Keasey v Director of Housing

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCI 2021 0056

JODI KEASEY Applicant
v
DIRECTOR OF HOUSING Respondent

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JUDGES: NIALL, EMERTON and WHELAN JJA
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 1 February 2022
DATE OF ORDERS: 1 February 2022
DATE OF REASONS: 2 February 2022
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2022] VSCA 7
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: [2021] VSC 199 (Derham AsJ)

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Pt 16 inserted into Residential Tenancies Act 1997 in response to COVID-19 pandemic – Whether judge erred in finding there was no ‘decision’ within the meaning of the Administrative Law Act 1978 (‘ALA’) – Whether application of the Director of Housing to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a termination order is a ‘decision’ under the ALA – Whether the Director of Housing is a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of the ALA – Application for leave refused.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Applicant Ms E Bennett SC with
Ms M Narayan
Victoria Legal Aid
For the Respondent Ms S Maharaj QC with
Ms J Davidson
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

NIALL JA
EMERTON JA
WHELAN JA:

  1. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (‘the RTA’) was amended by the insertion of pt 16 headed ‘COVID-19 temporary measures’, so as to change the process by which a landlord could evict a tenant under a residential tenancy agreement. In contrast to the pre-existing regime, which was built on the landlord giving a notice to vacate to a tenant, the amendments made it harder for a landlord to evict a tenant and gave to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’ or ‘VCAT’) a greater decision making role in the process. In short, under the provisions, a landlord is prohibited from issuing a notice to vacate to a tenant and any notice given is of no effect.[1] A tenancy agreement does not terminate unless, relevantly (amongst other things), the Tribunal makes an order under s 549(1).[2]  The landlord must apply to the Tribunal for an order terminating the tenancy agreement.[3] An order under s 549(1) can only be made in limited circumstances.[4]

    [1]RTA, s 544(1).

    [2]Ibid s 547(1)(a). The tenancy agreement may also be terminated in a number of prescribed circumstances, none of which are relevant to the circumstances of this proceeding.

    [3]Ibid s 548(1).

    [4]Ibid ss 548, 549(1), (2).

  1. Under this temporary statutory process,[5] a landlord could apply to VCAT under s 548 of the RTA for an order terminating a tenancy agreement. On an application under s 548, VCAT could make an order terminating a tenancy agreement only if satisfied of various stipulated matters. Those matters include that, in the circumstances of the particular application, it is reasonable and proportionate to terminate the tenancy having regard to s 538, and taking into account the interests of, amongst other persons, the landlord, the tenant, and any neighbours who may be, or who has been, affected by the conduct of the tenant. Section 538 set out various qualitative matters, such as the nature,…

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Details
Case
[2022] VSCA 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Keasey v Director of Housing involved a dispute over whether the Director of Housing had made a decision within the meaning of the Administrative Law Act 1978 (ALA) when applying to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) for a termination order. The plaintiff, Mr Keasey, was a tenant in Victoria who argued that the Director's application was a decision subject to review under the ALA. The Director contended that the application was not a decision and thus not subject to review, and that they were not a tribunal within the meaning of the ALA. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Director of Housing's application to VCAT for a termination order constituted a decision under the ALA, and whether the Director was a tribunal for the purposes of the ALA. The court needed to determine the scope of the term 'decision' in the context of the ALA and whether the Director's application to VCAT was subject to judicial review. The court also had to examine whether the Director of Housing was a tribunal within the meaning of the ALA and if so, whether this affected the applicability of the ALA to their actions.

The court held that the Director of Housing's application to VCAT was not a decision within the meaning of the ALA. The court reasoned that the application was not a final determination of a matter but rather a request for VCAT to make a decision. The court further held that the Director of Housing was not a tribunal within the meaning of the ALA, as they were not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The court found that the Director's role was administrative and that their application to VCAT was part of the process of seeking a termination order, not a decision itself.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal, affirming that the Director of Housing's application to VCAT was not a decision subject to review under the ALA and that the Director was not a tribunal for the purposes of the ALA. The court's decision effectively upheld the Director's position and clarified the scope of review available under the ALA in the context of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997.

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