Keegan v North Burnett Regional Council

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Keegan v North Burnett Regional Council [2025] QCAT 285

PARTIES:

MICHAEL VINCENT KEEGAN

(APPLICANT) 

v

NORTH BURNETT REGIONAL COUNCIL (RESPONDENT)

APPLICATION NO/S:

GAR564-23

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

24 July 2025

HEARING DATE:

23 April 2025

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Lumb

ORDERS:

1.     The decision of the Respondent made on 24 July 2023 to uphold its decision to issue a destruction order against the Applicant’s dog, ‘Jack’, is set aside.

2.     The Tribunal substitutes its own decision that:

(a)     a destruction order is not made against Jack; and

(b) Jack is to be returned to the Applicant pursuant to s 131 of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld).

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – general administrative review – review of decision of respondent uphold a decision to issue destruction order against the applicant’s dog – destruction order issued pursuant to s 127 of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) – where applicant’s dog previously declared to be a regulated (dangerous) dog after attacking two dogs – where applicant’s dog found wandering on its own without a muzzle and impounded – in impounding the dog the respondent’s compliance officer described dog as ‘docile’ and presented no handling difficulties – the applicant’s dog seriously attacked the other dog within the meaning of the Act – whether destruction order limits any of the applicant’s rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) – whether or not discretion should be exercised to confirm destruction order

Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld), s 4, s 59, s 89, s 127, s 187, s 188, Schedule 1
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 9, s 10, s 13, s 24, s 25, s 58, Schedule 1
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20, s 24, s 157, s 161

Austin BMI Pty Ltd v Deputy Premier [2023] QSC 95
Bradshaw v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2017] QCATA 139
BZN v Chief Executive, the Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs [2023] QSC 266
Cutbush v Scenic Rim Regional Council (No. 2) [2019] QCATA 167
Elze v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 195
Johnston & Ors v Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service [2024] QSC 2

Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58

Lee v Brisbane City Council [2012] QCA 284
Mitchell v Gympie Regional Council [2022] QCATA 40
Nguyen v Gold Coast City Council Animal Management [2017] QCATA 121
Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services (2021) 9 QR 250

Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented 

Respondent:

Mr B. James – James Hilty Lawyers

REASONS FOR DECISION

INTRODUCTION

  1. By an Application to review a decision filed on 21 August 2023 (‘the Review Application’), the Applicant (‘Mr Keegan’) has applied to review an internal decision of the Respondent made on 24 July 2023 (‘the Review…

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Details
Case
[2025] QCAT 285
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Keegan v North Burnett Regional Council, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) reviewed a decision by the North Burnett Regional Council to issue a destruction order against the applicant’s dog, Jack. The Council had decided to issue the destruction order under section 127 of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) after Jack, who had previously been declared a regulated (dangerous) dog, attacked two other dogs. The applicant argued that the destruction order should not be confirmed as it limited his rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and that the destruction order was not justified.

The primary legal issues before the tribunal were whether the destruction order infringed upon the applicant's rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and whether the tribunal should exercise its discretion to confirm the destruction order. The tribunal needed to balance the purposes of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) with the rights of the applicant and the safety of the community.

The tribunal found that although the dog had previously attacked other dogs, there was no evidence of adverse behaviour since the regulated dog declaration, and the dog had been described as docile by the officer who impounded it. The tribunal also considered the applicant's compliance with the permit conditions and the purposes of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld). Ultimately, the tribunal determined that the risk posed by Jack did not justify the destruction of the dog. The tribunal set aside the Council’s decision to uphold the destruction order and ordered that no destruction order be made against Jack and that he be returned to the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Respondent made on 24 July 2023 to uphold its decision to issue a destruction order against the Applicant’s dog, ‘Jack’, is set aside.

2. The Tribunal substitutes its own decision that:

(a) a destruction order is not made against Jack; and

(b) Jack is to be returned to the Applicant pursuant to s 131 of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld).

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Given the ultimate conclusion I have reached below, I consider it unnecessary to address the question of whether the limitation of Mr Keegan’s rights under s 24 would be justified (having regard to s 13 of the HRA) in the event that a destruction order against Jack were to be made.Conclusion I consider that s 127 of the AMA has been, to the extent possible consistently with the purpose of that provision, interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, in particular, Mr Keegan’s rights under s 24 of the HRA. As to the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion in this case, I consider that there are competing considerations which are finely balanced. Factors tending to support the making of a destruction order are:(a)that the circumstances leading to the making of the regulated (dangerous) dog declaration involved Jack attacking and injuring two dogs in separate incidents on the same day;(b)Mr Keegan’s failure to comply with the permit conditions of ensuring that Jack was at all times wearing a distinctive collar with an attached identifying tag containing the prescribed information and failing to ensure that Jack was muzzled when outside of Mr Keegan’s property on 11 July 2023;(c)Mr Keegan’s failure to provide any explanation as to how Jack came to have escaped the enclosure at Mr Keegan’s property on 11 July 2023;(d)Mr Keegan’s lack of insight in relation to the importance of strict compliance with the permit conditions and Mr Keegan’s ambivalent attitude to dogs attacking other dogs. Factors weighing against the making of the destruction order are:(a)that there is no evidence of any aggression shown by Jack towards a person, either within or outside Mr Keegan’s property;(b)the evidence of Ms Keegan as to Jack’s general demeanour, including towards Ms Keegan’s young nieces;(c)that Mr Keegan provided a fully fenced enclosure which, I infer, satisfied the Respondent’s requirements;(d)that there is no evidence suggesting that Jack had escaped the enclosure between the return of Jack to Mr Keegan in 2022 and 11 July 2023;(e)that Jack was micro-chipped;(f)that there is no evidence that Jack attacked any animal subsequent to the making of the regulated dog declaration;(g)that, on 11 July 2023, Jack had travelled approximately 1 to 1½ km from Mr Keegan’s property without apparent incident;(h)the Council officer who impounded Jack on 11 July 2023 described Jack as ‘docile’ and that Jack presented no handling difficulties;(i)that it is a ‘serious matter’ to order the destruction of a family pet[31] (and acknowledging Mr Keegan’s rights under s 24(1) of the HRA). [31]Bradshaw v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2017] QCATA 139, [39]. I have taken into account the purposes of the AMA in general[32] and the purposes of Chapter 4 (dealing with regulated dogs) in particular.[33] Nevertheless, having regard to the matters addressed above, I am not satisfied that the extent of the risk posed by Jack to other dogs justifies the destruction of Jack. Although Mr Keegan’s attitude to compliance with the permit conditions has been unsatisfactory and the lack of insight demonstrated by his comments on the behaviour of dogs, I consider that the lack of any adverse behaviour on the part of Jack subsequent to the regulated dog declaration being made, coupled with the description of Jack’s behaviour when seized in July 2023 (and the absence of any evidence from the Respondent in relation to Jack’s subsequent behaviour), persuades me that a destruction order is not justified and a destruction order should not be made. [32]See esp. AMA ss 4(g), 4(m).[33]See esp. AMA s 59.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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