Kerrisk v DC Holdings WA Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kerrisk v DC Holdings WA Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1217

Citation: Kerrisk v DC Holdings WA Pty Limited [2013] FCA 1217
Parties: PETER KERRISK  and MINDIL CORP PTY LIMITED ACN 627 665 719 v DC HOLDINGS WA PTY LIMITED ACN 136 640 330
File number: WAD 323 of 2013
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 18 November 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment by respondent – whether applicants have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecuting proceeding – whether mixed questions of law and fact – whether contract a “services contract” for purposes of Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth)
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2), s 31A(2)(b)
Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) s 3(1), s 3(2), s 4, s 5, s 5(1), s 5(1)(b), s 5(2), s 11, s 11(1)(a), s 15, s 16, s 16(1)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 127A, s 127A(1), s 127A(3)(b), s 127A(3)(c)

Cases cited:

ATS (Asia Pacific) Pty Ltd v Dun Oir Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1004; (2012) 212 FCR 566
ATS (Asia Pacific) Pty Ltd v Dun Oir Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1460
Bank of Queensland Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] FCA 1435

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Victoria [2013] FCA 445; (2013) 302 ALR 1
Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44; (2001) 207 CLR 21
Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Ltd [2012] FCAFC 165; (20120 207 FCR 298
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60; (2008) 167 FCR 372
Jordan v Aerial Taxi Cabs Co-operative Society Ltd [2001] FCA 972; (2001) 108 IR 263
JY Smile Centre Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd [2013] FCCA 336
Lee v Aerial Taxi Cabs Co-Operative Society Ltd [1999] FCA 1727; (1999) 97 IR 407
Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118
Stevens v Brodibb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16

Date of hearing: 31 October 2013
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 90
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr S Meehan
Solicitor for the Applicants: Harris Freidman
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P O’Grady
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 323 of 2013

BETWEEN:

PETER KERRISK AND MINDIL CORP PTY LIMITED ACN 627 665 719
Applicants

AND:

DC HOLDINGS WA PTY LIMITED ACN 136 640 330
Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application of the respondent filed 27 September 2013 for summary judgment be dismissed.

2.The respondent pay the costs of the applicants to be taxed if not agreed.

3.The respondent file and serve its defence within 28 days and the applicants file and serve any reply within…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Kerrisk and Mindil, a company associated with Dr Kerrisk, brought an action against DC Holdings WA Pty Limited seeking relief under the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) to vary a Facilities and Service Agreement (FSA) that they claimed was unfair and harsh. The respondents sought summary judgment, arguing that the applicants were not independent contractors as defined by the Act, and thus the Court did not have jurisdiction to intervene. The applicants argued that the FSA, along with other related agreements, created a contractual relationship where they were independent contractors, entitling them to seek relief under the Act. The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicants were independent contractors under the Act, which would determine the Court's jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The Court examined the nature of the agreements and the arguments presented by both parties. The applicants contended that the totality of the agreements and circumstances could lead to a finding that they were independent contractors. They highlighted potential factual issues regarding the true nature of their relationship with the respondent and the respondent's obligations under the agreements. The Court noted that there were significant factual and legal questions that needed to be explored, particularly concerning the interpretation of the FSA and the related agreements. The Court concluded that there was no single clear legal issue that would allow for the summary dismissal of the proceeding. It was not appropriate to decide the case summarily when there were unresolved factual and legal questions that could impact the applicants' prospects of success.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the respondent's application for summary judgment. The Court ordered that the respondent pay the applicants' costs and set a timeline for the respondent to file its defence and for the applicants to file any reply. The matter was listed for further directions to ensure that the substantive issues could be properly addressed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the result, however, I am not satisfied that summary judgment should be ordered so the respondent’s application should be dismissed with costs.PLEADING AND EVIDENCE The application for summary judgment was supported by the affidavit of Mr Scott Chesterman, solicitor on behalf of the respondent, which put into evidence a Facilities and Service Agreement (FSA) relating to a dental practice at 38 Outram Street, West Perth, Western Australia, and 551 Marmion Street, Booragoon, Western Australia, together with an Associateship Deed (Deed) between the respondent, the applicants, and Dr NR Radny (Dr Radny) and a company associated with him, PUG Nominees Pty Ltd (PUG). The affidavit of Ms Fiona McLay, solicitor, filed on behalf of the applicants, also put into evidence an Asset Sale Agreement (ASA) made between the parties to this proceeding. It appeared in the course of consideration of the evidence received on the interlocutory application that the parties generally accept that these undated agreements and the deed were each made on or about 28 March 2011. I also received into evidence, on the tender of the applicants at the hearing, a copy of a concurrent writ of summons with accompanying statement of claim in action CIV 1595 of 2013 in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, wherein the respondent, as plaintiff, has sued the applicants, as first defendant and second defendant, claiming damages for breaches of the FSA and ASA, as well as an injunction restraining the defendants in that proceeding from soliciting a customer of the “Dental Practice” referred to in the statement of claim. I later also received into evidence, at the hearing, on the respondent’s tender, the defence and counter‑claim in CIV 1595 of 2013 and then the reply and defence to counter‑claim. The action CIV 1595 of 2013 was commenced 15 April 2013 and so precedes the proceeding in this Court. In the event, the writ and pleadings in CIV 1595 of 2013 are of limited relevance to the interlocutory application before me, other than to provide some context to the current proceeding in this Court. By the statement of claim in this proceeding, the first applicant (Dr Kerrisk), who is a periodontist, and the second applicant (Mindil), which is a company associated with him and the trustee of the PK Dental Trust, seek relief under s 16(1) of the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) (IC Act) varying the FSA in accordance with the relief sought in the originating application, on the basis that the FSA was unfair and harsh. In the statement of claim (put generally) the applicants plead:·That the applicants would perform dentistry and related services at the subject premises.·Dr Kerrisk would perform the “Dental Services” personally during the “Term”, these expressions being terms defined by reference to the FSA.·Dr Kerrisk would perform the Dental Services with due care and skill and to the standard expected of a dentist experienced in the performance of obligations and services required under the FSA.·The applicants were licensed by the respondent to use and occupy the premises and perform the Dental Services.·The FSA was a “services contract” within the meaning of that term and s 5 of the IC Act.·Dr Radny was a periodontist who conducted a dental practice at the same premises.·Dr Radny conducted the dental practice pursuant to the licence granted by the respondent.·PUG was a company associated with Dr Radny and trustee of the N R Radny Family Trust.·The parties and Dr Radny and PUG made the Deed.·It was a term of the Deed that Dr Kerrisk and Dr Radny would conduct licensed dental practices at the premises in association.·The Deed was a “services contract” or alternatively a condition or collateral arrangement that related to the FSA and is taken to be part of that services contract by reason of s 5(4) of the IC Act.·It was a term of the Deed that Dr Radny would not interfere with, or seek to influence improperly, Dr Kerrisk’s professional judgment in relation to the conduct of his dental practice and that any new patient, unless specifically referred to, or requesting to be dealt with by a particular specialist, would be allocated between Dr Radny and Dr Kerrisk by Dr Radny acting reasonably provided that Dr Kerrisk may decline to take any patient allocated.·In late October and during November 2012 Dr Radny engaged in a course of conduct, particulars of which are provided, that was in breach of Dr Radny’s obligations under the Deed, was unconscionable and carried out in bad faith, evinced an intention to no longer be bound by the Deed and prevented Dr Kerrisk from performing the Dental Services in accordance with the FSA and the Deed.·The respondent failed to ensure that: Dr Kerrisk had unrestricted access and use of the premises to perform his practice; the use and occupation of the premises was free from substantial interference by Dr Radny and/or PUG in relation to the performance of his dental practice; and that the use and occupation of the premises was free from threatening, intimidatory and/or bullying conduct by Dr Radny and/or PUG.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the result, I am not satisfied that there is a single clear real legal issue that falls for determination which enables the summary dismissal of the proceeding of the applicants against the respondent. I accept the submission made on behalf of the applicants that questions of fact and law may arise. In my judgment it is not appropriate in all of the circumstances of this case to conclude, as s 31A(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) requires, that the applicants have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.CONCLUSION AND ORDERS For these reasons, the interlocutory application for summary judgment is dismissed. The appropriate orders, therefore, are that:1.The interlocutory application of the respondent filed 27 September 2013 for summary judgment be dismissed.2.The respondent pay the costs of the applicants to be taxed if not agreed.3.The respondent file and serve its defence within 28 days and the applicants file and serve any reply within 14 days after being served with the defence.4.The matter be listed for further directions on 31 January 2014 at 11:15am (WST).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants say there is no clear and binding authority in relation to the construction point that the respondent contends requires resolution. All this fortifies the submission that the Court should decline to determine this proceeding summarily.CONSIDERATION In the result, I largely accept the submissions made on behalf of the applicants. While, as I noted above, there is no doubt that in an appropriate circumstance the Court may dismiss a case summarily by determination of a real legal issue, in this case I am not satisfied that the factual issues raised by the applicants as to the true relationship both under the FSA, ASA and Deed, or otherwise, between the parties, and thus, whether it can truly be said that the applicants did not relevantly provide services to the respondent, are unarguable. The construction points as to the FSA made by the applicants and set out above raise real questions as to what the substance of that relationship is. The pleadings in this case are at a point where only the statement of claim has been filed. Bare allegations have been made concerning the ownership of a dental practice by the respondent. I am not prepared at this point in the proceeding to make legal findings on an assumed factual basis to the contrary. No defence has yet been filed, thus there has been no reply and it may be that as the proceeding develops quite distinct factual issues will be raised. It is not beyond argument, and certainly not a fanciful proposition, that the totality of the circumstances may ultimately and upon closer consideration suggest that the applicants are independent contractors for the purpose of the IC Act and that they provided services to the respondent under the FSA, thus satisfying the definition of a services contract under s 5 of the IC Act. It is also unclear and not beyond argument that on the proper construction of the IC Act the points made in JY Smile Centre by his Honour are well made. The observations of Madgwick J in Jordan lend support to the construction there taken. In that regard, while the background to the IC Act, particularly the explanatory memorandum, may suggest that a more restrictive and less literal meaning should be given to the relevant terms and construction of the s 5 definition of a services contract than that contended for on behalf of the applicants, that construction is far from inevitable. The explanatory memorandum and other relevant documents suggest a particular policy motivation for the IC Act and the concept of services contract inserted in it, but that does not necessarily mean that the plain words and expressions used in ascribing a meaning to “services contract” should not be given effect to. In the result, I am not satisfied that there is a single clear real legal issue that falls for determination which enables the summary dismissal of the proceeding of the applicants against the respondent. I accept the submission made on behalf of the applicants that questions of fact and law may arise. In my judgment it is not appropriate in all of the circumstances of this case to conclude, as s 31A(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) requires, that the applicants have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.CONCLUSION AND ORDERS