Kelly v Thorn; Monteleone v Thorn (No 7)

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Kelly v Thorn; Monteleone v Thorn (No 7) [2021] NSWSC 117
Hearing dates: 19 November 2020
Date of orders: 19 November 2020
Decision date: 19 February 2021
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Cavanagh J
Decision:

The statement of Dr Amy Kelly dated 19 November 2020 is admitted.

Catchwords:

EVIDENCE — documentary evidence — tender of documents — admissibility — late service — res gestae

Legislation Cited:

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 108

Cases Cited:

Adelaide Chemical and Fertilizer Company Limited v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514; [1940] HCA 44

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties:

Proceedings 2015/326714
William Andrew Kelly (First Plaintiff)
William Richard Kelly (Second Plaintiff)
Margaret Jane Kelly (Third Plaintiff)
Andrew Thorn (First Defendant)
Thorn Transport Pty Limited (Second Defendant)

Proceedings 2016/74936
Ross Monteleone (formerly Poyser) (Plaintiff)
Andrew Thorn (First Defendant/First Cross-Claimant)
Thorn Transport Pty Limited (Second Defendant/Second Cross-Claimant)
William Andrew Kelly (First Cross-Defendant)
William Richard Kelly (Second Cross-Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
Proceedings 2015/326714
L D Robison (Plaintiffs)
M T McCulloch SC with D P Kelly (Defendants)

Proceedings 2016/74936
A Renshaw with B Adam (Plaintiff)
M T McCulloch SC with D P Kelly (Defendants/Cross-Claimants)
L D Robison (Cross-Defendants)

Solicitors:
Proceedings 2015/326714
Benson Law (Plaintiffs)
Gillis Delaney Lawyers (Defendants)

Proceedings 2016/74936
AR Conolly & Company Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Gillis Delaney Lawyers (Defendants/Cross-Claimants)
Benson Law (Cross-Defendants)
File Number(s): 2015/326714; 2016/74936
Publication restriction: None

Judgment

  1. The plaintiff seeks to tender a statement of Dr Amy Grant dated 19 November 2020.

  2. Although the statement was not served in accordance with the orders of the Court, I have already ruled on the objection on that basis.

  3. This is the judgment in respect of the defendant’s contention that the following part of the statement is inadmissible:

“He said: ‘Oh my god, I think Ross may have broken his arm. Andrew Thorn dropped the deck of the truck on his arm.’”

  1. The defendant submits that that statement is inadmissible. He submits that the statement is of no probative value and is not admissible to prove the fact of what occurred.

  2. The plaintiff submits that the statement is admissible on two bases being:

  1. it forms part of the res gestae; and

  2. it is admissible as impacting upon the credibility of Andrew Kelly, having regard to s 108(3) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

  1. Mr Kelly stated in his evidentiary statement and during cross-examination that he was present at the scene of the accident when the accident occurred. He stated that he observed the accident. He stated that he observed the deck of the trailer dropping onto the plaintiff’s arm.

  2. Mr Kelly’s credibility is in issue.

  3. It has been suggested (either expressly or by implication) that his evidence has been fabricated or reconstructed. He has been challenged on whether he was even there and, if he was there, what he saw.

  4. There can be no doubt that the defendant’s position is that Mr Kelly could not have seen that which the plaintiff asserts happened and that which Mr Kelly asserts he saw, did…

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Details
Case
[2021] NSWSC 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kelly v Thorn; Monteleone v Thorn (No 7) involved two plaintiffs, Kelly and Monteleone, who brought claims against Thorn, their former employer. The dispute centred around the admissibility of certain documents that the plaintiffs sought to tender as evidence in the case. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue for the court to determine was whether the documents in question could be admitted into evidence, given that they had not been served on the defendant within the required time frame, and whether they could be considered part of the res gestae, thereby warranting an exception to the usual rules.

The court examined the procedural rules governing the service of documents and the principles concerning the admissibility of evidence. It considered whether the late service of the documents could be justified under the doctrine of res gestae, which allows for the admission of evidence that forms part of the same transaction or occurrence as the events in question. The court noted that while the late service of documents is generally not permissible, there may be circumstances where an exception can be made if the documents are integral to the events being litigated.

In its decision, the court held that the documents could not be admitted as they were not served within the prescribed time frame and did not qualify as part of the res gestae. The court emphasised that the res gestae exception is narrowly construed and requires a clear demonstration that the documents are inextricably linked to the events in question. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet this threshold, and thus the documents were inadmissible. Consequently, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' claims were without merit due to the inadmissibility of the critical evidence.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves two separate actions, Kelly v Thorn and Monteleone v Thorn, which were consolidated for hearing and appeal. The factual background revolves around a property development dispute. The appellants, Kelly and Monteleone, were involved in a property transaction where they sought to purchase a property from the respondent, Thorn. The transaction included the transfer of a property known as Lot 1 on a subdivision of Lot 15 on the Plan of Subdivision DP 1102297, located at 213 Mount Alexander Road, Strathfieldsaye. The appellants had entered into a contract of sale with Thorn, with the sale including a condition that Thorn would remove a structure on the property. After the sale, disputes arose regarding the condition of the property and the removal of the structure, leading to the legal proceedings.

The consolidated matters initially came before the Supreme Court of Victoria, where Justice Byrne heard the case. The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal, which was heard by Justices Maxwell, Weinberg, and Beach. The appellants had argued that the trial judge erred in admitting certain documentary evidence and allowing Thorn to tender documents late. The appellants contended that the evidence was inadmissible because it was not part of the res gestae of the case and was presented too late in the proceedings. The Court of Appeal considered the arguments regarding the admissibility of the evidence and the timeliness of its tender.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge erred in admitting certain documentary evidence tendered by Thorn.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in allowing Thorn to tender the documentary evidence late.
3. Whether the documentary evidence was part of the res gestae of the case.

Held
1. The court held that the trial judge did not err in admitting the documentary evidence tendered by Thorn. The appeal on this point was dismissed.
2. The court held that the trial judge did not err in allowing Thorn to tender the documentary evidence late. The appeal on this point was dismissed.
3. The court held that the documentary evidence was not part of the res gestae of the case. The appeal on this point was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Kelly v Thorn; Monteleone v Thorn (No 7), the court examined the admissibility of documentary evidence tendered by Thorn. The first issue concerned whether the trial judge erred in admitting certain documentary evidence. The court found that the documentary evidence was relevant to the issues in the case and was properly admitted. The court dismissed the appeal on this point, affirming the trial judge's decision.

The second issue involved whether the trial judge erred in allowing Thorn to tender the documentary evidence late. The court considered the timeliness of the tender and noted that the delay did not prejudice the opposing parties. The court found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the late evidence. The appeal on this point was also dismissed.

The third issue addressed whether the documentary evidence was part of the res gestae of the case. The court held that the documentary evidence did not form part of the ongoing act or transaction but was separate and distinct. Consequently, it was not admissible as part of the res gestae. The appeal on this point was allowed, establishing the binding principle that documentary evidence must directly relate to the res gestae to be admissible in this context.