FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kerrisk v DC Holdings WA Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1217
Citation: Kerrisk v DC Holdings WA Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1217 Parties: PETER KERRISK and MINDIL CORP PTY LIMITED ACN 627 665 719 v DC HOLDINGS WA PTY LIMITED ACN 136 640 330 File number: WAD 323 of 2013 Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 18 November 2013 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment by respondent – whether applicants have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecuting proceeding – whether mixed questions of law and fact – whether contract a “services contract” for purposes of Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) Legislation: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2), s 31A(2)(b)
Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) s 3(1), s 3(2), s 4, s 5, s 5(1), s 5(1)(b), s 5(2), s 11, s 11(1)(a), s 15, s 16, s 16(1)Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 127A, s 127A(1), s 127A(3)(b), s 127A(3)(c)
Cases cited: ATS (Asia Pacific) Pty Ltd v Dun Oir Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1004; (2012) 212 FCR 566
ATS (Asia Pacific) Pty Ltd v Dun Oir Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1460
Bank of Queensland Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] FCA 1435Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Victoria [2013] FCA 445; (2013) 302 ALR 1
Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44; (2001) 207 CLR 21
Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Ltd [2012] FCAFC 165; (20120 207 FCR 298
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60; (2008) 167 FCR 372
Jordan v Aerial Taxi Cabs Co-operative Society Ltd [2001] FCA 972; (2001) 108 IR 263
JY Smile Centre Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd [2013] FCCA 336
Lee v Aerial Taxi Cabs Co-Operative Society Ltd [1999] FCA 1727; (1999) 97 IR 407
Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118
Stevens v Brodibb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16Date of hearing: 31 October 2013 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 90 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr S Meehan Solicitor for the Applicants: Harris Freidman Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P O’Grady Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 323 of 2013
BETWEEN: PETER KERRISK AND MINDIL CORP PTY LIMITED ACN 627 665 719
Applicants
AND: DC HOLDINGS WA PTY LIMITED ACN 136 640 330
Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application of the respondent filed 27 September 2013 for summary judgment be dismissed.
2.The respondent pay the costs of the applicants to be taxed if not agreed.
3.The respondent file and serve its defence within 28 days and the applicants file and serve any reply within…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1217
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the nature of the agreements and the arguments presented by both parties. The applicants contended that the totality of the agreements and circumstances could lead to a finding that they were independent contractors. They highlighted potential factual issues regarding the true nature of their relationship with the respondent and the respondent's obligations under the agreements. The Court noted that there were significant factual and legal questions that needed to be explored, particularly concerning the interpretation of the FSA and the related agreements. The Court concluded that there was no single clear legal issue that would allow for the summary dismissal of the proceeding. It was not appropriate to decide the case summarily when there were unresolved factual and legal questions that could impact the applicants' prospects of success.
Consequently, the Court dismissed the respondent's application for summary judgment. The Court ordered that the respondent pay the applicants' costs and set a timeline for the respondent to file its defence and for the applicants to file any reply. The matter was listed for further directions to ensure that the substantive issues could be properly addressed.
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants say there is no clear and binding authority in relation to the construction point that the respondent contends requires resolution. All this fortifies the submission that the Court should decline to determine this proceeding summarily.CONSIDERATION In the result, I largely accept the submissions made on behalf of the applicants. While, as I noted above, there is no doubt that in an appropriate circumstance the Court may dismiss a case summarily by determination of a real legal issue, in this case I am not satisfied that the factual issues raised by the applicants as to the true relationship both under the FSA, ASA and Deed, or otherwise, between the parties, and thus, whether it can truly be said that the applicants did not relevantly provide services to the respondent, are unarguable. The construction points as to the FSA made by the applicants and set out above raise real questions as to what the substance of that relationship is. The pleadings in this case are at a point where only the statement of claim has been filed. Bare allegations have been made concerning the ownership of a dental practice by the respondent. I am not prepared at this point in the proceeding to make legal findings on an assumed factual basis to the contrary. No defence has yet been filed, thus there has been no reply and it may be that as the proceeding develops quite distinct factual issues will be raised. It is not beyond argument, and certainly not a fanciful proposition, that the totality of the circumstances may ultimately and upon closer consideration suggest that the applicants are independent contractors for the purpose of the IC Act and that they provided services to the respondent under the FSA, thus satisfying the definition of a services contract under s 5 of the IC Act. It is also unclear and not beyond argument that on the proper construction of the IC Act the points made in JY Smile Centre by his Honour are well made. The observations of Madgwick J in Jordan lend support to the construction there taken. In that regard, while the background to the IC Act, particularly the explanatory memorandum, may suggest that a more restrictive and less literal meaning should be given to the relevant terms and construction of the s 5 definition of a services contract than that contended for on behalf of the applicants, that construction is far from inevitable. The explanatory memorandum and other relevant documents suggest a particular policy motivation for the IC Act and the concept of services contract inserted in it, but that does not necessarily mean that the plain words and expressions used in ascribing a meaning to “services contract” should not be given effect to. In the result, I am not satisfied that there is a single clear real legal issue that falls for determination which enables the summary dismissal of the proceeding of the applicants against the respondent. I accept the submission made on behalf of the applicants that questions of fact and law may arise. In my judgment it is not appropriate in all of the circumstances of this case to conclude, as s 31A(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) requires, that the applicants have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.CONCLUSION AND ORDERS