KF Garty Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Tiger Trust v Prasad

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

KF Garty Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Tiger Trust v Prasad & Ors [2025] QSC 91

PARTIES:

KF GARTY PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE TIGER TRUST ACN 167 919 137

(plaintiff)

v
SIMON SAUL PRASAD

(1st defendant)
and
SKI PROJECTS PTY LTD ACN 623 251 696
(2nd defendant)
and
CHADOORA PTY LTD ACN 010 056 363
(3rd defendant)

FILE NO/S:    

4506/24

DIVISION: 

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

6 May 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

8 April 2025

JUDGE:

Smith J

ORDERS:

1.   I declare that those parts of the loan agreement and guarantee dated 12 October 2023 which purport to impose an interest rate of 8% per month are a penalty and are void and unenforceable. 

2.   I order that part of the judgment of Muir J dated 11 July 2024 that the first defendant and the second defendant pay to the plaintiff the amount of $1,058,950.43 plus interest be set aside. In lieu thereof I propose to order judgment against the First and Second Defendants in an amount calculated in accordance with these reasons.

3.   I will hear the parties as to the form of any other consequential orders.

4.   The application for an injunction and the removal of caveats is dismissed.

5.   I will hear the parties on the question of costs.

CATCHWORDS:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – DEFAULT JUDGMENT –  Setting aside default judgment – where the defendants allege unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff – whether defence on the merits – where the defendants also allege that the default interest rate was excessive and amounted to a penalty        

CONTRACT – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – Harsh and unconscionable contracts and statutory remedies – where the interest rate of the loan was 4% per month but increased to 8% per month  - whether default interest rate of 96% per annum amounts to a penalty 

EQUITY – Unconscionable conduct – whether evidence of exploitation of special disadvantage  

TORT – interference with contract – whether sufficient evidence of such an allegation – whether refusal to allow refinancing is actionable in this matter    

Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth) ss 20, 21, 22
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 290
Andrews v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30; (2012) 247 CLR 205, cited
Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd v Hung [2021] NSWSC 1681, considered
Bellas v Powers [2023] NSWSC 1198, considered
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447, applied
De Castro v Burtenshaw Super Pty Ltd [2023] QCA 218, applied
Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, cited
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company v New Garage & Motor Co [1915] AC 79, applied
Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25; (2013) 250 CLR 392, considered
McKernan v Fraser [1931] HCA 54; (1931) 46 CLR 343, cited
Northern Territory v Mengel [1995] HCA 65

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Details
Case
[2025] QSC 91
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of KF Garty Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Tiger Trust v Prasad, the defendants sought to set aside a default judgment entered against them, alleging unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff and arguing that the interest rate in the loan agreement was excessive and amounted to a penalty. The case was heard by the court, which had to determine whether the defendants' defence was valid and whether the interest rate in the loan agreement constituted a penalty. The court also had to consider the defendants' claim for damages due to the alleged unconscionable conduct and improper use of caveats.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the defendants had a valid defence to the claim for the loan repayment and whether the interest rate of 8% per month constituted a penalty. The defendants argued that the interest rate was unconscionable and that the plaintiff's conduct in using caveats to block refinancing and enforce the penalty was unconscionable. They also sought to have the default judgment set aside and claimed damages for the alleged unconscionable conduct and improper use of caveats. The court had to assess the evidence provided by the parties and determine whether the defendants' claims were substantiated.

The court found that the interest rate of 8% per month in the loan agreement was a penalty and therefore void and unenforceable. The court also found that the defendants had not provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of unconscionable conduct and improper use of caveats. The court set aside the default judgment and ordered that the defendants pay an amount calculated in accordance with the court's reasons. The court dismissed the defendants' application for an injunction and the removal of caveats and directed the parties to discuss the form of any other consequential orders.

The final orders of the court were that the interest rate of 8% per month in the loan agreement was a penalty and was void and unenforceable. The default judgment was set aside, and the defendants were ordered to pay an amount calculated in accordance with the court's reasons. The application for an injunction and the removal of caveats was dismissed. The court directed the parties to discuss the form of any other consequential orders and to appear before the court to discuss the question of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. I declare that those parts of the loan agreement and guarantee dated 12 October 2023 which purport to impose an interest rate of 8% per month are a penalty and are void and unenforceable.

2. I order that part of the judgment of Muir J dated 11 July 2024 that the first defendant and the second defendant pay to the plaintiff the amount of $1,058,950.43 plus interest be set aside. In lieu thereof I propose to order judgment against the First and Second Defendants in an amount calculated in accordance with these reasons.

3. I will hear the parties as to the form of any other consequential orders.

4. The application for an injunction and the removal of caveats is dismissed.

5. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In essence, the defendants submit that the default interest rate of 96% per annum is an unenforceable penalty. It is also claimed that the plaintiff has refused to release caveats obstructing the defendants from refinancing. It is submitted the plaintiff has engaged in unconscionable conduct and an order for damages is claimed against the plaintiff for unconscionable conduct and alleged improper use of caveats. Background In the claim and statement of claim filed 11 April 2024, the plaintiff alleges that on or about 12 October 2023 the plaintiff and the third defendant signed a loan agreement for the plaintiff to provide financial accommodation to the third defendant. The material terms of the loan agreement were:(a)The principal amount involved was $600,000. (b)Loan establishment fees were $22,500. (c)Broker management fees $22,500. (d)Legal fees $1,500.(e)Interest for minimum interest period $88,159.(f)Interest rate – 8% per calendar month fixed. (g)Concessional rate – 4% per calendar month fixed. (h)The interest commencement date was 25 September 2023.(i)The repayment date was six calendar months from the interest commencement date. (j)The borrower charged all of its right, title and interest in all real estate and leasehold or personal property.(k)Subject to clauses 4.2 and 4.3 for the period between the interest commencement date and the repayment date, the borrower must pay interest on the outstanding balance of the loan amount monthly in advance and interest is calculated at the interest rate and interest not paid when due would compound and itself bear interest.(l)Clause 4.2(a) provided “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this agreement if in the lender’s reasonable opinion, no event of default occurs either on or before the repayment date, then the lender will accept interest at the concessional rate in lieu of interest under clause 4.1.”(m)In the event of default prior to the repayment date then the concession on interest does not apply. (n)If the borrower fails to repay the loan on the repayment date, then the borrower must pay interest on the outstanding balance at the interest rate which shall compound. (o)In the event of default, the total amount owing will at the option of the lender become due and payable as determined by the lender. (p)If the borrower fails to pay the total owing on the repayment date or fails to pay any other money payable and this continues for more than five business days this amounts to payment default. Also, on or about 12 October 2023 the first defendant and the second defendant entered into written guarantees to guarantee the payment of the monies owed by the third defendant to the plaintiff and, to secure their obligations under the deed, the guarantors charged any of its right title and interest in any land, realty or other assets owned by the guarantors. On or about 12 October 2023, the third defendant granted a mortgage over its interest in the third defendant’s property in favour of the plaintiff to secure the debts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In a second affidavit Mr Rouyanian encloses the advice from Mr Davis showing that Mr Prasad received independent legal advice prior to executing the guarantee.Defendant’s evidence Mr Prasad has filed an affidavit dated 26 March 2025. He agrees that on 12 October 2023 he entered into the loan agreement with the plaintiff. The original loan principal of $646,500 was repaid along with some interest ($664,496.75) but despite this he says the plaintiff has refused to release the caveats placed on his properties which had prevented him from refinancing to pay off any remaining balance. He believes the interest rate of 96% per annum is an unenforceable penalty under Australian Law. He attaches correspondence with the plaintiff which shows his attempts to refinance and settle the debt. He says he was hospitalised for seven weeks due to severe financial and emotional distress caused by the plaintiff’s enforcement actions and medical records are attached to the affidavit. He says that he was unable to properly defend the foreclosure proceedings when judgment was entered. He says the plaintiff’s conduct by the use of caveats to block refinancing and enforce a penalty is unconscionable and has caused severe and personal hardship. There is email correspondence dated 23 February 2024 from Mr Prasad to the finance company as to his difficulties in repaying the loan. He indicated he wanted to obtain refinancing. By reply dated 23 February 2024, Mr Cooper from Speedy Finance required the load to be refinanced sooner rather than later. There were further discussions about refinancing with Angus Securities. In response to a letter of demand, Mr Paul Davis from Davis Lawyers for Mr Prasad wrote to the plaintiff confirming that Speedy Finance had been assisting the defendant with refinancing options and it would take a few weeks to finalise. There is a further letter from Mr Davis dated 13 March 2024 which referred to the plaintiff’s refusal to allow refinancing and there were no other refinance options available. There were discussions in May 2024 about the plaintiff receiving $90,000 net sale proceeds of a property at 97 Wayland Street Stafford and a caveat would be withdrawn. There is other evidence relating to the sale of some properties. He attaches a letter from a psychiatrist from the Belmont private hospital which indicates that Mr Prasad was admitted to the hospital for treatment.Defendants’ submissions The defendants submit that injunctions should be ordered by the court to restrain the plaintiff from enforcing any interest over the defendants’ properties and to remove caveats lodged by it. The plaintiff’s conduct constitutes unconscionable conduct both in equity and statute and has resulted in significant economic and personal loss. It is submitted that the losses are somewhere between six to ten million dollars. It is submitted that the plaintiff acted unconscionably contrary to section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law and under the principles of equity.[1] [1]Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the default interest rate of 96% per annum is an unenforceable penalty.
2. Whether the evidence supports a claim of unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff.
3. Whether the plaintiff's refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty amount to interference with contract.
4. Whether the court should set aside the default judgment and order judgment against the first and second defendants in an appropriate amount.

Held
1. The court concluded that the default interest rate of 96% per annum is an unenforceable penalty.
2. The court found that the evidence did not support a claim of unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff.
3. The court determined that the plaintiff's refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty amount did not amount to interference with contract.
4. The court set aside the default judgment and ordered judgment against the first and second defendants in an appropriate amount.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing the issue of whether the default interest rate of 96% per annum was an unenforceable penalty. The court examined the terms of the loan agreement and noted that the interest rate increased significantly upon default. The court cited relevant principles from case law concerning harsh and unconscionable contracts and statutory remedies. The court found that the default interest rate was indeed a penalty because it served no legitimate purpose other than to punish the borrower for default and exceeded what was necessary to protect the lender’s interest. Thus, the court declared the penalty clause void and unenforceable.

The court then assessed whether the evidence supported a claim of unconscionable conduct by the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had received independent legal advice before entering into the loan agreement. The court noted that the defendants had not provided evidence of a special disadvantage or reliance on the plaintiff. The court relied on established principles and case law, including the decision in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, to conclude that the evidence did not substantiate a claim of unconscionable conduct.

Next, the court considered whether the plaintiff's refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty constituted interference with contract. The court examined the circumstances and found that the refusal to release the caveats and enforce the penalty did not constitute an actionable interference with the defendants' ability to refinance or settle the debt. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation of interference with contract.

Finally, the court addressed the application to set aside the default judgment and order judgment against the first and second defendants. The court found that the relief requested was justified given the findings on the penalty clause and the appropriate amount owing by the defendants. The court set aside the previous default judgment and ordered judgment against the first and second defendants in an amount that it calculated based on the evidence and arguments presented. The court also dismissed the application for an injunction and the removal of caveats, finding that the defendants had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for such relief.