FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kenoss Contractors Pty Ltd v Warren [2005] FCA 1175
INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from Chief Industrial Magistrate (NSW) – award interpretation – travelling allowance in building and construction industry awards – meaning of ‘the employer’s depot’ – principles of award interpretation.
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384
Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311
R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed.)
Macquarie DictionaryKENOSS CONTRACTORS PTY LIMITED v ROGER IRVIE WARREN
ACD 0011 OF 2004
MADGWICK J
24 AUGUST 2005
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
ACD 0011 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE CHIEF INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN:
KENOSS CONTRACTORS PTY LTD
APPELLANTAND:
ROGER IRVIE WARREN
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 AUGUST 2005
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Time be extended to enable the appellant to appeal out of time as to the question of travel allowance only.
2.The appeal be allowed.
3.The judgment of the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court of 7 April 2004, insofar as it deals with a claim for travel allowances, is set aside.
4.The matter be remitted to the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court for further hearing.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
ACD 0011 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE CHIEF INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN:
KENOSS CONTRACTORS PTY LTD
APPELLANTAND:
ROGER IRVIE WARREN
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MADGWICK J
DATE:
24 AUGUST 2005
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MADGWICK J:
This is an application for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court of New South Wales given on 7 April 2004. The substantive appeal is made under s 422 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘the Act’). It concerns the appellant’s liability to the respondent, a former employee of the appellant, in respect of travel allowance and crib time allowance under the relevant clauses of the National Building and Construction Industry Award 1990 (‘the 1990 Award’) and the National Building and Construction Industry Award 2000 (‘the 2000 Award’).
EXTENSION OF TIME
An appeal as of right is provided for. As the notice of appeal was filed only four days late, and an explanation – a measure of oversight in a family concern – has been given, a proper exercise of discretion requires that leave be granted to extend the time to permit the appeal on the travel allowance issue which involves several thousand dollars.
However, the crib time allowance concerns only a few hundred dollars. The appellant was given leave to be legally represented despite the informal procedure invoked by the appellant before Mr Miller C.I.M. and contemplated by s 179 of the Act (ss 179C and 179D). Any misunderstanding may at least have been…
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- Case
- [2005] FCA 1175
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the interpretation of the term "depot" as used in the relevant award provisions, specifically in determining the employee's entitlement to travel allowance. The employer argued that the term "depot" should be understood in its ordinary sense, as a storehouse or warehouse, and claimed that either its site office, the principal contractor's depot, or its storage area qualified as a "depot". In contrast, the employee argued that there was no "depot" as he travelled directly to and from the worksite, and that the employer's storage area did not qualify as a "depot" because it only provided basic amenities. The court had to determine whether the employer's storage area could be considered a "depot" under the award provisions.
The court considered the ordinary meaning of the term "depot" in industrial contexts and reviewed previous decisions of the Industrial Relations Commission. It found that a "depot" typically denotes more than a mere storage yard. The court was not satisfied that the employer's storage area at Moruya qualified as a "depot" under the common usage of the term within awards. The court allowed the employee's calculation of travel allowance, considering the distance from the employee's home to the worksite and the days he stayed at Moruya. Consequently, the court allowed the claim for travel allowance.
The court's decision emphasised the importance of interpreting the award provisions in a way that promotes their underlying purpose. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court for further hearing on the travel allowance claim. Additionally, the court extended time for the appellant to appeal out of time regarding the travel allowance only.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Time be extended to enable the appellant to appeal out of time as to the question of travel allowance only.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The judgment of the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court of 7 April 2004, insofar as it deals with a claim for travel allowances, is set aside.
4. The matter be remitted to the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court for further hearing.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MADGWICK J
In his judgment his Honour said:‘In regard to the claim for travel allowance the [employer] submitted the crux to the entitlement to the determination of the claim is the meaning to be given to the word “depot” as used in the relevant clause as set out above. The [employer] submitted the word “depot” was to be given its ordinary defin[ition] and meaning of “a storehouse or warehouse”.In this regard [it is] submitted either its site office, the principal contractors Allied depot or the [employer’s] storage area for pipes and equipment with basic amenities present such as a table and chairs and a portaloo, constituted a “depot” for the purposes of the award.However, the [employee] stated there was no depot as such as he proceeded directly to and from his work site leaving his excavator at the work site on cessation of work. He said he attended Allied site office on two or three occasions for union meetings and agreed that on occasions men working … near Allied’s site office had lunch there. He said that at the [employer’s] storage area the amenities were very basic with him preferring to use the local surf club’s toilet than the “portaloo” provided at the yard.Ordinarily in industrial terms and in common parlance a “depot” denotes something more [than] a mere storage yard which the [employer] now claims was its “depot” at Moruya. Leaving aside its site office (clearly not a depot in any sense of the word) and Allied’s depot which clearly was not the [employer’s] depot the only remaining place for consideration is what I describe on the material before me as its storage yard. A search of decisions of the Industrial Relations Commission confirms my understanding of the word “depot” as being more than a mere storage yard. I am not satisfied on the material before me that the [employer] had a “depot”, as that term is commonly used within awards, at Moruya as asserted by the [employer].I note in the [employee’s] calculations the union has calculated the return trip from the [employee’s] house at Burrill Lakes to Moruya and return and deducted 40kms from that figure. It has also deducted the days where the [employee] stayed at Moruya. In all the circumstances the [employee’s] calculation is fair. I allow this claim.’CONSIDERATIONS Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides:‘(1)In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.’ Section 46 of that Act provides:‘(1)If a provision confers on an authority the power to make an instrument that is neither a legislative instrument within the meaning of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 nor a rule of court, then, unless the contrary intention appears: (a)this Act applies to any instrument so made as if it were an Act and as if each provision of the instrument were a section of an Act; and(b)the enabling legislation; and(c) any instrument so made is to be read and construed subject to the enabling legislation, and so as not to exceed the power of the authority.’