Khatri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Khatri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2015] FCA 669

Citation: Khatri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 669
Appeal from: Khatri v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 407
Parties: MUHAMMAD ADNAN KHATRI and SAIRA ADNAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 203 of 2015
Judge: RARES  J
Date of judgment: 21 May 2015
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Khatri v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 407
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287
SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563
Date of hearing: 21 May 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 15
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellants: Christopher Levingston & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 203 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MUHAMMAD ADNAN KHATRI
First Appellant

SAIRA ADNAN
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES  J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 203 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MUHAMMAD ADNAN KHATRI
First Appellant

SAIRA ADNAN
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES  J

DATE:

21 MAY 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, refusing the applicants’ application for constitutional writ relief in respect of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal given on 7 March 2014, in which it affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visas, commonly known as 457 visas:  Khatri v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 407.

    Background

  2. On 12 May 2011, the appellants lodged applications for 457 visas under the sponsorship of a company called Chedglen Pty Limited. A precondition of the grant of the application was that the sponsor, Chedglen, be approved as a sponsor under s 140E(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), in relation to a relevant class of persons prescribed for the purposes of s 140E(2). An approved sponsor could nominate an applicant or proposed applicant for a visa of a prescribed kind in relation to that person’s proposed occupation, amongst others, and the Minister had to approve an approved sponsor’s nomination…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 669
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Khatri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal regarding a visa application. The appellants, who had applied for 457 visas, argued that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant information and acted unreasonably in deciding their application. The primary focus of the appeal was whether the Tribunal erred in not considering the information that Chedglen had been approved as a standard business sponsor, and whether the Tribunal's decision to proceed without further opportunity for the appellants to appear or make submissions was unreasonable.

The court examined whether the Tribunal had to consider the information about Chedglen's approval and if it was unreasonable to proceed without giving the appellants further opportunity to provide information. The court noted that the Tribunal had explicitly informed the appellants, through their solicitors, that failure to provide the requested information could result in the application being decided without further submissions. The appellants had ignored this invitation, and the Tribunal had fulfilled its duty to act fairly by giving them an opportunity to address the issue. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was inevitable given the lack of response from the appellants and that there was no basis on which the appellants could satisfy the mandatory requirement for their nominated occupations.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the first respondent's costs. The court found that the appellants had the opportunity to provide information to the Tribunal but chose not to do so, and thus the Tribunal's decision to proceed without further submissions was not unreasonable. The court's decision was grounded in the understanding that the Tribunal had acted fairly and that the appellants' failure to respond to the invitation to provide information led to the inevitable outcome of the visa application being refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A person who ignores an invitation to provide information, of the kind in the letter of 19 February 2014, can hardly be surprised of the consequence that the Tribunal’s decision might be to refuse the application without giving any further opportunity to them to appear or make submissions. The Tribunal’s letter had expressly foreshadowed this consequence. Particularly that is so, when such a letter is addressed to that person’s solicitors, as their agents under the Act.Conclusion In those circumstances, I am of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants applied to the trial judge, raising two grounds on which they sought constitutional writ relief, namely that, first, the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider information of which it was aware that was central to the appellants’ case when making its decision, being that Chedglen had been approved as a standard business sponsor and, secondly, that its decision to proceed to decide the application was unreasonable in the legal sense. The trial judge held that neither ground was established.Consideration In my opinion, despite the earnest arguments of counsel for the appellants, the appeal must be dismissed. The appellants had the opportunity to provide information to the Tribunal to satisfy its inquiry as to how they met each of the provisions in cl 457.223(4)(a). The appellants argued that the Tribunal, in effect, had ignored its own decision, made the day before it wrote the letter of 19 February 2014 to approve Chedglen as a standard business sponsor. I do not think that this was a reasonable construction of the Tribunal’s decision-making process. The same Tribunal member made both the Chedglen decision and that the subject of this appeal. She noted in her reasons for decision, in rejecting the appellants’ application for review, that the Tribunal had informed them on 21 February 2013 that it was deferring consideration of their application while Chedglen’s was processed. The Tribunal also noted that its letter of 19 February 2014 indicated that their application for visas was, then, under active consideration by it. Obviously, a decision-maker in the position of the Tribunal, who has actual notice of a recent and significant matter affecting the question of whether an applicant for a visa complied or did not comply with the matter must base his or her decision on that information: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 44-45 per Mason J, with whom Gibbs CJ at 30 and Dawson J at 71 agreed on this issue; see too SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563 at 571-573 [27]-[37], especially at [37] where I considered the authorities, and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287 at 287-292 [27] per Mansfield, Gilmour and Foster JJ. As I have noted, it is common ground that throughout the period in which the appellants’ application for their 457 visas was being considered by both the delegate and later the Tribunal, there was no basis before any decision-maker on which they could satisfy the mandatory requirement, in cl 457.223(4)(a)(i) specified under s 140GB, of an approval for their nominated occupations, having heard nothing from the appellants in response to its invitation to provide information in the letter of 19 February 2014. The decision of the Tribunal was inevitable. The appellants could not possibly have been granted a visa because an essential precondition of such a grant had neither been satisfied nor even addressed by them. Moreover, when they were invited to provide information, they did nothing. The Tribunal did not have to give the appellants any further time after 5 March 2014 to remedy that omission. It had fulfilled its duty to act fairly in the conduct of the review by inviting them to address this question at the outset of its active consideration of their application immediately after the approval had been granted to Chedglen.