and/or the Medical Practice;
(b)Provide the mother by email with a copy any referral letter and any documents provided by the referring doctor or specialist treater; and
(c)Take all steps to authorise the treater to provide to the mother directly all information in respect of the treatment.

30.The mother and father shall as soon as reasonably practicable or within twelve (12) hours advise the other parent, by the parenting app, of any medical condition, significant health issue or illness suffered by the child whilst in their care that required attendance upon a doctor or hospital.
31.In the event of an emergency or serious accident or illness, notice shall be given to the other parent within two (2) hours by telephone call. If the telephone call is not answered, the parent who the child is staying with on that night will send a text message to the other parent.

Communication
32.The mother and father shall communicate about issues relating to the child and parenting arrangements (except in the case of an emergency) via a parenting application, "Our Family Wizard", and if for whatever reason that application is no longer available, the mother and father are to communicate via an app and in a manner as nominated by the father.
33.The mother and father must advise the other in writing of any change of telephone number, mailing address or email address within twenty-four (24) hours of such change occurring.
34.The child be at liberty to telephone either parent at any reasonable time upon request, with the parent who has the care of the child to facilitate the telephone call to the other parent, and the child shall be afforded privacy to do so.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Klasson & Borisov has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CURRAN J:
INTRODUCTION

These are parenting proceedings between the applicant father, Mr Klasson, and the respondent mother, Ms Borisov. There is one child of the relationship, X (“X” or “the child”) who was born in 2021 (currently three years of age).
At the end of the trial the parties reached agreement for interim time orders to be put in place that removed the requirement for the mother’s time to be supervised.
The parties reached an agreed position that the child would live with his father and that the father should hold sole long-term decision-making responsibility, however, did not agree to restraints on the mother’s communication regarding the proposed long-term decisions, as sought by the father.
The balance of the issues remained in dispute between the parties, including the spend time arrangements, school holiday time, injunctions sought, and ancillary orders.
For the reasons that follow the child will spend incrementally increasing time with his mother until the beginning of 2026, at which point he will spend time with the mother each alternate weekend from Friday until Monday and every Wednesday overnight. Upon him commencing school the child will half of all school holidays with each of his parents.
THE LAW
Parenting orders
Orders in respect of children are informed by Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The meaning of a parenting order is defined at s 64B.
Section 60CA of the Act provides that the Court is to regard the best interests of the children as the paramount consideration. Section 60B of the Act outlines the objects and principles underlying Pt VII, being to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety, and to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CROC”).

Section 60CC(2) identifies the matters that the Court is to take into account in determining what is in the best interests of a child, those being:
(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:
(i) the child; and
(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);
(b) any views expressed by the child;
(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;
(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;
(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child’s parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;
(f)anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.
CREDIT
A credit submission was made by the father’s counsel regarding the way the mother gave evidence at times, contending that this would give rise to the Court finding that her evidence could not be relied upon.
Counsel for the mother contended that although the mother was blunt at times in her evidence, she made appropriate concessions, at times to her detriment, such that her credit would not cause her evidence to be being disregarded as sought.
The Full Court in Adamson & Adamson [2014] 51 Fam LR 626 (“Adamson”) at [90] said “in parenting proceedings an adverse credit finding against a parent should not only be necessary to determine the real issues joined between the parties but should be soundly based, with due allowance for the limitations referred to.” The Full Court agreed with the observations made by Kent J in Carlson & Fluvium [2012] FamCA 32:
165.As a general proposition, civil courts usually refrain from specific adverse credit findings against litigants if the disposition of the case can legitimately be achieved otherwise. There are good reasons for that approach. For example, a specific finding that a litigant has misled the court might be tantamount to a finding of perjury. Further, it can be accepted as a given that human beings have the capacity to reconstruct or rationalise or even misconstrue past events or conduct, or to engage in self-justification, particularly in recounting events in highly emotive settings or in respect of highly emotive issues. This may make the distinction between an honest, although wrong, account on the one hand, and a deliberate and calculated obfuscation on the other, difficult to draw.
166.To deny significant limitations in the capacity to use assessment of the demeanour of a witness as an entirely reliable guide to his or her truthfulness would be to deny the existence of plausible liars; or those who may be timid, uncertain or unconvincing, but nevertheless truthful, in relating events.
167.Moderation in this respect is also called for when it is recognised that adverse credit findings in arriving at a decision at first instance may present a significant hurdle to legitimate rights of review of that decision on appeal.
168.These observations apply with at least equal, if not greater, force in parenting proceedings such as these in this Court where the decision does not bring an end to the litigants’ relationship. These parties are, and will remain, the parents of D and K and adverse credit findings in this decision carry the inherent risk that, rather than bringing an end to long-standing conflictual issues, they may be embraced as vindication for the pursuit of further conflict in the future.
169.Moreover, the resolution of parenting proceedings in this Court usually requires consideration of not only the credibility of the parties as witnesses or litigants but appreciation of the characters and personalities of them as people whose future relationship, or the context of that relationship with their child, the Court has the responsibility to decide.
The father’s counsel directed the Court to two examples that she contended would bring into question the mother’s credit throughout the proceedings as set out below.
Mr C, the mother’s partner, gave evidence that he did not want to provide his phone number to the father because he did not want to be involved in the conflict between the parties or give his phone number to a person he did not know after he and the mother experienced a home invasion. The mother said in an email to the father’s lawyers, dated 11 November 2024, “given the history of violence and unpredictable behaviour exhibited by your client, as well as the recent break-in at our residence, my partner does not feel comfortable sharing his personal contact number at this time.” It was contended that this suggested the father was responsible for the home invasion and in this regard the mother’s evidence was inconsistent with that of her partner and that it should not be accepted.
Counsel for the father also contended that the lack of evidence in the mother’s affidavit with respect to the mother ceasing time following the January 2024 orders being made due to her work arrangements, as she had contended in cross examination, raised a question as to her credit.
It was contended that the mother’s failure to inform D Contact Centre and the father at the time that the reason for the cancelled visits was due to the mother’s work commitments supported such a finding. It was contended that it was open for the Court to find that the mother elected to cease time at this period, as she was unhappy with the outcome of the interim hearing in January 2024, not due to changes in work commitments as she had stated.
The evidence does not support such a critical lens to be applied to the evidence of the mother in respect of these matters. The email does not directly say the break in was by the father although it is a possible interpretation. The mother’s evidence was that those responsible were identified and charged and she did not suspect it was the father. Doubtless, the mother was disappointed with the outcome of the interim hearing. However, at the time the mother was dealing with complex social and personal circumstances including changes to her work I am not persuaded on the evidence that an adverse credit finding in respect of the issue of the mother’s explanation is warranted noting the caution that ought to be applied to making such a finding and noting that any such finding should be soundly based.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The parties remain in dispute about a number of issues, which are summarised as follows:
(a)Should a further restraint be put in place in relation to the mother communicating with the father about long-term decisions regarding the child.
(b)The time that the child will spend with his mother.
(c)When overnight time should commence.
(d)Whether the child should spend additional time with his mother over the school holidays.
(e)How much time the child should spend on special occasions with either parent.
(f)Whether the mother should be permitted to attend the child’s daycare/preschool/school events and medical appointments.
(g)Whether the child should be permitted to travel overseas with his mother.
(h)What passport orders should be made.
(i)Whether the mother should be required to notify the father if she is hospitalised for treatment of her mental health.
(j)Whether certain injunctions as sought by each parent should be made.
(k)Whether the child’s surname should be changed.
(l)Whether either parent should contribute to the payment of the ICL’s costs.
(m)Whether various other ancillary orders should be made.
These issues in dispute between the parties must be determined by consideration as to what is in the best interests of the child. In determining orders that are in the best interests of the child I have had regard to the relevant matters in s 60CC of the Act.
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
The parties have reached a consent position for the father to have sole decision-making authority in respect of all major long-terms decision in relation to the child. The parties also agree the mother is to be involved in the process by providing one written response to any proposed long-term decisions being made by the father. I agree this is an appropriate order to be made.
The consent process ensures that the mother is aware of the proposed decision and has an opportunity for input into the decision as recommended by the Court Family Consultant, Ms G (“Ms G”), while also reducing the opportunity for conflict between the parties which may impact X.
The parties remained in dispute about whether a further restraint sought by the father is necessary.
There can be no doubt on the evidence that the parties have had a very difficult and dysfunctional co-parenting relationship. They had a short and fraught relationship and have been in litigation over the arrangements for X since shortly after separation.
The complexity of the dysfunctional relationship and poor communication was recognised by Ms G, in her family report dated 17 July 2023. Ms G conducted interviews on 26 June 2023 and in-person observations of the mother and father interacting with the child.
Ms G observed that the father appeared to hold significant resentment towards the mother and that he expressed concerns about her capacity to care for their child. However, the report noted at [14] that “despite this, the father did indicate that he understands that [the child] needs to have a healthy relationship with the mother and time with her.” Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, the father, even after abandoning his application for supervised time, continued to seek orders for the child to spend quite limited time with the mother with no additional time during school holidays.
Ms G observed that the mother’s primary concern was her belief that the father may negatively influence the child’s relationship with the mother and alienate the child from her.
In the report at [26] Ms G observed that the parties were “quite far apart” regarding the mother’s spend time arrangements. Ms G contended that it would be unrealistic to expect that the parties could co-parent the child, stating at [28] that the parties would “likely need the Court to provide a comprehensive arrangement for [the child] to reduce any potential conflict between them.”
When suggested to Ms G that due to the poor communication between the parties, the child should be protected from parental conflict by limiting communication, Ms G opined that if the mother’s time with the child was going to increase, there would need to be a level of consultation between the parents about decisions regarding the child. She was of the view that the mother engaging in decisions being made about the child would be of benefit to the child as by her involvement she would be more connected to him, and this would continue to assist and strengthen their relationship.
Ms G opined that “the benefit of [the child] knowing that his mother is involved in decision making outweighs [the] risk” of the father being exposed to communications from the mother about decisions regarding the child. The father perceived her communication as being a bombardment of her views.
Despite the history of difficulty in communication I am persuaded by Ms G’s opinion that the mother should be consulted and have input in the decisions because of the benefit to the relationship as she opined and due to the mother’s ongoing engagement with her psychologist to improve communication and co-parenting as referred to later in these reasons.
There were a number of incidents that illustrate that X’s parents have poor communication and are mistrustful toward each other. Accordingly, as observed by Ms G, I agree there is a need for comprehensive orders in relation to the mother’s involvement in decision making to ensure she remains involved but to reduce potential areas of dispute and therefore parental conflict. As set out below each of the parents has played a role in the poor communication and consequent mistrust that has existed.
Communications between the parties in 2023 and 2024 about the child’s diet and dairy intolerance
The parties’ discussions around the child’s diet and in particular his reported dairy intolerance illustrates the poor communication and mistrust that had existed.
The father said that while the child was in the mother’s care, including during the supervised visits, the mother would not provide the child with “age-appropriate food.” The father contended he informed the mother multiple times that the child has a dairy intolerance and despite her being told this she continued to feed him dairy causing the child to have an upset stomach after visits with the mother. He said that this resulted in him contacting D Contact Centre to advise he would provide all the food for the child’s visits.
Handover notes between the parties from 22 July 2023 and 18 August 2023 included an email from the father detailing the food the child consumed in the morning and informing the mother that a lunch had been packed for the child. The mother’s response was “the lunch you packed I wouldn’t feed to a dog so I will feed him healthy food today.”
The mother conceded that her response was a tit for tat response but said she was reacting to the father’s ongoing accusation that she was not feeding the child healthy food.
The mother’s evidence was that she had not received any medical information or report which established that the child was allergic to dairy, however, she accommodated the father’s requests and had been providing the child with a dairy-free diet. She has since been working with her psychologist to improve her responses to the father and improve communication.
The father gave evidence that on 12 April 2024, there was an incident where the mother had brought easter chocolates for the child and the centre informed her that she could not provide these to the child due to his dairy intolerance. He said the mother stormed out of the centre during her visit. The easter eggs the mother was providing to the child were dairy-free, which the mother confirmed with the father later that day.
The H Family Services contact reports from 3 July 2022 until 22 September 2024 were received into evidence. The contact reports dated 8 September 2024 and 22 September 2024, both reference the mother providing the child with dairy-free drinks and food. When taken to the report of 22 September 2024, which recorded that the mother “provided her son with food suitable for his dietary requirements, including apple juice, snacks, and a sandwich” the father’s only comment was still critical of the mother, whereby he responded that he “wouldn’t have given the child apple juice.”
Despite the contact reports recording that the mother was adhering to a dairy-free diet, the father maintained his belief that the mother was giving the child dairy. He said the reports did not give him any assurance to the contrary. It is difficult to understand such a position in light of the independent record of the mother providing the dairy-free diet. His rigidity in his response is an example of the mistrust he holds of the mother.
Counsel for the mother asserted that the father’s communications with the mother about the diet issues is an example of the father’s controlling behaviours towards the mother. I do not accept the communication is an example of control, but it is without doubt an example of a dysfunctional relationship that lacks respect and trust.
Communications between the parties in May 2024 to December 2024 about the child’s daycare
The incident in December 2024 was central to the father’s assertion that the mother is extremely reactive in her responses which have a detrimental impact on the child, and he says that this lends against an order for consultation in decision making.
The mother contends that the father’s conduct is designed to marginalise her from decisions and input in the child’s life.
The mother experienced a home invasion in early 2024, after which D Contact Centre cancelled visits for a period of six weeks due to safety concerns. Around this time the father removed the child from his daycare and changed his residence without informing the mother.
Around May 2024 the father moved to Suburb V due to financial reasons. In October 2024, he enrolled the child in J Childcare in what was referred to as a “casual spot.” The father “decided not to inform [the mother] at this stage as [the child] was only there casually.” He said he was concerned about the child potentially losing a spot at the day care due to the mother’s prior conduct.
The father contended that he had attempted to involve the mother in updates about the child’s attendance at daycare by arranging for her to have access to the daycare app. He said the daycare informed him that as the child had a casual spot at the centre, and that the mother had supervised care only, they could not provide the mother access to the app due to safety concerns.
The mother continued to request details of the child’s daycare. The father stated that he felt pressured by the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) to disclose the daycare details, which he finally did on 14 November 2024.
Exhibit 42 contains a series of emails from November 2024, between the mother and Ms L, the director of J Childcare. The mother contacted J Childcare in November 2024, enquiring about the applications or platforms the centre offered, so that she could be updated on her child’s progress. Ms L informed the mother that information was not available as the child did not have a “permanent spot” at the centre. The mother sent a further email seeking information about what days the child was attending the service and why she was not consulted prior to the child’s enrolment at the centre. Ms L replied advising the mother that the child had not been offered any permanent days at the centre.
The mother called J Childcare in December 2024 requesting to speak with the supervisor. That same day, the father received an email from an employee, Ms K, at the childcare centre where he was advised that the employee had received a phone call from the mother at around 10.50am requesting to speak with Ms L about the child’s attendance and that she assisted the mother with her inquiries due to Ms L being unavailable. The email recorded that the mother threatened legal action against Ms L and Ms K. Ms K recorded that the mother’s tone became more confrontational as she questioned why she was not informed of the child’s attendance or consulted with, and that the mother used “threatening language.” The email recorded that “her tone sounded filled with malice and words caused me significant distress, and I was shaking with fear as she continued shouting.”
Following this phone call the father was advised that the J Childcare could no longer offer the child occasional care until the situation was legally resolved.
The mother agreed in her oral evidence that she had contacted the centre but denied that she was abusive to staff. The mother stated that it was not her intention for the child to be removed from the childcare centre but agreed that the outcome after she had contacted the centre was not child-focused. The mother did not accept the proposition that the father sharing information with her might negatively impact the child’s ability to access important services. Her perception was that the lack of information was part of a cycle of the father withholding information in circumstances where she wished to be involved in their son’s life.
Both parties played a role in the outcome that X was unable to continue at the childcare, the father by failing to keep the mother informed in a timely way and his failure to include the mother’s details in the childcare enrolment, and the mother by her communication, which although perhaps understandable, lacked insight into the outcome for X of losing the childcare spot.
Communications between the parties in 2024 and 2025 regarding the child’s medical appointments

The father gave evidence that he was contacted by a medical centre to book a medical assessment for the child, which had been booked for October 2024. The mother sent a text to him the week prior, informing him that she would attend the appointment. The father responded that she would be in breach of the orders if she attended the appointment. He said in evidence he believed this to be the case, as the appointment was “not during her visitation” time with the child.
The father cancelled the appointment after contacting the clinic to confirm it was not urgent, as he stated he was “genuinely scared to be at a medical appointment” with the mother and the child.
The father stated that the mother was notified by the clinic that the appointment was not urgent, but despite this she emailed the ICL stating that the father had cancelled an important medical appointment for the child.
The mother’s evidence that she was not informed about this appointment ahead of time by the father but in October 2024 she received a reminder to attend the appointment at the hospital. The mother then contacted the father stating that she wanted to attend and received the response that she would be in breach of the Court orders if she did so.
In January 2025, whilst the child was in the care of the mother she took the child to a walk-in optometrist appointment when they had walked past an Optical retailer as she had recently noticed the child squinting while watching the television. The mother telephoned the father to inform him that she had taken the child to the optometrist and that he needed to see an eye specialist. The mother gave oral evidence that she had called the father to give him “peace of mind” that there was nothing to worry about but that they wanted to double check a blur that was picked up in the eye appointment.
The father deposed that due to a poor telephone line he could not understand what the mother was saying and so he asked that she email him all the details in the handover note. The mother disputed this and contended that he was screaming abuse and not listening to her during this phone call.
In the email handover note on 17 January 2025 the mother informed the father that the child needs to see a specialist following the appointment and stated “due to your aggressive and extremely rude behaviour on the phone I will manage the situation myself. I will let you know what happens and what the specialist advises.” A further eight emails were exchanged between the parties, in which the father requested further details, and the mother stated that the information had already been provided and that she would inform him when she had more information.
The mother stated that she provided the father with a copy of the referral letter that was sent to the specialist and that she did not provide the name of the doctor as their name was unknown to her.
It was suggested to the mother that she attended the optometrist in January because she was upset with the father in respect of the cancellation of the October 2024 medical appointment. The mother disagreed with this proposition.
Again, each parent played a role by their own poor communication in the outcome and both showed immaturity and lack of child focus in their responses.
Capacity for communication
Although the communication between the parties has been poor in the past, the mother has demonstrated a commitment to improving her communication skills through her continued attendance at counselling sessions and various parenting courses, as is discussed in further detail below. Whilst, unfortunately, there are recent examples of poor communication between the parties, there are also examples of improved communication more recently.
The paternal grandmother gave evidence in support of the father’s case. On 14 July 2023 she received an email from the mother. Her evidence was that “she was in shock about how nice the email presented” and said that she believed the email to be generated by AI. Her oral evidence was that she felt as though it was not a genuine attempt by the mother at open communication. Regardless of whether or not the communication was generated by AI, the email demonstrates an attempt from the mother, during these proceedings, to actively improve her communication with the father and paternal family.
Should a further restraint be put in place in relation to the mother communicating with the father about long term decisions as sought by the father?
In the father’s amended minute of order, which became exhibit 50, the father sought a restraint on the mother communicating with the father about the proposed decision on any communication platform, including in person at changeovers, other than the one response email to the father’s nominated email address.
The mother opposed the father’s restraint order on the basis that it was too broad and that this would unnecessarily restrain the parties from properly discussing crucial topics, such as the child’s schooling.
The ICL did not make any submission as whether restraints should be placed on the mother in this regard, beyond the stipulation that the mother was to only provide one written response to the father’s proposed decision in respect of long-term decisions.
As discussed above, there is clearly a history of poor communication between the parties. Counsel for the father submitted that such a restraint was necessary in circumstances where there is a chronic lack of trust between the parties.
The father asserted that the mother engaged in a “bombardment” of communication towards the father, which has worn him down.
In support of his orders sought, counsel for the father directed the Court to the mother’s communication with the father and his legal representatives from February 2024 onwards (after she became self-represented) as evidence in support of the Court making a finding that the mother did bombard the father with excessive emails and communication.
In February 2024, the father contacted the supervision centre, D Contact Centre, to organise the mother’s re-engagement in visitations. The father stated that he told the mother not to involve his lawyers and for the parties to sort out the visits between themselves. Exhibit 19 is a copy of emails exchanged between the father, his legal representatives and the mother. The exhibit includes an email from the father to the mother dated 29 February 2024, in which the father wrote: “I have instructed my solicitor not to be involved in these negotiations, please reply to me directly so we can get this established ASAP.” The exhibit includes the mother addressing an email on the same date to the father’s legal representative requesting that she include the ICL in the correspondence.
The father responded to this email stating that the mother was emailing his legal representatives to make the father pay more legal costs and requested that the mother no longer include the lawyers in correspondence. The mother responded to this email requesting that the father only contact her via his lawyers, writing “Don’t ever message me against your hurtful words. If you have something nasty to say use your lawyer. They can articulate and spell it better.” In response to the assertion that the mother was sending a significant number of emails to cause the father to pay more legal fees, the mother disagreed that the emails she sent were “significant” in number.
In her oval evidence, the mother explained that it was her understanding from the orders that she needed to email the ICL to inform him when she was seeing the child, and that she was not able to email the ICL without including the father in the communication.
Despite the father’s request, he stated that the mother continued to contact his lawyer to inform them of her cancelled visits, her request for the child’s medical records, complaints about the care of the child and complaints about the father’s legal representatives.
Exhibit 20 is an email from the mother to the father’s lawyer dated 27 March 2024, in which the mother explains her concerns about the hygiene and care of the child. The same exhibit included an email the mother sent to the father’s lawyers later that day seeking information on how she can make a complaint against their law firm. The mother contended that she would not normally raise day-to-day parenting issues with the father’s lawyers but was concerned about the child’s hygiene as a safety concern.
The father directed the Court to earlier instances of the mother’s “bombardment” of communication, which included an email from the father’s legal representatives to the mother dated 5 July 2022, tendered and marked as exhibit 23. In the email his lawyer wrote that the mother had sent seven emails to the legal representatives in the one day, and that they would be required to obtain instructions to provide a substantive response later in the week.
The mother gave oral evidence that she had told the father’s legal representatives to stop contacting her. She stated that she was receiving, at times, inappropriate communications from the father’s lawyers, including being emailed late at night. The mother agreed with the proposition that on occasion she felt the father’s lawyers were engaging in conduct of “bombardment of emails” back and forth.
The seven emails that were alleged to have been sent on the 5 July 2022 by the mother to the father’s legal representatives did not form part of the evidence. Without the context of the other emails, I cannot be satisfied that the emails sent by the mother were appropriate or inappropriate in the circumstances.
In the absence of evidence, I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the mother engaged in a course of conduct described as bombarding the father and his legal representatives with communication, nor that such conduct supports the order for a restraint being put in place regarding the communication that the mother can have with the father in relation to the child.
The mother gave evidence of the psychological support she has engaged in and her attempts to improve her reactions and communication with the father. Her treating psychologist also gave evidence as to the different strategies the mother is using to actively improve the communication. Her opinion was that the mother is engaging well and deriving benefit from the psychological support she has sought out.
To ensure that the mother and her psychologist continue to work on improved and positive co-parenting and communication I will order that both parents are able to provide a copy of the orders and these reasons to their own and to X’s treatment providers and counsellors or psychologists.
I give weight to the evidence of the mother that she has actively sought to address and improve her responses and communication by continuing with ongoing psychological supports. I also give weight to the fact that, at the times of some of the fraught communication as set out above, the parties were engaged in litigation, something that with the making of these orders has finished. The very fact that the stressors of litigation are now in the past may well assist both parents to focus of the best interests of their child and be less antagonistic. It is also significant that the mother will be spending increased time with X pursuant to these orders and there may be a necessity to communicate in respect of day-to-day decisions or matters relevant to X’s care.
Each of these factors persuades me that the restraint as sought is not in X’s best interests. Accordingly, I decline to make the restraint as sought but note the orders permit the mother to provide one written response to any proposed long-term decision to be made by the father. In relation to day to day matters the parties will otherwise communicate as necessary through the Our Family Wizard App as referred to later in these reasons.
PARENTING ORDERS
Orders Sought
At the commencement of the trial the father sought that the mother’s time with the child should be supervised and limited to six visits per year for two hours. However, at the conclusion of the trial he sought that the child spend time on one day each week, increasing to one overnight period each fortnight. The father did not seek orders for the mother to have additional school holiday time.
The mother sought that her time be unsupervised and that the time be gradually increased to a five nights per fortnight and half of the school holidays. At the conclusion of the trial the mother ultimately adopted the spend time proposal as sought by the ICL, being a regime of overnight time commencing immediately with a gradually increasing regime of time on each alternate weekend from Friday after school until Monday before school and every Wednesday overnight during school term. The mother and the ICL both sought orders that X spend half of the school holidays with each parent.
What time should the child spend with his mother and when should overnight time commence?
In the family report, Ms G recommended that the mother spend unsupervised time with the child, including overnight time for one night increasing to two nights after a period of six months. In cross-examination and after considering the parties’ updated material, Ms G stated that she did not see the benefit in waiting until October 2026 before overnight time with the mother was to occur, as proposed by the father. I accept her opinion that overnight time should commence now.
In addressing the extreme conflict between the parties, the Ms G stated that her preferred approach to the time arrangements was for less incremental changes and bigger increases in time. Ms G confirmed that the mother’s original proposed orders of one night per week increasing to five nights per fortnight, is a time arrangement that she has recommended for other children of the same age. A progression of time with less incremental changes and transitions was recommended by Ms G and I accept her evidence as to the benefits to the child in this instance of such an approach.
It was contended for the father that the Court should take a more conversative and cautious approach when making time orders, and make orders as proposed by the father because the child is very young, has not had consistent time with the mother, and that it would be preferable to wait until psychological and therapeutic supports were established for the child prior to moving forward with overnight time. The father and his wife, although having previously discussed arranging psychological supports for the child, said they were waiting for the finalisation of the family law proceedings to move ahead with this.
In support of the father’s orders sought, the father and his wife gave evidence that the child was dysregulated which they contended was caused by inconsistency of visits with the mother which caused him to be distressed when returned after visits with the mother.
The father gave evidence that the behaviour of the child after the mother had failed to attend a visit on 8 November 2024 was concerning, recalling that the child was crying uncontrollably and was screaming during his sleep due to nightmares. He said the child has continued to have regular nightmares since this time and has also started “wetting himself” more frequently.
The father’s wife said that she has observed the child displaying “serious signs of distress” through nightmares and crying after visitors leave. She said “when [the child] has periods of time without her, this issue dissipates” and that he has nightmares after each visit with his mother.
Ms G opined that the reported dysregulated behaviour could be improved by X spending block time with each parent particularly given his age. Ms G opined that a child of three years old can cope with longer periods away from a parent and opined that spending block time with the mother may allow the child to have a stronger relationship with her. She was in full support of moving to immediate overnight time and then transitioning to block time as proposed by the ICL.
In being asked about the increase in time and the timing of the transition for X, Ms G observed that some children benefit from less frequent change, but bigger changes in time and some children benefit from a slow incremental change. In considering the mother’s proposed seven stages of increased time over 21 months Ms G observed there may be benefits to that approach but noted that “there are benefits both ways, obviously the less changes there are the better for [X].”
On the second day of her evidence after considering all of the parties proposals Ms G opined that she was in full support of the ICL’s proposal being incremental increases adding one night at the end of each eight week block with a view to arriving at block period of time with X over a shorter time frame, being one night for eight weeks, adding a second night for eight weeks and then adding a third night.
I give weight to the opinion of Ms G, that for X, given his age and the close relationship he has with his mother, that this progression of time to a block time is in his best interests. Given his young age and that there was no evidence or submission in relation to the child’s views, there has been no consideration of this factor. I will make the orders as sought by the ICL and adopted by the mother in respect of moving to the alternate weekend blocks.
Given X’s age he will begin school in 2027. I give weight to Ms G’s view that time should be afforded to X to settle into the new block time with his mother, accordingly I find that the further increase of time to include Wednesday overnights as sought by the ICL and supported by the mother, should commence at the beginning of 2026.
I order that the addition of the Wednesday overnight in each week should occur at the beginning of 2026 because X is already familiar with spending time with his mother on both the Wednesday and Thursday as ordered by consent since 21 February 2025. The transition to including another night will not be difficult given this routine.
The mother expressed concerns that the father’s wife’s conduct during changeovers was contributing to the child’s distress. The mother gave evidence that the wife had held the child behind her back and was not willing to let go of the child’s hand. The mother sent an email to the father’s legal representatives and the ICL on 30 October 2024 raising this concern. In the email the mother voiced her concern that the child was experiencing “undue influence or distress” from the father’s wife before handovers. It was not in dispute that the child was hiding behind the wife and holding onto her leg, but it was contended that the wife reassured the child to go to the mother.
Ms G observed that both parents would need to show their support for the time arrangement to assist the child in coping with the handover. She also observed that changeover directly to and from pre-school or school whenever possible will reduce any potential conflict or influence, deliberate or otherwise, from impacting the child at the point of changeover. During the transition period there will be the need for the parties to facilitate changeover at times not at childcare or pre-school.
Ms G opined that although it would be ideal for the child to have age-appropriate therapeutic supports in place to assist with the transition, it would not be appropriate to delay the child’s connection with the mother whilst waiting for these supports to be established.
X has been spending significant time with the mother although not yet overnight time. Ms G observed that the mother and X have a strong relationship and healthy attachment. The transition to overnight time in accordance with the regime proposed by the ICL increasing at regular intervals as supported by Ms G is in my view in X’s best interests. I accept the father’s evidence that he will arrange for any therapeutic supports for the child to assist with the transition should those supports be considered necessary. The increase of Wednesday overnight from 2026 is also a transition that was supported by Ms G.

The increasing times as sought by the ICL will have X in a settled pattern of overnight time with his mother of alternate weekends and each Wednesday night well prior to the next significant milestone of him commencing school at the start of 2027.
For the reasons above overnight time between X and his mother is to commence immediately and will increase at the rate of one additional night being added each two months until he is spending alternate weekends in the care of his mother.
After this transition he will be spending alternate weekends with each of his parents and this gives X the opportunity of the block time as recommended by Ms G which she opines should reduce the distress observed by his father and stepmother.
The inclusion of the overnight time each Wednesday night overnight as sought by the mother and ICL will commence in 2026. This will enable him to both adjust to the changed routine as recommended by Ms G but also to ensure that X has a sufficient opportunity to adapt to the addition to his routine. This routine will be maintained once he commences school.
In making this decision as to the timing of the incremental changes I have considered and given weight to Ms G’s opinion that a big change at the time of school commencing is not in the child’s best interests. By the last transition of adding each Wednesday night occurring over the 2026 year X will already be four years of age, will be well familiar with block overnights with his mother and will have had a year of this new routine before he commences school.
The arrangement becoming well familiar for X before he commences school will have the added benefit for X of enabling the mother to play an active role in his adjustment to school. The time with orders will enable to mother to be involved in the school routine each week noting she will collect him from school each Wednesday afternoon and take him to school each Thursday in addition to the alternate weekend times.
The orders will ensure the involvement of both of X’s parents in his education and daily routine. X has a warm and connected relationship with both parents as observed and reported by Ms G. The spend time with orders will ensure he has the benefit of both of his parents who each have capacity to provide for the child’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs engaging with him to the greatest extent possible.
Once the child commences school in late January 2027 he will be in a well-established routine of alternate weekends and Wednesday overnights with his mother. The spend time with orders once X is at school will have the additional benefit of very limited direct contact between the parties which will reduce the child’s exposure to any ongoing tension between the parties. This arrangement, in my view and on the evidence, will promote the safety of X by avoiding him being subjected to, or exposed to, conflict between his parents or between his mother and his stepmother. This is another compelling reason in support of the ICL’s proposed orders which I accept are in the child’s best interest.
Should the child spend school holiday time with the mother?
The father sought that there be no variation to the time arrangements for school holidays and did not seek any orders for the child to spend additional time during the school holidays with the mother.
The mother sought orders for half school holiday time to occur in block periods, with changeover at the half-way point. The ICL also sought orders for the child to spend equal time during the school holiday periods. The ICL contended that during the longer summer holiday periods the time should occur on a week about basis in 2027, and thereafter to occur for half of each school holiday period at times and dates as agreed by the parties.
Counsel for the father contended that the child spending half of the school holidays with the mother might be too overwhelming of a transition, and that the father’s orders seeking for the time arrangements to remain the same in the school holidays should be preferred over the mother’s and the ICL’s orders sought.
It was suggested to Ms G that to increase time from one night to a block overnight period in the school holidays may be a difficult transition where the child might struggle with the sharp increase in time. Ms G agreed with the proposition that a big change may require adjustment and explained that is why she recommended moving to larger overnight blocks sooner, to enable the child time to adjust to this change prior to commencing school. I give weight to and am persuaded by this opinion and accept and agree with the reasons of Ms G that increasing overnight time prior to commencing school to enable time to settle into this routine is in the best interest of the child.
Ms G observed that X has a close and loving bond with each of his parents and that he derives benefit from spending time with them both. There is no doubt that X will benefit from spending shared holiday time with each of his parents as each have the positive parenting attributes observed by Ms G which will benefit X’s development. I accept the submission that holiday time away from the usual school routine should be equal and shared and should commence when he starts school in 2027. As proposed by the ICL a week about arrangement in the first longer summer school holidays in 2027 is appropriate given the young age of X and the need for his to adjust to longer periods away from his father and that should continue for his first longer summer holidays, unless otherwise agreed.
I am satisfied given the opinion of Ms G that as X adjusts to the block time with his mother he will be of an age when longer periods away from each parent is something that he will increasingly cope with. This will have the added advantage that from that time his parents can each take him for longer holidays during the long school holiday period. Noting the mother’s place of birth is Country N where her family still reside this will enable him to spend time with and get to know his Country N culture and spend time with the maternal family.
X should have the benefit of spending time with each of his parents over the school holiday periods and it is in his best interests that this increase to larger blocks of time from after his first year of school. From the time he commences school he will spend week about with each of his parents during the school holidays and derive the benefit that each parent offers him during those times.
How much time should the child spend on special occasions with either parent?
The parties were unable to reach agreement with respect to the time arrangements for the child on special occasions, including the child’s birthdays, the parent’s birthdays, and holidays such as Christmas, Easter, Mother’s Day and Father’s Day. However, both the mother and father sought orders that the child’s time with the mother on special occasions should be in addition to the time provided in the orders.
Mother’s Day and Father’s Day
The father sought orders for the child to spend time with the father from 5.00pm on the Saturday prior to Father’s Day to 5.00pm on Father’s Day. However, he sought orders for the mother to spend time with the child from 9.00am to 2.00pm on Mother’s Day in 2025 and 2026, to then increase in 2027 from 5.00pm the Saturday prior to Mother’s Day to 12.00pm on Mother’s Day each alternate year, if Mother’s Day does not fall on the mother’s scheduled weekend. He sought for the time to change once again in 2028, from 12.00pm on Mother’s Day until before school the following Monday in each alternate year.
The mother sought orders the father to spend time with the child on Father’s Day from 5.00pm on the Saturday before Father’s Day until 5.00pm on Father’s Day. She sought the same orders for herself on Mother’s Day.
The ICL did not include specific orders for Mother’s Day and Father’s Day in his prepared minute. In submissions he stated that “the ICL does not have a problem with an order for Mother’s Day and Father’s Day” but did not specify which proposed order, if any, the ICL was in support of.
The mother submitted that her proposed orders for Mother’s Day and Father’s Day would be preferred over those of the father, given the importance of the mother’s role in the child’s life and thus the importance of spending the entirety of the day with her. There is no basis on the evidence to limit the mother’s time with the child on Mother’s Day as proposed by the father.
The mother stated in her affidavit that the father has previously refused to facilitate the mother’s time with the child on special occasions, such as Mother’s Day. Exhibit 28 is an email from the mother to the father’s legal representatives and the ICL dated 8 May 2024, in which the mother stated that she had not seen the child in over two weeks, due to the father allegedly withholding the child from her and expressed her desire to see her son on the upcoming Mother’s Day.
In cross-examination the father stated that he did not believe that he facilitated time or contact between the child and the mother on Mother’s Day in 2024. When asked whether he thought it was best for the child not to contact the mother on Mother’s Day, he responded, “I don’t think it changes anything for [the child] being so young.” The father’s response illustrates a lack of insight as to the significance of days of celebration and is likely illustrative of the fathers at times dismissive attitude to the role of the mother in X’s life.
It is in X’s best interest that he celebrates Mother’s Day with his mother and Father’s Day with his father and I make orders as sought by the mother as I prefer them as being child focussed.
The child’s birthday
On the father’s orders sought, if the child’s birthday falls on a weekday, the mother would spend time with the child from 12.00pm until 5.00pm in 2025 and 2026, and then from 2027 onwards from 4.00pm until 7.00pm. If the child’s birthday falls on a weekend that was not the mother’s weekend, she would spend time with the child from 9.00am until 2.00pm.
The mother sought orders that if the child’s birthday falls on a weekday, the child would spend time with the parent in accordance with the orders, and then with the other parent on a day following the child’s birthday from after school to before school the next day, or from 9.00am until 5.00pm if the following day is on the weekend.
The ICL sought orders for child to spend a period of not less than three hours with the mother on the child’s birthday, if he was not in her care.
There were no submissions made in respect of whether the fathers more limited time order, or the mother’s order providing for overnight time was to be preferred.
I agree that it is important for X to spend time with each of his parents on his birthday and order that he spend time with the parent with who he is not currently living on his birthday and if it is on a school day he will spend time from after school until 7pm and if it is on a weekend he should spend time from 9am until 2pm on that day. I do not agree that it is necessary for X to alter his overnight routine on his birthday but that each parent will be able to spend some time if X is not residing with them to acknowledge the day.
The mother’s and father’s birthdays
The father sought orders for the child to spend time with the mother on her birthday from 10.00am until 5.00pm in 2025 and 2026, and then from 2027 onwards, if on a school day the child will spend time with the mother from 4.00pm until 7.00pm and if on the weekend from 10.00am until 5.00pm if it is not the mother’s weekend. However, the father’s order then state that if the mother’s birthday falls on the weekend, she shall spend time with the child from 9.00am until 2.00pm if it is not her weekend.
The mother sought orders for the child to spend time with the mother on her birthday from 5.00pm the day before until 5.00pm on her birthday. She sought similar orders for the father to spend time with the child on the father’s birthday.
The ICL did not include any orders in respect to the parent’s birthdays stating in submissions that the ICL does not support a position about parent’s birthdays.
Given both parents seek orders for the child to spend time with the other parent on their birthdays I make the order that permits time to occur from after school until 7pm if it falls on a school day and from 9.00am until 2.00 pm if it falls on a weekend as sought by the father because it provides sufficient time for X to share a meal with each of his parents on these days.
Christmas
The father sought orders for Christmas time with the mother to incrementally increase from day time on Christmas Day, to an arrangement for the mother to spend from 10.00am Christmas Eve until 4.00pm Boxing day with the child and the father to spend from 4.00pm Christmas Day until 4.00pm on 27 December with the child, and for this arrangement to alternate between the parties each year.
The mother sought orders for the father to spend from 12.00pm on Christmas Eve to 12.00opm Christmas day with the child and the mother from 12.00pm Christmas Day until 12.00pm Boxing Day with the child in even numbered years and the arrangement to swap in odd numbered years.
The ICL sought orders for the parties to agree between themselves time to be sent at Christmas, but in the absence of agreement for the parent with whom the child is not living or spending time with, in accordance with the orders, to spend time from 4.00pm on Christmas day until 4.00pm on boxing day with the child.
The parties did not make any further submissions about their competing orders sought for time with the child on Christmas.
In order to promote certainty in respect of the time and to avoid conflict I order that the child spend time with each of the parents as agreed and in the absence of agreement in each alternate year from 4.00pm Christmas Eve until 4.00pm on Christmas Day with the mother and from 4.00pm Christmas Day until 4.00 pm Boxing Day with the father in odd years and from 4.00pm Christmas Eve until 4.00pm on Christmas Day with the mother and from 4.00pm Christmas Day until 4.00 pm Boxing Day with the father in even years.
Easter
The father sought orders that during Easter the child’s time with the mother incrementally increase from 10.00am to 5.00pm on Good Friday in 2025, to eventually spending time with the mother from 10.00am on Good Friday to 5.00pm on Easter Saturday and then with the father from 5.00pm on Easter Saturday until 5.00pm on Easter Monday.
The mother sought orders for the child to be with the father from 5.00pm on Holy Thursday to 5.00pm on Easter Saturday and with the mother from 5.00pm Easter Saturday until 5.00pm on Easter Monday in even numbered years and then for this arrangement to swap in odd numbered years.
The ICL’s orders did not specifically provide for Easter time arrangements.
The parties did not make submissions as to their proposed Easter time arrangements.
I prefer the mother’s orders sought as the time spent is reciprocal for the parties in alternating years which will ensure X has the benefit of spending time with each of his parents over the Easter period.
Overseas travel
Should the child be permitted to travel overseas with his mother?
The father sought orders that he alone is permitted to travel overseas with the child, but that the mother not be permitted to travel overseas with the child. His position was extraordinary and lacking in insight as to the impact on the mother and the child in circumstances where the mother is from Country N, and her entire family support remains living in Country N.
The mother seeks orders, supported by the ICL, that the child be permitted to travel overseas with both parents.
The parties agreed that if overseas travel were to occur, it would be appropriate for this not to occur until the Christmas holiday period after the child had commenced school, as was recommended by Ms G.
In submissions the father contended that the mother is a current flight risk and he maintained his concern that she would not return from Country N if she was permitted to travel there because the mother has no family in Australia and limited friends here. The father’s opposition to the child being permitted to travel with the mother internationally was difficult to understand, particularly as his original position as to unacceptable risk to the child in the mother’s care by reason of her mental health history, fell away.
In Line v Line (1997)136 FLR 149 the Full Court said (at p 152):
The next matter is obviously the degree of risk that the departing parent, once permitted to leave Australia, will, despite assurances to the contrary, choose not to return. In assessing that degree of risk, obvious considerations are the existence (or otherwise) of continuing ties between the departing parent and Australia (such as the ownership of real estate, the existence of business interests, or the residence of close family or friends here), the existence and strength of possible motives not to return (including the level of conflict between the parents, particularly over child related issues) and the existence and strength of possible motives to remain in the other nominated country (such as the ownership of real estate, the existence of business interests, or the residence of close family and/or personal friends there).
There was no evidence to support a finding that there was a risk of the mother taking the child and not returning to Australia. He did not contend that the mother had threatened to not return with the child, and it was not put to the mother that she intends to relocate out of Australia.
The mother lives in Australia. She is employed here. She has a partner with whom she lives, and he is also employed here.
The mother was born in Country N and relocated to Australian when she was 27 years old. The maternal family resides in City M, Country N, where the mother grew up.
In the specific issues report prepared by Dr O on 11 September 2023, the mother expressed to Dr O her desire to travel with the child to Country N so that he can have the opportunity to meet his maternal family members. She reported that the child and his maternal grandmother have a warm relationship and speak regularly online.
The maternal grandmother gave evidence in support of the mother’s case. She spoke of her desire to have the child visit the maternal family in Country N and that she would also welcome the father, and his wife should they ever travel with the child. The maternal grandmother gave evidence of her interaction with X over Skype.
The maternal grandmother gave evidence that immediately upon the COVID restrictions being lifted she and her husband travelled to Australia to visit the child. She gave evidence of the communication she has with X and there is no doubt of her which love and affection for X. I accept her evidence that she would dearly love him to visit her and the maternal family for him to experience directly his Country N family and culture.
The maternal grandmother presented as a genuine support for the mother and child. I accepted her evidence her desire to continue to support the mother and develop their relationship and to share the Country N culture with X. This support and connection enabling X to experience his Country N culture is a factor that I give weight to in the orders made.
There can be no doubt the mother’s cultural background and Country N heritage is a matter that is relevant and important to the particular circumstances of the child.
When asked by counsel for the ICL if he agreed that it was important for the child to maintain a connection with his maternal family, particularly considering his Country N heritage, the father responded that as a broad notion the child’s heritage is important although he appeared reluctant to acknowledge his Country N heritage.
The father ultimately agreed that it is important for the child to have a connection with his maternal family.

There was no evidence or submission that persuades me that the restraints sought by the father, or the mother are in the child’s best interests. Both parties have in the past shown immaturity and lack of insight as to the potential impact on the child of their overtly uncooperative attitude toward the other parent when it comes to X’s medical needs. I accept the evidence of Ms G that the child will derive benefit from both of his parents having at least some involvement in decision-making for the child. It is also important because this ensures both parents are kept informed of his developmental needs.
Each parent will have the care of X for periods of time including equal time over school holidays. Each should be able to take child to necessary medical appointments when the child is in their care and should inform the other parent of the outcome of any necessary medical appointments. Each parent will be at liberty to seek information from the medical professionals who treat for X. Accordingly, no restraint as sought by either parent is in X’s best interests.
Should an injunction on illicit substance/alcohol use be made?
The ICL sought an injunctive order for both parties to be restrained from consuming any illegal drugs or substances or permitting or authorising any other person from doing so whilst the child is in their care.
The father did not seek any injunctive restraint on using illicit substances or alcohol.
In Dr O’s report there was a concern that the mother, if faced with significant stressors, would turn to maladaptive conduct, including engaging in risky conduct to harm herself, her health or her relationships. This could include drug and alcohol usage.
Dr O in cross-examination opined that the alcohol use disorder prognosis identified in his specific issues report appears to have remained in remission from the material that he was provided with.
Given the parties’ history and competing past allegations as to illicit drug use it is appropriate that both parties be restrained from consuming any illegal drugs or substances or permitting or authorising any other person from doing so whilst the child is in their care, to ensure the safety of X.
Should an injunction on using physical discipline and exposing the child to family violence exposure be made?
The ICL sought orders restraining the parties from exposing the child to violence, including physical or verbal threats or intimidation, whether directed at each other, the child or any other member of the household. The ICL also sought that the parties be restrained from physically disciplining the child. Neither the mother nor the father sought similar injunctions to be made.
There is a significant history of family violence alleged by the mother as perpetrated by the father during and after the parties’ relationship. The father maintains his denial of perpetrating any physical or verbal abuse against the mother. Conversely, the father stated that he was subject to manipulation, emotional abuse and threatening conduct of the mother. Both parties agree that the relationship was “toxic.”
The mother alleged that the father subjected her to coercive control during and after the relationship. The mother alleged that the father could control her spending through insisting she download an app called “Splitwise.” The father agreed that he told the mother to download the app but denied that he would use it to track her spending.
The mother stated in her affidavit there was an incident in early 2021, where she alleged the father “smashed a glass in her hand” after an argument ensued between the parties. The mother claims that she then locked herself in the bathroom. The father said that he went to grab his vape off the table where the mother was sitting, and she snatched it back causing her to hit a wine glass that she was holding against the table and subsequently cut her hand. The father stated that she ran and locked herself in the bathroom and rang police, informing them that the father had “glassed her.”
The NSW COPS record from early 2021 recounts both parties’ recollection of the event. The record stated that the mother told the police that the father picked up a glass and threw it at her, which then broke and cut her finger. The record stated that the mother later changed her recount of the incident to stating that the father grabbed her hand which was holding the glass and shattered it in her hand. The mother then again changed her recount to the police and claimed that the father threw a glass and at some point, shattered another glass which was used to threaten her. The father stated to police that he reached across the table to take the vape from the mother’s hand and knocked the wine glass in her hand, breaking it at its stem.
In April 2021, there was an incident when the parties were on holidays in Tasmania when the father conceded he threw the mother’s phone out of the car in which they were driving after an argument between the parties. The father stated that he did this because the mother was driving at the time and constantly texting whilst doing so, and after repeatedly telling her to stop he took her phone and threw it out of the window.
As stated above, the mother alleged that she was coerced into having sex with the father between 26 January and 28 January 2022, to see her child. The father conceded that the parties did have sex, but that he did not coerce her, and conversely that she initiated the sexual encounter between the two. I am not able to make a finding in respect of the allegations based on the evidence nor in my view is it necessary to do so.
The father stated in his affidavit that he obtained an ADVO from the police in early 2022 for his protection from the mother, after she started contacting his clients, people he works with and his friends and family. A copy of the provisional ADVO order was tendered into evidence and marked as exhibit 47.
The mother alleged that the father continued to coercively control her after their relationship had ended, by controlling when she could see the child, denying her time with the child and controlling what foods she fed to the child.
Counsel for the father stated that the Court is not able to positively find that on the balance of probabilities the father engaged in acts of violence during the relationship. I agree it is not necessary in the circumstances of this case to do particularly where no issues to the safety of the child or a parent are contended and where each seeks that the child spend time with the other parent.
The father stated in cross-examination that he was concerned that the mother would abuse the father in front of the child and place him in the middle of conflict. When he was pressed further on when the last time was that the mother abused him in front of the child and put the child in the middle of conflict, the father then accepted that the mother has not done this as they have not been in the same room together.
The parties have undoubtedly had a tumultuous relationship with each making various allegations of family violence against the other mostly during the periods leading to the end of their relationship. I am satisfied that there has been family violence between the parties that pre-dates X’s birth such as the incident with the wine glass and the incident with the telephone in Tasmania. There was no evidence or allegation that either party had used physical discipline towards the child or that the child was exposed directly or indirectly to the alleged family violence. The counsel for the ICL did not make submissions addressing why such injunctive orders should be made.
I am not satisfied on the evidence that the injunction sought should be made and I decline to make such an order.
Should an injunction restraining the relocation of the child’s residence be made?
The mother sought an order that each parent be restrained by injunction from relocating the child’s residence further than 50 kilometres from the residence of the other parent.
The ICL and the father did not seek any injunctive order in this respect.
Counsel for the mother submitted that the father stated in his affidavit that he wished to expand his business to the coast and that ultimately this concerned her that for the father would relocate the child’s residence.
The father’s counsel acknowledged that the orders would be unworkable if either of the parties moved further away.
The father has previously relocated the child’s residence without informing the mother, and only after significant insistence from both the mother and the ICL did the father inform the mother of where the child was living and the childcare centre he was then unilaterally enrolled in. Given that past conduct and the concession from the father’s counsel that to do so would make the orders unworkable, such an injunction is in X’s best interests, and I make the order sought.
Should an injunction on the father allowing or encouraging the child to refer to other persons as his mother be made?
Both the mother and father sought injunctive orders regarding the child referring to other persons as “mum”, “mummy”, “mother” or any other variation of the word.
The father sought an order restraining himself from encouraging the child to refer to anyone other than the mother as “mum”, “mummy”, or any other term for “mother” and from allowing any other person to encourage the child to do so. The ICL was in support of the father’s order sought.
The mother sought an order that the father be restrained from encouraging or allowing the child to refer to anyone other than the mother in such a way, and from allowing any other person to encourage the child to do so.
The issue as to how the child addressed and referred to his mother was a matter that was the subject of cross-examination during the trial. The father, his wife and her mother gave evidence about the child referring to the mother as “the bubble lady.” The wife and her mother gave evidence that he did so after associating the mother with a gift or a toy of a bubble gun and they did not see it as an issue. The mother felt that being referred to as “bubble lady” was diminishing her role in his life. The father, his wife and her mother all gave evidence that they did not correct the child.
Ms G observed that the child referring to the mother as “bubble lady” might be due to the limited time he has spent with the mother, but that she would hope that there were conversations with the child to address this and to ensure she was referred to as his mother. When asked when at home what he referred to the mother as, the father said that he did not refer to her as anything.
Ms G gave evidence that there are ways for the father and his wife to discuss the implications of calling the mother “bubble lady” that are age appropriate. She opined that it would be confusing for the child if his familial relationships were not discussed and explained to him. It is hoped with the benefit of having heard the opinion of Ms G as to the importance of being child focussed that the father’s household will adopt a more supportive attitude toward the role of the mother in X’s life and will engage with whatever supports are necessary to ensure that happens.
There can be no doubt that X understands who his mother is. The contact reports from H Family Services dated 22 September 2024 tendered into evidence at exhibit 6 records the child as excitedly engaging with his mother and calling her “mummy.” The observations from Ms G’s report also stated that the child was affectionate with the mother.
When suggested to Ms G that in the context of the high conflict relationship between the parties it was concerning that the child was calling his stepmother “mum”, Ms G fairly observed that it is not unusual for a child to call a stepparent “mum”, and there was no immediate concern about this.
It was submitted and I accept that the child lives primarily in his father’s household, which includes his stepmother and stepsiblings, each of whom refer to their mother as mum or mummy. Ms G accepted the proposition that given the child’s young age and exposure to other children referring to the wife as mum or mummy that an order not allowing such terms to be used may be confusing and punitive to the child. I am persuaded by that submission and the reality that X primarily lives in a blended family where those dynamics are his lived experience.
I note that in the father’s household he is referred to as … (a play on his name and Dad) seemingly a recognition that he is not the father but the stepfather of the stepmother’s children. As the child becomes older it is possible that a similar name may be able to be fashioned for the father’s wife. If that does not occur, the mother at the very least will be referred to as mum or mummy recognising the very important and significant part she plays in the child’s life as his mother.
The injunction in the terms sought by the father and the ICL of encouraging the child is the order that is in the best interests of X because it manages the issue identified while balancing the reality of X living in a home where his stepsiblings will continue to refer to their mother as mum and mummy.
Name Change
Should the child’s surname be changed?
A parenting order is defined by section 64B(1) of the Act to be an order under Part VII of the Act, dealing with a matter mentioned in subsection 64B(2). Section 64B(2) provides that a parenting order may deal with one or more of those matters prescribed in subsections (2)(a) through to (2)(h) as well as any aspect of the care, welfare or development of the child or any other aspect of parental responsibility for a child.
The name of a child comes within the ambit of “any aspect of the care, welfare, development of the child or any other aspect of parental responsibility for a child.” Accordingly, an order changing the name of the child is a parenting order. In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the child’s best interests is the paramount consideration.
The mother sought an order that the child’s surname be changed from “[Klasson]” to “[Borisov-Klasson]”, a hyphenation of both parties’ surnames. She also sought that the parties share equally in the fees associated with such a change.
Both the father and the ICL opposed such an order being made.
When the child was born, he was registered with the mother’s surname “[Borisov].” In cross-examination the father agreed that he insisted the mother change the child’s surname to the father’s surname “[Klasson]” which the parties did.
The father was asked in cross-examination whether he agreed that hyphenating the child’s name could assist the child in having a connection with the maternal family and the father did not agree.
The mother gave no evidence as to why such an order was in the child’s interest nor was there any evidence from Ms G as to the impact on X of a name change at his age.
Ms G did not address the issue of name change in her written report. There was no evidence from either party in respect of the impact of a change to X’s name at this time. There was limited focus on the issue of the child’s surname during the hearing.
In Chapman and Palmer (1978) 34 FLR 405, the Full Court identified that an application in relation to change of name is something to be considered on the facts of an individual case with the best interests of a child being the paramount consideration. Decisions such as Beach and Semmler (1979) FLC 90-692 have considered the relevant evidence in support of such a change. In a number of more recent decisions of A v B (No 2) [2003] FMCAfam 530; Reynolds & Sherman [2016] FamCAFC 240, and Zachariah & Zachariah [2017] FamCA 482 consideration of whether a child’s surname should be changed to include or to hyphenate the mother’s surname such as in the current case, has occurred.
Those decisions have helpfully articulated some relevant considerations in assessing the best interests of the child regarding a name change including the short and long term effects of any change of the child’s name; any embarrassment likely to be experienced by the child if its name is different from that of the person with whom the child normally lives; any confusion of identity which may arise from the child if his or her name is changed or is not changed; time that the parent who is agitating the change of name has had or is likely to have with the child in the future; the degree of identification that the child now has with the parent seeking the change of name; whether the name should reflect the parentage of the child and the degree of identification which the child now has with both the parties.
Ultimately, however, each case turns on its own facts and the evidence relevant to the child’s best interests.
There was no evidence as to the impact on X, or as to any benefit to X of such a change. There was no general evidence of the likely impact of such a change on a child of X’s age.
The mother had agreed to a birth certificate with his current surname. I infer that X who will be turning four this year, knows his name and identifies with it. I have a concern based on the evidence of historical conflict between these parties, that to impose such a change may be a source of further tension between the parties that X could be exposed to.
Given the absence of evidence, I have not been persuaded on the facts and evidence in the circumstances of X’s case, that the change of name sought is in the best interests of X and for these reasons I find that it is in X’s best interest to retain his current surname.
OTHER ORDERS SOUGHT
Communication
The father sought that the parties communicate about parenting arrangement through “Our Family Wizard” except in the case of an emergency where he sought that they communicate by telephone or text. The mother did not oppose the fathers proposed App and in submissions the mother’s counsel accepted that they had used that Our Family Wizard previously.
In circumstances where they have previously used the Our Family Wizard App without incident and noting there was no opposition to the order, I make the order as sought by the father.
The mother sought an order that the child be permitted to telephone the other parent at any reasonable time the child requests. They father did not seek any orders for telephone communication.
The parents should have the capacity to support X’s relationship with both parents. It is reasonable to expect that if the child were to request to speak to his mother or father while in the care of the other parent that it should be facilitated. Such capacity for X to speak to each of his parents at times he requests is in his best interests and should occur. Accordingly, I make the order as sought.
Dispute Resolution
The mother sought orders that should either parent wish to amend the orders, the parties would engage a Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner to mediate the issue and if a dispute arises more than once in a six-month period, the parties will engage the services of a Parenting Coordinator to assist them.
In submissions, counsel for the mother stated that these orders were not pressed.
I make no order for dispute resolution. If the parties are in dispute, they are able engage in dispute resolution absent an order being made.
Changeover Additional Orders Sought by the father
The changeover location of McDonalds at Suburb F if it was not otherwise from childcare, preschool or school, was an agreed position. Most changeovers will occur at pre-school, childcare or school. On occasion changeover will occur as between the parents or their agents.
The father sought orders that the parties personally conduct handover within the McDonalds Restaurant, that the parents should arrive 15 minutes prior to handover, the parent and any agent are restrained from approaching the other parent’s car and that handover notes are to be sent at the commencement and conclusion of each visit.
There were no specific submissions made addressing the necessity of the orders sought as set out above.

Having made orders for any necessary communication to be undertaken through the Our Family Wizard App I am not satisfied it is necessary to order handover notes as sought by the father. The parties can use the App to provide any necessary notes and information pertinent to X’s care.
To avoid any uncertainty and given the young age of X, I order that changeover occur within the restaurant as proposed by the father. It is not necessary to order the parties be in attendance 15 minutes in advance of the changeover time, although I note the obligation of the parties to comply with the order including the time set for the changeover.
I was not taken to any evidence to support nor were submissions made in support of the restraint on approaching the other parent’s car. There is no basis upon which I am satisfied such an order is in X’s best interests.
Authorities and Information
The ICL sought orders that each parent be able to directly obtain from preschool and school, extra-curricular and sporting organisations and any health or welfare professionals’ copies of any information and reports concerning the child. To facilitate such an order the ICL also sought an order that each parent keep the other informed as to the names and contact details of any relevant education, health and welfare professionals. Such orders are in the best interest of X given the history of lack of information sharing as set out above.
The mother sought an order that within 12 hours of the child suffering from any medical condition, significant health issue or illness suffered by the child while in a parent’s care that they notify the other parent through the App. Such an order is appropriate, and it is in X’s interest that each parent is aware of any health or medical issues requiring medical attention and accordingly I make an order accordingly.
The father sought specific orders in respect of advising the mother of medical matters. These orders also ensure the mother remains informed of matters relevant to X and I make them in the terms sought by him.
The parties each sought an order that the parents are at liberty to provide a copy of these orders to the child’s daycare, preschool school and medical treaters. Such an order is in X’s best interests.
Both parties sought orders to keep the other informed of any changes to their current telephone number, mailing address and email address. Such an order is appropriate and is made.
ICL costs
The ICL sought an order for the mother and the father to pay half of the costs of the ICL.
The mother received legal aid in respect of the proceedings.
The father opposed the costs order, with counsel for the father stating that because the father has had to meet significant legal fees in the proceedings and share the costs of supervised visits, together with his primary care and support of the child he was unable to meet the ICL’s costs order.
The provisions of s 117(4)(a) of the Act apply in respect of the mother. I am satisfied having regard to the evidence and submissions as to the father’s circumstances that the provisions of s 117(4)(b) of the Act apply in respect of the father. I am satisfied that the evidence about the father's financial circumstances is such that I would not depart from the usual rule.
The application for costs is refused.
CONCLUSION
I am satisfied these orders are in the best interest of the child.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and eighty-nine (289) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Curran.
Associate:
Dated: 9 May 2025

File number(s):	SYC 2878 of 2022
Judgment of:	CURRAN J
Date of judgment:	9 May 2025
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Where child has been living with father – Where the mother has been spending supervised day time with the child – Where on final day mother agreed for father to have sole-decision making – Where father accepted mother was not a safety risk and did not require supervision – Where father sought limited spend time orders – Where orders made for incremental increase in time with mother and immediate overnight time are in the child’s best interest – Where mother sought orders to change child’s name to include her surname – Where such an order is not in the best interest of the child – Where parties sought various injunctive orders
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), pt VII, ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 64B, 117 Convention on the Rights of the Child
Cases cited:	A v B (No 2) [2003] FMCAfam 530 Adamson & Adamson [2014] 51 Fam LR 626; [2014] FamCA 232 Beach and Semmler (1979) FLC 90-692 Carlson & Fluvium [2012] FamCA 32 Chapman and Palmer (1978) 34 FLR 405 Line v Line (1997)136 FLR 149 Reynolds & Sherman [2016] FamCAFC 240 Zachariah & Zachariah [2017] FamCA 482
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	289
Date of last submission/s:	21 February 2025
Date of hearing:	17-21 February 2025
Place:	Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant:	Ms Tabbernor
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Gibson Howlin Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Adams-Nash
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Opal Legal
Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Mr Jackson
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Brian Samuel & Associates

SYC 2878 of 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MR KLASSON Applicant
AND:	MS BORISOV Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:	CURRAN J
DATE OF ORDER:	9 MAY 2025