SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
KF Garty Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Tiger Trust v Prasad & Ors [2025] QSC 91
PARTIES:
KF GARTY PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE TIGER TRUST ACN 167 919 137
(plaintiff)
v
SIMON SAUL PRASAD(1st defendant)
and
SKI PROJECTS PTY LTD ACN 623 251 696
(2nd defendant)
and
CHADOORA PTY LTD ACN 010 056 363
(3rd defendant)FILE NO/S:
4506/24
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
6 May 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
8 April 2025
JUDGE:
Smith J
ORDERS:
1. I declare that those parts of the loan agreement and guarantee dated 12 October 2023 which purport to impose an interest rate of 8% per month are a penalty and are void and unenforceable.
2. I order that part of the judgment of Muir J dated 11 July 2024 that the first defendant and the second defendant pay to the plaintiff the amount of $1,058,950.43 plus interest be set aside. In lieu thereof I propose to order judgment against the First and Second Defendants in an amount calculated in accordance with these reasons.
3. I will hear the parties as to the form of any other consequential orders.
4. The application for an injunction and the removal of caveats is dismissed.
5. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
CATCHWORDS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – Setting aside default judgment – where the defendants allege unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff – whether defence on the merits – where the defendants also allege that the default interest rate was excessive and amounted to a penalty
CONTRACT – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – Harsh and unconscionable contracts and statutory remedies – where the interest rate of the loan was 4% per month but increased to 8% per month - whether default interest rate of 96% per annum amounts to a penalty
EQUITY – Unconscionable conduct – whether evidence of exploitation of special disadvantage
TORT – interference with contract – whether sufficient evidence of such an allegation – whether refusal to allow refinancing is actionable in this matter
Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) ss 20, 21, 22
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 290
Andrews v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30; (2012) 247 CLR 205, cited
Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd v Hung [2021] NSWSC 1681, considered
Bellas v Powers [2023] NSWSC 1198, considered
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447, applied
De Castro v Burtenshaw Super Pty Ltd [2023] QCA 218, applied
Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, cited
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company v New Garage & Motor Co [1915] AC 79, applied
Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25; (2013) 250 CLR 392, considered
McKernan v Fraser [1931] HCA 54; (1931) 46 CLR 343, cited
Northern Territory v Mengel [1995] HCA 65
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- Case
- [2025] QSC 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the defendants had a valid defence to the claim for the loan repayment and whether the interest rate of 8% per month constituted a penalty. The defendants argued that the interest rate was unconscionable and that the plaintiff's conduct in using caveats to block refinancing and enforce the penalty was unconscionable. They also sought to have the default judgment set aside and claimed damages for the alleged unconscionable conduct and improper use of caveats. The court had to assess the evidence provided by the parties and determine whether the defendants' claims were substantiated.
The court found that the interest rate of 8% per month in the loan agreement was a penalty and therefore void and unenforceable. The court also found that the defendants had not provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of unconscionable conduct and improper use of caveats. The court set aside the default judgment and ordered that the defendants pay an amount calculated in accordance with the court's reasons. The court dismissed the defendants' application for an injunction and the removal of caveats and directed the parties to discuss the form of any other consequential orders.
The final orders of the court were that the interest rate of 8% per month in the loan agreement was a penalty and was void and unenforceable. The default judgment was set aside, and the defendants were ordered to pay an amount calculated in accordance with the court's reasons. The application for an injunction and the removal of caveats was dismissed. The court directed the parties to discuss the form of any other consequential orders and to appear before the court to discuss the question of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. I declare that those parts of the loan agreement and guarantee dated 12 October 2023 which purport to impose an interest rate of 8% per month are a penalty and are void and unenforceable.
2. I order that part of the judgment of Muir J dated 11 July 2024 that the first defendant and the second defendant pay to the plaintiff the amount of $1,058,950.43 plus interest be set aside. In lieu thereof I propose to order judgment against the First and Second Defendants in an amount calculated in accordance with these reasons.
3. I will hear the parties as to the form of any other consequential orders.
4. The application for an injunction and the removal of caveats is dismissed.
5. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the default interest rate of 96% per annum is an unenforceable penalty.
2. Whether the evidence supports a claim of unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff.
3. Whether the plaintiff's refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty amount to interference with contract.
4. Whether the court should set aside the default judgment and order judgment against the first and second defendants in an appropriate amount.
Held
1. The court concluded that the default interest rate of 96% per annum is an unenforceable penalty.
2. The court found that the evidence did not support a claim of unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff.
3. The court determined that the plaintiff's refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty amount did not amount to interference with contract.
4. The court set aside the default judgment and ordered judgment against the first and second defendants in an appropriate amount.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by addressing the issue of whether the default interest rate of 96% per annum was an unenforceable penalty. The court examined the terms of the loan agreement and noted that the interest rate increased significantly upon default. The court cited relevant principles from case law concerning harsh and unconscionable contracts and statutory remedies. The court found that the default interest rate was indeed a penalty because it served no legitimate purpose other than to punish the borrower for default and exceeded what was necessary to protect the lender’s interest. Thus, the court declared the penalty clause void and unenforceable.
The court then assessed whether the evidence supported a claim of unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had received independent legal advice before entering into the loan agreement. The court noted that the defendants had not provided evidence of a special disadvantage or reliance on the plaintiff. The court relied on established principles and case law, including the decision in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, to conclude that the evidence did not substantiate a claim of unconscionable conduct.
Next, the court considered whether the plaintiff's refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty constituted interference with contract. The court examined the circumstances and found that the refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty did not constitute an actionable interference with the defendants' ability to refinance or settle the debt. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation of interference with contract.
Finally, the court addressed the application to set aside the default judgment and order judgment against the first and second defendants. The court found that the relief requested was justified given the findings on the penalty clause and the appropriate amount owing by the defendants. The court set aside the previous default judgment and ordered judgment against the first and second defendants in an amount that it calculated based on the evidence and arguments presented. The court also dismissed the application for an injunction and the removal of caveats, finding that the defendants had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for such relief.