Court of Appeal
New South Wales
Case Title: Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Pham & Ors Medium Neutral Citation: [2013] NSWCA 93 Hearing Date(s): 15 April 2013 Decision Date: 26 April 2013 Before: Meagher JA at [1];
Barrett JA at [1]Decision: 1. Application for leave to appeal refused.
2. Applicant pay the respondents' costs of the application.[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Catchwords: APPEAL - application for leave to appeal - application to amend pleadings in proceedings in Common Law Division - proceedings commenced in 2002 - plaintiff notified substance of proposed amendments in May 2011 - respect in which amendment said to be critical raised by a defence filed in November 2006 - primary judge refused leave - whether arguably erred in exercise of discretion - notwithstanding significance of amendment, decision not "attended with sufficient doubt" to warrant leave to appeal Legislation Cited: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Civil Procedure Act 2005Cases Cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; 148 CLR 170
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175
Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; 203 CLR 194
Garrard (t/a Arthur Andersen) v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 663
Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
In re the Will of F B Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318
Jagot v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46; 168 CLR 23
Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Pham & Ors [2012] NSWSC 645; 90 ACSR 554
Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Philip Viet Dzung Pham [2011] NSWSC 1405
Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Philip Viet Dzung Pham [2013] NSWSC 110
Macquarie Bank Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 543Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) (Applicant)
Philip Viet Dzung Pham (First Respondent)
Pham & Associates (Second Respondent)
Pham Atic Pty Ltd (Third Respondent)Representation - Counsel: Counsel:
M Ashhurst SC, S J Duggan (Applicant)
D R Pritchard SC, M F Newton (Respondents)- Solicitors: Solicitors:
Swaab Attorneys (Applicant)
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (Respondents)File Number(s): 2013/95010 Decision Under Appeal - Before: Beech-Jones J - Date of Decision: 28 February 2013 - Citation: Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Philip Viet Dzung Pham [2013] NSWSC 110 - Court File Number(s): 2002/69495
JUDGMENT
THE COURT: The applicant (KSE
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- Case
- [2013] NSWCA 93
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the primary judge had erred in the exercise of their discretion in refusing leave to amend the pleadings. The applicant argued that the proposed amendment was significant and critical to its case.
Meagher and Barrett JJA determined that, notwithstanding the significance of the proposed amendment, the primary judge's decision was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant granting leave to appeal. The Court applied the principles governing the exercise of discretion in granting leave to appeal, focusing on whether the primary judge's decision was demonstrably wrong or attended by significant uncertainty.
Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal refused.
2. Applicant pay the respondents' costs of the application.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Background
Background to the litigation
In May 2011, the plaintiff sought to amend its pleadings to include new evidence and claims, which it asserted were critical to its case. The plaintiff claimed that these amendments were necessary in light of a defence filed by Pham in November 2006, which raised issues that required further substantiation and clarification. The plaintiff argued that the proposed amendments were essential to address the defence and to ensure a fair trial. Despite the plaintiff's assertion of the importance of these amendments, the primary judge declined to grant leave for the amendments, concluding that the application did not present a case of sufficient doubt or error in the exercise of discretion to warrant an appeal.
The plaintiff subsequently applied for leave to appeal the primary judge's decision, contending that the refusal to allow the amendments had deprived it of a fair opportunity to present its case. The application for leave to appeal was ultimately unsuccessful, with the court holding that while the amendments might have been significant, they did not create a situation of sufficient doubt to merit an appeal. Consequently, the court ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of the application.
Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Pham arose from proceedings initially commenced in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 2002. The plaintiff sought to amend its pleadings to include a particular argument that was identified as critical to its case following the filing of a defence by the defendant in November 2006. The plaintiff notified the substance of the proposed amendments in May 2011. Despite the perceived importance of the amendment, the primary judge declined the application to amend the pleadings, ruling that it did not warrant leave to appeal due to a lack of sufficient doubt about the correctness of the decision. The application for leave to appeal was subsequently dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs associated with the application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the primary judge arguably erred in refusing leave to amend the pleadings despite the significance of the proposed amendment.
2. Whether the primary judge arguably erred in finding that the decision was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal.
3. Whether the significance of the amendment, even if acknowledged, sufficiently demonstrates that the primary judge’s refusal of leave to amend was an error warranting leave to appeal.
4. Whether the refusal of leave to amend the pleadings resulted in a miscarriage of justice or a substantial injustice.
5. Whether the applicant's delay in proposing the amendments affects the court's discretion to grant leave to amend or appeal.
Held
1. Whether the primary judge arguably erred in refusing leave to amend the pleadings despite the significance of the proposed amendment.
The court concluded that there was no arguable error in the primary judge's refusal of leave to amend the pleadings despite the proposed amendment's significance.
2. Whether the primary judge arguably erred in finding that the decision was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal.
The court found no arguable error in the primary judge's determination that the decision was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal.
3. Whether the significance of the amendment, even if acknowledged, sufficiently demonstrates that the primary judge’s refusal of leave to amend was an error warranting leave to appeal.
The court held that even acknowledging the significance of the amendment, it was not sufficient to demonstrate that the primary judge's refusal of leave to amend was an error warranting leave to appeal.
4. Whether the refusal of leave to amend the pleadings resulted in a miscarriage of justice or a substantial injustice.
The court concluded that the refusal of leave to amend the pleadings did not result in a miscarriage of justice or a substantial injustice.
5. Whether the applicant's delay in proposing the amendments affects the court's discretion to grant leave to amend or appeal.
The court held that the applicant's significant delay in proposing the amendments was a relevant factor in the court's discretion to grant leave to amend or appeal, but it did not impact the ultimate conclusion regarding the refusal of leave.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Pham, the court evaluated the applicant's request for leave to amend pleadings and to appeal the primary judge's decision. The applicant, Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd, sought to amend its pleadings to include a new cause of action. The significance of the proposed amendment arose from a defence filed in November 2006, but the plaintiff only notified the substance of the proposed amendments in May 2011, nearly five years later. Despite this significant delay, the applicant argued that the amendment was critical and warranted reconsideration.
The primary judge declined to grant leave to amend the pleadings, finding that the decision was not "attended with sufficient doubt" to warrant leave to appeal. The court examined whether this decision constituted an error. In considering the applicant's contention, the court recognized the importance of the proposed amendment but found that the delay in proposing the amendment was substantial. The applicant's failure to bring forward the amendment sooner was noted as a critical factor that influenced the primary judge's decision. The court found that the delay undermined the applicant's position, making it difficult to argue that the refusal of leave to amend was an error warranting an appeal.
Further, the court considered whether the refusal of leave to amend resulted in a miscarriage of justice or a substantial injustice. The applicant argued that the refusal would lead to a substantial injustice because the proposed amendment was critical. However, the court held that the delay in proposing the amendment, coupled with the lack of clear demonstration that the amendment would have altered the outcome of the case, did not meet the threshold for a miscarriage of justice or substantial injustice. The court was not persuaded that the refusal of leave to amend the pleadings would significantly affect the outcome of the case.
In addition, the court scrutinized whether the applicant's delay in proposing the amendments affected the court's discretion to grant leave to amend or appeal. The court emphasized that the delay in proposing the amendments was a significant factor in its discretion. The court noted that the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 require timely amendments, and significant delays can justify a refusal of leave to amend. The court's reasoning indicated that the applicant's delay in notifying the proposed amendments weighed heavily against granting leave.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the primary judge's decision to refuse leave to amend the pleadings was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal. The court found that the applicant's significant delay in proposing the amendments, coupled with the lack of a clear demonstration of how the amendment would alter the outcome, did not meet the threshold for an appeal. The court's decision highlights the importance of timely amendments and the discretion of the court in considering applications for leave to amend and appeal.