FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1276
Citation: Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1276 Appeal from: Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1264 Parties: SATVIR KAUR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File numbers: NSD 678 of 2014 Judges: BARKER J Date of judgment: 25 November 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for skilled (provisional) (class VC) visa – where Tribunal found that appellant had provided false or misleading information in a material particular and did not satisfy public interest criterion 4020(1) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – validity of public interest criterion 4020 as it applied to visa application – whether Tribunal applied correct legal test in assessing whether information provided was false or misleading Legislation: Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 12(2)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 97Migration Amendment Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 3, reg 5, reg 5(2)(a), item 4 of Sch 3
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.26B, reg 2.26B(1A), Sch 2: cl 485.221, cl 485.224, Sch 4: cl 4020, cl 4020(1), cl 4020(2), cl 4020(5)Cases cited: Batra v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 274; (2013) 212 FCR 84
Hu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1710; (2007) 214 FLR 296
Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1264
Kaur v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2209
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 75
Kozel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 658; (2004) 138 FCR 181
Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381
Mudiyanselage v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FMCA 887
Shah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 18; (2011) 249 FLR 136
Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014 FCAFC 42; (2014) 220 FCR 169Date of hearing: 25 November 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 64 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms SA Given Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 678 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SATVIR KAUR
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 NOVEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The decision of the second respondent be quashed.
3.A writ of mandamus directed to the second…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1276
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted the public interest criterion 4020 and applied the appropriate legal test in determining whether the information provided by Ms Kaur was false or misleading. The court needed to ascertain whether the Tribunal had correctly identified the relevant assessing authority at the time of its decision and whether the public interest criterion 4020 was validly applied. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal’s reliance on the department’s site visit report was justified and whether Ms Kaur’s evidence was credible and consistent.
The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its application of the public interest criterion 4020. The court held that the relevant assessing authority at the time of the Tribunal’s decision was the relevant authority under legislative instrument IMMI 12/068. The court also determined that the public interest criterion 4020 was validly applied, as it was expressly intended to operate retrospectively. The court noted that any challenge to the validity of the criterion would need to be determined by a court. Regarding the misleading information, the court held that the Tribunal correctly found Ms Kaur’s evidence to be credible and consistent. The court also noted that the department’s site visit report was not given weight as it was deemed highly unsatisfactory. Ultimately, the court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in its decision, and the appeal was dismissed.
The final orders of the court allowed the appeal, quashed the decision of the second respondent, issued a writ of mandamus to the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application for review according to law, and directed the first respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the application before the Federal Circuit Court and on this appeal, if any, to be taxed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the second respondent be quashed.
3. A writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent be issued requiring the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application for review according to law.
4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application before the Federal Circuit Court and on this appeal, if any, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the Minister’s submission, PIC 4020 was inserted by the operation of item 4 of Sch 3 of the Amendment Regulations. The Minister contended that the injustice complained of did not arise, as the Amendment Regulations only operate in respect of future decisions on visas that have not been granted and without making any alteration to the past legal position of any visa applicant. See Hu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1710; (2007) 214 FLR 296 at [24]. Given the express intention that the amendments were to take effect in the future, the Minister said there was no room for the operation of any common law presumption against retroactive operation. The primary judge held that the applicant’s submissions were an “invitation to consider a hypothetical opinion on the outcome of the event if there is some application made by this applicant within the next three years” and this is beyond the scope or authority of jurisdictional review and needs no further comment (reasons at [56]). His Honour found that as PIC 4020 is a time‑of‑the‑decision criterion, it only applied after 2 April 2011 and does not affect or impact on any right or obligation that existed at that time (reasons at [57]). The primary judge referred to comments made by Smith FM in Hu v Minister for Immigration, who found that a particular provision revealed an express intention that the change to the time‑of‑the‑decision criterion would apply to all future decision-making addressing any undecided visa applications and any application for review by the Tribunal. Smith FM then stated at [16]-[18]: 16. It was strongly urged upon the Court that the application of the amended criterion in the present situation gave rise to a significant degree of hardship and unfairness to a student such as Mr Hu, who had studied in Australia in courses with the expectation of qualifying for permanent residence under a subclass 880 visa, and had undertaken that study and applied for a visa at a time when it was not a condition of the visa that all his qualifications were obtained in registered courses.17. The degree of this hardship, and the strength of any public policy considerations justifying its infliction, are not matters for the Court to determine. Nor can the Court give a remedy to the applicants, if the intent of the amending regulation is clear, and if it is clear that s 12(2) of the Legislative Instruments Act has no application. Unfortunately, I have decided that both of these questions must be decided against the applicants.18. As I have explained above, there is no ambiguity in the transitional provision which accompanied the amendment, allowing application of principles presuming against interference with accrued rights or expectations. The primary judge also referred to the reasons of Judge Barnes in Kaur v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2209 at [8], [12] and [71]. At [71], Judge Barnes stated:71.Hence the new time of decision criteria in relation to Subclasses 485 and 487 which applied PIC 4020 were applicable to the Applicant’s application at the time of the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal was bound to apply the Amending Regulations because the Applicant’s visa application had not been “finally determined” at the date of commencement of the Amending Regulations. The fact that it did so was not a misconstruction or misapplication of the relevant law. The Tribunal was not obliged to apply the criteria for the visa as they stood at the time of the visa application, the delegate’s decision, the application to the Tribunal or the first Tribunal decision (insofar as various earlier dates were referred to in the Applicant’s submissions). By analogy with the remarks of Smith FM in Hu at [27], the Applicant had no more than a right to compel the Tribunal to make a decision on whether it was satisfied as to the prescribed criteria which were relevantly in place at the time of the decision. Clause 487.228 (which required the applicant to satisfy PIC 4020) was such a criterion, as was cl.485.224.