Kazemi v The Queen

Case [2003] WASCA 301


KAZEMI -v- THE QUEEN [2003] WASCA 301



(2003) 28 WAR 176
SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIACitation No:[2003] WASCA 301
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
Case No:CCA:102/20038 OCTOBER 2003
Coram:PARKER J
TEMPLEMAN J
MILLER J
3/12/03
18Judgment Part:1 of 1
Result: Appeal dismissed
A
PDF Version
Parties:FARIBORZ KAZEMI
THE QUEEN

Catchwords:

Criminal law
Appeal against conviction
Cross-examination of co-accused about apparently inconsistent statement
Distinction between inconsistent statement and inadequate statement
Whether discretion exists to exclude previous inconsistent statement by an accused which is prejudicial to co-accused

Legislation:

Criminal Code, s 689(1), s 570D
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 21, s 22
Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 18

Case References:

Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1
Lui Mei Lin v The Queen [1989] 1 AC 288
Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997) (1998) 70 SASR 555
R v Myers [1998] AC 124. ,
Robinson v The Queen (1996) 15 WAR 191

Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85
R v Corelli [2001] Crim LR 913
R v Rowson [1986] QB 174
R v Soma [2003] HCA 13
Winning v R [2002] WASCA 44

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL CITATION : KAZEMI -v- THE QUEEN [2003] WASCA 301 CORAM : PARKER J
    TEMPLEMAN J
    MILLER J
HEARD : 8 OCTOBER 2003 DELIVERED : 3 DECEMBER 2003 FILE NO/S : CCA 102 of 2003 BETWEEN : FARIBORZ KAZEMI
    Appellant

    AND

    THE QUEEN
    Respondent



Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Cross-examination of co-accused about apparently inconsistent statement - Distinction between inconsistent statement and inadequate statement - Whether discretion exists to exclude previous inconsistent statement by an accused which is prejudicial to co-accused




Legislation:

Criminal Code, s 689(1), s 570D


Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 21, s 22
Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 18

(Page 2)

Result:

Appeal dismissed




Category: A


Representation:


Counsel:


    Appellant : Mr L M Levy
    Respondent : Mr B Fiannaca


Solicitors:

    Appellant : Laurie Levy & Associates
    Respondent : State Director of Public Prosecutions



Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1
Lui Mei Lin v The Queen [1989] 1 AC 288
Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997) (1998) 70 SASR 555
R v Myers [1998] AC 124. ,
Robinson v The Queen (1996) 15 WAR 191

Case(s) also cited:



Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85
R v Corelli [2001] Crim LR 913
R v Rowson [1986] QB 174
R v Soma [2003] HCA 13
Winning v R [2002] WASCA 44


(Page 3)

1 PARKER J: I have had the considerable advantage of reading in draft the reasons of Templeman J.

2 I entirely agree with the analysis and conclusion of Templeman J that there were no inconsistencies between Mrs Combo's evidence at trial and her earlier statements to police officers which were not explored in cross-examination.

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AGLC
Kazemi v The Queen [2003] WASCA 301
Case
[2003] WASCA 301
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter under consideration in the High Court of Australia involved an appeal by the appellant, Kazemi, against his conviction for conspiracy to traffic in a commercial quantity of a controlled drug. The appeal centred around the trial judge's decision to permit the cross-examination of a co-accused, who had previously given a statement that appeared inconsistent with his in-court testimony. The co-accused's statement was introduced to challenge his credibility and to support the appellant's case, but the defence objected on the grounds that the statement was prejudicial to the co-accused and should not have been admitted.

The legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge exercised an appropriate discretion in allowing the cross-examination about the inconsistent statement, and whether there exists a discretion to exclude a previous inconsistent statement by an accused if it is deemed prejudicial to a co-accused. The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to sufficiently consider the potential prejudice to the co-accused and that such prejudice outweighed any probative value the statement might have had.

In considering the matter, the court noted that the trial judge did indeed exercise a discretion in allowing the cross-examination and that there is a distinction between an inconsistent statement and one that is merely inadequate. The court held that the trial judge had correctly recognised the probative value of the statement in testing the co-accused's credibility and had considered the potential prejudice to him. The court further found that while prejudice to a co-accused is a relevant consideration, it is not the sole determinant in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. The trial judge had weighed the competing interests and determined that the probative value of the statement outweighed any prejudice to the co-accused. Consequently, the court concluded that the trial judge had exercised the relevant discretion appropriately and dismissed the appeal.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal against the conviction, thereby upholding the original decision of the lower court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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