Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1276

Citation: Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1276
Appeal from: Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1264
Parties: SATVIR KAUR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File numbers: NSD 678 of 2014
Judges: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 25 November 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for skilled (provisional) (class VC) visa – where Tribunal found that appellant had provided false or misleading information in a material particular and did not satisfy public interest criterion 4020(1) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – validity of public interest criterion 4020 as it applied to visa application – whether Tribunal applied correct legal test in assessing whether information provided was false or misleading
Legislation:

Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 12(2)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 97

Migration Amendment Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 3, reg 5, reg 5(2)(a), item 4 of Sch 3
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.26B, reg 2.26B(1A), Sch 2: cl 485.221, cl 485.224, Sch 4: cl 4020, cl 4020(1), cl 4020(2), cl 4020(5)

Cases cited: Batra v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 274; (2013) 212 FCR 84
Hu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1710; (2007) 214 FLR 296
Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1264
Kaur v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2209
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 75
Kozel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 658; (2004) 138 FCR 181
Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381
Mudiyanselage v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FMCA 887
Shah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 18; (2011) 249 FLR 136
Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014 FCAFC 42; (2014) 220 FCR 169
Date of hearing: 25 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 64
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms SA Given
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 678 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SATVIR KAUR
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The decision of the second respondent be quashed.

3.A writ of mandamus directed to the second…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1276
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appeal by Ms Kaur against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The central dispute is whether the Tribunal applied the correct legal test when assessing whether the information provided by Ms Kaur in her visa application was false or misleading. Additionally, the case questions the validity of public interest criterion 4020 as it applied to Ms Kaur’s visa application. The Tribunal had determined that Ms Kaur had provided false or misleading information in a material particular and did not satisfy the public interest criterion, leading to the rejection of her visa application. The appeal was filed in response to the Federal Circuit Court’s judgment upholding the Tribunal’s decision.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted the public interest criterion 4020 and applied the appropriate legal test in determining whether the information provided by Ms Kaur was false or misleading. The court needed to ascertain whether the Tribunal had correctly identified the relevant assessing authority at the time of its decision and whether the public interest criterion 4020 was validly applied. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal’s reliance on the department’s site visit report was justified and whether Ms Kaur’s evidence was credible and consistent.

The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its application of the public interest criterion 4020. The court held that the relevant assessing authority at the time of the Tribunal’s decision was the relevant authority under legislative instrument IMMI 12/068. The court also determined that the public interest criterion 4020 was validly applied, as it was expressly intended to operate retrospectively. The court noted that any challenge to the validity of the criterion would need to be determined by a court. Regarding the misleading information, the court held that the Tribunal correctly found Ms Kaur’s evidence to be credible and consistent. The court also noted that the department’s site visit report was not given weight as it was deemed highly unsatisfactory. Ultimately, the court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in its decision, and the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court allowed the appeal, quashed the decision of the second respondent, issued a writ of mandamus to the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application for review according to law, and directed the first respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the application before the Federal Circuit Court and on this appeal, if any, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the second respondent be quashed.

3. A writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent be issued requiring the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application for review according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application before the Federal Circuit Court and on this appeal, if any, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

By notice of appeal filed on 7 July 2014, Ms Kaur appeals against the Federal Circuit Court’s judgment. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal dealt with submissions concerning the authority of TRA as an assessing authority and the validity of PIC 4020. It referred to the decision in Mudiyanselage v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FMCA 887 and stated that PIC 4020 does not set any temporal confinement as to when a bogus document is provided. The Tribunal held that the issue of whether TRA was the relevant assessing authority at the time the reference letter was provided or at the time of the delegate’s decision was irrelevant. In the Tribunal’s view, the relevant time is not when the applicant provided the skills assessment to TRA or when the delegate made their decision; rather, it is the time of the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal considered that the relevant assessing authority at the time of the Tribunal’s decision is TRA, pursuant to legislative instrument IMMI 12/068, and there is nothing to suggest that IMMI 12/068 is not valid. The Tribunal rejected Ms Kaur’s submission that PIC 4020 did not apply at the time her application for a visa was made and that its retrospective operation was invalid. It found that the legislation expressly provided for its retrospective operation and evidenced a parliamentary intention that it would apply retrospectively. It stated that any challenge to its validity would need to be determined by a court. As to whether Ms Kaur had submitted false or misleading information, the Tribunal referred to observations made by departmental officers in relation to their investigation of the salon in March 2011. Amongst other concerns, the officers were not satisfied, given the size and scope of the business, that it could have gainfully employed six to eight students, as claimed, over the relevant periods. The Tribunal found, however, that the information obtained by the officers as a result of their site visit was “highly unsatisfactory”. It considered it significant that the officers’ conclusion was not that Ms Kaur’s employment claims were not genuine, rather, that they could not be verified. The Tribunal held that this evidence alone was insufficient for it to make a positive finding that Ms Kaur was not working at the salon. It gave the department’s site visit report no weight. In respect of Ms Kaur’s evidence, the Tribunal found her to be a credible witness who had provided consistent and credible information about her employment at the salon. It accepted that her evidence concerning the dates and hours of her employment was consistent with the timesheets she had submitted and credible with respect to her study commitments. Nonetheless, the Tribunal stated that the reference letter Ms Kaur provided to TRA and the department appeared to be misleading, as it suggested that when she started working at the salon in August 2008, she worked independently and performed the full range of hairdressing services, even though she had no formal qualifications or experience as a hairdresser at that stage. When this was pointed out to Ms Kaur in oral evidence, she confirmed that she did not work independently as a hairdresser when she commenced her employment and did not perform the full range of hairdressing services until later in her work experience.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the Minister’s submission, PIC 4020 was inserted by the operation of item 4 of Sch 3 of the Amendment Regulations. The Minister contended that the injustice complained of did not arise, as the Amendment Regulations only operate in respect of future decisions on visas that have not been granted and without making any alteration to the past legal position of any visa applicant. See Hu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1710; (2007) 214 FLR 296 at [24]. Given the express intention that the amendments were to take effect in the future, the Minister said there was no room for the operation of any common law presumption against retroactive operation. The primary judge held that the applicant’s submissions were an “invitation to consider a hypothetical opinion on the outcome of the event if there is some application made by this applicant within the next three years” and this is beyond the scope or authority of jurisdictional review and needs no further comment (reasons at [56]). His Honour found that as PIC 4020 is a time‑of‑the‑decision criterion, it only applied after 2 April 2011 and does not affect or impact on any right or obligation that existed at that time (reasons at [57]). The primary judge referred to comments made by Smith FM in Hu v Minister for Immigration, who found that a particular provision revealed an express intention that the change to the time‑of‑the‑decision criterion would apply to all future decision-making addressing any undecided visa applications and any application for review by the Tribunal. Smith FM then stated at [16]-[18]: 16. It was strongly urged upon the Court that the application of the amended criterion in the present situation gave rise to a significant degree of hardship and unfairness to a student such as Mr Hu, who had studied in Australia in courses with the expectation of qualifying for permanent residence under a subclass 880 visa, and had undertaken that study and applied for a visa at a time when it was not a condition of the visa that all his qualifications were obtained in registered courses.17. The degree of this hardship, and the strength of any public policy considerations justifying its infliction, are not matters for the Court to determine. Nor can the Court give a remedy to the applicants, if the intent of the amending regulation is clear, and if it is clear that s 12(2) of the Legislative Instruments Act has no application. Unfortunately, I have decided that both of these questions must be decided against the applicants.18. As I have explained above, there is no ambiguity in the transitional provision which accompanied the amendment, allowing application of principles presuming against interference with accrued rights or expectations. The primary judge also referred to the reasons of Judge Barnes in Kaur v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 2209 at [8], [12] and [71]. At [71], Judge Barnes stated:71.Hence the new time of decision criteria in relation to Subclasses 485 and 487 which applied PIC 4020 were applicable to the Applicant’s application at the time of the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal was bound to apply the Amending Regulations because the Applicant’s visa application had not been “finally determined” at the date of commencement of the Amending Regulations. The fact that it did so was not a misconstruction or misapplication of the relevant law. The Tribunal was not obliged to apply the criteria for the visa as they stood at the time of the visa application, the delegate’s decision, the application to the Tribunal or the first Tribunal decision (insofar as various earlier dates were referred to in the Applicant’s submissions). By analogy with the remarks of Smith FM in Hu at [27], the Applicant had no more than a right to compel the Tribunal to make a decision on whether it was satisfied as to the prescribed criteria which were relevantly in place at the time of the decision. Clause 487.228 (which required the applicant to satisfy PIC 4020) was such a criterion, as was cl.485.224.