Kitagawa & Yokota
[2024] FedCFamC1F 358
•29 May 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Kitagawa & Yokota [2024] FedCFamC1F 358
File number: MLC 880 of 2023 Judgment of: MCGUIRE J Date of judgment: 29 May 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – NULLITY – Application for a declaration of nullity of marriage – Where it is alleged that at the time of the marriage the respondent wife was lawfully married to another person – Application dismissed Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 51
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) ss 13, 23 and 94
Cases cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34
Re: F Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072; [2001] FamCA 348
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 70 Date of hearing: 11 and 12 April 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Finegan Solicitor for the Applicant: Andropoulos & Associates Lawyers Solicitor for the Respondent: Litigant in Person ORDERS
MLC 880 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR KITAGAWA
Applicant
AND: MS YOKOTA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MCGUIRE J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 MAY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Further Amended Application for Nullity filed by the husband, Mr Kitagawa, on 14 March 2024 be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Kitagawa & Yokota has been approved pursuant to subsection 114(Q)(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCGUIRE J
APPLICATIONS
The husband, Mr Kitagawa (“the applicant”), brings an application seeking an order that the marriage entered into between the parties at Suburb B in Victoria in mid-2019 be declared null and void.
He also seeks an order as follows:
4.A sealed copy of this order, a certified copy of the reasons for judgment delivered this day, sealed copies of the applicant’s Initiating Application and affidavit in support thereof filed on 14 March 2024 and any other document which may be considered relevant be referred to the chambers of the Chief Justice of this Court for referral to the appropriate authority of the Commonwealth of Australia for consideration of the prosecution of the respondent for a breach of section 94 of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and any further charge at their discretion.
In short, the applicant asserts that the wife, Ms Yokota (“the respondent”), in mid-2019 was then married to another person namely Mr C, a resident of Country D, with such marriage taking place in 1988, and where the respondent and Mr C are not divorced.
Section 51 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides:
An application under this Act for a decree of nullity of marriage shall be based on the ground that the marriage is void.
The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) at s 23 provides:
(1)A marriage that took place on or after 20 June 1977 and before the commencement of section 13 of the Marriage Amendment Act 1985 is void where:
(a)either of the parties was, at the time of the marriage, lawfully married to some other person;
…
Section 23B of that Act provides similarly in respect of marriages taking place after the commencement of section 13 of the Marriage Amendment Act 1985 (Cth).
Further, that Act at s 94 provides under the heading of ‘bigamy’:
(1)A person who is married shall not go through a form or ceremony of marriage with any person.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years.
(1A)For the purposes of an offence against subsection (1), strict liability applies to the physical element of circumstance, that the person was married when the form or ceremony took place.
…
(4)A person shall not go through a form or ceremony of marriage with a person who is married, knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that the latter person is married.
…
(7)In a prosecution for an offence against this section, the fact that, at the time of the alleged offence, a person was married shall not be taken to have been proved if the only evidence of the fact is the evidence of the other party to the alleged marriage.
THE RELEVANT ISSUE
The relevant issue for determination is whether the respondent prima facie committed the offence of bigamy having been married to another person at the time she entered into the marriage with the applicant and not having been divorced from that other person.
For the purposes of my determination this is an issue of credit on the one hand between the applicant, supported by three witnesses, and, on the other hand, the respondent who offers blatant denials to the assertions made by the applicant and his witnesses which can be summarised as:
(1)That as of mid-2019 being the date of the marriage of the applicant and the respondent, the respondent was then married to another person namely Mr C;
(2)That the respondent had not been the divorced from Mr C;
(3)That the respondent and Mr C are jointly the parents of three children namely:
(i)MS E born 1999;
(ii)MR F born 1999;
(iii)MS G born 2006.
(4)That the true name of the respondent is MS H born 1980 (currently 44 years of age);
(5)That the birth certificate provided in these proceedings by the respondent as MS YOKOTA born 1987 (currently 37 years of age) was obtained by the respondent by means of fraud.
Broadly, therefore, it remains for the Court to determine whether the respondent has perpetrated a fraud in the form of a bigamist marriage or, alternatively, whether the applicant has conspired with others to make a false allegation of bigamy against the respondent?
EVIDENCE
Importantly, where issues of credit prevail, it must be emphasised that the party making the assertion of fact carries an onus to prove that fact to the standard of ‘on the balance of probabilities’.
Relevantly, s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Evidence Act”) provides:
1.In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
2.Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b) the nature of the subject - matter of the proceeding; and
(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.
Where the allegation here is one of bigamy carrying with it potential criminal charges then the matter is, in my view, at the higher end of gravity of the matters alleged. In this sense, and where s 140 of the Evidence Act enshrines in statute the common law principles, the statement of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[1] is pertinent:
…when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. … it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.
[1] (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34.
The conduct of this trial was made more difficult in its process and the taking of evidence by the fact that the respondent was self-represented. Further compounding these difficulties is that the Court had previously made an order under s 102NA of the Act which provides the mandatory ‘protections’ for matters where, as in that now before me, there is an extant family violence order or where the Court, in its discretion, and against a background of family violence, determines to make an order under the section. Although the Court made the order effectively in favour of the respondent, she did not take up the indulgence offered under the section and the order and appeared in person unrepresented. Enquiry suggest she made only cursory attempts online to activate the order. As such, and with explanation to counsel for the applicant, it fell upon the Court to challenge many of the assertions of fact made by the applicant and his witnesses and to perhaps enter the forum of cross-examination to a greater extent than usual.
Whilst the respondent has some command of the English language, it was apparent that the process of the proceedings and its complexities caused some difficulties to the respondent but where the Court took some time to explain to the respondent the process and procedure in court with an invitation to ask questions at any juncture.[2] It followed that the respondent’s cross‑examination of the applicant’s witnesses was brief, generally argumentative, and of limited assistance in addressing the issues of credit prevailing in this matter.
[2] Re: F Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072; [2001] FamCA 348.
THE APPLICANT
The applicant relied on his affidavit sworn 14 March 2024.
The applicant’s affidavit asserted that he is 45 years of age and had two marriages prior to marrying the respondent in mid-2019. He is the father of one child.
He deposes to meeting the respondent at a bar in Country D in 2017 whereupon the respondent made several statements to him as to her personal, historical and work status. Specifically, she asserted that she had never been married and had no siblings.
The applicant says the parties started dating almost immediately after meeting. He returned to Australia in 2017 but with the parties maintaining a long-distance relationship. He returned variously to Country D in late 2017 and 2018 where in early 2018 the respondent introduced him to “Ms G” who she said was a daughter that had been “legally adopted” by her aunt and that the respondent therefore did not have any children. She asserted that she was single when falling pregnant to Ms G’s father.
The applicant states that he also met a male, Mr F, at the respondent’s house whereupon the respondent informed him that Mr F was her nephew.
The applicant says that he proposed to the respondent “online” in early 2018 and later in person in late 2018. In the meantime, and in about mid-2018, the respondent had applied for a Multiple Entry Tourist Visa.
At paragraph [17] of his affidavit the applicant deposes:
17.The respondent told me that she needed to get a new passport as her old one was stolen. She said that whilst she was being driven […] to the agent to submit her application for the Multiple Entry Tourist Visa, the driver had an accident, all her papers scattered everywhere and the driver stole her papers, amongst which were her passport and identification documents.
Further at [18] and [19]:
18.The respondent told me that the name on her stolen passport [had two surnames]. I do not recall the order of the names as she said them but she mentioned all three. She said she would remove [one of the surnames] so that she could do a fresh application from the start as it would be faster than an application to renew her passport. She also said she had a police clearance under the name of [Ms Yokota] and had obtained a birth certificate with that name based on her police clearance. I believe that the entire story was made up, to enable the respondent to obtain fraudulent documents, and to explain any inconsistencies to me.
19.[In mid] 2018 a Multiple Entry Tourist Visa was issued to [Ms Yokota] born […] 1987.
The applicant alleges at [23] that in 2019 in Country D the parties went to the relevant government authority to obtain a Certificate of No Marriage Record for the respondent. He asserts that the respondent chose a particular attendant who was her friend so as to provide a fraudulent document.
The applicant deposes that the parties married in Victoria in mid-2019 and in late 2019 he applied for a Partner Visa for the respondent.
The applicant says that in early 2021 he was contacted by “Ms J” through Facebook Messenger informing him that she was the respondent’s half-sister, that they shared a mother and that the respondent was married to another man and had three children. Photographs purporting to be of the respondent’s wedding were provided. The applicant says that the respondent denied the allegations when confronted.
In mid-2021 the respondent was granted a Temporary Partner Visa and the following month obtained a Permanent Residency Visa. The applicant says that the respondent left the home and the marriage in mid-2022 going to live with Mr K who was a friend of the applicant. The parties have remained separated.
The applicant asserts that he then became suspicious as to the respondent’s background and was contacted in late 2022 by a Ms L who also told him the respondent lied to him about her marital status. He then again contacted Ms J who arranged a Facebook call with a male person being Mr C who informed the applicant that he was the husband of the respondent and they were not divorced. He advised that he and the respondent had three children, Ms E, Mr F, and Ms G.
Ms J sent the applicant a purported Facebook conversation with a person who was alleged to be the respondent and where it is asserted that the respondent made admissions as to her untruths to the applicant under an alias.
The applicant then obtained various documents including a birth certificate for a Ms H born 1980 and did so on the advice of Ms J. He obtained birth certificates for the children, Ms E, Mr F and Ms G. He obtained a copy of Ms J’s birth certificate. He also arranged for a certified copy of the marriage certificate between Mr C and the person named as Ms H. The applicant asserts that the signatures on his marriage certificate and that of Mr C and Ms H “appear strikingly similar”.
The applicant had Facebook communication with Mr F who identified the respondent as his mother via photographs.
The applicant’s affidavit then goes on in detail to deny the assertions made by the respondent of family violence during their marriage.
In questions asked by myself the applicant repeated that he denies the issues of family violence. To the contrary, he alleged family violence by the respondent on him. The applicant admitted providing money to each of his three witnesses, but claims it was for “expenses” only.
When the respondent was cross-examined by counsel for the applicant she maintained family violence perpetrated on her by the applicant. She produced a document exhibited through re‑examination being text messages between herself and the applicant’s own mother where the respondent contemporaneously raises issues of family violence. A document, being communication between the parties, also purports to raise the respondent’s allegations directly with the applicant, with statements made by the applicant dated 27 December 2021 which may be interpreted as admissions by the applicant. The applicant’s credibility suffers accordingly by reason of his denials under oath in the witness box of any family violence perpetrated by him.
The applicant was asked whether he provided any money to any of his witnesses. He claimed that this detail was mentioned in his affidavit. It was not. He then agreed that he had provided some money to each of his witnesses and that was subsequently corroborated by those witnesses. The applicant and the witnesses say that monies provided and received were only for expenses incurred when completing their affidavits. Where the applicant would be ordinarily responsible for the costs of preparation of such affidavits and where the applicant advises that he sent ‘$500 – $600’ to the witness, Mr F, I am not persuaded by the explanations of the applicant and witnesses of being provided with “expenses” only for the swearing of the affidavits.
MR C
Mr C swore an affidavit on 28 November 2023.
The jurat does not cite the affidavit as being interpreted to the deponent prior to signing. Nevertheless, Mr C required an interpreter for his evidence in court and my observations were of a person with very limited, if any, command of English. As such, the use of language with some complexities in his affidavit raises concerns as to the contents and execution of that document.
Mr C gave evidence by Microsoft teams with the assistance of an interpreter. He maintained that he was married to the respondent. He identified the respondent over the video. He admitted that he had not the seen the respondent for some 10 years.
In cross-examination by the respondent to Mr C he conceded that he had first “identified” the respondent from a driver licence permit provided over video by the applicant. My own viewing in court of that document showed blurred vision and I am unable to easily identify the respondent as the person in the photograph.
MS J
Ms J gave evidence by Microsoft Teams from her home in Country N. She claims to be the half-sister of the respondent and deposes that the respondent is married to Mr C and not divorced. As mentioned above, she asserts the Facebook communication between herself and the respondent albeit under a name not now used by the respondent.
Cross-examination by the respondent of the witness was voluble with Ms J maintaining that the respondent was her half-sister and the respondent repeatedly asserting denials of that proposition.
Ms J admitted to receiving some money from the applicant but suggested it was for expenses only. Essentially, the credit dispute between Ms J and the applicant remains one of word-on-word.
MR F
Mr F swore an affidavit on 28 November 2023.
He gave evidence by Microsoft teams. He identified the respondent over the video as his mother. He says that he has not seen that person since 2018. His affidavit provides photographs of himself and a woman who he asserts to be his mother and the person he viewed in court.
The respondent denies that she is the mother of Mr F. She denies that she is the person in the photographs.
I am unable to confirm from my own observations that the person exhibited in Mr F’s photographs is indeed the respondent.
Notably, the applicant did not adduce evidence of any expert nature such as a facial recognition expert.
Mr F conceded that he was provided with money by the applicant which was again for “expenses”. His affidavit was sworn before a second secretary at the Australian Consulate in Country D.
Mr F had reasonable command of the English language and did not require an interpreter.
DOCUMENTS
A number of documents were exhibited on behalf of the applicant. They purport to carry a signature identical to or similar to that of the respondent on her marriage certificate to the applicant. My own untrained eyes show discrepancies in the signatures but perhaps explicable by the different names signed. Again, however, where the respondent denies that the previous documents contain her signature, the applicant did not adduce evidence from a handwriting expert which may have resolved this issue.
In other respects, and where the respondent maintains blatant denials that she is the person named in the birth certificates and the marriage certificate of Mr C, the documents are of little, if any, forensic assistance. That is, they show marriage by Mr C to a person who carries a different name than that now carried by the respondent. I cannot determine on their face that the signatures are identical. There is also a difference in the Christian names of the bride’s mother asserted by Ms J and as stated by the respondent on her own marriage certificate.
The submission by counsel for the applicant that the similarity of birthdates for the “brides” on the marriage certificates is not persuasive. Put simply, the marriage certificate for Mr C shows the respondent to be MS H born 1980. The marriage certificate of the parties shows the respondent to have been born in the same month in 1987 and under a different name.
THE RESPONDENT
The respondent affirmed an affidavit on 13 June 2023 when she was previously represented by a solicitor. She provided no updated documents.
The respondent was cross-examined at some length and vigorously as to the assertions made by her the applicant. The respondent presented as a credible and determined witness. She did not retreat under cross-examination in respect of any of the following:
(1)she maintained that she was not previously married when she married the applicant in Victoria in mid-2019;
(2)she insisted that she had never been previously married;
(3)she says that she has no children;
(4)she stated that she is not related to a Ms J;
(5)she deposed to having no knowledge of Mr F and is not the person in the photographs presented to the Court by Mr F;
(6)she asserted that she has never been known as or used the name Ms H;
(7)she says that her father is “unknown” as exhibited on the extract of birth obtained by her; and
(8)she says that her mother, now deceased, was known as Ms P and not Ms Q, with the same given name, as seen on the marriage certificate of Mr C nor Ms Q as noted on the birth certificate of Ms J.
The respondent produced in cross-examination, and caused to be exhibited in re-examination, text communications between herself and the applicant’s mother giving some corroboration to her claim of family violence during the relationship where such claims were blatantly denied by the applicant.
Where credit and ‘word-on-word’ are important in this dispute and determination, this evidence gives some weight to the credit of the applicant.
The respondent also produces a document namely an extract of a Certificate of Live Birth showing the name she now uses and the name of her mother as Ms P. Her father is listed as “unknown”. The probative value of this document, however, is limited, if any, by reason of this being a document provided to the applicant by way of her affidavit and application made in 2018 for a “delayed registration of birth”. That is, it is clear that it was the respondent herself who provided the information for the creation of this document in 2018.
CONSIDERATIONS AND FINDING
As mentioned above, the dispute here is very much an issue of credit between the applicant and the respondent. Where the applicant is asserting bigamy on the part of the respondent, he holds an onus to prove that assertion on the balance of probabilities. There is no onus on the respondent to prove the negative.
Whilst the applicant was generally a credible witness, his evidence suffers by reason of his denials of family violence and where I find the corroboration adduced by the respondent leads me to prefer her evidence that she was indeed the subject of family violence during the relationship.
Initially, there is an issue of “motive” and why the applicant should bring an application, as spurious as the respondent suggests it is, for a nullity grounded on bigamy when he might more easily come to this Court and simply obtain a divorce on the no-fault provisions in the Act. The respondent, however, asserts the motive to be the applicant’s annoyance of her leaving the marriage and moving to live with one of his friends and where the respondent understands that a nullity of the marriage and an eventual finding/conviction that she has committed the crime of bigamy may result in her being deported from Australia. Again, where the respondent asserts, and the applicant denies, family violence, inclusive of coercive control, in the marriage then prima facie I accept the respondent’s contention that this would provide a motive for the applicant to bring false allegations.
Further, where the respondent blatantly denies the allegations as set out by the applicant and does so under vigorous cross-examination, it falls to me to make findings on the various assertions made by the applicant in support of his allegation of bigamy and as follows:
(1)the applicant asserts, at least impliedly, that the marriage was entered into by the respondent simply to obtain residential status in Australia and upon obtaining such status she left the marriage;
(2)the chronology lends some support to this contention where the separation occurred only a month or so after the respondent obtained Permanent Resident Status. Nevertheless, I cannot make such a finding where the respondent gives a plausible alternative explanation for the separation being one of family violence and where I accept her evidence over that of the applicant;
(3)the applicant adduces evidence from witnesses namely Ms J, Mr C and Mr F who all identified the respondent over the Microsoft Teams connection. However, none assert recent observations of the respondent as indicated by Mr C who conceded it being some 10 years since he has seen his wife and some six years since Mr F has seen his mother according to his evidence. Where the respondent denies any knowledge or association with the any of the three witnesses brought for the applicant, this word-on-word evidence is of limited probative value;
(4)various photographs are exhibited to the affidavits of witnesses brought by the applicant. Those witnesses assert the respondent to be shown in those photographs. The respondent denies that she is the person in the photographs. I am unable to identify the respondent as the person shown in any of the photographs even as a lay observer and certainly not to the standard of on the balance of probabilities. Notably, the applicant does not bring any expert evidence such as a facial identification expert;
(5)the applicant produces various documents containing signatures of the respondent such as on their marriage certificate and signatures on other documents including the marriage certificate of Mr C and the birth certificates of the children. Counsel for the applicant submits that I can, even as a layperson, observe such similarities between signatures as to find on the balance of probabilities that they are from the same hand. I am unable to do so but do note to several observable discrepancies and not surprisingly so given that there are different names typed on those documents. Again, the applicant may have been assisted in this assertion by way of evidence from a handwriting expert. He did not adduce such evidence;
(6)counsel for the applicant asks me to take inferences from the dates of birth on each of the marriage certificates of Mr C and that of the applicant. The earlier shows the respondent to have been born in 1980. The latter shows the respondent to have been born in 1987. I cannot take any inference; and
(7)the applicant adduces evidence from Ms J who claims to be the half-sister of the respondent. He produces birth certificates of both and I am asked to take an inference as to certain similarities in named persons. Firstly, he produces a Certificate of Live Birth for MS H born 1980 whose mother is noted as MS Q. Secondly, he produces the birth certificate of MS J born 1969 showing her mother as MS Q and her father as MR R. Where Ms J claims to be the half-sister of the respondent then these certificates prima facie give some support to the contention that the respondent and the witness are half-sisters. The difficulty, however, is that the respondent consistently denies that she is or ever has been “Ms H”. To the contrary, the respondent produces a copy of her own birth certificate, albeit obtained as a delayed registration of birth in 2018, showing her mother as “Ms P” and father “unknown”. Where there are certain identifiable consistencies as noted by Ms J there also are a number of notable discrepancies leaving me in a position where I cannot make a finding, on the balance of probabilities, from this evidence alone that the respondent is the one and same person noted variously as Ms H born 1980.
It is proper that these reasons should record that when Mr F was giving evidence and had identified the respondent as his mother, he was asked as to whether he might participate in DNA testing. He replied in the affirmative. At that stage the respondent interjected and said that she would also participate in DNA testing.
Such a resolution of credit was suggested to the counsel for the applicant who did not, for reasons which on reflection are entirely reasonable and proper, take up such a suggestion. Nevertheless, the matter was raised later in final submissions by counsel for the applicant as a solution to the credit issue. At that stage, and on advice that such a course was not mandatory, the respondent with some hesitation chose not to undertake such testing. I cannot, of course, make such testing mandatory in proceedings such as these. I note the logistical anticipated difficulties of conducting DNA testing between Country D and Australia with attendant costs. I note that the respondent appeared in these proceedings unrepresented and where independent advice would be crucial, I take no inference against the respondent refusing such a suggestion.
CONCLUSION
Where the applicant holds an onus of proof on the balance of probabilities as to the assertion he makes out which is one of bigamy and where the ramifications of such a finding are grave, I cannot conclude that the applicant has made out his case.
This is very much an issue of credit between the respondent on the one hand and the applicant and his witnesses on the other hand. I find that the applicant’s own credit suffers by way of his denials of family violence where I prefer the evidence of the respondent corroborated such as it is.
I have difficulties with the probity of the evidence of the applicant’s witness. Mr C had limited or no command of the English language. He required an interpreter to assist in court. His affidavit, however, shows a jurat completed without the assistance of an interpreter and where my own observations suggest that the complexities of the content of the affidavit are beyond the comprehension of the deponent.
Similarly, I harbour concerns as to the provision of monies to each of the applicant’s three witnesses whereon I am not persuaded as to their explanation of those monies being provided only for “expenses”. Where the evidence of each of those witnesses remains “word-on-word” against the respondent’s consistent denials of the assertions of each then I cannot make positive findings as to those assertions. Again, I am not assisted by the purported corroborative evidence such as the photographs adduced through the witness Mr F and Ms J.
I do not accept the submission that I can identify that the signatures on various documents exhibited on the applicant’s affidavit as those of the respondent and where the applicant did not bring evidence such as from a handwriting expert.
Similarly, I am unable to identify the woman shown in various photographs adduced in evidence by or on behalf of the applicant as the respondent and where again the applicant did not bring expert evidence such as from a facial recognition expert.
For all of these reasons I am not persuaded that the applicant has made out his case to the requisite standard of proof and the application will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding seventy (70) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McGuire. Associate:
Dated: 29 May 2024
0
2
3