Kennedy and National Disability Insurance Agency

Kennedy and National Disability Insurance Agency [2022] AATA 265 (18 February 2022)
Division: NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME DIVISION
File Number: 2020/8400
Re:Anthony Kennedy
APPLICANT

AndNational Disability Insurance Agency
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:R Cameron Senior Member
Date:18 February 2022
Place:Melbourne

The reviewable decision will be set aside and in substitution a decision made that the applicant is entitled to SDA funding for:
(a)Building type - two bedrooms, one resident, apartment;
(b)Design category - High Physical Support with on-site overnight assistance;
(c)Location – Victoria, Inner Melbourne; and
(d)Funding of up to $114,373 per year.

.....[sgd]...................................................................
R Cameron Senior Member
Catchwords
NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME – should the applicant receive funding for a two-bedroom, one resident apartment – second bedroom to accommodate his children to stay overnight – storage equipment – space for workstation – accommodation for carers or other supports to stay overnight – whether supports are “reasonable and necessary” – consideration of the Special Disability Accommodation Price Guide – Special Disability Accommodation Rules – the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act – supporting his goals and maximising independence - decision set aside and substituted
Legislation
National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)
Cases
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Scheme [2017] FCA 308
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 54
National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF (2020) 276 FCR 415
Secondary Materials
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature on 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force on 13 December 2006)
National Disability Insurance Scheme (Price Guide 2020-21) Specialist Disability Accommodation, Version 1.3
National Disability Insurance Scheme (Specialist Disability Accommodation) Rules 2020
National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013
Operational Guideline on Reasonable and Necessary Supports, dated 1 April 2021
REASONS FOR DECISION
R Cameron Senior Member
18 February 2022
INTRODUCTION

The applicant seeks review of an internal review decision made on 15 December 2020 by a delegate of the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the National Disability Insurance Agency (“NDIA”) (“the reviewable decision”).
The reviewable decision affirmed a previous decision made on 2 December 2020, by a delegate of the CEO which found that the applicant was eligible for Special Disability Accommodation (“SDA”) funding for:
(a)Building type - two bedrooms, with two residents;
(b)Design category - fully accessible;
(c)Location – Victoria, Inner Melbourne; and
(d)Funding - up to $40,119.62 per year (quote required).
The applicant had applied to the NDIA for SDA support for:
(a)Building type - two bedrooms, one resident, apartment;
(b)Design category - High Physical Support with on-site overnight assistance (“OOA”);
(c)Location – Victoria, Inner Melbourne; and
(d)Funding - up to $113,129 per year.
The respondent now concedes that the applicant should receive SDA funding for:
(a)Building type – single-bedroom, one resident, apartment;
(b)Design category - High Physical Support with OOA;
(c)Location - Victoria, Inner Melbourne; and
(d)Funding - up to $91,122.00.
The sole issue remaining in dispute between the parties is whether the applicant should receive SDA funding for a single resident apartment which contains two bedrooms.
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
There was both viva voce and documentary evidence before the Tribunal.
The following witnesses gave viva voce evidence:
(a)The applicant;
(b)Mr Clark;
(c)Mr Barry; and
(d)Ms White.
Tendered into evidence were relevant parts of the T documents[1] and Supplementary T documents,[2] two reports of Mr Clark dated 7 August 2020 and 17 August 2021 and three witness statement; one from the applicant, Mr Barry and Ms White.
[1] T documents T1 to T11 together with T16 and T17.
[2] Document ST3 of the Supplementary T documents (“ST Documents”).
THE REGULATORY SCHEME
The subject matter of this application requires an application of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (“the Act”).
It is not in dispute that the applicant is a participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) created by the Act.
Section 3(1) of the Act identifies several objects that are relevant to this application. They include:
(a)In conjunction with other laws, giving effect to Australia’s obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“the Convention”): section 3 (1)(a);
(b)Supporting the independence and social and economic participation of people with a disability: section 3(1)(c);
(c)Providing reasonable and necessary supports for participant in the Scheme: section 3(1)(d);
(d)Enabling people with disability to exercise choice and control in pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery of their supports: section 3(1)(e); and
(e)Promoting the provision of high quality and innovative supports that enable people with disability to maximise independent lifestyles and full inclusion in the community: section 3(1)(f).
Reference should be made to some provisions of the Convention. Article 19 provides that “persons with disabilities should have the opportunity to choose their place of residence and where and with whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live in a particular living arrangement”. Article 23 provides that “in no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis of a disability either of the child or one or both of the parents”.
The applicant contends, and the Tribunal agrees, that in construing the Act and any subordinate legislation made under it, the preferred construction should be that which best achieves the stated object of the Act; which is to “give effect to Australia’s obligations under the Convention”.
Section 4 of the Act identifies general principles that guide actions taken under it. Several of those warrant mention as follows:
(a)People with disabilities have the same right as other members of the Australian Society to realise their potential for physical, social, emotional and intellectual development: section 4(1);
(b)Reasonable and necessary supports should:
(i)Support people with disability to pursue their goals and maximise their independence;
(ii)Support people with disabilities to live independently and be included in the community as fully participating citizens; and
(iii)Develop and support their capacity to undertake activities that enable them to participate in the community and in employment: section 4(11);
(c)The role of families, carers and other significant persons in the lives of people with disability is to be acknowledged and respected: section 4(12); and
(d)Positive personal and social development of people with disabilities is to be promoted: section 4(16).
Section 17A of the Act contains principles concerning the participation of people with a disability. Several of them also warrant mention as follows:
(a)People with disabilities are assumed, as far as is reasonable in the circumstances, to have capacity to determine their own best interests and make decisions that affect their lives: section 17A(1);
(b)The capacity of people with disabilities to exercise choice and control is to be maximised: section 17A(2); and
(c)The NDIS is to respect the interests of people with a disabilities in exercising choice and control about matters that affect them; enable people with disability to make decisions that will affect their lives, to the extent of their capacity; and support people with disabilities to participate in, and contribute to, social and economic life, to the extent of their ability: section 17A(3).
Under section 32 of the Act the CEO must facilitate the preparation of a plan for the participant. The plan must include a statement that identifies any general supports that will be provided to, or in relation to the participant and any reasonable and necessary supports that will be funded under the NDIS. This is known as a “statement of participants supports”.
Section 34 of the Act specifies the matters which the CEO of the NDIS must be satisfied for the purposes of a statement of participants supports. It is worthwhile reproducing that section in full:
34 Reasonable and necessary supports
For the purposes of specifying, in a statement of participants supports, the general supports that will be provided, and the reasonable and necessary supports that will be funded, the CEO must be satisfied of all of the following in relation to the funding or provision of each such support:
(a) the support will assist the participant to pursue the goals, objectives and aspirations included in the participant statement of goals and aspirations;
(b) the support will assist the participant to undertake activities, so as to facilitate the participant’s social and economic participation;
(c)   the support represents value for money in that the costs of the support are reasonable, relative to both the benefits achieved and the cost of alternative support;
(d) the support will be, or is likely to be, effective and beneficial for the participant, having regard to current good practice;
(e) the funding or provision of the support takes account of what is reasonable to expect families, carers, informal networks and the community to provide;
(f)    the support is most appropriately funded or provided through the National Disability Insurance Scheme, and is not more appropriately funded or provided through other general systems of service delivery or support services offered by a person, agency or body, or systems of service delivery or support services offered:
(i)     a part of a universal service obligation; or
(ii)    in accordance with reasonable adjustments required under a law dealing with discrimination on the basis of disability.
(g) the support is not prescribed by the National Disability Insurance Scheme rules as a support that will not be funded or provided under the National Disability Insurance Scheme;
The funding of the support complies with the methods or criteria (if any) prescribed by the NDIS Rules for deciding the reasonable and necessary supports that will be funded under the NDIS. The NDIS Rules are a legislative instrument made by the Minister pursuant to the powers conferred upon him by Part 5 of the Act. The NDIS Rules may prescribe methods or criteria to be applied, or matters to which the CEO is to have regard, in deciding whether or not he or she is satisfied as mentioned in any of the paragraphs (1) (a) to (f).
The relevant features of the legislative scheme have been the subject of some consideration by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF (“WRMF”).[3] The Full Court outlined the features of the legislative scheme in the following terms:
“First, the subject matter of the NDIS legislation is unique, as is its structure: it embeds an approach to the support of persons with disability which was previously non-existent. In its structure, it does more than “ordinary” legislation by incorporating objects and purposes. It incorporates a number of values, which are integral to the legislative scheme. It is always necessary to ensure that constructional choices, and construction, are undertaken paying sufficient regard to the legislative scheme as a whole, for that forms the context for any particular provision. In the case of the Act, because of its particular features, the need to examine particular provisions in the wider context of the scheme as a whole is especially important.”[4]
[3] (2020) 276 FCR 415.
[4] WRMF at paragraph 138.
The Full Court also observed:
“A provision such as s 4 is to be distinguished from an objects clause. It is less susceptible to being characterised as aspirational. That is because, as it’s heading suggests, s 4 identifies “principles” which Parliament intends will “guide actions” under the Act. The word “actions” should be understood as including the performance of functions and the exercise of powers. It includes in our opinion the function and power performed by the CEO (or delegate, or Tribunal) under s 33 of determining whether a statement of participants supports should be approved.”[5]
[5] WRMF at paragraph 146.
The Full Court declined to express a view on the precise limits of the phrase “reasonable and necessary supports” but did give some very useful guidance as follows:
“The phrase also needs to be understood taking into account what is qualified a person as a participant, and the links between a person’s impairment and their full participation in the community, in the same variety of ways as persons without a disability might choose to participate. It is not accidental, in our opinion, that Parliament has chosen the term “participant” to describe individuals who will receive funded support: the choice of that term reinforces, as we have sought to explain, that the driving objective of this act is the holistic, improved an increased participation by persons with disability in the life of their communities, and in life itself.”[6]
[6] WRMF at paragraph 151.
The applicable rules to which the CEO must have regard under section 34(2) of the Act include the NDIS Supports Rules and the NDIS SDA Rules.
Section 16 of the SDA Rules relevantly addresses the question of building type. It is also worthwhile reproducing this rule in full:
16 SDA building type.
For the purposes of determining under subsection 15(1) the SDA building type that is appropriate to support an eligible participant, the CEO must have regard to the following matters:
(a) the eligible participants preference, if the preference can be established and it aligns with the eligible participant statement of goals and aspirations;
(b) the features of the building type in relation to the eligible participants needs;
(c)   the support model that is more appropriate for the eligible participant, having regard to the eligible participants needs and whether immediately available or constant person-to-person support is required;
(d) the eligible participant support needs;
(e) whether the building type represents value for money in that the costs would be reasonable, relative to both the benefits achieved and the cost of alternatives;
(f)    the extent to which the building type would facilitate social and economic participation, including how the building type may impact on:
(i)the eligible participants ability to engage in the life of the household and community; and
(iii)the dynamics of the household, including the eligible participants ability to share with others and build relationships;
(g) the extent to which the building type facilitates past, established or planned connections or the continuation of established connections in particular cultural and community connections;
(h) the extent to which the building type increases, reduces or mitigates the risks to the eligible participant and others, having regard to the eligible participants response to risk and the interaction of the eligible participant with the environment;
(i)    the extent to which the building type improves the lifestage outcomes for and be a long-term benefit to, the eligible participant;
(j)    the extent to which the building type impacts on the eligible participants capacity or capabilities, including:
(i)whether it alleviates the impact of the eligible participants impairment on the eligible participants daily functioning; and
(ii)whether it enhances the eligible participants skill development, in particular independent living skills; and
(iii)whether it increases the benefit and effectiveness of supports, other than specialist disability accommodation, or to lower cost specialist disability accommodation, in particular through a transition period with intensive capacity building supports; and
(iv)whether it enhances the opportunity for a move to accommodation other than specialist disability accommodation, or to lower cost specialist disability accommodation, in particular through a transition period with intensive capacity‑building supports;
(k)   the extent to which the building type facilitates or sustains informal supports and the extent to which those supports reduce the cost of other supports;
(l)    the extent to which the building type facilitates or hinders the provision of other supports required by the eligible participant;
(m) the extent to which the building type facilitates access to other support or specialist services required by the eligible participant and which are not funded or provided through the National Disability Insurance Scheme.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE APPLICANT’S WITNESSES
It is appropriate to make some observations on the witnesses called by the applicant.
The applicant himself presented as a credible and decent witness, who was not prone to exaggeration or embellishment. The Tribunal accepts his evidence in full. It should record that for someone who has had to confront some serious challenges in life, he presented as an individual who had a positive outlook and wishes to make a contribution to society.
His evidence covered his goals, objectives and aspirations, his support needs, his accommodation needs, support available from family, carers, informal networks and the community and the question of value for money.
He gave evidence of having a burning desire to parent his twins. He stated that the hope of seeing his children and being a parent to them keeps him alive. He stated that his disability, inability to look after himself, coupled with his present state of homelessness prevented him from being a parent to his children to date. He also stated that he considered his mental state would be better if he could have meaningful time with his children as a father. He said he believed that there was considerable potential and being a parent to his children was, as he put it, a driving force. Additionally, he wishes to find suitable permanent accommodation, so he could be safe, healthy and live as independently a life as possible with his children.
The applicant also gave evidence about his desire to become a mentor in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community.
Another goal of the applicant is to be as independent as possible in the home and in the community, leading as normal a life as possible in his circumstances.
Mr Barry, a Disability Supports Consultant, gave his evidence in a careful and impartial manner largely relying upon a collation of information which were recorded in the tables attached to his statement. In parts of his statement, he did express opinions. In cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had not been provided with a copy of the Tribunal Practice Note concerning expert evidence. He stated that he did not see himself as an advocate for the applicant, which the Tribunal accepts. The Tribunal accepts his evidence.
Similarly, Ms White was a credible and decent witness who has faced considerable adversity in recent years raising twins as a single mother. She is dedicated to raising her children in the best possible way. Further reference will be made to the substance of her evidence later in these reasons. Similarly, her evidence is accepted by the Tribunal in full.
Mr Clark, an Occupational Therapist, gave his evidence impartially and in a manner that was of assistance to the Tribunal. He had prepared two reports that were in evidence; one dated 7 August 2020,[7] and another one dated 17 August 2021.[8] He was not an advocate for the applicant. He presented as a dedicated and professional Occupational Therapist of vast experience. It should be observed that Mr Clark in preparing both reports did not meet the applicant in person. His communications with the applicant were by email and the “Zoom” video platform. The Tribunal does not consider, nor was it suggested by any party, that the value of his reports or for that matter his evidence in the witness box was in any way diminished by this fact.
[7] Exhibit A3.
[8] Exhibit A4.
RELEVANT FACTS CONCERNING THE APPLICANT’S DISABILITY

In consideration of this application, it is important to appreciate just how disabled the applicant is. He suffers from functional quadriplegia, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression.[9] These conditions are lifelong and will not improve.[10] Indeed, according to Mr Clark, his conditions had deteriorated over a period of approximately 12 months to August 2021.[11]
[9] Dr Jeuniewic, the applicant’s treating Psychiatrist in a report dated 20 April 2020 stated that the applicant suffers from generalised anxiety disorder, major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. He stated that these three conditions are chronic and lifelong and there is no prospect of any recovery. He also expressed the opinion that the applicant will continue to deteriorate unless an appropriate living environment is provided for him. The report of Dr Jeuniewic is at page 138 of the T documents.
[10] Dr Lewis in his report said the deterioration is permanent leaving a lifelong disability. He also expressed the opinion that further physical deterioration is likely if the applicant is not given suitable housing and services. His report is document ST 1.
[11] Described in Exhibit A4.
The evidence before the Tribunal adequately demonstrates that there are several manifestations of his condition.[12] These deficits and functional impairments include:
(a)Severe impairment of function and strength in the upper limbs and hands, such that he cannot use cutlery or a mobile telephone;
(b)Severe impairment in function and strength of the lower limbs, such that he cannot stand or walk unaided;
(c)Bilateral lower limb paraesthesia;
(d)Reduced right-hand sensation;
(e)Reduced core strength/trunk stability;
(f)Mild brain injury; and
(g)Susceptibility to pressure lesions.
[12] In addition to the two reports of Mr Clark which provide considerable detail of the applicant’s disabilities there was also a report from an Occupational Therapist Ms Brown, dated 12 August 2020, which provided further detail of the applicant’s disabilities in terms of his Physical Function personal care, shopping, meal preparation, transport, recreational activities together with work and education.
The evidence also demonstrates that the applicant requires assistance from someone else for getting in and out of his wheelchair, getting in and out of bed or a vehicle, toileting, personal hygiene, showering, dressing, shopping, meal preparation, household cleaning, laundry, transport and medication management. He has significantly reduced strength and impairment of grip bilaterally. He is unable, for example, to use cutlery other than a stabbing action with a fork in his left hand, do up buttons or tie-up shoelaces. He is unable to self-propel a manual wheelchair.
DOES THE APPLICANT QUALIFY FOR A SINGLE RESIDENT APARTMENT WITH TWO BEDROOMS?
The respondent denies that the applicant is entitled to funding for a single resident two-bedroom apartment.
The applicant has identified several reasons why he requires an apartment with a second bedroom. Those reasons are as follows:
(a)Space for his twin children to stay overnight;
(b)Storage of the equipment he needs including wheelchairs (bearing in mind he has two of them), a walking frame, together with physiotherapy and exercise equipment;
(c)Space for him to set up a computer and workstation permanently to enable him to undertake activities as a mentor in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community; and
(d)It would provide accommodation for carers, or other informal supports, who may have to stay overnight from time to time.
SDA Price Guide
The respondent commenced its resistance of the applicant’s claim by contending that clause 85 of “Appendix G – Shared living arrangements, including with people who are not SDA-eligible” (“Appendix G”) of the NDIS, SDA Price Guide 2020-21 applies to the fact situation of this case. In short it means that the person who is not an SDA-eligible participant must make a contribution to the cost of the second bedroom. It also contends that an SDA participant with funding for a single-bedroom one person apartment can, under the provisions of Appendix G of the Price Guide, negotiate with the SDA provider and pay for the second bedroom himself.
The applicant contends that this is incorrect because the clause does not refer to children. The applicant also submitted that as a matter of common-sense, children cannot pay rent. The Tribunal agrees with the applicant’s contention. It is telling that there is no specific reference to children in the clause. Another reason why the Tribunal does not accept the respondent’s contention is that the clause itself is prefaced on an SDA participant sharing a bedroom and does not refer to the cost of a second bedroom to be occupied by children. Once again, were it intended that a second bedroom to be occupied by children was to be paid for separately, one would have expected the clause to have been drafted in such a way that it says so. To this extent the Tribunal agrees also with the submissions of the applicant that the clause is ambiguous and should be interpreted beneficially.
A subsidiary argument mounted by the applicant concerning clause 85 of Appendix G was that it is not made with reference to the actual statutory scheme and is therefore invalid and inapplicable. In such circumstances the appropriate course is not to apply it. Having found in favour of the applicant’s contention that on a proper construction of the clause it does not apply, it is not strictly necessary to consider this argument. However, the Tribunal considers this contention correct.
Section 34 of the Act
The respondent also contends that when applying section 34 of the Act to determine whether it is reasonable and necessary to supply a second bedroom there are three reasons why it is not.
(a)Firstly, the cost of a second bedroom, it is contended by the respondent, is an everyday living expense. It is the cost of accommodating his children. It arises because of his parental obligations not because of the applicant’s disability.
(b)Secondly, the reasons that he requires a second bedroom are not sufficiently linked to his disability to be a reasonable and necessary support.
(c)Thirdly, it is contended by the respondent that if it is found that a second bedroom is reasonable and necessary it is nonetheless a premature application on the facts of this case.
(a) “Everyday living expense”
In support of its contention that the cost of a second bedroom is in effect in everyday living expense it relies upon section 5.1(d) of the Supports for Participants Rules (“SP Rules”) which provides that a support will not be provided or funded under the NDIS if it relates to day-to-day living costs (for example rent, groceries and utility fees), that are not attributable to a participant’s disability support needs.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s contentions that the cost of a second bedroom in an apartment is not for day-to-day living costs within the meaning of section 5.1(d) of the SP Rules. The applicant contends, and the Tribunal agrees, that the word “rent” in section 5.1(d) of the SP Rules does not extend to or appear in the concept of SDA funding. He quite rightly points to the definition of “specialist disability accommodation” which is defined as:
(a) “means accommodation for a person who requires specialist housing solutions including to assist with the delivery of supports that cater for the person’s extreme functional impairment or very high support needs; but
(b) does not include supports delivered to the person while the person is living in the accommodation.”
He further observes that the amount of SDA funding is determined by reference to the SDA building type, the SDA design category and location:
“The SDA building type, SDA design category and location are used to determine the maximum amount that a participant can be funded under the National Disability Insurance Scheme. The amount is determined under the SDA Price Guide.”
SDA funding is only available under the strict statutory regime providing a specialist housing solution for people with extreme functional impairment or very high support needs to achieve their goals. The cost of a second bedroom, as sought by the applicant, cannot on its true and proper construction be said to be “rent” within the meaning of section 5.1(d) of the SP Rules.
Amongst other things, the reasons why the applicant seeks a second bedroom in an apartment is to be able to properly parent his twins and be a mentor for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. These fall within the ambit of the description of social participation which of course is recognised in the Act and the various rules made thereunder.
The applicant has adduced evidence from Mr Barry, which was not contested, that the NDIS has funded second bedrooms to support income earning activities and economic participation.[13] These included a home office.[14] It did not consider those cases involving day-to-day living costs within the meaning of section 5.1(d) of the SP Rules. Had it done so the second bedroom providing support for economic participation would in the course of things attract rent. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s contention that there is no sound reason why support for social participation should be treated any differently from that of economic participation. In any event, both the Act and the SDA Rules do not contemplate such, referring equally to both.
[13] The viva voce evidence of Mr Barry is referred to. Also, the contents of his witness statement at [22], [25] and [26] are referred to.
[14] See for instance the persons identified in the tables to Mr Barry’s statement as “P5”, “P6” P9”.
Mention should be made of Mr Barry’s evidence on this topic. He attached a number of tables to his statement. Those tables, amongst other things, compared the applicant’s SDA support needs with other NDIS participants who were granted SDA funding for the design category “High Physical Support” and the building type which included two bedrooms.[15]
[15] See tables 2, 3 and 4 to Mr Barry’s statement.
Mr Barry observed from the information contained in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 to his statement, that the applicant’s support needs are at least as high as the other participants who were determined to meet the category “High Physical Support”. In some cases, the applicant’s needs were greater than those participants who have been granted SDA funding for the design category “High Physical Support”.
Those tables showed, amongst other things, that the NDIA accepted SDA funding for a second bedroom for a number of reasons for several participants, including storage of mobility equipment (including manual and powered wheelchairs), commode, the provision of a home office, accommodation for overnight carers and friends when visiting and as a study for volunteer and like work. Critically, those tables also show that it was accepted for SDA funding to enable one participant’s two sons to stay when he was caring for them. The respondent observed that this particular participant had a well-established relationship with his children which of course is different to the situation facing the applicant who has not met his children as yet. Mr Barry readily conceded this point in the witness box. Whilst this distinction must be acknowledged, the Tribunal does not consider it determinative. The applicant seeks a two-bedroom apartment so that he can indeed create a well-established relationship with his children. To date, his disabilities have prevented him from doing so.
(b) “Reasonable and necessary support”
The respondent contended that extra space, by way of a second bedroom, was not reasonable and necessary unless the medical equipment required for the participant’s treatment is noisy and disruptive or is particularly large and bulky such that it cannot be conveniently stored elsewhere in the residence. It contended that a wheelchair does not fall into this category and does not warrant the provision of a second bedroom.[16] This contention was not borne out by the contents of the tables attached to Mr Barry’s witness statement. There was no reference to the participants’ equipment as being noisy and disruptive or particularly large and bulky. In any event, it also showed that SDA funding was accepted by the NDIA for a second bedroom, when there was no need to store equipment and as noted earlier, facilitated studies, work, volunteer work or supports staying overnight in a casual capacity.
[16] Paragraph [31] of the respondent's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions.
The Tribunal also accepts the contention of the applicant that in its Operational Guideline on Reasonable and Necessary Supports (“Operational Guideline”) the NDIA has acknowledged the need to make consistent decisions and to treat applicants and participants fairly. Participants with similar circumstances and disability needs should receive similar amounts of supports in their plans.[17] No evidence has been adduced disputing the contents of Tables 2, 3 and 4 attached to Mr Barry’s statement. Nor was he questioned on their contents in cross-examination. The Tribunal agrees that it was within the power of the respondent to do so and does draw an adverse inference within the meaning of the rule in Jones v Dunkel[18] that had it done so, such documents or evidence would not have assisted it.
[17] See the Operational Guideline at page 4.
[18] (1959) 101 CLR 298.
As for the respondent’s contention that the reasons the applicant requires a second bedroom are not sufficiently linked to his disability, the Tribunal cannot agree.
In reaching this conclusion it is useful to start by specifying the applicant’s goals identified in his NDIS plan. They are:
“I would like help to find suitable permanent accommodation, so I can be safe healthy and live as independently as possible, with my children.
To have support to find accommodation for me and my children whilst our permanent accommodation is sourced and secured.
To improve my current physical and emotional well-being.
To help me redevelop my independent living skills as much as is possible by having daily living supports.
To have support to participate and engage in community activities that bring meaning and purpose to my life.
I need equipment and tools to increase my independence.
I would like support to reconnect with my heritage and families.”
These goals were reiterated both in his witness statement and evidence from the witness box. The applicant emphasised his desire to parent his twins and to be a mentor in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community.
The applicant contends, and the Tribunal agrees, that the applicant’s disabilities presently prevent him from achieving his stated goals. These goals include being a parent to his children. Without a separate bedroom for his children this goal is denied to him. Therefore, the applicant requires premises designed for his disability so he can achieve such goals.
There is also the evidence of Mr Clark, which was that the applicant’s ability to have his children stay with him at an apartment will very significantly alleviate the impact of his physical impairment on his psychosocial functioning. His opinion was that the positive impact of such an arrangement on the applicant’s psychosocial functioning and his mental health cannot be understated. Such evidence was not disputed. This evidence is accepted by the Tribunal.
Mr Clark also expressed the opinion in his second report that if the applicant were to suffer any secondary health concerns requiring on-site, active model of care, the second bedroom would facilitate that overnight support. This potential need clearly arises as a result of the applicant’s disability.
Mr Barry considered that a two-bedroom, one resident apartment was the most appropriate for the applicant for a number of reasons. He also considered that such a building type is likely to facilitate past, established or planned connections, in particular cultural and community connections, and is likely to improve the life stage outcomes for, and be of long-term benefit to, the applicant. He stated that the principal way the outcomes would eventuate in such a building type is the ability of the applicant to engage as a father to his children. He expressed the opinion that this is been prevented by the combination of his disability and his housing circumstances to date.[19]
[19] Paragraph 19 of Mr Barry's witness statement is referred to.
(c) “Premature application”
As for the contention of the respondent that if it is found that a second bedroom is reasonable, (which the Tribunal finds it is) it is nonetheless a premature application on the facts once again the Tribunal cannot agree.
It is also contended that it would be open to the applicant to make a later application under section 48 of the Act seeking a second bedroom when parenting arrangements have become more formalised and a relationship has been established between the applicant and his children to a level that will enable them to stay overnight with him.
The respondent points to a number of facts which emerged in the evidence, particularly from that of the applicant and Ms White which it says justifies reaching this conclusion. Reference should be made to some of those facts.
The respondent submits that it would be unrealistic to expect the twins to be spending overnight time with the applicant in the near future. It points to the evidence of Ms White who could not say when it might happen. The applicant has not spoken to Ms White since her pregnancy. The twins are three years old and are in the primary care of Ms White. The applicant has never met them. Currently, Ms White lives in Adelaide with her mother and the twins in her mother’s house. It is her intention to move back to Melbourne with the twins when she can. She conceded in cross-examination that it will take some months for her to be able to return to Melbourne. There are no parenting orders in place. Both the applicant and Ms White believe that they can make shared parenting arrangements when the applicant is willing and able to do so. She described it as being a delicate situation to introduce the twins to the applicant as their father. They would not be staying overnight without her also being present in the short term. She stated she was committed to structuring the arrangements with the applicant so that they would work.
The applicant rebuts this contention by relying upon both his evidence and that of Ms White in that once appropriate premises are in place, she will move to Melbourne and the children will be introduced to their father with a view to implementing a satisfactory coparenting arrangement. She stated that her attitude was that her door is open for the applicant to be a father in any way possible. This evidence is accepted by the Tribunal. There is no doubt that there will be significant hurdles in terms of implementing the parenting arrangements between them. However, it does not doubt the commitment of the applicant and Ms White, to doing the best to make these plans work out. It can only be determined how these planned parenting arrangements eventuate once appropriate accommodation is provided, and the applicant and Ms White use their best endeavours to implement their plans.
Without appropriate accommodation in place the applicant and Ms White cannot commence to undertake coparenting arrangements. Therefore, the Tribunal does not find that it is a premature application on the facts of this case.
Section 16 of the SDA Rules
Section 16 of the SDA Rules “SDA building type” is the key provision for the purposes of this application. It identifies several matters which the decision maker must have regard to in determining what SDA building type is appropriate to support an eligible participant. Each of those matters will now be considered.
Section 16(a) “the applicant’s preference”

As to preference, Justice Mortimer in McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Scheme (“McGarrigle”) observed that the goals, objectives and aspirations of a person with a disability are a core aspect of the participant plan and the supports which are approved are intended by the scheme to support pursuit of those goals, objectives and aspirations.[20]
[20] [2017] FCA 308 at [103].
The respondent acknowledges that the applicant’s preference should be considered in this case as section 16 of the SDA Rules require.[21]
[21] Paragraph 27 of the respondent's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions.
The applicant explained in his evidence why his preference was to live in an apartment with two bedrooms. It is to realise his goals contained in his participant plan which were articulated earlier in these reasons. It was so he can realise his primary goal of being safe healthy and living as independently as possible with his children.
A two-bedroom apartment is his preference because it is the only realistic way he is going to be able to co-parent his children. Much has been said on this topic already. The Tribunal should observe that this preference is both understandable and realistic. It does not seem practical for his twin children to be able to stay overnight without a second bedroom. They cannot realistically be expected to sleep in the same room (which in a single-bedroom setting would have his wheelchairs and other aids present) as the applicant or in the lounge room.
It is also apparent that support to parent his children is support he needs to effectively manage his disabilities and to lead as ordinary a life as is possible given the limitations he faces as a result of his disability. This is consistent with both the objects contained in the Act in section 3 and also the general principles guiding actions taken under it in section 4.
The applicant also contends that the second bedroom would give effect to the principle that people with a disability should have their privacy and dignity respected as contemplated by section 4(10) of the Act. The Tribunal agrees.
Overall, having regard to this matter, the Tribunal favours the applicant’s contention that he should have a two-bedroom single occupant apartment.
Section 16(b) “features of the building type in relation to the applicant’s needs”
An apartment with two bedrooms as noted earlier in these reasons would meet the applicant’s psychosocial needs and his need to parent his children with safety and privacy.
The applicant also relies upon the report of Dr Hickey in which she opined that the applicant’s physical and mental care management and parenting of his children requires a suitable home environment.[22] She also observed that it is only the possibility of meeting and parenting his children that gives the applicant hope of a meaningful life and future. Additionally, she considered that it is only from a basis of secure and appropriate housing that the applicant can forge and foster new and positive family and social relationships and most importantly parent the twins. She emphasised the need for a private space. This view expressed by Dr Hickey is also consistent with the role of families, carers and other significant persons in the applicant’s life referred to in section 4(12) of the Act being another one of the general principles that guide actions taken under it. Although she did not give viva voce evidence, the Tribunal accepts this evidence from Dr Hickey.
[22] Dr Hickey’s report was document ST1 of the ST documents.
The applicant’s parenting needs must be looked at with a degree of realism. Particularly in the early stages of his introduction to the twins and taking on a co-parenting role Ms White will be required for some time at least, to sleep overnight at the apartment with them. It would not be practical for this objective to be achieved in a single-bedroom apartment. When a point is reached that Ms White no longer needs to stay overnight with the twins it is still unrealistic to suggest that they sleep either in the applicant’s bedroom, which would already be crowded with his wheelchair and other supportive aids, or in the lounge room. It is the only effective accommodation option in the circumstances.
The applicant’s other needs should also be repeated; namely that in his role as a potential mentor to the Torres Strait Islander community, the need for storage of his wheelchairs and other assistive equipment and the use of a second bedroom by informal supports that may assist him from time to time.
Having regard to this matter it favours the applicant having a two-bedroom apartment.
Section 16(c) and(d) “appropriate support model for the applicant’s support needs”
This consideration favours the applicant. There are several reasons for this. Mr Clark in his second report, which was not challenged by the respondent, expressed the opinion that an apartment is appropriate for the recommended support model being 1:1 personal support plus 24/7 availability of concierge support. He observed that this type of support is now provided in many apartment complexes, whereby several participants within the complex can share the concierge support.
The applicant also relies upon the evidence given by Mr Barry and in particular the tables attached to his witness statement. Those tables compare the applicant’s support needs with seven other NDIS participants who were granted SDA funding for the design category “High Physical Support” and a two-bedroom apartment building type, single SDA resident. The applicant contends, and the Tribunal agrees, that his support needs are comparable to each of the NDIS participants identified in each of the tables. It should be borne in mind, lest it needs to be repeated, that the applicant has been assessed as having severe dependence on others for self-care and mobility and had a Care and Needs Scale Level of 7 showing that he cannot be left alone and requires support 24 hours per day.[23]
[23] Paragraph 57 of the applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions.
Another relevant consideration arising from the applicant’s support needs was identified in Mr Clark’s second report; namely that if the applicant was to suffer any secondary health concerns requiring on-site, active (rather than concierge) model of care, the second bedroom would facilitate that overnight support.
Section 16(e) “value for money” (section 34(c) of the Act)
The respondent contends that funding of accommodation for the applicant’s parental obligations falls outside the proper scope of NDIS funding when one considers value for money. It also contends that a second bedroom would not represent value for money as a means of accommodating wheelchairs, a walking frame and physiotherapy equipment that may be required by the applicant. It did not advance any evidence in support of these contentions.
On the other hand, the applicant did rely upon evidence that was before the Tribunal to support his contention that an apartment with two bedrooms did represent value for money in the relevant sense. The Tribunal agrees.
The applicant points to the evidence of Mr Barry and his witness statement where seven other participants in the tables attached to it were granted a second bedroom. As noted earlier, the applicant seeks the bedroom to parent his children, to become a mentor in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community, store his equipment and allow informal supports to stay overnight if needed.
Also as noted earlier, one of the participants in the tables attached to Mr Barry’s statement was granted a second bedroom to permit his sons to stay overnight with him. The other participants were granted a second bedroom: to facilitate their studies or work,[24] to allow supports to stay overnight,[25] and to store their equipment.[26]
[24] Participants P4, P5, P6, P8 and P9.
[25] Participants P4, P5, P6, P8 and P9.
[26] Participants P5, P6 and P9.
Mr Clark and Mr Barry also gave evidence to the effect that the provision of a two-bedroom apartment to the applicant as a single resident is likely to reduce the cost of the funding supports for the applicant in the long-term (section 3.1(c) SP Rules) and increase his independence and reduce his need for other kind of supports (section 3.1(f) SP Rules). These are factors that are relevant to and indicative of value for money within the meaning of section 16(e) of the SDA Rules and section 34(c) of the Act.
Mr Clark opined that a two-bedroom apartment represents better value for money by reducing future support needs through the provision of a living environment and model of care aimed at maximising the applicant’s function and mitigating the impact of his current circumstances upon his physical and mental health whilst developing his independence.[27]
[27] Page 121 of the T documents, the first Clark report.
Mr Barry opined that all capacity building outcomes enhanced by the provision of SDA would be value for money outcomes. He further considered that significant benefits are likely to be had from assistance provided in that setting, with self-care and self-management capabilities, enhanced to such an extent that reliance on formal supports is likely to be less over time.[28] Therefore, this represents value for money within the meaning of the rule and the section. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of both Mr Clark and Mr Barry on this topic. It was not really challenged at all whilst they were in the witness box or contradicted by any other evidence.
[28] See Mr Barry’s first report at page 83 of the T documents. This evidence was not challenged when Mr Barry was in the witness box.
The applicant also advanced a contention concerning value for money that centred around the potential for his physical and mental health disabilities to improve were he given a two-bedroom apartment. The improvement would come once he was living in a property where he felt safe and could parent his children. He contended, and the Tribunal understands the argument and accepts it, that if he were given the supports he seeks it would reduce potential anxiety, depression, trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). This would in the long-term represent good value for money.
There is another contention that was advanced by the applicant which the Tribunal accepts. It is that if the respondent does not provide supports to the applicant to parent his children by having them stay overnight in his home it would ultimately be required to fund support for him to do so in settings outside his residence. Such funding is not currently provided for in the applicant’s plan. Assuming such funding is sought, more likely than not, it will require funding for transport to and from another location where his children are present, and funding for a carer to be with him on every occasion that he parents his children outside his place of residence. There is also a possibility or likelihood of the need for additional funding for psychosocial therapy to address his PTSD and anxiety. Given this analysis it is likely that a second bedroom will reduce the cost of supports that would otherwise be needed to fund the foreshadowed parenting and interaction with his children.
The applicant also contends that the annual difference in cost between a single-bedroom, one resident apartment, with “High Physical Support” with OOA when compared with a two-bedroom, one resident apartment, with “High Physical Support” with OOA is only $23,251.[29] Therefore, by reason of the relatively small difference, the costs of a second bedroom are reasonable relative to the benefits achieved and the cost of alternatives. The Tribunal agrees with this assessment. This means that there are no comparable supports that will achieve the same outcome at a substantially lower cost.
[29] These figures are derived from the NDIS, SDA Price Guide which was in evidence before the Tribunal. There was also the concession of the respondent that it would fund to $91,122. The difference in the scheme of this dispute is comparatively small.
Section 16(f) “facilitate social and economic participation” (section 34(b) of the Act)
Social participation will be facilitated at several levels. Firstly, it will enable him to co-parent his twins. Presently, this has been denied to him as it is not practical for him to reside where the children are living with their mother. He is homeless and they cannot stay with him. A two-bedroom apartment, as has been touched on earlier in these reasons, will enable the twins to stay overnight and permit the applicant to interact with them as far as possible in the capacity of a parent.
Secondly, as for social participation, he will be able to attempt to achieve his goal as a mentor in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community.
The respondent did not challenge these contentions that were advanced on the part of the applicant.
Section 16(g) “the extent to which the building type facilitates past, established or planned connections particularly cultural connections”
The applicant has connections with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community in Melbourne. As has been observed on several occasions in these reasons, he plans to re-establish these connections and hopefully become a mentor for that community.
A second bedroom in the apartment is desired by him because he will be able to use it as a study and have a computer area to facilitate his role as a mentor. It was suggested by the respondent that a “study nook” in the lounge room could be relied upon to achieve this objective. The Tribunal considers this is unrealistic in the circumstances.
Having regard to this matter, the Tribunal favours the applicant having a two-bedroom apartment.
Section 16(h) “reduced or mitigated risks to the Applicant”
The respondent did not address the Tribunal on the application of this rule.
The applicant pointed to his significant physical and mental disabilities details of which have been outlined earlier.
He also contended that historical trauma and losses associated with being a member of the Stolen Generations emphasised the need for him to have children living with him at least for some time. It is submitted that he will continue to deteriorate unless an appropriate living arrangement, which includes two bedrooms in an apartment, is provided to him. The Tribunal agrees.
Additionally, he relies upon the evidence of Mr Barry who opined that a single level apartment dwelling with accessibility throughout would mitigate psychological risks and trauma transferred from intergenerational family displacement. This evidence was not challenged.
Section 16(i) “improves the applicant’s life stage outcomes”
This rule was also not addressed by the respondent.
The applicant contended that a two-bedroom apartment is inextricably linked to his positive life stage outcome of being an active father of his two young children because relying on the report of Mr Barry, this is the only option that provides for all his mobility and psychosocial limitations.[30]
[30] Document T3 of the T documents at page 72.
Mr Barry also expressed the opinion in his evidence that he considered the building type of a two-bedroom, one resident apartment is the most appropriate for the applicant. He considered this is likely to facilitate past, established, or planned connections and the continuation of established connections, in particular cultural and community connections and is likely to improve the life stage outcomes which will be of long-term benefit to him. The principal way he considered that these life stage outcomes would be manifest in the building type is the likely ability of the applicant to engage as the father to his children in the setting of a two-bedroom dwelling. To date a combination of the applicant’s disability and housing circumstances have prevented him achieving such objectives.
Mr Clark observed also that the applicant wishes to engage with his children in a domestically appropriate manner, consistent with the circumstances of many of his peers and cohort who would be in a similar position.[31] This is an understandable life stage outcome that the applicant wishes to achieve.
[31] Page 18 of the second Clark report of 17 August 2021.
The Tribunal would also observe that if a two-bedroom apartment gives the applicant the optimal opportunity to achieve his goal of becoming a mentor to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community, it would be a significant improvement to his life stage outcomes.
Section 16(j) “positively impact on the applicant’s capacity and capabilities”
This rule was not addressed by the respondent.
The applicant contended that a two-bedroom apartment well-designed of an appropriate building type that meets the applicant’s needs would, as opined by Mr Barry, provide the optimal setting for the delivery of other necessary supports required by him and maximise his opportunity to develop independent living skills.[32]
[32] Document T3 at page 72 of the T documents.
Mr Clark, as noted earlier, also expressed a similar view about the provision of a two-bedroom apartment and its impact on the applicant’s capacity and capabilities.[33]
[33] In particular the response to question 7 on page 18 of the second Clark report is referred to.
Section 16(k) “facilitates or sustains informal supports”
This section was not addressed by the respondent.
The applicant pointed towards his broader informal support network from Aunties and Uncles who live in Melbourne that may be able to provide him with informal support. He intends to reconnect with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community groups in Melbourne and develop a role as a mentor in that community.
Additionally, Ms Draddy and her partner will provide informal support including staying overnight with him. The second bedroom will facilitate this provision of informal support.
Section 16(l) “facilitates the provision of other supports required by the applicant”
This section was not addressed by the respondent.
The only evidence before the Tribunal that address this consideration was from Mr Clark (whose evidence on this topic was not challenged or contradicted) who contended that the building type of an apartment would facilitate the provision of other supports provided to the applicant. He considered that an apartment building of the type sought would be likely to increase the ready availability of supports.
Section 16(m) “facilitates the provision of other supports required by the applicant”
This section was not addressed by the respondent.
Mr Clark briefly touched upon this in his second report. He expressed the opinion that the building type will not affect the applicant’s access to other supports of specialist services. He considered it is the geographic location which will have a greater effect.
Section 34(e) of the Act takes account of what is reasonable to expect others to provide
The respondent contended that in considering the provisions of this subsection of the Act, it was reasonable to expect others to provide the accommodation by way of a second bedroom. It was put alternatively that the applicant should look elsewhere for the funding of an additional bedroom.
There was no evidence before the Tribunal that demonstrated there was any other realistic option for such funding available to him. This included Ms White, whose financial position is at best spartan. In cross-examination she was probed as to whether, if the NDIS agreed to pay for a one-bedroom apartment with all supports, she would make a contribution to a second bedroom. Her response was that she did not think she could financially do that. She pointed out that she cannot pay her own rent at the moment. She also stated that she did not see why she should be asked to make a contribution to a second bedroom in the applicant’s apartment in any event. This is perfectly understandable.
It was readily conceded by the respondent that no orders for child support or other contribution in favour of the applicant could be made with respect to his children.

The applicant contended that it is not reasonable to expect families, carers, informal networks and the community to provide SDA accommodation. He conceded that it is desirable to support and develop the potential contributions of his informal supports and networks within his communities. However, such support would not affect his need for SDA in the form of the apartment that satisfies the “High Physical Support” design category, and which has two bedrooms and one resident.
CONCLUSION
Keeping in mind both the objects of the Act and the principles which guide actions taken under it, in the words of the Full Court in WRMF, the driving objective of the Act is the holistic, improved and increased participation by persons with disability in the life of their communities, and life itself. For the reasons articulated above, the provision of a two-bedroom apartment improves and increases the applicant’s participation in the life of his community and of life itself to the maximum possible extent. It is a reasonable and necessary support within the meaning of section 34 of the Act.
If the applicant is provided with a two-bedroom apartment it will support his independence and social and economic participation as a person who suffers from a severe disability as contemplated by one of the objects of the Act in section 3. It is also consistent with, amongst other things, the object of the Act which is to enable people with disability to exercise choice and control in pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery of their supports.
A two-bedroom apartment will support the applicant to enable him to pursue his goals and maximises independence as contemplated by the general principles contained in section 4 of the Act. To be able to adequately parent his twins emphasises the role of families, which is also referred to in the general principles contained in section 4 of the Act. For the reasons articulated earlier a two-bedroom apartment will perform an important function in establishing and maintaining the family unit with the twins.
A two-bedroom apartment will also help the applicant achieve a positive personal and social development as also contemplated by section 4 of the Act.
The applicant’s preference in this matter should be emphasised. It was as noted earlier by Justice Mortimer in McGarrigle a core aspect of the participant plan and the supports which are approved and intended by the scheme to support pursuit of those goals, objectives and aspirations. It is encompassed in the general principles contained in section 17 A of the Act. It is also of course the very first matter that the decision-maker is obliged to take into account when determining the SDA building type under section 16 of the SDA Rules. This approach is fortified by the very first object of the Act which is to give effect to Australia’s obligations under the Convention. So far as the language of the Act permits it should be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the terms of the Convention.[34] As noted earlier Article 19 of the Convention casts an obligation on signatories to ensure that persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose their place of residence and where and with whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live in a particular living arrangement.
[34] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 54 at [138] to [151].
It should be noted that at paragraph 20 of the Explanatory Statement for the SDA Rules it is stated:
“This legislative instrument engages the rights of persons with disabilities in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), especially Articles 3, 9, 19 and 28; Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).”
Further, when one has regard to each of the matters contained in section 16 of the SDA Rules and weighing all of them, the Tribunal for the reasons articulated in its consideration of those matters, is satisfied that the following is appropriate to support the applicant as an eligible participant:
(a)Building type - two bedrooms, one resident, apartment;
(b)Design category - High Physical Support with OOA;
(c)Location – Victoria, Inner Melbourne; and
(d)Funding - up to $114,373 per year.
DECISION
By reason of the foregoing matters the reviewable decision will be set aside and in substitution a decision made that the applicant is entitled to SDA funding for:
(a)Building type - two bedrooms, one resident, apartment;
(b)Design category - High Physical Support with OOA;
(c)Location – Victoria, Inner Melbourne; and
(d)Funding of up to $114,373 per year.

I certify that the preceding 128 (one-hundred and twenty-eight) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of R Cameron, Senior Member

.....[sgd].............................................
Associate
Dated: 18 February 2022

Dates of hearing:

4 & 5 November 2021

Advocate for the Applicant:

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Advocate for the Respondent:

R Knowles

Draddy Legal

G Costello

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitors

[2022] AATA 265

18 February 2022

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