FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Khatri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 669
Citation: Khatri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 669 Appeal from: Khatri v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 407 Parties: MUHAMMAD ADNAN KHATRI and SAIRA ADNAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 203 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 21 May 2015 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)Cases cited: Khatri v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 407
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287
SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563Date of hearing: 21 May 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 15 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr L Karp Solicitor for the Appellants: Christopher Levingston & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 203 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MUHAMMAD ADNAN KHATRI
First AppellantSAIRA ADNAN
Second AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 MAY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 203 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MUHAMMAD ADNAN KHATRI
First AppellantSAIRA ADNAN
Second AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
21 MAY 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, refusing the applicants’ application for constitutional writ relief in respect of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal given on 7 March 2014, in which it affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visas, commonly known as 457 visas: Khatri v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 407.
Background
On 12 May 2011, the appellants lodged applications for 457 visas under the sponsorship of a company called Chedglen Pty Limited. A precondition of the grant of the application was that the sponsor, Chedglen, be approved as a sponsor under s 140E(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), in relation to a relevant class of persons prescribed for the purposes of s 140E(2). An approved sponsor could nominate an applicant or proposed applicant for a visa of a prescribed kind in relation to that person’s proposed occupation, amongst others, and the Minister had to approve an approved sponsor’s nomination…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 669
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Tribunal had to consider the information about Chedglen's approval and if it was unreasonable to proceed without giving the appellants further opportunity to provide information. The court noted that the Tribunal had explicitly informed the appellants, through their solicitors, that failure to provide the requested information could result in the application being decided without further submissions. The appellants had ignored this invitation, and the Tribunal had fulfilled its duty to act fairly by giving them an opportunity to address the issue. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was inevitable given the lack of response from the appellants and that there was no basis on which the appellants could satisfy the mandatory requirement for their nominated occupations.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the first respondent's costs. The court found that the appellants had the opportunity to provide information to the Tribunal but chose not to do so, and thus the Tribunal's decision to proceed without further submissions was not unreasonable. The court's decision was grounded in the understanding that the Tribunal had acted fairly and that the appellants' failure to respond to the invitation to provide information led to the inevitable outcome of the visa application being refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellants applied to the trial judge, raising two grounds on which they sought constitutional writ relief, namely that, first, the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider information of which it was aware that was central to the appellants’ case when making its decision, being that Chedglen had been approved as a standard business sponsor and, secondly, that its decision to proceed to decide the application was unreasonable in the legal sense. The trial judge held that neither ground was established.Consideration In my opinion, despite the earnest arguments of counsel for the appellants, the appeal must be dismissed. The appellants had the opportunity to provide information to the Tribunal to satisfy its inquiry as to how they met each of the provisions in cl 457.223(4)(a). The appellants argued that the Tribunal, in effect, had ignored its own decision, made the day before it wrote the letter of 19 February 2014 to approve Chedglen as a standard business sponsor. I do not think that this was a reasonable construction of the Tribunal’s decision-making process. The same Tribunal member made both the Chedglen decision and that the subject of this appeal. She noted in her reasons for decision, in rejecting the appellants’ application for review, that the Tribunal had informed them on 21 February 2013 that it was deferring consideration of their application while Chedglen’s was processed. The Tribunal also noted that its letter of 19 February 2014 indicated that their application for visas was, then, under active consideration by it. Obviously, a decision-maker in the position of the Tribunal, who has actual notice of a recent and significant matter affecting the question of whether an applicant for a visa complied or did not comply with the matter must base his or her decision on that information: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 44-45 per Mason J, with whom Gibbs CJ at 30 and Dawson J at 71 agreed on this issue; see too SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563 at 571-573 [27]-[37], especially at [37] where I considered the authorities, and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287 at 287-292 [27] per Mansfield, Gilmour and Foster JJ. As I have noted, it is common ground that throughout the period in which the appellants’ application for their 457 visas was being considered by both the delegate and later the Tribunal, there was no basis before any decision-maker on which they could satisfy the mandatory requirement, in cl 457.223(4)(a)(i) specified under s 140GB, of an approval for their nominated occupations, having heard nothing from the appellants in response to its invitation to provide information in the letter of 19 February 2014. The decision of the Tribunal was inevitable. The appellants could not possibly have been granted a visa because an essential precondition of such a grant had neither been satisfied nor even addressed by them. Moreover, when they were invited to provide information, they did nothing. The Tribunal did not have to give the appellants any further time after 5 March 2014 to remedy that omission. It had fulfilled its duty to act fairly in the conduct of the review by inviting them to address this question at the outset of its active consideration of their application immediately after the approval had been granted to Chedglen.