Kim v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 685
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Kim v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 685
File number: MLG 281 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 23 August 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – refusal to grant Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa – non-judicially determined claim of family violence – whether Tribunal decision affected by jurisdictional error because independent expert denied applicant procedural fairness – whether denial of procedural fairness based on interpretation errors in applicant’s interviews with independent expert – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Constitution s 75
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 375A, 476, 477
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.21, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25, cl 801.221
Cases cited: BKO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection(No 2) [2018] FCA 1850
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 397 ALR 1; [2022] FCAFC 3
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Maman (2012) 200 FCR 30; [2012] FCAFC 13
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 59 Date of hearing: 20 June 2022 Place: Perth Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L Mills Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz ORDERS
MLG 281 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: RATHANA KIM
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
23 AUGUST 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,328.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an application filed on 5 February 2018, by which the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 29 January 2018. The Tribunal affirmed an earlier decision made by a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa (partner visa). The application was filed pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).
For the reasons set out below, I have found that there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a non-citizen who applied for a partner visa on 16 August 2013 on the basis of his relationship with his former sponsor, Ms Ngin (sponsor). The applicant and the sponsor were married on 3 August 2013.
On 19 August 2013 the applicant was granted a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.
On 22 December 2014 the Department received email correspondence from the sponsor advising that she withdrew her sponsorship of the applicant for the partner visa on the basis that the relationship had ended.
On 6 January 2015 the Department sent to the applicant an invitation to comment on adverse information, being the information from the sponsor that the relationship had broken down. The applicant requested an extension of time to respond to the invitation on 3 February 2022 and was granted an additional 28 days to respond. The applicant did not provide any response to the invitation to comment within the extended timeframe.
On 31 March 2015 a delegate of the Minister made a decision not to grant the applicant a partner visa. The applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision by an application lodged with the Tribunal on 20 April 2015.
Before the Tribunal, the applicant claimed to have suffered family violence committed by the sponsor. On 1 July 2016 the Tribunal referred the family violence claim to an independent expert for an opinion in relation to a non-judicially determined claim of family violence, in accordance with reg 1.23(10)(c)(i) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). The independent expert found that the applicant had experienced family violence within the meaning of reg 1.21 of the Regulations and on 6 October 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.
The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision of 6 October 2016 and on 14 March 2017 the Federal Circuit Court set aside the Tribunal decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law. The Order made by the Court included the following Note:
The First Respondent concedes that the decision of the Second Respondent is affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that the Second Respondent erred by relying on the opinion of an independent expert as to whether the Applicant had suffered relevant family violence (as defined by reg 1.21 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations)) which was not formed in accordance with reg 1.23(10)(c)(ii) of the Regulations.
The opinion of the independent expert was not formed in accordance with reg 1.23(10)(c)(ii) of the Regulations because the independent expert denied the applicant procedural fairness at common law, given:-
(a)the Tribunal provided various documents to the independent expert, including a copy of an email dated 22 December 2014 (Email);
(b)the Email contained information that “could throw light upon the relationship and the tensions in the relationship” between the applicant and his former sponsor; and
(c)neither the Email, nor its gist, were disclosed to the applicant before the independent expert formed an opinion.
The parties rely on Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Maman [2012] FCAFC 13; (2012) 200 FCR 30 per Flick and Foster JJ at [24]-[27], [48], [51] and [61]-[65] (Katzmann J agreeing).
Following the remittal the Tribunal, similarly constituted, referred the matter to the same independent expert for assessment of the applicant’s claims to have experienced family violence. The independent expert provided a report dated 12 September 2017 to the Tribunal and expressed the opinion that the applicant had not been the victim of actual or threatened family violence.
A copy of the expert’s report was provided to the applicant on 14 September 2017 and he was invited to comment on the report. The applicant provided a short response via his migration agent on 11 October 2017, expressing the view that ‘the assessment did not give consideration to the fact that the incident has happened many years in the past and had happened during the relationship. It would be unreasonable for him to recall the exact dates of series of incidents during the interview with [the independent expert]’.
On 11 December 2017 the Tribunal convened a hearing at which the applicant gave evidence and presented arguments.
Following the hearing, on 21 December 2017 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him to comment on the validity of a certificate issued under s 375A of the Migration Act on the basis that the disclosure of the email from the sponsor withdrawing her sponsorship of the applicant for a partner visa would be contrary to the public interest. The applicant responded to this notice by providing a statement made on 22 January 2018 and various supporting documents.
On 29 January 2018 the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.
TRIBUNAL DECISION
The Tribunal found that the certificate under s 375A of the Migration Act was invalid as it did not provide a reason as to why the disclosure of the sponsor’s email would be contrary to the public interest.
The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant and the sponsor had been in a genuine spousal relationship which ceased in December 2014 when the sponsor decided and subsequently advised the applicant that the relationship had broken down.
The Tribunal identified that the issue that arose on the evidence before it was whether the applicant has suffered family violence committed by the sponsor, within the meaning of the Regulations.
The Tribunal was satisfied that the statutory declarations provided by the applicant in support of his claim of family violence met the evidentiary requirements under regs 1.24 and 1.25 of the Regulations. The Tribunal was satisfied that a non-judicially determined claim of family violence had been made under reg 1.23 of the Regulations.
The Tribunal noted that the matter had been referred to an independent expert as the Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant had suffered family violence. On 12 September 2017 the independent expert provided an opinion that the applicant had not suffered family violence.
The Tribunal considered the matters raised by the applicant in response to the invitation to comment on the expert’s report and at the hearing.
The Tribunal was satisfied that the independent expert report was not based on untested assertions which had not been disclosed to the applicant, and therefore did not need to be referred back to the independent expert. The Tribunal found that the applicant disagreed with the independent expert’s assessment because he was of the opinion that he suffered family violence. The Tribunal was satisfied that the independent expert considered that the claimed family violence raised by the applicant included the incidents that the applicant discussed with the expert, which had happened some years ago during the course of the relationship. The inconsistencies in the dates provided by the applicant to the independent expert was not the basis for any finding made by the independent expert that the applicant had not been the victim of actual or threatened family violence.
The Tribunal was satisfied that the independent expert’s opinion was authorised by the Regulations, as it was provided by an independent expert who is a person suitably qualified to make the assessment and an employee of an organisation specified for this purpose, and was properly made. The Tribunal identified that under reg 1.23 it was required to take as correct an independent expert’s opinion properly made.
The Tribunal therefore found that the applicant was not taken to have suffered family violence committed by the sponsor and therefore, the applicant did not meet the requirements of cl 801.221(6)(b) and (c) for the grant of the partner visa.
Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.
PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT
The application for judicial review was filed on 5 February 2018, within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal decision as required by s 477(1) of the Migration Act.
The applicant advances three grounds of review in his written application, reproduced without alteration:
1.There was a breach in procedural fairness as the independent expert’s report by Ms Kerrilee Hollows on 12 September 2017 did not afford the email dated 22 December 2014 (Email).
2.The independent expert did not observe order made by Judge Hartnett, order made by consent on 14 March 2017.
3. The tribunal thus erred in its decision on 29 January 2018.
The only relief sought by the applicant in his application was an order that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed. The Court has the same jurisdiction in migration matters as the High Court has pursuant to s 75(v) of the Constitution, which does not include matters where only a writ of certiorari is sought. At the hearing of this matter, I granted leave to the applicant to orally amend his application to also seek a writ of mandamus. This is sufficient to bring the matter within the Court’s jurisdiction.
The evidence before the Court comprises the court book filed by the Minister and two affidavits filed by the applicant. The applicant’s first affidavit, affirmed on 5 February 2018, annexes the Tribunal decision made on 29 January 2018 and notification of that decision, correspondence between the applicant’s lawyer and the Minister’s lawyer regarding payment of costs in relation to the previous judicial review proceeding, the Order made by Judge Hartnett on 14 March 2017 and the report of the independent expert dated 12 September 2017. The applicant’s second affidavit affirmed on 11 April 2022 purported to annex two receipts (filed separately) in relation to his travel booking in October 2014. I have had regard to both affidavits, which were read without objection. All of the documents, other than the correspondence regarding costs of the previous judicial review proceeding, were before the Tribunal and are also contained in the court book. I give no weight to the correspondence regarding costs as this does not address or relate to any assertion of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision made on 29 January 2018, which is the subject of this application.
CONSIDERATION
Need to establish jurisdictional error
The role of a court in considering an application for judicial review was explained by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 397 ALR 1; [2022] FCAFC 3, where the Full Court said at [17]:
… an application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the Executive branch of government… The Court does not consider the merits or wisdom of the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the Court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it.
In order to be entitled to relief by this Court, the applicant must establish that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error. The Tribunal will have made a jurisdictional error if it ‘exceeded the limits of the decision-making authority conferred by the statute in making the decision’: MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17 at [29].
The High Court identified a number of examples of jurisdictional error in Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58 (Craig). In that case the High Court said at [14] that if the decision-maker:
…falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it.
The examples of jurisdictional error set out in Craig are not exhaustive: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30 at [82]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3 (SZMTA) at [81].
To amount to a jurisdictional error, any error by the Tribunal must be material, in the sense that the error could realistically have deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: SZMTA at [45].
Grounds in written application
The grounds set out in the application were prepared by the applicant’s lawyer at the time. By the time the matter came on for hearing, the applicant was self-represented. He filed a written outline of submissions on 19 April 2022, but these submissions do not address the grounds in the application. The applicant also made oral submissions to the Court, but again, the submissions did not address the grounds in the application. The Court has endeavoured to understand the grounds in the written application in the absence of submissions by the applicant.
It is convenient to address the grounds in the application collectively as they are related. The grounds essentially assert that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error because the independent expert denied the applicant procedural fairness by not providing him with a copy of the email from the sponsor withdrawing her sponsorship of him for a partner visa, and by not ‘observing’ the Order made by consent on 14 March 2017.
Where an applicant makes a non-judicially determined claim of family violence, the Minister (or the Tribunal on review) must consider whether the alleged victim has suffered relevant family violence and, if not so satisfied, must seek the opinion of an independent expert about whether the alleged victim has suffered relevant family violence: reg 1.23(10)(a) and (c)(i) of the Regulations. The Minister (or Tribunal on review) must take the independent expert’s opinion on the matter to be correct for the purposes of deciding whether the alleged victim satisfies a prescribed criterion that requires the applicant, or another person mentioned in the criterion, to have suffered family violence: reg 1.23(10)(c)(ii).
As set out above, the applicant in the present case made a non-judicially determined claim of family violence and the Tribunal, not being satisfied that the applicant had been the victim of family violence, referred the matter to an independent expert.
The independent expert was required to afford the applicant procedural fairness in accordance with the common law principles of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Maman (2012) 200 FCR 30; [2012] FCAFC 13 (Maman) at [26]-[27]. An opinion of an independent expert which is not formed in accordance with law, including the common law requirement to afford the applicant procedural fairness, does not satisfy the requirements of the Regulations and is not an opinion which the Tribunal is required to take as correct pursuant: Maman at [64]-[65]. Reliance by the Tribunal on an independent expert’s opinion that was not formed in accordance with law can amount to jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision: Maman at [65].
As can be seen from the Note to the Order of 14 March 2017, the Tribunal’s decision made in 2016 was set aside because the independent expert denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to provide to him the email from the sponsor withdrawing her sponsorship, or the gist of that email, which ‘could throw light upon the relationship and the tensions in the relationship’. The Tribunal advised the independent expert of the basis for the remittal when it requested that the expert arrange a further appointment with the applicant for the purpose of preparing a fresh assessment.
It is not clear from the materials before the Court that a copy of the email was provided to the applicant before the independent expert provided her opinion on 12 September 2017. For the purposes of this judgment, I will proceed on the assumption that a copy of the email was not provided until after the Tribunal hearing when the applicant was invited to comment on the validity of the s 375A certificate.
Notwithstanding that a copy of the email may not have been provided to the applicant prior to the independent expert providing her opinion on 12 September 2017, the applicant was afforded procedural fairness because the independent expert put the gist of the email to him and invited him to comment on it.
The email from the sponsor advised that she wished to withdraw her sponsorship of the applicant and gave the following reason:
Relationship broken down because he (Rathana KIM) and I, we had a long term argument for almost a year and he decided to leave home on the 5th October 2014 to go back Cambodia. Until now, I have no contact from him at all and I have been force to isolation and depressed. Now, I have made my decision to inform immigration that I have no responsible to this person from the date of this letter.
The independent expert recorded in her report:
So as to afford Mr Kim procedural fairness the author put to Mr Kim that Ms Ngin had claimed that their relationship broke down due to the pair experiencing an ongoing issue for almost a year. It was also put to Mr Kim that Ms Ngin claimed to have had no contact with him after he returned to Cambodia in October 2014. Mr Kim responded by refuting Ms Ngin’s claims. He reported that the pair had remained in contact daily, speaking each night…
I accept the Minister’s submission that this shows that the independent expert disclosed the gist of the sponsor’s email to the applicant prior to forming her opinion. The applicant was invited by the Tribunal to comment on the information in the independent expert’s report, and did not raise any concerns about the accuracy of the expert’s comments in the extract above.
The applicant has not established that the independent expert did not afford him procedural fairness, or that the independent expert did not observe the Order of 14 March 2017.
There is one further matter raised by the applicant in his oral submissions which might be seen as relevant to ground 2. In oral submissions, the applicant raised concerns that, upon remittal, the Tribunal was constituted by the same member who made the purported decision in 2016, and the matter was referred to the same independent expert who provided the earlier report in 2016. The applicant submitted:
… they have sent my case to go back to the tribunal, but on that time when I go back to the tribunal they put me with the same chap, the same independent expert, they didn’t change to the new one. So, that’s why I have concern about that one whenever they put me – because two – one time, the first time with that member and the second time with the same member, I see the final decision look – seem not much different. They had change only the translator. They didn’t change the member and then they didn’t change the independent expert.
This might generously be seen as a complaint that the Tribunal did not observe the Order made on 14 March 2017 because of the similar constitution of the Tribunal and the use of the same independent expert. However, the Order did not require that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal differently constituted, and there is no apparent reason why it was not appropriate in the present case for the same member to rehear the matter, and for the same independent expert to be used. That was a matter for the Tribunal to determine in the present case.
The applicant’s grounds of application do not establish jurisdictional error.
Issues raised in the applicant’s written submissions
The applicant’s written submissions filed on 19 April 2022 provide comments in relation to the email sent by the sponsor on 22 December 2014 withdrawing her sponsorship, and are substantially similar to the applicant’s statement dated 22 January 2018, which he provided to the Tribunal.
They do not assert any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision, and effectively invite the Court to address the merits of his application for a partner visa. The Court does not have the jurisdiction to reconsider the merits of the decision: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6 at [31].
Issues raised in the applicant’s oral submissions
In oral submissions the applicant alleged that there were interpretation errors in his interviews with the independent expert. Different interpreters were used in his 2016 and 2017 interviews and the applicant submitted:
So, the first one that’s no good, that’s no – she translate, it’s not fit or that’s not correct with what I have told her by my own languages. And the second one, the second time they have changed the translator. The second one, when they change, the visa are more better than the last – are more better than the first one, but they not yet 100 per cent correct with what I have told the translator. That’s what I have concern, that’s what I have faced the problem with when I have meet with the independent expert.
The applicant did not give any specific examples of any errors in interpretation, and instead submitted that the interpreter ‘didn’t tell the psychologist about [his] full story’. When I asked the applicant at the hearing what was interpreted incorrectly, he responded ‘about the translation, it was a long time, I forget about that’. In the absence of any meaningful details or evidence, the applicant has made a mere assertion of interpretation error. As Allsop CJ said in BKO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection(No 2) [2018] FCA 1850 at [40], ‘[m]ere allegation of interpretation error (even if sworn to) is not sufficient to ground a finding that such error occurred’.
I have considered the materials before the Court to ascertain whether the applicant raised any concerns before the Tribunal about interpretation errors in his interviews with the independent expert. Ms Mills, acting for the Minister, has also drawn the Court’s attention to some of the relevant evidence. The Court has before it the following evidence relevant to whether there has been any denial of procedural fairness based on interpretation error at the interviews by the independent expert:
(a)At the conclusion of both of his interviews with the independent expert, on 3 August 2016 and 28 July 2017 respectively, the applicant signed an end of interview acknowledgment, which was in the following terms:
I acknowledge that the psychologist who interviewed me gave me a fair and reasonable opportunity to present my case and be heard.
I acknowledge that I understood and was satisfied with the interpreter whose services were utilised during this interview, including interpreting the contents of this acknowledgement.
I understand that if, for any reason, I felt uncomfortable raising either of the above matters during the interview, I can do so directly with my case officer or my migration agent, if one is representing me, within five (5) days from the date of this interview.
(b)There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant raised any concerns about the quality of the interpretation within five days of the date of either interview. However, the applicant did subsequently express concerns about the interpretation at the interview conducted on 3 August 2016. In response to an invitation to comment on the independent expert’s report dated 29 August 2016, the applicant’s representative provided an email to the Tribunal on 3 October 2016, in which he said:
More importantly, [the applicant] instructs that there were difficulties with the quality of the interpreting. He feels that he was rushed by the interpreter, and did not have the opportunity to properly put his case. [The applicant] was not sure if the interpreter provided at the time of the interview was a naati qualified level three interpreter.
(c)The Tribunal considered this submission in its purported decision of 6 October 2016 and did not find any interpretation error, noting that the applicant had signed the end of interview acknowledgement and that the applicant had not nominated any particular part of the expert’s report that was not properly interpreted. There is nothing in the way in which the Tribunal has addressed the issue to suggest that the applicant provided any further information in oral submissions to the Tribunal about any alleged deficiencies in interpretation at the interview in August 2016.
(d)The applicant’s first judicial review application contained a ground based on interpretation at the interview conducted by the independent expert, but this ground simply asserted that a ‘non-qualified’ interpreter was used, and did not allege any error in interpretation. The affidavit accompanying the applicant did not provide any evidence about any specific interpretation error.[1]
(e)There is no evidence before the Court to show that the applicant raised any concerns to the independent expert or the Tribunal about the quality of interpretation at the second interview. The expert identified a number of discrepancies between the information given by the applicant at the interview in 2016 and at the interview in 2017. The applicant was invited to comment on those discrepancies. There is no suggestion that he raised interpretation error as a reason for any of the discrepancies.
[1] The applicant’s first judicial review application and accompanying affidavit are contained in the court book for the present proceeding. Those are the only documents filed on behalf of the applicant from the first judicial review proceeding and which are in evidence before the Court in this proceeding.
The applicant told the Court at the hearing that he did not have the opportunity to attend another Tribunal hearing after the independent expert provided her report on 12 September 2017, with the implication that he could not have expressed any concerns about interpretation to the Tribunal. I do not accept this. The evidence in the court book clearly shows that the independent expert’s report was provided to the applicant on 14 September 2017, the applicant provided comment on the report in writing on 11 October 2017, and attended a further hearing before the Tribunal on 11 December 2017.
It can be seen from the above overview of the evidence that the applicant:
(a)did not raise before the Tribunal any specific interpretation error in relation to the interpretation at the interview in August 2016, but rather told the Tribunal that he felt rushed by the interpreter;[2]
(b)raised no concerns about the quality of the interpretation at the interview with the independent expert in July 2017; and
(c)expressly acknowledged that he was satisfied with both interpreters.
[2] While the applicant raised concerns about the qualifications of the interpreter who was present at the interview in August 2016, he has not raised any such concerns in the course of the present judicial review proceeding.
Critically, there is no evidence before the Court of any specific error in interpretation. There is no basis for the Court to find that the applicant was denied procedural fairness by the independent expert, or the Tribunal, as a result of interpretation errors at the interviews with the independent expert.
No jurisdictional error is established based on any allegation of interpretation error.
The applicant raised one further matter at the hearing, which was effectively a complaint that the Tribunal and the independent expert still do not believe that he has been the victim of family violence. The applicant is simply complaining about the merits of the Tribunal decision, and the Court does not have jurisdiction to engage in merits review.
CONCLUSION
I have found that there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision. It follows that the application to the Court must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams. Associate:
Dated: 23 August 2022
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