Khan v Minister for Immigration
[2010] FMCA 383
•2 June 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KHAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2010] FMCA 383 |
| MIGRATION – Migration of decision by Migration Review Tribunal – whether Migration Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether the Migration Review Tribunal properly exercised its discretion to refuse to postpone the hearing. |
| Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.116; 119; 122; 474; 494C; pt.8 div.2 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.2.44; 2.44(2)(a) |
| Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Another v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Others (1986) 162 CLR 24 |
| Applicant: | DELWAR KHAN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 539 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Emmett FM |
| Hearing date: | 2 June 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 2 June 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 2 June 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant appeared in person assisted by a Bengali interpreter |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms A. Mitchelmore |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Ms N. Johnson, Sparke Helmore |
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 539 of 2010
| DELWAR KHAN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
EX TEMPORE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Part 8 Division 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 19 February 2010 and handed down the same day.
Mr Khan (“the Applicant”) is a citizen of Bangladesh and first arrived in Australia in November 2004 as a student.
On 10 October 2006, the Applicant was granted a Subclass 457 Business (Long Stay) visa. The Applicant’s sponsor for this visa was Kul-In Restaurant Group Pty Ltd with whom the Applicant was employed as a chef.
On 13 November 2008, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) issued to the Applicant a notice under s.119 of the Act of proposed cancellation of the Applicant’s visa.
On 23 June 2009, the Department notified the Applicant that a delegate of the First Respondent (“the Delegate”) had decided to cancel the Applicant’s visa pursuant to s.116 of the Act.
On 9 July 2009, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Migration Review Tribunal.
On 19 February 2010, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate to cancel the Applicant’s visa.
On 15 March 2010, the Applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
The Tribunal’s review and decision
The background of the Applicant’s visa applications and the review and decision of the Tribunal are accurately summarised in the written submissions of counsel for the First Respondent, Ms Mitchelmore, as follows:
“The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He first arrived in Australia as a student in November 2004 (CB 42). On 10 October 2006, he was granted a Subclass 457 visa, which was due to expire on 10 October 2010 (CB 16).
The applicant came to Australia to work as a Chef for Kul-In Restaurant Group Pty Ltd. In a letter to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department) dated 13 October 2008, the company’s Restaurant Manager informed the Department that it had sponsored the applicant’s wife to come to Australia, only to discover that the woman who arrived was not his wife but his sister. The letter also stated that the applicant had provided to Trades Recognition Australia an employment reference purporting to be from the company, when it had not prepared or signed such a letter (CB 2-3). The company requested that its sponsorship of the applicant’s visa be withdrawn.
On 13 November 2008, the Department sent the applicant a “Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation Under Section 116 of the Migration Act 1958” (CB 6-8) (the Notice). In the Notice, the Department referred to s 116(1)(a) of the Act, which provides that the Minister may cancel a visa if he is satisfied that “any circumstances which permitted the grant of the visa no longer exist”. The Notice stated that grounds for cancelling the applicant’s visa appeared to exist because of the advice received from his sponsor that his employment had ceased, as a result of which he no longer satisfied reg 457.223(4)(f) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations), which provides (CB 6):
[F]or an applicant in respect of whom there is a nomination of an activity under regulation 1.20G – the Minister is satisfied that:
(i) the applicant will be paid at the level specified in the nomination; and
(ii) that level will be at least the minimum salary level that applies at the time the decision on the visa application is made.
By letter dated 8 December 2008, the applicant, through his migration agent, responded to the Notice. The applicant’s migration agent stated that the applicant’s sponsor made him work very long hours, but only paid the applicant for, and accounted for, half of that time. After coping with that situation for a considerable period, because he was afraid that if he complained his employment would be terminated and he would be deported, the applicant finally complained. He was told to take some time off, but on returning to work he was told that his sponsor was having difficulties with the Department and could not employ him at that time. His employer then stalled the applicant in terms of his returning to work, during which time it wrote to the Department in the terms noted above (CB 18-19).
On 23 June 2009, a delegate of the Minister notified the applicant that his visa had been cancelled under s 116 of the Act, on the basis that circumstances which permitted the grant of the visa no longer existed (CB 28). The delegate noted that the evidence established that the applicant was no longer employed by his sponsor, nor was there evidence that his employment with that sponsor was to resume. The delegate further noted that he had no evidence before him that the visa holder’s skills were in demand by an alternative sponsor, for example in the form of a current approved nomination relating to the applicant. The delegate stated (CB 42-43):
The visa holder has indicated that he wishes to remain in Australia due to preferring Australia to Bangladesh. The visa holder indicates that he has dispensed of his assets in Bangladesh in order to start a new life in Australia and that if his visa is cancelled he will have no prospects. However, in spite of any arrangements that the visa holder may have made, he is in Australia as a temporary resident and there is no evidence that the visa holder has applied for permanent residence in Australia. It appears that while the visa holder has made financial arrangements to move to Australia, he has not fully considered the migration requirements of becoming a permanent resident.
The visa holder has been given ample time to resolve his immigration status by applying for another visa or departing Australia and has not done so.
On 9 July 2009, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the decision of the Minister’s delegate (CB 44).
By letter dated 28 August 2009, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing before it on 14 October 2009 (CB 54). The applicant accepted that invitation (CB 56), but on 6 October 2009 he wrote to the Tribunal stating that he was unable to attend due to his mental illness (CB 58). The applicant attached to this letter a Medical Certificate, dated 29 September 2009, which stated that he was suffering from “Depression” and was unfit for work from 29 September 2009 to 29 October 2009 (CB 59).
The Tribunal agreed to the applicant’s request to postpone the hearing, and on 15 October 2009 it sent him a further letter notifying him of the rescheduled hearing date of 10 December 2009 (CB 60). The applicant accepted that invitation on 19 November 2009 (CB 62), but in an undated letter, which was received by the Tribunal on 8 December 2009, he stated that he was unable to attend. The applicant attached to this letter a further Medical Certificate from the same doctor, dated 2 December 2009, which stated that he was suffering from “Major Depression/suicidal” and that he would be unfit for interviews from 2 December 2009 to 2 January 2010 (CB 65). The applicant also attached a referral letter from the doctor to the Mental Health Team, dated 19 November 2009 (CB 66).
The Tribunal agreed to the applicant’s further request to postpone the hearing, and by letter dated 9 December 2009 it invited the applicant to attend a rescheduled hearing on 27 January 2010 at 3pm (CB 68).
In an undated letter which was received by the Tribunal on 6 January 2010, the applicant informed the Tribunal that due to his health condition he was unable to attend the hearing on 27 January 2010 (CB 70). He attached a further letter from the same doctor, dated 29 December 2009, in which the doctor stated that the applicant was “presently very depressed and has had suicidal tendencies which may prevent him from (sic) tribunal hearing”. The doctor stated that the applicant would need at least 3 months to improve, and noted that he was undergoing counselling (CB 71).
On 7 January 2010, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant and notified him that it had refused his request for a further postponement of the hearing (CB 72). The Tribunal referred to its obligation under s 353(1) of the Act to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that was, inter alia, quick, and that the applicant had sought a further postponement of three months in circumstances where his doctor did not unequivocally state that his condition prevented him from attending the hearing, only that it “may” do so (CB 72).
The applicant did not attend the hearing on 27 January 2010. Before the hearing, the applicant provided a submission to the Tribunal dated 25 January 2010, in which he stated that he was presently suffering from a lot of stress (CB 76). The applicant did not attach any further medical evidence to this submission but referred back to the previous certificate he had provided with his letter of 6 January. At 12.50pm on 27 January, a case officer with the Tribunal rang the applicant and advised that the hearing was going ahead at 3pm; the applicant said that he would not be attending and he understood the ramifications of not attending, but he was too stressed to attend (CB 88).
By letter dated 19 February 2010, the Tribunal notified the applicant of its decision to affirm the decision of the Minister’s delegate (CB 93). The Tribunal was satisfied that a circumstance which permitted the grant of the visa – namely that the applicant be employed by his sponsor – no longer existed, and that this gave rise to the ground for cancellation under s 116(1)(a) of the Act (at [21], CB 99).
Turning, then, to consider whether the discretion to cancel should be exercised, the Tribunal noted the applicant’s claims and evidence that he ceased working for his sponsor through no fault of his own, and that he was subjected to excessive work demands for inadequate remuneration. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had not been treated fairly by his sponsor, and attached some weight to that consideration. It also accepted that the applicant had cooperated with the Department, and that cancellation of his visa would involve hardship, including as a result of the likely consequent restrictions on, or withdrawal of, his right to work and reside in Australia. However, these considerations did not, in the Tribunal’s opinion, outweigh the fact that it had been well over a year since he ceased working for his sponsor, since which time he had been unable to obtain an offer of employment from a new sponsor, and the evidence suggested that there was little prospect that he would obtain an approved sponsor for a considerable time (at [23], CB 99-100).
In taking that view of the applicant’s circumstances, the Tribunal had regard to the apparent deterioration in his health and appreciated that it may currently affect his ability to obtain an offer of employment. However, it considered that even before his health had deteriorated the applicant had had sufficient time to take steps to regularise his employment status. The Tribunal noted in this regard that there was no evidence on the Department’s file that the applicant’s health was constraining his ability to obtain a new sponsor after he ceased working for his original sponsor (at [23], CB 100).”
The proceeding before this Court
The Applicant was unrepresented before this Court, although had the assistance of a Bengali interpreter.
On 15 April 2010, the Applicant attended a directions hearing before me and was given leave to file and serve an amended application giving complete particulars of each ground of review relied upon, together with any further evidence by way of affidavit, as well as written submissions in support of his application.
At the commencement of the hearing, the Applicant confirmed that no other documents had been filed by him or on his behalf in accordance with the Court’s directions or otherwise.
Each of the grounds was interpreted for the assistance of the Applicant and the Applicant was invited to make submissions in support of each of the grounds and in support of the application generally.
The grounds of the application are as follows:
“1. The decision-maker acted in breach of the rules of natural justice.
2. The decision-maker failed to follow the procedures required by the Migration Act 1958.
3. The decision-maker failed to address or to make findings in relation to claims made by the applicant.
4. a) The Tribunal denied the applicant a proper hearing under the ACT because it made specific wrong findings in relation to the evidence of the applicant without having seen the applicant give that evidence in person.”
None of the grounds were supported by particulars or evidence.
Ground 1
In support of ground 1, the Applicant said that he was sick and ill and suffering from depression. He said that he provided a medical certificate and sought an adjournment of three months which was refused. He said he was not in a position to attend the hearing.
The Applicant has not provided any evidence before this Court to suggest that he was unable and unfit to participate in the Tribunal hearing to which he was invited, such that he was denied a real and meaningful opportunity of giving evidence and presenting arguments in support of his application. I asked the Applicant if he wished to seek the Court’s leave to give sworn evidence in accordance with the assertions he had made from the bar table. I explained that if he wished the Court to have regard to those assertions, he would need to give that evidence to the Court on oath and that he may be questioned about that evidence by counsel for the First Respondent. The Applicant declined to seek the Court’s leave to give evidence.
Counsel for the First Respondent referred the Court to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41 (“SZNVW”), where the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the Minister’s appeal in respect of a decision of Smith FM. Federal Magistrate Smith, in setting aside the Tribunal’s decision, held that, by reason of material concerning the refugee visa Applicant’s emotional and mental state (evidence which was placed before the Federal Magistrate, but which was not before the Tribunal) that the Tribunal had deprived the Applicant of a real and meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing in compliance with s.425 of the Act. Keane CJ, with whom Emmett and Perram JJ agreed held that in SZNVW at [34]-[36]:
“[34] It was not demonstrated that the Tribunal was wrong to regard the respondent as a witness who was not worthy of belief. It has not even been shown that the Tribunal was wrong to attribute the respondent’s poor performance before it to dishonesty rather than to the effects of his psychological problems. At the highest for the respondent it may be said that more information relating to his psychological problems might have led to a different view of his credibility. To say only that it is possible that a different view might have been taken of the respondent’s credibility had more information been made available to the Tribunal as to his psychological problems is to fall short of demonstrating that the respondent was denied a “real and meaningful” opportunity of giving evidence and presenting arguments in support of his application. In this case, in contrast to SCAR, it has not been established, as a fact, by the evidence subsequently adduced before the Magistrate, that the Tribunal’s adverse view of the respondent’s credibility reflects an impaired opportunity for him to give evidence and present arguments.
[35] In summary to this point, there is nothing in the text of s 425, or in the statutory context in which it appears, or in the authoritative judicial exegesis of s 425, to suggest that it was the intention of the legislature that the Tribunal should take upon itself the role of ensuring that all possibly arguable lines of argument which might be available to an applicant in any given case are pursued to the applicant’s best advantage.
[36] There was, in my respectful opinion, no foundation for the magistrate’s ultimate conclusion that “the applicant was denied a fair opportunity of having the Tribunal assess whether those defects [in addition to demeanour, memory, and consistency] were attributable to a mental impairment, or to concerns about veracity.” The Tribunal was not obliged to conduct an inquiry to discover whether the respondent’s case might be better put or supported by other evidence. The applicant had the opportunity to adduce such evidence as to his psychological state and its impact on his “demeanour, memory and consistency”, as he wished. There is no suggestion that his capacity to make decisions in his own interests in that regard was impaired by his condition.”
Similarly, in the case before this Court there was no evidence to suggest that the Applicant was unable or unfit to participate in the Tribunal hearing. Nor was there any such evidence before the Tribunal.
The medical certificate, dated 29 December 2009, provided by the Applicant attached to an undated letter from the Applicant received by the Tribunal on 6 January 2010, stated as follows:
“This is to state that [the Applicant] is my patient and is suffering from Major Depression. He is presently very depressed and has had suicidal tendencies which may prevent him from tribunal hearing.
He will need at least 3 months of time to improve and he is undergoing counselling at this stage.”
That medical certificate must be considered in the context of the Tribunal’s letter, dated 9 December 2009, inviting the Applicant to attend a hearing on 27 January 2010. That letter was the third time the Applicant had sought to have the hearing before the Tribunal rescheduled due to “mental illness”.
As stated above, on 7 January 2010, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant refusing his request that the hearing be postponed for three months and confirming the hearing on 27 January 2010. The Tribunal’s letter noted that it was the Applicant’s third application to postpone scheduled hearings and further stated as follows:
“The Tribunal has considered the medical certificate provided with your letter. Your doctor notes that you will need “at least 3 months of time to improve” on your ongoing depressed condition, implying further lengthy delays to the review mechanism if you remain unwilling to attend a hearing until your depression improves. The Tribunal notes that the doctor does not unequivocally state that your condition prevents you from attending a hearing; the doctor states that your condition “may” prevent you from attending.”
By that letter, the Tribunal made clear to the Applicant the concern it had with deficiency in the medical certificate upon which the Applicant relied in support of his application for a further postponement of the scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010. The letter pointed out that the doctor stated that the Applicant’s condition “may” prevent him from attending the hearing. The concern was expressed by the Tribunal in its letter to be that the doctor did not “unequivocally” state that the Applicant’s condition prevented him from attending the hearing. The Applicant declined to provide any further medical certificate addressing that issue. No further evidence or submission was received by the Tribunal by or on behalf of the Applicant subsequent to that letter and prior to 27 January 2010.
On 18 January 2010, a Tribunal file note indicates that the Applicant telephoned the Tribunal stating that he was sick and could not come to the hearing scheduled on 27 January 2010 because he was “not mentally ok”. He said he needed two or three months. He was advised he would have to write to the Tribunal. The Applicant said he had done so, and attached a medical certificate. The case note indicates that the Applicant was told that the last document received by the Tribunal from him was 6 January 2010, which had a medical certificate attached. The Applicant confirmed that was the letter to which he was referring. The Applicant was then advised that the content of this telephone exchange would be brought to the attention of the Tribunal member and he would be called back “shortly”.
On 19 January 2010, a case officer telephoned the Applicant to confirm that he was aware that the Tribunal had decided to proceed with the hearing. The Tribunal’s file note indicates that the Applicant responded that he was aware of the hearing on 27 January 2010 and had received the Tribunal’s letter, dated 7 January 2010. The Applicant stated he required more time, such as a few months, in order to get his thoughts together for the hearing. He was informed that he should attend the hearing, as if he did not attend the member may make a decision at any stage after the date of the hearing. The Applicant was informed that if he decided not to attend the hearing, the Tribunal member was “willing to look at any written evidence or statements he wished to provide to the Tribunal in support of his case”. He was told that the Tribunal member would look at any written evidence received up until the date of the decision. The Applicant indicated that he “might post a written submission to the Tribunal”.
On 25 January 2010, the Applicant wrote a letter, received by the Tribunal on 27 January 2010, attaching submissions. The Applicant again attached the same medical certificate given to the Tribunal on 6 January 2010 and about which it had expressed its concerns to the Applicant.
The Applicant did not attend the hearing on 27 January 2010.
As stated above, the Tribunal accepted many of the Applicant’s claims about the history of his employment in Australia. However, the Tribunal found that those factors did not overcome the fact that the Applicant had ceased working for the sponsor well over a year ago and since that time had been unable to obtain a new sponsor. Further, the Tribunal found that the evidence before it suggested that there was little prospect of the Applicant obtaining an approved sponsor for some considerable time. The Tribunal acknowledged that the deterioration in the Applicant’s health may affect the Applicant’s ability to obtain a sponsor, however, found that the Applicant had had sufficient time prior to the deterioration of his health to take measures to regularise his employment status. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence in the Department’s case file that the Applicant’s health was “constraining his ability to obtain a new sponsor after he ceased working for his original sponsor”.
The Tribunal noted that in considering whether to exercise its discretion to cancel the Applicant’s visa, the Tribunal had regard to relevant policy guidelines, which it identified.
In the circumstances, I accept the submission of counsel for the First Respondent that the Tribunal carefully considered the Applicant’s request for the Tribunal hearing to be postponed and, indeed, agreed to two prior requests for postponement. The Tribunal also considered carefully the Applicant’s request to postpone the hearing scheduled for 27 January 2010 and wrote to the Applicant informing him of the concern the Tribunal had with the medical certificate he had provided. As stated above, the letter pointed out that the doctor stated that the Applicant’s condition “may” prevent him from attending the hearing. The concern was expressed by the Tribunal in its letter to be that the doctor did not “unequivocally” state that the Applicant’s condition prevented him from attending the hearing. The Applicant declined to provide any further medical certificate addressing that issue. The subsequent telephone exchanges between the Tribunal and the Applicant confirmed: that the Applicant had received the Tribunal’s letter dated 7 January 2010 identifying its concerns; that the hearing was proceeding on 27 January 2010 on the present medical evidence before the Tribunal; and, that the Applicant could send further material if he wished up until the date of decision.
In all the circumstances, it was open to the Tribunal to exercise its discretion to refuse the Applicant’s request for a further adjournment and there was no error in its decision to do so.
Otherwise, the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions were open to it on the material before it and for the reasons it gave.
Accordingly, ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2
In support of ground 2, the Applicant asserted to this Court that the Department should have given him time after sending the notification of proposed cancellation before cancelling his visa without further notice. Such an assertion does not by itself establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
It is clear from an examination of the letter from the Department dated 13 November 2008 that the Applicant was notified in accordance with ss.119 and 116 of the Act.
In accordance with s.119 of the Act, the letter gave the Applicant the particulars of the information of the grounds that enlivened the power to cancel, namely, that the Department had received advice from the Applicant’s sponsor indicating that he had ceased employment. The letter invited the Applicant to answer why his visa should not be cancelled and provided that any such response be given “within 12 working days after the date of this notice”. That time period is the period of time prescribed by reg.2.44 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) pursuant to s.122 of the Act. Regulation 2.44(2)(a) provides that if the visa holder is in Australia, the time in which the Applicant must give comments is five working days from when the Applicant was notified under s.119 of the Act. Section 494C of the Act provides that the Applicant is deemed to have been notified seven days after the date of the letter sent by mail. The Tribunal’s letter gave the Applicant twelve days for comment after the date of the letter.
In the circumstances, the Department’s letter was sent to the Applicant in accordance with the legislative scheme. Moreover, no complaint was ever made by or on behalf of the Applicant suggesting any invalidity in the s.119 notification.
In the circumstances, the Applicant was validly given notice of the proposed cancellation in accordance with the legislative scheme and the decision made to cancel the Applicant’s visa was also made in accordance with the Act. There was no further obligation on the Department to give the Applicant any further notice about the proposed cancellation prior to its notification of the Delegate’s decision to cancel the Applicant’s visa.
As stated above, the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions were open to it on the evidence and material before it, including its decision to refuse the Applicant’s request for a further postponement of the hearing.
Accordingly, ground 2 is not made out.
Grounds 3 and 4
The Applicant declined to make any submission in support of grounds 3 and 4. The grounds are otherwise unsupported by particulars or evidence.
Ground 3 and 4 appear to be no more than a disagreement with the findings and conclusions of the Tribunal. Such complaints invite merits review which this Court cannot undertake (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1 at 53-54, [194]; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Another v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Others (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41 per Mason J).
Accordingly, ground 3 and 4 are not made out.
Conclusion
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal understood the claims being made by the Applicant and had regard to all material provided in support. The Tribunal acceded to two requests by the Applicant to postpone the hearing because of the Applicant’s “mental illness”. In respect of the Applicant’s third request, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant identifying concerns it had about the medical certificate provided by the Applicant. The Applicant took no further step to address those concerns. The Tribunal proceeded to make its decision without taking any further step to invite the Applicant to appear before it. That course was open to the Tribunal for the reasons it gave. The Tribunal then made findings based on the evidence and material before it. Those findings of fact were open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal reached conclusions based on the findings made by it and to which it applied the correct law.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal complied with its obligations under the statutory regime in the making of its decision, including the conduct of its review.
The Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.
The proceeding before this Court should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM
Deputy Associate: E. Maconachie
Date: 2 June 2010
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