Kerol Pty Ltd & Anor v Eldic & Ors No. Scciv-01-1399

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KEROL PTY LTD & ANOR V ELDIC & ORS
[2002] SASC 181

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Mullighan and Williams JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ:            This is an appeal against a decision by the District Court dismissing claims made by the plaintiffs against the defendants.  There are certain other claims in the proceedings that may yet be pursued by the plaintiffs against one defendant, but that aspect of the matter can be put to one side.

  2. On appeal the plaintiffs submit that the Judge did not dispose of certain claims or causes of action against the first and second defendants.  The plaintiffs submit that the action should be remitted to the District Court Judge for further hearing, to dispose of these claims or causes of action.  The plaintiffs also submit that the Judge erred in dismissing the claim they made against the fourth defendant.

  3. I have had the benefit of considering the reasons of Williams J.  For the reasons given by him, I agree that the appeal against the dismissal of the claim against the fourth defendant, a firm of solicitors which acted in connection with the sale of a business, should be dismissed.  For the reasons given by him I agree that the appeal against the order for costs in favour of the fourth defendant should be dismissed.  Like all costs orders, the order involved the exercise of a broad discretion.  The pre-trial offer by the fourth defendant, made well in advance of the trial, provided a basis for the order that the Judge made, even though I consider that the basis for an order for costs on a solicitor and client basis prior to the date of the letter is not strong.

  4. The remaining issue is whether the Judge erred in failing to deal with certain claims or causes of action identified by Mr Wells QC on appeal, and whether the action should be remitted to the Judge to deal with those matters.

    Facts

  5. Williams J has outlined the facts.  I will deal with them very briefly, and simplify them somewhat.

  6. Mr Edge was interested in acquiring a business conducted by the third defendant, a company now in liquidation.  Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius were directors of the company, and actively involved in its business.  In October 1994 a contract for the sale of the business was entered into.  Details of how the sale was effected appear in the reasons of Williams J.

  7. Before the contract was signed there were negotiations in April 1994 involving Mr Edge and his accountant Mr Donnelly, Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius.  Other people were present at different times.  The negotiations centred on a letter prepared by Mr Donnelly which proposed, among other things, a restraint on Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius competing with the new owner of the business.  The initial negotiations were unsuccessful.  They revived in September 1994, and centred around a second letter prepared by Mr Donnelly, which again proposed a restraint.  This time the negotiations were successful, leading to a written contract…

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Details
Case
[2002] SASC 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Kerol Pty Ltd & Anor v Eldic & Ors, the appeal revolves around the sale of a business, the interpretation of a contract clause, and the alleged misleading conduct of the defendants, Eldic and Vergelius, during negotiations. The case was initially heard in the District Court of South Australia and later appealed to a higher court. The plaintiffs, Kerol Pty Ltd and another party, sought to enforce a non-compete clause and claim damages for alleged misleading conduct by the defendants in the context of the sale of a business. The primary legal issues were whether the trial judge erred in failing to address specific claims raised during the appeal and whether the case should be remitted to the trial judge for reconsideration of those claims.

The court examined whether the trial judge properly considered the claims of misrepresentation and misleading conduct made by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants made representations and warranties during negotiations that they would not compete with the business post-sale, and that these statements induced the sale. The defendants contended that the representations were not binding and that the plaintiffs failed to prove any misleading conduct. The court found that the plaintiffs' claim for misrepresentation and misleading conduct was not adequately supported by the evidence and pleadings, and the trial judge's decision not to address these claims on appeal was justified. The court held that the trial judge correctly dismissed the claims, as the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to support their allegations.

The court concluded that the trial judge's order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims was a proper exercise of discretion, and there was no merit in the appeal. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the trial judge was upheld. The court did not find it necessary to remit the case to the trial judge for further consideration of the claims that were not properly before the court on appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The remaining issue is whether the Judge erred in failing to deal with certain claims or causes of action identified by Mr Wells QC on appeal, and whether the action should be remitted to the Judge to deal with those matters.Facts Williams J has outlined the facts. I will deal with them very briefly, and simplify them somewhat. Mr Edge was interested in acquiring a business conducted by the third defendant, a company now in liquidation. Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius were directors of the company, and actively involved in its business. In October 1994 a contract for the sale of the business was entered into. Details of how the sale was effected appear in the reasons of Williams J. Before the contract was signed there were negotiations in April 1994 involving Mr Edge and his accountant Mr Donnelly, Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius. Other people were present at different times. The negotiations centred on a letter prepared by Mr Donnelly which proposed, among other things, a restraint on Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius competing with the new owner of the business. The initial negotiations were unsuccessful. They revived in September 1994, and centred around a second letter prepared by Mr Donnelly, which again proposed a restraint. This time the negotiations were successful, leading to a written contract dated 13 October 1994. The contract is in a standard form. A feature of the contract is that the standard clause restraining the vendor from conducting a business of a like nature is struck out. Attached to the contract are “Special Conditions” which are not part of the printed form. Condition 6 imposes a limited restraint on the vendor, being limited to the “business of manufacture of mechanical conveyors.” The case went to trial pursuant to an order made by a Master of the District Court for the determination of preliminary issues. The order provided that damages were not to be decided at that stage. The Statement of Claim alleges that Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius have competed directly with the business acquired by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim that Condition 6 should be rectified so that it imposes a restraint relating to a wider range of business activities, and so that it binds Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius. The Statement of Claim also alleges that in the course of negotiations Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius made statements, amounting to representations and warranties, that they would not compete with the business to be carried on by the plaintiffs or be involved with any other person in competition with that business. The central allegations are set out in the reasons of Williams J. The Statement of Claim alleges that these representations and warranties bind Mr Eldic and Mr Vergelius because the plaintiffs entered into the agreement relying on them: see pars 17 and 18. The Statement of Claim alleges in the alternative that the representations and warranties (referring to the statements alleged in pars 10 and 13 of the Statement of Claim):“… created an understanding and/or belief on the part of the Plaintiffs that Eldic and Vergelius would not compete directly or indirectly …”with the plaintiffs: par 19.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Nevertheless, I reject the appellants’ submission (complaint No 1(a)) that there remains a question of representation by conduct which has been (or ought to have been) reserved to a later trial. I reject the appellants’ submission that on this account the order dismissing the claim should be set aside.5.The responses of Eldic and Vergelius - their effect in relation to the evidence and the case as pleaded. In their alternative argument (complaint No 1(b)) the appellants submit that the Trial Judge has failed to recognise and deal with the plaintiffs’ case of misleading conduct based upon the absence of disclosure by Eldic and Vergelius as to their future intentions in response to the written proposals and the questions put forward in negotiation by Mr Edge or by his accountant Mr Donnelly. Although I have already considered (in pt 4 of these reasons) the effect of the plaintiffs’ pleading, it is convenient to revisit this material and to apply it to the alternative argument. The exchanges relied upon by the plaintiffs as the foundation for a claim of misleading conduct are set out in pars 10 and 13 of the statement of claim. The statements allegedly made by Eldic and Vergelius took place against the background of the proposals in the correspondence which initiated negotiations. It is alleged in the statement of claim that the statements referred to in pars 10 and 13 amounted to representations (and warranties) that Eldic and Vergelius would not themselves compete with the business which was to be sold. There is no allegation that the conduct of Eldic and Vergelius gave rise to a reasonable expectation in the circumstances of the case that they would make full disclosure of their future plans but failed to make that disclosure (cf Black CJ in Demagogue quoted above). The nearest that the statement of claim comes to such an allegation is as set out in par 19 of the statement of claim that the “said representations” (ie the “statements” amounting to representations identified in par 17 as those referred to in pars 10 and 13) created an understanding or belief on the part of the plaintiffs that Eldic and Vergelius would not compete. In summary, the statement of claim relies upon:(i)express statements by Eldic and Vergelius as to future intention (pars 10 and 13);(ii)proof of subsequent conduct inconsistent with that expression of intention (par 22); and(iii)the effect of s 51A of the Trade Practices Act (par 21). It is true that the statement of claim also recites extracts from the letters of 6 April and 30 September 1994 and the text of questions asked on behalf of the potential purchaser. Until final addresses there is no hint that the plaintiffs rely upon an omission to provide information. The appellants’ oral submission upon this appeal placed emphasis on (i) the responsibilities of disclosure attaching to Eldic and Vergelius upon receipt of the correspondence and (ii) the inadequacy of their responses to subsequent questions. This submission was made as part of a more general argument by the appellants’ counsel which called in question the conduct of Eldic and Vergelius which “in all of the circumstances” allegedly induced an erroneous assumption or belief on the part of Edge; those circumstances are those which I have identified upon the appellants’ oral argument, namely the requests for information made in the course of negotiations following written proposals.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILLIAMS J (dissent)
In my opinion the order represented a proper exercise of discretion with respect to a claim which ought not to have been made.8. Conclusion In pt 3 of these reasons I identified four questions which required examination and I summarised the appellants’ complaints. I would resolve each of the points of appeal against the appellants. I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: