Kitagawa & Yokota

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1)

Kitagawa & Yokota [2024] FedCFamC1F 358

File number: MLC 880 of 2023
Judgment of: MCGUIRE J
Date of judgment: 29 May 2024
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – NULLITY – Application for a declaration of nullity of marriage – Where it is alleged that at the time of the marriage the respondent wife was lawfully married to another person – Application dismissed
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 51

Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) ss 13, 23 and 94

Cases cited:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34

Re: F Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072; [2001] FamCA 348

Division: Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of hearing: 11 and 12 April 2024
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Finegan
Solicitor for the Applicant: Andropoulos & Associates Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondent: Litigant in Person

ORDERS

MLC 880 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:

MR KITAGAWA

Applicant

AND:

MS YOKOTA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MCGUIRE J

DATE OF ORDER:

 29 MAY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Further Amended Application for Nullity filed by the husband, Mr Kitagawa, on 14 March 2024 be dismissed.

Note:   The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Kitagawa & Yokota has been approved pursuant to subsection 114(Q)(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCGUIRE J

APPLICATIONS

  1. The husband, Mr Kitagawa (“the applicant”), brings an application seeking an order that the marriage entered into between the parties at Suburb B in Victoria in mid-2019 be declared null and void.

  2. He also seeks an order as follows:

    4.A sealed copy of this order, a certified copy of the reasons for judgment delivered this day, sealed copies of the applicant’s Initiating Application and affidavit in support thereof filed on 14 March 2024 and any other document which may be considered relevant be referred to the chambers of the Chief Justice of this Court for referral to the appropriate authority of the Commonwealth of Australia for consideration of the prosecution of the respondent for a breach of section 94 of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and any further charge at their discretion.

  3. In short, the applicant asserts that the wife, Ms Yokota (“the…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC1F 358
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kitagawa & Yokota involved a dispute between Mr Kitagawa, the husband, and Ms Yokota, the wife. The husband sought a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the basis that the wife had been married to another person at the time of their marriage. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was required to decide whether the wife had committed bigamy or whether the husband had conspired with others to make a false allegation of bigamy against her. The court had to determine the credibility of the parties and their witnesses, given the serious consequences of a finding of bigamy. The court noted the difficulty of the wife appearing unrepresented and self-represented in the proceedings. The court concluded that the husband had not proved his case on the balance of probabilities. The wife had denied all allegations of bigamy under vigorous cross-examination. The husband's evidence was undermined by his own denials of family violence, which the court found to be contradicted by the wife's evidence. The court was not satisfied with the probity of the husband's witnesses and their evidence. The court also found that the husband had not provided sufficient evidence to support his allegations of bigamy, such as expert evidence on signatures or photographs. The court dismissed the husband's application for a declaration of nullity of the marriage.

The court ordered that the further amended application for nullity filed by Mr Kitagawa on 14 March 2024 be dismissed. The form of the order was subject to the entry in the Court’s records and could be reviewed or varied pursuant to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

MLC 880 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:

MR KITAGAWA

Applicant

AND:

MS YOKOTA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MCGUIRE J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MAY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Further Amended Application for Nullity filed by the husband, Mr Kitagawa, on 14 March 2024 be dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Broadly, therefore, it remains for the Court to determine whether the respondent has perpetrated a fraud in the form of a bigamist marriage or, alternatively, whether the applicant has conspired with others to make a false allegation of bigamy against the respondent? EVIDENCE Importantly, where issues of credit prevail, it must be emphasised that the party making the assertion of fact carries an onus to prove that fact to the standard of ‘on the balance of probabilities’. Relevantly, s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Evidence Act”) provides: 1.In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.2.Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and(b) the nature of the subject - matter of the proceeding; and(c) the gravity of the matters alleged. Where the allegation here is one of bigamy carrying with it potential criminal charges then the matter is, in my view, at the higher end of gravity of the matters alleged. In this sense, and where s 140 of the Evidence Act enshrines in statute the common law principles, the statement of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[1] is pertinent: …when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. … it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.[1] (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34. The conduct of this trial was made more difficult in its process and the taking of evidence by the fact that the respondent was self-represented. Further compounding these difficulties is that the Court had previously made an order under s 102NA of the Act which provides the mandatory ‘protections’ for matters where, as in that now before me, there is an extant family violence order or where the Court, in its discretion, and against a background of family violence, determines to make an order under the section. Although the Court made the order effectively in favour of the respondent, she did not take up the indulgence offered under the section and the order and appeared in person unrepresented. Enquiry suggest she made only cursory attempts online to activate the order. As such, and with explanation to counsel for the applicant, it fell upon the Court to challenge many of the assertions of fact made by the applicant and his witnesses and to perhaps enter the forum of cross-examination to a greater extent than usual.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MS J
Such a resolution of credit was suggested to the counsel for the applicant who did not, for reasons which on reflection are entirely reasonable and proper, take up such a suggestion. Nevertheless, the matter was raised later in final submissions by counsel for the applicant as a solution to the credit issue. At that stage, and on advice that such a course was not mandatory, the respondent with some hesitation chose not to undertake such testing. I cannot, of course, make such testing mandatory in proceedings such as these. I note the logistical anticipated difficulties of conducting DNA testing between Country D and Australia with attendant costs. I note that the respondent appeared in these proceedings unrepresented and where independent advice would be crucial, I take no inference against the respondent refusing such a suggestion. CONCLUSION Where the applicant holds an onus of proof on the balance of probabilities as to the assertion he makes out which is one of bigamy and where the ramifications of such a finding are grave, I cannot conclude that the applicant has made out his case. This is very much an issue of credit between the respondent on the one hand and the applicant and his witnesses on the other hand. I find that the applicant’s own credit suffers by way of his denials of family violence where I prefer the evidence of the respondent corroborated such as it is. I have difficulties with the probity of the evidence of the applicant’s witness. Mr C had limited or no command of the English language. He required an interpreter to assist in court. His affidavit, however, shows a jurat completed without the assistance of an interpreter and where my own observations suggest that the complexities of the content of the affidavit are beyond the comprehension of the deponent. Similarly, I harbour concerns as to the provision of monies to each of the applicant’s three witnesses whereon I am not persuaded as to their explanation of those monies being provided only for “expenses”. Where the evidence of each of those witnesses remains “word-on-word” against the respondent’s consistent denials of the assertions of each then I cannot make positive findings as to those assertions. Again, I am not assisted by the purported corroborative evidence such as the photographs adduced through the witness Mr F and Ms J. I do not accept the submission that I can identify that the signatures on various documents exhibited on the applicant’s affidavit as those of the respondent and where the applicant did not bring evidence such as from a handwriting expert. Similarly, I am unable to identify the woman shown in various photographs adduced in evidence by or on behalf of the applicant as the respondent and where again the applicant did not bring expert evidence such as from a facial recognition expert. For all of these reasons I am not persuaded that the applicant has made out his case to the requisite standard of proof and the application will be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MS J

The respondent also produces a document namely an extract of a Certificate of Live Birth showing the name she now uses and the name of her mother as Ms P. Her father is listed as “unknown”. The probative value of this document, however, is limited, if any, by reason of this being a document provided to the applicant by way of her affidavit and application made in 2018 for a “delayed registration of birth”. That is, it is clear that it was the respondent herself who provided the information for the creation of this document in 2018. CONSIDERATIONS AND FINDING As mentioned above, the dispute here is very much an issue of credit between the applicant and the respondent. Where the applicant is asserting bigamy on the part of the respondent, he holds an onus to prove that assertion on the balance of probabilities. There is no onus on the respondent to prove the negative. Whilst the applicant was generally a credible witness, his evidence suffers by reason of his denials of family violence and where I find the corroboration adduced by the respondent leads me to prefer her evidence that she was indeed the subject of family violence during the relationship. Initially, there is an issue of “motive” and why the applicant should bring an application, as spurious as the respondent suggests it is, for a nullity grounded on bigamy when he might more easily come to this Court and simply obtain a divorce on the no-fault provisions in the Act. The respondent, however, asserts the motive to be the applicant’s annoyance of her leaving the marriage and moving to live with one of his friends and where the respondent understands that a nullity of the marriage and an eventual finding/conviction that she has committed the crime of bigamy may result in her being deported from Australia. Again, where the respondent asserts, and the applicant denies, family violence, inclusive of coercive control, in the marriage then prima facie I accept the respondent’s contention that this would provide a motive for the applicant to bring false allegations. Further, where the respondent blatantly denies the allegations as set out by the applicant and does so under vigorous cross-examination, it falls to me to make findings on the various assertions made by the applicant in support of his allegation of bigamy and as follows:(1)the applicant asserts, at least impliedly, that the marriage was entered into by the respondent simply to obtain residential status in Australia and upon obtaining such status she left the marriage;(2)the chronology lends some support to this contention where the separation occurred only a month or so after the respondent obtained Permanent Resident Status. Nevertheless, I cannot make such a finding where the respondent gives a plausible alternative explanation for the separation being one of family violence and where I accept her evidence over that of the applicant;(3)the applicant adduces evidence from witnesses namely Ms J, Mr C and Mr F who all identified the respondent over the Microsoft Teams connection. However, none assert recent observations of the respondent as indicated by Mr C who conceded it being some 10 years since he has seen his wife and some six years since Mr F has seen his mother according to his evidence. Where the respondent denies any knowledge or association with the any of the three witnesses brought for the applicant, this word-on-word evidence is of limited probative value;(4)various photographs are exhibited to the affidavits of witnesses brought by the applicant. Those witnesses assert the respondent to be shown in those photographs. The respondent denies that she is the person in the photographs. I am unable to identify the respondent as the person shown in any of the photographs even as a lay observer and certainly not to the standard of on the balance of probabilities. Notably, the applicant does not bring any expert evidence such as a facial identification expert;(5)the applicant produces various documents containing signatures of the respondent such as on their marriage certificate and signatures on other documents including the marriage certificate of Mr C and the birth certificates of the children. Counsel for the applicant submits that I can, even as a layperson, observe such similarities between signatures as to find on the balance of probabilities that they are from the same hand. I am unable to do so but do note to several observable discrepancies and not surprisingly so given that there are different names typed on those documents. Again, the applicant may have been assisted in this assertion by way of evidence from a handwriting expert. He did not adduce such evidence;(6)counsel for the applicant asks me to take inferences from the dates of birth on each of the marriage certificates of Mr C and that of the applicant. The earlier shows the respondent to have been born in 1980. The latter shows the respondent to have been born in 1987. I cannot take any inference; and(7)the applicant adduces evidence from Ms J who claims to be the half-sister of the respondent. He produces birth certificates of both and I am asked to take an inference as to certain similarities in named persons. Firstly, he produces a Certificate of Live Birth for MS H born 1980 whose mother is noted as MS Q. Secondly, he produces the birth certificate of