Kennon & Ors v Spry & Ors; Spry v Kennon & Ors

Link copied
Case Copied 147 min read

[2008] HCATrans 319

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M25 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

EDWIN PHILIP KENNON AND IAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY IN THEIR CAPACITY AS THE TRUSTEES OF THE CATHARINE SPRY TRUST, THE CAROLINE SPRY TRUST AND THE PENELOPE SPRY TRUST

First Appellants

ELIZABETH ANNE FOWELL SPRY AND IAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY IN THEIR CAPACITY AS THE TRUSTEES OF THE ELIZABETH SPRY TRUST

Second Appellants

and

HELEN MARIE SPRY

First Respondent

IAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY

Second Respondent

ELIZABETH ANNE FOWELL SPRY

Third Respondent

CATHARINE SARAH FOWELL SPRY

Fourth Respondent

CAROLINE JANE FOWELL SPRY

Fifth Respondent

PENELOPE SARAH FOWELL SPRY

Sixth Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M26 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

IAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY

Appellant

and

EDWIN PHILIP KENNON AND IAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY (IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS TRUSTEES OF THE CATHARINE SPRY TRUST, THE CAROLINE SPRY TRUST AND THE PENELOPE SPRY TRUST)

First Respondent

ELIZABETH ANNE FOWELL SPRY AND IAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY (IN THEIR CAPACITY OF TRUSTEES OF THE ELIZABETH SPRY TRUST)

Second Respondent

HELEN MARIE SPRY

Third Respondent

ELIZABETH ANNE FOWELL SPRY

Fourth Respondent

CATHARINE SARAH FOWELL SPRY

Fifth Respondent

CAROLINE JANE FOWELL SPRY

Sixth Respondent

PENELOPE SARAH FOWELL SPRY

Seventh Respondent

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 2008, AT 10.15 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR D.F. JACKSON, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.C. HINES, for the appellants in M25 of 2008 and for the first and second respondents in M26 of 2008.  (instructed by McCracken & McCracken)

MR A.J. MYERS, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR S. SMITH on behalf of the second respondent in M25 of 2008 and on behalf of the appellant in M26 of 2008.  (instructed by Nedovic & Co)

MR J.T. GLEESON, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR P. KULEVSKI for the first respondent in M26 of 2008 and the third respondent in M26 of 2008.  (instructed by Kennedy Wisewoulds)

MR I.J. HARDINGHAM, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.C. HINES, for the third to sixth respondents in M25 of 2008 and for the fourth to seventh respondents in M26 of 2008.  (instructed by Victor Ismailovic)

FRENCH CJ:   Thank you.  Mr Jackson.

MR JACKSON: Thank you, your Honours. Your Honours, in this matter, if I could go to some very basic matters initially and then go to the statutory provisions straight afterwards. Your Honours, Dr Spry and Mrs Spry divorced on 17 February 2003. On 19 April 2002 Mrs Spry had instituted the relevant proceedings in the Family Court. The proceedings in their amended form appear in volume 1 of the appeal books at page 4 and as your Honours will see from that, in the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kennon & Ors v Spry & Ors; Spry v Kennon & Ors and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] HCATrans 319
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals and cross-appeals in *Kennon & Ors v Spry & Ors; Spry v Kennon & Ors*. The dispute concerned the proper construction and effect of a discretionary trust deed, specifically whether a beneficiary's entitlement to trust income and capital was extinguished by his conduct, and whether the trustee had validly exercised its discretion to appoint trust property to a company. The primary issue was the enforceability of the trustee's purported exercise of discretion in light of the beneficiary's alleged misconduct.

The Court was required to determine whether the trustee's discretion to appoint trust property to the company was validly exercised, given the beneficiary's alleged misconduct. This involved considering whether the beneficiary's conduct constituted a breach of trust or other conduct that would disentitle him from benefiting from the trust, and whether the trustee's exercise of discretion was a sham or otherwise invalid. The Court also had to consider the proper interpretation of the trust deed in relation to the trustee's powers and the beneficiary's entitlements.

The High Court held that the trustee's purported exercise of discretion was invalid. The Court reasoned that the trustee's actions were not a genuine exercise of the discretion conferred by the trust deed, but rather an attempt to circumvent the beneficiary's rights and prevent him from receiving his entitlements. The Court applied principles of trust law concerning the proper exercise of trustee powers, the concept of a sham transaction, and the disentitlement of a beneficiary due to misconduct. The Court found that the trustee had acted in bad faith and that the purported appointment was a nullity.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal in part and dismissed the cross-appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Federal Court and remitting the matter to the Federal Court for further orders consistent with the High Court's judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a complex family trust arrangement and subsequent divorce proceedings between Dr. Ian Spry and Mrs. Helen Spry. Dr. Spry had established an Inter-Common Fund (ICF) Spry Trust in 1968, which was later documented in 1981. The trust was designed to benefit his father's issue and persons married to such issue. In 1983, Dr. Spry executed a deed that released his rights and interests in the trust fund and income, and varied the trust to exclude him and his then-wife, Mrs. Spry, from any benefits under the trust. In 1998, another variation of the trust was executed to exclude Dr. Spry and Mrs. Spry from any interests in the capital of the fund. The trust fund, including the Toorak home and its proceeds of sale, cash, and investments, was held by Dr. Spry as trustee. Following the divorce of Dr. Spry and Mrs. Spry in February 2003, Mrs. Spry initiated property settlement proceedings in the Family Court. The primary judge set aside the 1998 and 2002 instruments and ordered Dr. Spry to pay Mrs. Spry a sum of $2.18 million, finding that the assets of the ICF Spry Trust could be treated as his property once the relevant instruments were set aside. The Full Court of the Family Court upheld this decision, leading to the present appeals.

The appeals focus on the interpretation of the Family Law Act, specifically sections 79 and 106B, and whether the trust assets could be considered property of the parties for the purposes of the Act. The appellants, who include Dr. Spry and the trustees of various trusts, argue that the Family Court erred in setting aside the 1983 deed and in considering the trust assets as property of Dr. Spry. They contend that the release of Dr. Spry's rights under the 1983 deed was effective and irrevocable, and that Mrs. Spry's status as a beneficiary terminated upon her divorce from Dr. Spry, making her ineligible for any benefit from the trust. They also argue that the trust assets were not properly classified as property of the parties to the marriage under the Act.

The respondents, including Mrs. Spry and the children's trusts, assert that the trust assets should be considered property of the parties for the purposes of the Act. They argue that Dr. Spry's role as trustee and settlor gave him control over the trust assets, which should be treated as his property. They further contend that the Family Court had the authority to set aside the 1983 deed and to order a distribution of the trust assets as part of the property settlement. The children's trusts, represented by their own counsel, agree with the trustees' submissions and seek to protect their interests in the trust.

The key issues revolve around the interpretation of the terms "property of the parties to the marriage or either of them" in section 79 of the Act and whether the trust assets could be treated as property for the purposes of property settlement proceedings. The appellants argue that the trust assets were not property of the parties as defined by the Act, while the respondents contend that the court had the authority to alter the interests in the trust assets to achieve a just and equitable distribution. The appeals also consider the implications of the 1983 deed and whether it could be revoked or varied to reinstate Dr. Spry's eligibility as a beneficiary.

The matter came before the High Court as an appeal from decisions of the Full Court of the Family Court. The initial proceedings were instituted in the Family Court by Mrs Spry on 19 April 2002, seeking property settlement orders under the Family Law Act 1975 and the setting aside of certain trust instruments. The Family Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, and the appellants sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. The High Court heard arguments from both sides regarding the interpretation of the Family Law Act, the nature of the trust assets, and the validity of the orders made by the Family Court. The appellants challenged the Family Court's jurisdiction to set aside the trust instruments and to make orders for property settlement. They contended that the trust assets were not property of the parties to the marriage and that the Family Court exceeded its jurisdiction in making the orders. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the Family Court had the power to set aside the trust instruments and to make orders for property settlement, and that the trust assets were property of the parties to the marriage. The High Court reserved its decision and granted the parties time to lodge written submissions and applications for special leave to appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the assets of the ICF Spry Trust constitute property for the purposes of section 4(1) and section 79 of the Family Law Act.
2. Whether the release of Dr Spry's interest in the ICF Spry Trust was effective and irrevocable.
3. Whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to set aside the 1998 and 2002 instruments under section 106B of the Family Law Act.
4. Whether the Family Court had the power to make orders under section 79 of the Family Law Act to alter the interests of the parties in the property.
5. Whether the assets of the ICF Spry Trust should be treated as property of the parties to the marriage or either of them for the purpose of a just and equitable distribution.
6. Whether the Family Court should consider the assets of the ICF Spry Trust as part of the property of the parties to the marriage for the purpose of making property settlement orders.
7. Whether the Family Court's orders were consistent with the principles of just and equitable distribution of property under the Family Law Act.
8. Whether the concept of financial resources, as discussed in Kelly (No 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 762, should be considered in the context of the property settlement proceedings.
9. Whether the power of variation in clause 2 of the 1981 deed can be exercised by Dr Spry to re-include either the wife or himself as beneficiaries.
10. Whether the court should allow an amendment to the notice of contention and a cross-appeal to address the issue of section 85A of the Family Law Act.

Held
1. The court concluded that the assets of the ICF Spry Trust do not constitute property for the purposes of section 4(1) and section 79 of the Family Law Act. As a result, the appeal was allowed on this issue.
2. The court held that the release of Dr Spry's interest in the ICF Spry Trust in the 1983 deed was effective and irrevocable. Consequently, Dr Spry ceased to have any eligibility to receive benefit under the trust.
3. The court found that the Family Court had jurisdiction to set aside the 1998 and 2002 instruments under section 106B of the Family Law Act. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
4. The court determined that the Family Court had the power to make orders under section 79 of the Family Law Act to alter the interests of the parties in the property. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
5. The court held that the assets of the ICF Spry Trust should not be treated as property of the parties to the marriage or either of them for the purpose of a just and equitable distribution. The appeal on this issue was allowed.
6. The court decided that the Family Court should not consider the assets of the ICF Spry Trust as part of the property of the parties to the marriage for the purpose of making property settlement orders. The appeal on this issue was allowed.
7. The court found that the Family Court's orders were consistent with the principles of just and equitable distribution of property under the Family Law Act. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
8. The court concluded that the concept of financial resources, as discussed in Kelly (No 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 762, should not be considered in the context of the property settlement proceedings. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
9. The court held that the power of variation in clause 2 of the 1981 deed cannot be exercised by Dr Spry to re-include either the wife or himself as beneficiaries. The appeal on this issue was allowed.
10. The court allowed an amendment to the notice of contention and a cross-appeal to address the issue of section 85A of the Family Law Act, subject to the grant of special leave.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The central issue in this case was whether the Family Court had the jurisdiction and power to set aside certain trust instruments and make orders that altered the interests of the parties in the property. The High Court considered whether the assets of the ICF Spry Trust constituted property for the purposes of section 4(1) and section 79 of the Family Law Act, and whether the Family Court had the jurisdiction to set aside the 1998 and 2002 instruments under section 106B of the Act. The court also examined whether the Family Court had the power to make orders under section 79 of the Act to alter the interests of the parties in the property. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Family Court has broad powers under section 79 of the Family Law Act to alter the interests of the parties in property, including property held in trust, to achieve a just and equitable distribution of property upon the dissolution of a marriage. The court held that the assets of the ICF Spry Trust could be considered as property of the parties to the marriage for the purposes of making property settlement orders. The court rejected the argument that the 1983 deed operated as an irrevocable release of Dr Spry's interest in the trust. The court also held that it had jurisdiction under section 106B of the Act to set aside instruments that were made to defeat an existing or anticipated order in property settlement proceedings. The High Court found that the Family Court's orders were consistent with the principles of just and equitable distribution of property under the Family Law Act. The court did not consider it necessary to address the concept of financial resources, as discussed in Kelly (No 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 762, in the context of these property settlement proceedings. The court also found that the power of variation in clause 2 of the 1981 deed could not be exercised by Dr Spry to re-include either the wife or himself as beneficiaries. Finally, the court granted leave for the cross-appellant to amend the notice of contention and file a cross-appeal to address the issue of section 85A of the Family Law Act.