Kew Yee v Wellington

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Kew Yee v Wellington [2025] QSC 121

PARTIES:

RICHARD HESTON KEW YEE

(First Plaintiff)
and
MOSTENI HANI
(Second Plaintiff)

v
JUSTIN PHILIPPE BLUETT WELLINGTON

(Defendant)

FILE NO:

SC 777 of 2022

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

27 May 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

23 April 2025

JUDGE:

Henry J

ORDERS:

1.    The following content of the Third Amended Statement of Claim (with the general topic of each included in brackets for ease of reference) is struck out:

(a)     the last sentence of paragraph [7] (the allegation of agency);

(b)     paragraph [8] (the agreement);

(c)     paragraph [9] (the terms);

(d)     paragraph [10] (the partnership or joint venture);

(e)     paragraph [11] (the implied or constructive trust);

(f)      paragraph [43] (damage);

(g)     paragraph [M] (prayer for relief via damages for breach of copyright).

2.    I will hear the parties as to whether the plaintiffs should be required to seek leave to replead their Statement of Claim (if the defendant continues to maintain they should) and as to costs (unless costs are agreed in the meantime) at 9.15 am, 18 June 2025.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – GENERALLY – where the respondent plaintiff has commenced proceedings against the applicant defendant – where the applicant defendant complains the case against them is inadequately pleaded – whether parts of the statement of claim should be struck out, pursuant to r 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), due to having a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceedings – where particular pleadings leave the reader to guess their meaning with the result that surprise at trial, and thus prejudice or delay, will follow.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 146(1)(f), r 149(1), 150(2), r 171

BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266, cited

COUNSEL:

S Ryan KC for the plaintiffs

M Windsor for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

O’Reilly Stevens Lawyers for the plaintiffs

Media Arts Lawyers for the defendant

  1. ‘Iko Iko’ is a catchy song.  It has been covered by various artists with varying chart success for more than 50 years.  It was recently covered by the defendant Mr Wellington and a Solomon Islands musical duo known as Small Jam.  That duo is the plaintiffs, Mr Kew Yee and Mr Hani. 

  2. The parties’ remake, released as ‘Iko Iko (My Bestie)’, included substantial variations and additions to existing lyrics.  For example, the iconic line ‘My grandma and your grandma, were sittin’ by the fire’, became, ‘My bestie and your bestie, dancin’ by di fire’.  That variation was likely written by Mr Wellington. 

  3. Additions, likely written by Mr Kew Yee, to give the remake a mixed reggae/rap feel known as ‘ragga’,[1] included:

    ‘Solomon girl straight up right hoochie mama

    Make we party non stop in a island banda

    Swing those hips and back it up to mi ragga

    A…

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Details
Case
[2025] QSC 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kew Yee v Wellington was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The respondent plaintiffs, Mr Kew Yee and Mr Hani, commenced proceedings against the applicant defendant, Mr Wellington, claiming a share of the financial fruits from a commercial collaboration involving the remaking of a song. The plaintiffs alleged that they were owed money due to a breach of an agreement, fiduciary duties, or a trust relationship. The defendant contested the adequacy of the plaintiffs' pleadings, arguing that certain parts of the Statement of Claim were inadequately pleaded and could prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceedings.

The legal issues before the court were whether parts of the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim should be struck out under r 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). The court had to determine whether the pleadings were sufficiently clear and specific, particularly regarding the foundational and intermediate facts that would support the plaintiffs' claims. The court considered the requirements of r 149(1)(b) and r 149(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, which mandate that pleadings state the material facts and any matter that may take another party by surprise.

The court found that certain parts of the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim were inadequately pleaded and struck them out. The court noted that the plaintiffs' pleadings failed to adequately state the intermediate facts necessary to infer the causes of action, and the foundational facts were collectively relied upon in a way that left the reader guessing their relevance. The court concluded that striking out these parts of the Statement of Claim was necessary to avoid prejudice or delay to the defendant. The court also considered whether the plaintiffs should be required to seek leave to replead their Statement of Claim, but decided that costs were a sufficient remedy. The court scheduled a hearing for the parties to address this issue and to discuss costs unless they were agreed in the meantime.

The court's orders included striking out specific parts of the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim and scheduling a hearing for the parties to address whether the plaintiffs should be required to seek leave to replead their Statement of Claim and to discuss costs. The court allowed the parties an opportunity to be heard as to costs if they were not agreed in the meantime.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The following content of the Third Amended Statement of Claim (with the general topic of each included in brackets for ease of reference) is struck out:

(a) the last sentence of paragraph [7] (the allegation of agency);

(b) paragraph [8] (the agreement);

(c) paragraph [9] (the terms);

(d) paragraph [10] (the partnership or joint venture);

(e) paragraph [11] (the implied or constructive trust);

(f) paragraph [43] (damage);

(g) paragraph [M] (prayer for relief via damages for breach of copyright).

2. I will hear the parties as to whether the plaintiffs should be required to seek leave to replead their Statement of Claim (if the defendant continues to maintain they should) and as to costs (unless costs are agreed in the meantime) at 9.15 am, 18 June 2025.

Background

Background to the litigation

The collaborative remaking of the song was obviously a commercial rather than charitable enterprise, relying substantially upon Small Jam’s involvement in it. It is therefore unsurprising Mr Kew Yee and Mr Hani claim they should share in the financial fruits of their collaboration with Mr Wellington. But on what basis?The pleadings do not allow the reader to know the inferred facts to be relied upon in support of each cause of action Setting aside an alleged breach of Mr Kew Yee’s copyright in the song, dealt with later in these reasons, the causes of action alleged in the SOC appear to be:(a)breach of the terms of an agreement described in the SOC as ‘the Iko Iko agreement’; or (b)breach of fiduciary duties deriving from:(i)a specific purpose partnership; or(ii)a joint venture; or(iii)an implied trust; or(iv)a constructive trust. The lax attention given to the parties’ financial interests in this enterprise left them without an expressly documented contract or trust, making it inevitable that, if any of the alleged causes of action are sustainable, they arise as a matter of inference. The circumstantial nature of the case means that the path to proof of the plaintiffs’ case at trial will involve a three step process of:(1) adducing direct evidence of foundational facts,(2) from which foundational facts they will invite inferences of intermediate fact,(3)to in turn allege a cause of action to be inferred from the foundational and intermediate facts. The intermediate facts in step (2) must be pleaded because they are to be relied upon as material facts in step (3) and r 149(1)(b) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules requires pleadings to state ‘the material facts on which the party relies’. Rule 149(1)(b) does not require the pleading of the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. However, r 149(1)(c) does require the pleading of ‘any matter that if not stated specifically may take another party by surprise’. If material facts are to be relied upon by Mr Kew Yee and Mr Hani in inferring a cause of action then r 149(1)(c) entitles Mr Wellington to know what those facts are, to avoid being taken by surprise at trial. They must also be pleaded because the SOC alleges alternative forms of breach of contract or trust and r 150(2) requires that any fact from which such matters are to be inferred must be specifically pleaded. Unfortunately, the SOC pleads the allegations it apparently wants to prove in steps (1) and (3) but fails to plead much about the intermediate facts in step (2). Exacerbating the problem is that various foundational facts are pleaded and then collectively relied upon in support of some intermediate facts and of the causes of action. Yet at least some of the foundational facts collectively relied upon do not appear to provide such support in each instance. The reader is left to guess which of the collectively pleaded foundational facts will be relied on in respect of each of the intermediate facts (to the extent any are pleaded) and each of the causes of action.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Paragraph [43] should be struck out. Conclusion The above reasons mean that pivotal parts of the SOC, particularly the paragraphs founding the causes of action and alleging loss and damage, should be struck out. It is therefore inevitable that any re-pleading will necessitate substantial changes, with likely impact upon the pleading of the plaintiffs’ case generally. The probability of change of that degree makes it unnecessary to deal with some of the less significant arguments advanced by the parties about the adequacy of some other parts of the SOC not addressed above. Mr Wellington flagged an intention, if successful as he has been, to argue the plaintiffs should be required to seek leave to replead their Statement of Claim. If he still wants to advance that argument it will be necessary to hear it next. My tentative view, subject to any such argument, is there should not be such a requirement, and that costs are a sufficient remedy for the inconvenience occasioned by the inadequate pleading of the plaintiffs’ case. It is important to appreciate the claim has substance in that it is founded in evidence credibly grounding the potential implication of substantial remunerative entitlements from an obviously commercial collaboration. It may be premature to impose a requirement, which if not met, would bring an early end to the pursuit of much or all of such a claim. That is not to suggest the varied and vague course taken in pleading the plaintiffs’ case to date can continue indefinitely. On the face of it the costs of the application to date should follow the event but my orders will allow the parties an opportunity to be heard as to costs if costs are not agreed. This would include hearing argument on costs thrown away because of the filed application having been met at the outset of its hearing with the giving of leave for the filing of the SOC. Orders My orders are:1. The following content of the Third Amended Statement of Claim (with the general topic of each included in brackets for ease of reference) is struck out:(a)the last sentence of paragraph [7] (the allegation of agency);(b)paragraph [8] (the agreement);(c)paragraph [9] (the terms);(d)paragraph [10] (the partnership or joint venture);(e)paragraph [11] (the implied or constructive trust);(f)paragraph [43] (damage);(g)paragraph [M] (prayer for relief via damages for breach of copyright).2. I will hear the parties as to whether the plaintiffs should be required to seek leave to replead their Statement of Claim (if the defendant continues to maintain they should) and as to costs (unless costs are agreed in the meantime) at 9.15 am, 18 June 2025.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established