Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Kazal v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2013] NSWSC 53 Hearing dates: 5 February 2013 Decision date: 07 February 2013 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Harrison J Decision: Summons dismissed with costs
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Independent Commission Against Corruption - finding of corrupt conduct - Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 s 9(1)(a) - "could constitute or involve...a criminal offence" - whether necessary for Commission to be satisfied of facts to the criminal standard - whether necessary for Commission to make findings based only upon evidence admissible at a criminal trial Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900
Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988Cases Cited: Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption [1990] HCA 28; (1990) 169 CLR 625
Greiner v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1992) 28 NSWLR 125
Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32; (2010) 241 CLR 390Category: Principal judgment Parties: Charif Kazal (Plaintiff)
Independent Commission Against Corruption (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
R F Sutherland SC and M Castle (Plaintiff)
T Alexis SC and A Mitchelmore (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Mitry Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Crown Solicitor (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2012/95312
Judgment
HIS HONOUR: By his summons filed on 26 March 2012, Charif Kazal originally sought the following orders:
1. An order in the nature of certiorari or, alternatively, a declaration setting aside or declaring invalid or unlawful the report of the defendant, made in December 2011 purportedly pursuant to section 74 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 styled "Investigation into the Undisclosed Conflict of Interest of A Senior Executive of the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority".
2. A declaration that the report was made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and was a nullity.
3. A declaration that on the facts as found in the report the determinations or findings were wrong in law.
4. An order in the nature of prohibition or, alternatively, an injunction preventing the defendant or any of its officers, servants or agents from acting on or taking any further step in reliance upon the report.
By the time that this matter came before me for hearing, Mr Kazal had abandoned the first and fourth prayers for relief sought in his summons. Only the second and third prayers for relief were pressed.
Mr Kazal claims that he is entitled to this relief because he contends that the Commission's report delivered to the NSW Parliament in December 2011 purportedly pursuant to s 74 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 contains a number of jurisdictional errors or errors of law on the face of the record. Alternatively, Mr Kazal says that the Commission constructively failed to exercise its statutory power in making the report. He also says that the Commission made a number of errors in its reasons for decision and in the findings that it made. These are all referred to below in more detail.
Background
The Commission's report was prepared following an investigation into allegations against Mr Kazal and Mr Andrew Kelly,…
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- Case
- [2013] NSWSC 53
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues involved the interpretation of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988, particularly section 9(1)(a), which empowers ICAC to determine whether conduct "could constitute or involve...a criminal offence". The court needed to decide whether ICAC was mandated to be satisfied of the facts to the criminal standard before making such a finding and whether ICAC was limited to basing its findings solely on evidence admissible in a criminal trial.
The High Court held that ICAC was not required to find facts to the criminal standard of proof. The Court emphasised that ICAC's role was to investigate and report on corrupt conduct, which was a civil rather than a criminal matter. The Court reasoned that requiring ICAC to find facts to the criminal standard would unnecessarily burden the investigative process and potentially impede its effectiveness. Additionally, the Court found that ICAC was not constrained to basing its findings solely on evidence admissible at a criminal trial, as this would unduly limit the scope of its inquiry. Instead, ICAC could consider a broader range of evidence in making its determinations.
The Court's decision clarified that ICAC's findings of corrupt conduct were not subject to the strict evidentiary rules applicable in criminal proceedings. This allowed ICAC to exercise its powers more flexibly and effectively in combating corruption. The Court's ruling provided much-needed guidance on the scope and standards applicable to ICAC's investigative and reporting functions.
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