Karim v Poche Engineering Services Pty Ltd - [2013] NSWWCCPD 24

WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:	Karim v Poche Engineering Services Pty Ltd [2013] NSWWCCPD 24
APPELLANT:	Joanne Karim
RESPONDENT:	Poche Engineering Services Pty Ltd
INSURER:	Allianz Australia Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd
FILE NUMBER:	A1-4890/12
ARBITRATOR:	Mr J Wynyard
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION:	4 February 2013
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:	8 May 2013
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION:	Journey claim; s 10(1A) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; whether personal injury (resulting in death) attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the worker; excessive speed; riding motor bike at double the speed limit in a suburban area; meaning of serious and wilful misconduct; failure to comply with Practice Direction No 6
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:	Deputy President Bill Roche
HEARING:	On the papers
REPRESENTATION:	Appellant:	Taylor & Scott
Respondent:	Sparke Helmore Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:	1. The Arbitrator’s determination of 4 February 2013 is confirmed. 2. Each party is to pay her or its own costs of the appeal.

INTRODUCTION

Section 10(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) states that a personal injury received by a worker on any journey to which the section applies is, for the purposes of the Act, an injury arising out of or in the course of employment, and compensation is payable accordingly. Section 10(1A) provides that sub‑s (1) does not apply if the personal injury “is attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the worker”.
On 24 May 2008, the worker, Angel Amado, was riding his Suzuki GSX R1000 motor bike from his place of employment to his home. As a provisional licence-holder, he was not licensed to ride a bike of that engine capacity. After he crested a hill in Stennett Road, Ingelburn (a suburban road with a speed limit of 60 km per hour) at a speed found to be between 120 and 130 km per hour, he collided with a Holden Commodore that was making a legal U-turn in Stennett Road.
Mr Amado died from his injuries and his de facto partner, Joanne Karim, has claimed compensation under Pt 3 of Div 1 of the 1987 Act on behalf of herself and their daughter.
Accepting the evidence from the senior attending police officer, Sergeant Linda Bradbury, the Arbitrator determined that the deceased caused the accident by virtue of his excessive speed on a motor bike that he was too inexperienced to ride and which he was prohibited from riding because of the status of his licence. The Arbitrator was satisfied that the high speed at which the deceased rode his bike “was of such a character as to place the deceased well within the exception to liability – in this case, the category of serious and wilful misconduct” ([97]).
The Arbitrator did not accept that the respondent bore a “higher onus” to demonstrate that “the deceased was aware of the actual risk of death in driving at such high speed, and with such reckless disregard for his own safety” ([98]), but held that such awareness was “intrinsic in the fact that [the deceased] chose to ride such a powerful machine at such high speed” ([98]). He added (also at [98]) that he was satisfied:
“that the circumstances under which he chose to ride his machine gave rise to a clear inference that the deceased was well aware of the danger he was in, but chose to ignore it. His conduct in choosing to cause his motorcycle to accelerate to the high speed it attained, and his conduct in choosing to ever ride such a powerful machine in contravention of his license [sic] was clearly wilful.”
The Arbitrator made an award for the respondent. Ms Karim has challenged that award.

ON THE PAPERS

Section 354(6) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 provides:
“(6) If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Nos 1 and 6; the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’ without holding any conference or formal hearing and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

The appellant has not complied with Practice Direction No 6 and has not properly identified the alleged grounds of appeal. Essentially, there are two main complaints, first, that the Arbitrator erred in concluding that the deceased “was engaged in serious and wilful misconduct which was the cause of his” death (serious and wilful misconduct), and, second, that he erred in giving insufficient weight to evidence in a later statement from Mr Alan Blount (Mr Blount’s evidence).

SERIOUS AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT

Submissions

Though experienced counsel (Mr Phillip Perry) appeared for Ms Karim at the arbitration, surprisingly, her solicitor, Mr Simon Meigan, has prepared the submissions on appeal. Those submissions may be summarised as follows:
(a)     the Arbitrator erred in finding that the respondent did not bear the “higher onus” to demonstrate the deceased was aware of the actual risk of death in driving at such a high speed and with such reckless disregard for his own safety;
(b)     the Arbitrator erred in finding “such awareness was intrinsic in the fact that [the deceased] chose to ride such a powerful machine at such a high speed”, as it did not necessarily follow that that was serious and wilful misconduct, particularly in circumstances where (the accident) occurred partially due to the dangerous driving of Mr Lynton (the driver of the Holden Commodore). (The submissions added that “[t]he Arbitrator erred in not finding this”.);
(c)     the inference the Arbitrator drew – that by choosing to ride the machine it could lead to an inference that the deceased was well aware of the danger he was in – cannot be maintained “taking in to account the consideration of such an issue in the recent decision of Whittingham v Ascott Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [2010] NSWWCCPD 36 at [73]” (Whittingham);
(d)     the Arbitrator erred in finding that the deceased’s “conduct in choosing to cause his motorcycle to accelerate to the high speed it attained, and his conduct in choosing to ever ride such a powerful machine in contravention of his license [sic] was clearly wilful” because it “does not accord with the finding which can be found in the decision of O’Meally [CC]J” in the decision of Sawle v Macadamia Processing Co Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCC 26; 18 NSWCCR 109 (Sawle), and
(e)     injury in s 4 of the 1987 Act means “personal injury arising out of or in the course of employment” and, in the present case, this means “death” or, alternatively, injury of such magnitude that would lead to death. On that basis, “the Arbitrator has failed to make out the test in Section 4 as his reasoning was that by choosing to ride such a powerful machine in contravention of his license [sic] was clearly wilful. On the basis of the definition in Section 4, the Applicant would submit that [the deceased] didn’t know that risk”.

Discussion and findings

It is prudent to note several general principles.
First, the employer carries the onus of proof of establishing serious and wilful misconduct (Johnson v Marshall Sons & Co Ltd [1906] AC 409 (Johnson); Higgins v Galibal Pty Ltd t/as Hotel Nikko Darling Harbour (1998) 45 NSWLR 45 (Higgins)).
Second, the phrase “serious and wilful misconduct” comprehends more than negligence, carelessness, or the mere disregard of orders (Johnson; Higgins). Breach of a traffic regulation may or may not be sufficient: a carrier who was injured while alighting from his truck, while it was double-parked on a public street, was found not guilty of serious and wilful misconduct (Thomas v Shelley & Sons Cordial Factory Pty Ltd [1965] WCR 104), but a worker who, having the opportunity to stop, deliberately drove through a red traffic light at high speed was (Levin v Moulhis [1965] WCR 177).
Third, in Johnson, Lord Atkinson observed (at 416–17) that not every violation by a worker of a rule would be regarded as necessarily amounting to serious misconduct. For “serious” to have any force, it must mean:
“at least that where the risk of loss or injury resulting to any person or thing from the doing of any particular act is very remote, or where that loss or injury, even if probable, would be trivial in its nature and character, the doing of that act, however wilful, would not amount to ‘serious misconduct’ within the meaning of this statute, unless indeed the indirect influence of the act done on the discipline of the factory is to make every transgression serious.”
Fourth, the word “wilful” imports that the misconduct was deliberate, not merely a thoughtless act on the spur of the moment (Johnson, per Lord Loreburn at 411), or something done “with the intention of being guilty of misconduct” (Bist v London & South Western Railway Co [1907] AC 209 per Lord James of Hereford). The worker must have had knowledge of the risk of injury and, in light of that knowledge, proceeded without regard to the risk (Sawle; Whittingham).
Fifth, the gravity of the conduct is not to be judged from the consequences of the act. As Lord James of Hereford explained in Johnson at 414:
“A man may be told not to walk on the grass, he does so, he slips up, and breaks his leg. The consequences are serious, but the conduct is not so.”
In summary, the position is succinctly summarised in the following statement by O’Meally CCJ in Sawle, at [24]:
“Serious and wilful misconduct is conduct beyond negligence, even beyond culpable or gross negligence. In order to establish serious and wilful misconduct, it must be demonstrated that the person performing an act or suffering an omission knows it will cause risk of injury, or acts in disregard of consideration whether it will cause injury. The word ‘wilful’ connotes that the applicant must have acted deliberately. As it seems to me, in order to establish serious and wilful misconduct, a person accused of it must be shown to have knowledge of the risk of injury and, in the light of that knowledge, proceeded without regard to the risk.”
Applying the above principles in the present matter, I do not accept Mr Meigan’s submissions.
The Arbitrator’s reference to the “higher onus” was a reference to a submission made by Mr Perry that the respondent had to prove that the deceased was aware not just of the risk of injury, but of the risk of death from riding in the manner in which he chose to do, and, as the respondent had failed to prove that matter, its s 10(1A) defence failed.
The Arbitrator was right to reject Mr Perry’s submission. Section 10(1A) states that sub‑s (1) does not apply if the “personal injury” is attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the worker. As submitted by counsel for the respondent, Mr Baker, the provision requires that the worker be aware of the risk of injury, not the ultimate sequelae of the injury.
In any event, the Arbitrator found (at [98]) that “such awareness” (that is, the awareness of the risk of death) was “intrinsic in the fact that [the deceased] chose to ride such a powerful machine at such high speed”. It is nonsense to suggest that a motorcyclist, whether experienced or inexperienced, would not be aware of the risk of serious injury (or death) from riding a high-powered bike at double the speed limit on a suburban street.
As to the submission that the Arbitrator erred in making the finding set out in the preceding paragraph, and in not finding that the accident occurred partially due to dangerous driving by Mr Lynton, Mr Meigan has referred only to the Arbitrator’s reasons at [98] but has not referred to any evidence in support of his submission.
The Arbitrator reviewed the evidence in detail and found (at [76]) that the deceased had been travelling at “120–130 km/hour at the time of the collision”. He based this finding on an acceptance of evidence from Senior Constable Roberts, an officer with the Metropolitan Crash Investigation Unit, who estimated the speed of the deceased’s bike to be between 117 and 145 km per hour, and an acceptance of the evidence from Sergeant Bradbury.
In submissions at the arbitration, Mr Perry challenged the calculations by Senior Constable Roberts, but they have not been challenged on appeal. More importantly, Ms Karim called no evidence to contradict those calculations. Sergeant Bradbury based her conclusions on the physical evidence at the scene. Her evidence was that the deceased applied the brakes on his bike before he left it and that the bike slid 180 metres past the point of impact with the Holden Commodore.
While Mr Perry suggested to Sergeant Bradbury that Mr Lynton had made his U-turn at a point closer to the crest of the hill in Stennett Road (the crest being about 250 metres before the point of impact), the Sergeant did not accept that proposition because the physical evidence showed the point of impact to be at the intersection of Stennett Road with Inglis Road, while Mr Lynton was part way through his U-turn.
Mr Lynton’s evidence was that he was driving west in Stennett Road when he pulled to the left in preparation to make a U-turn. He checked his rear-view mirror and saw a ute about 250 metres behind him. He then started his turn, believing it safe to do so. He then heard and felt a thump on his car’s right side quarter panel. When he finished his turn, he saw the deceased on the road.
Based on this evidence, which the Arbitrator accepted, it was open to him to find that it was the deceased’s actions (in riding at high speed), not Mr Lynton’s driving, that caused the accident. In any event, as the Arbitrator noted at [96], even if Mr Lynton’s conduct contributed to the accident, that would not prevent a finding that the personal injury (that caused the death) was attributable to the deceased’s serious and wilful misconduct. That is because, unlike s 14, s 10(1A) does not require that the injury is “solely attributable” to the worker’s serious and wilful misconduct and an accident can be attributable to more than one cause.
The Arbitrator’s conclusion that the deceased “was well aware of the danger he was in, but chose to ignore it” was open on the evidence and discloses no error.
The reference to Whittingham is misguided. That case concerned boorish conduct by an intoxicated worker at a Christmas party where the employer provided the alcohol and encouraged its consumption. It did not involve riding a high-powered motorcycle on a suburban street well in excess of the speed limit.
In that case, I held that Mr Whittingham’s conduct did not amount to serious and wilful misconduct within s 14 of the 1987 Act because the word “wilful” connotes that the worker must have acted deliberately, that is, the worker must have had knowledge of the risk of injury and, in the light of that knowledge, proceeded without regard to the risk (Sawle). In view of his level of intoxication, Mr Whittingham was incapable of assessing the risk involved in his actions and his actions could not be described as wilful.
There are no similarities between the facts in Whittingham and those in the present matter. The Arbitrator was correct to conclude that the deceased’s awareness of the danger he was in was intrinsic in the fact that he chose to ride such a powerful machine at high speed.
The purported reliance on Sawle is also misplaced. Apart from the bald assertion that the Arbitrator erred because his finding did not “accord with the finding which can be found in the decision” of O’Meally CCJ, Mr Meigan made no useful submission on this point.
In Sawle, the worker suffered injury by acting in defiance of instructions from his employer as to the method of cleaning a machine. In finding that the employer had not established that the worker’s injury had been caused solely by the worker’s serious and wilful misconduct under s 14 of the 1987 Act, O’Meally CCJ made the observations quoted at [17] above. The Arbitrator referred to this passage at [91] of his decision. After noting (at [92] and [96]) that s 10(1A) does not require that the serious and wilful misconduct be the sole cause of the injury, the Arbitrator applied the test stated in Sawle and was clearly satisfied that the deceased’s conduct was both serious and wilful, and that the deceased was aware his conduct carried a risk of serious injury.
The conduct was serious because the deceased was riding at about double the legal speed limit on a suburban road on a high-powered bike that he was not licensed to ride. Leaving aside that the deceased was not permitted to ride the bike, which, on its own may or may not have amounted to serious misconduct, the speed at which he rode the bike, and the area in which he rode it, carried a substantial risk of serious injury (or death) to himself and others.
The conduct was wilful in that the deceased deliberately rode at high speed in circumstances where he was riding home via his usual route and was therefore familiar with the road and the speed limit. It follows that it was unlikely in the extreme that he had inadvertently or accidently exceeded the speed limit. The compelling inference is that he deliberately and knowingly road his bike at high speed in circumstances where the “clear inference” was that he was well aware of the risks involved, but chose to ignore those risks.
Mr Meigan’s submission that the Arbitrator failed to make out the test in s 4 was simply nonsense. The respondent properly conceded that the deceased died of the injuries received on a journey home from work. The Arbitrator did not have to “make out the test in s 4”. The respondent had to establish that the injury (which caused the death) was attributable to the deceased’s serious and wilful misconduct. For the reasons explained above, it established that defence.
It follows that the Arbitrator’s conclusions were open and disclose no error.

MR BLOUNT’S EVIDENCE

Mr Blount was the deceased’s best friend and workmate, having known him since he started work with the respondent in 2003. They both had an interest in motorbikes. He said the deceased was a bike enthusiast who purchased his Suzuki GSX R1000 as a second bike in late 2007 or early 2008. As the deceased only had a provisional licence, he was not legally able to ride it and Mr Blount collected it from the dealer for him.
Mr Blount worked with the deceased on 24 May 2008 and left work just ahead of the deceased at about 1.00 pm. He has provided three statements about the accident and the content of those statements is discussed below.

Submissions

Mr Meigan submitted that Mr Blount’s evidence (in his later statement) was not challenged in cross-examination and the Arbitrator erred in not drawing conclusions in accordance with that evidence that the deceased was not travelling in excess of 120 km per hour and was not engaged in a race with Mr Blount at the time of the accident. These factors militate against the deceased having the requisite intent and knowledge of the risk of injury that became an actuality and the Arbitrator did not take this into account.
The Arbitrator did not consider Mr Blount’s evidence that Mr Lynton had “pulled up in a strange and dangerous place … the white sedan was half way through a U-turn”. While the Arbitrator noted this evidence (at [28]), he failed to analyse it or take it into account. This was a “critical piece of evidence in terms of the driving of Mr Lynton in the accident and the importance of that in informing the question whether the deceased had the requisite wilful intent or knowledge of the risk of injury”.
At [55], the Arbitrator referred to Mr Perry having conceded that the evidence established that the deceased was travelling too fast. However, the only concession was that the deceased was travelling too fast in the circumstances, in other words, “too fast for the circumstances of Mr Lynton driving dangerously”.

The Arbitrator made observations of Mr Blount’s evidence at [29]–[31] and, though he said he would return to that evidence, did not do so.
The Arbitrator’s acceptance of Sergeant Bradbury’s evidence did not “end up reconciling the statement of Mr Blount” and did not take that evidence into account in arriving at his decision, particularly when Mr Blount was not summoned to challenge his evidence, particularly in the circumstances where Sergeant Bradbury was challenged by Mr Perry.

Discussion and findings

I do not accept the above submissions.
There is no rule of law requiring that evidence not challenged in cross-examination must be accepted – a judge (or arbitrator) can reject evidence that has not been cross-examined on if, for example, it was inconsistent with other evidence that he or she accepted, or if it was inherently incredible (Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274 per Campbell JA at [134] (Macfarlan JA agreeing)). That principle is especially applicable in the Commission, where cross-examination is only allowed by leave (Aluminium Louvres & Ceilings Pty Ltd v Zheng [2006] NSWCA 34) and where all evidence must be filed in advance of the hearing (see generally NSW Police Force v Winter [2011] NSWCA 330 from [81]; Quadi v The Reject Shop (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWWCCPD 3 [56]–[63]). Mr Meigan’s submission was surprising, to say the least.
There is therefore, as Mr Baker submitted, no basis for an adverse inference to be drawn from Mr Blount not having been summoned for cross-examination. That is especially so where, as in the present case, Mr Blount’s statements were inconsistent with each other. In these circumstances, it was for the party seeking to rely on his later version of events to call him to explain the inconsistencies. Moreover, it was wrong to assert that the respondent had not challenged the assertions in Mr Blount’s latest statement.
Mr Blount provided three statements, in addition to the original interview with Sergeant Bradbury at the accident scene. The original interview was recorded in Sergeant Bradbury’s statement of 16 August 2008. When asked how fast he was going, Mr Blount is recorded as saying he was “doing about 120, and [the deceased] was trying to catch up if you get what I mean”. This statement was consistent with the summary in the COPS report prepared by Sergeant Bradbury on the evening of 24 May 2008.
Mr Perry challenged the contents of this conversation when he cross-examined Sergeant Bradbury, but she stood by the contents of the COPS report, which is consistent with the physical evidence, the evidence from Senior Constable Roberts (which the Arbitrator accepted), and the eyewitness account from Bruce Draper. Mr Draper’s evidence was that he was riding his pushbike east along the downhill section of Stennett Road at about 1.00 pm on the day of the accident when he saw a motorbike riding west in that street. What brought his attention to the bike was its speed, which he estimated at 100 km per hour. He also saw two cars, one was a ute and the other a sedan, also travelling west in Stennett Road. At the same time, he saw a second motorbike, which was “also travelling at high speed” west in Stennett Road. Mr Draper got the impression that the second motorbike was “racing the first motorbike”. He heard a large bang a short time later.
Mr Blount gave his first signed statement at Macquarie Fields Police Station on 25 May 2008, the day after the accident. He said he thought that the deceased “had been going pretty fast before the accident, too fast for the situation anyway”. He described the deceased’s bike as “just insane, its [sic] too big”. He said that no one should have a bike like that and that it “goes about 150km/h in first gear”. He had told the deceased not to get it, but he had his heart set on it.
Mr Blount’s second statement is dated 12 June 2008. Consistent with the earlier statement, it included an expectation that the deceased would catch up with him on the journey home. Mr Blount did not retract any of the matters in his statement of 25 May 2008.
In his third statement, dated 2 February 2009, Mr Blount said he had no recollection of making any of the statements attributed to him in Sergeant Bradbury’s statement of 16 August 2008. He said he “certainly made no admission about speed”.
The Arbitrator carefully considered Sergeant Bradbury’s evidence and said that she was thorough in her approach to the questions put to her, and gave her evidence in a measured and considered manner. While he did not deal specifically with the conflict between Mr Blount’s third statement and Sergeant Bradbury’s statement of 16 August 2008, the Arbitrator said he accepted Sergeant Bradbury’s evidence.
I agree with Mr Baker’s submission that the reference in Mr Meigan’s submission to Mr Blount’s statement about Mr Lynton’s actions (see [41] above) was misleading. It was also inaccurate. The full quote from [7] and [8] of Mr Blount’s third statement is as follows:
“7. I left the factory site ahead of [the deceased] because his bike was in gear, so he had to work through the gears back to neutral before he could ride off. I would say he was a minute maybe a bit less, behind me. I followed my usual route home. I recall I turned into Slater road and then left into Stennett Road and continued for 600–700 metres in a general westerly direction. On the bend of the road I overtook a white Ute that was also travelling in a westerly direction. I continued along Stennett Road near to the entrance of the Patrick’s car yard on my left and saw a large white sedan that was indicating to pull over to the left on the crest of the hill. I slowed down when I saw him pull into the kerb and continue [sic] on slowly because it was a strange and dangerous place for him to stop [sic] by this I mean there is a median strip on the middle of the road and there was potentially traffic coming and going from the Patrick’s car yard as it is a 24 hour operation. I went around him and continued along Stennett Road and travelled another 600 metres. At this point I would have been going no faster than 40kph.
8. I remember checking in my right side rear vision mirror to see where [the deceased] was. While I was doing this I saw the white sedan was half way through a u-turn seemingly with the intention of then travelling in a general easterly direction. I continued on and turned onto Campbelltown Road and checked a couple of times to see if [the deceased] was behind me but I couldn’t see him so I just continued on home and put my bike in the garage.” (emphasis added)
As can be seen, the passage quoted by Mr Meigan starts at [7] and deals with the time when he had pulled around Mr Lynton, who had slowed and pulled to the left until he could legally make a U-turn. However, the second part of the quote is from [8] of the same statement. By that time, Mr Blount had travelled 600 metres along Stennett Road, having apparently reduced his speed to 40 km per hour, as he waited for the deceased to catch up, and Mr Lynton had reached the point where he was past the median strip and double lines; could see clearly over his shoulder to the top of the crest he had just descended (and saw the ute 250 metres away); and felt safe in performing his U-turn.
Read in its proper context, the quoted passage from Mr Blount’s statement does not advance Ms Karim’s case on appeal. The evidence supports Mr Baker’s submission that Mr Lynton made a legal U-turn, and the Arbitrator’s finding that it was the deceased’s actions that caused the accident. Moreover, Mr Lynton’s conduct was irrelevant to the deceased’s conscious (deliberate) decision to ride his bike as he did and does not undermine the Arbitrator’s conclusion that the personal injury (and death) was attributable to the deceased’s serious and wilful misconduct.
The submission that Mr Perry’s concession that the deceased was travelling too fast “in the circumstances” depends on an acceptance of the assertion that Mr Lynton drove dangerously. The Arbitrator did not make that finding. Moreover, such a finding was not open and would have been contrary to the accepted evidence.
While it is correct that, after noting the content of Mr Blount’s third statement (at [28]), the Arbitrator did not refer to it again, he did consider the thrust of the allegation in that statement, namely, that Mr Lynton made his U-turn east of Inglis Road and, therefore, in a dangerous position relative to the hill crest. After a detailed analysis of the evidence, he concluded (at [84]) that Mr Lynton made his U-turn “in the vicinity of the intersection [of Stennett Road] with Inglis Road”. While this was slightly further east than Mr Lynton said in his statement, it was still well clear of the hill crest and was a reasonable and safe position at which to make the turn. Other than the challenge based on Mr Blount’s third statement, the Arbitrator’s analysis and conclusion as to where Mr Lynton made his U-turn has not been attacked.

CONCLUSION

It follows that the Arbitrator’s conclusions were open on the evidence and were correct. Mr Meigan has not established any error. It is clear beyond doubt that the deceased’s personal injury (and death) was attributable to his serious and wilful misconduct in riding his bike at about double the speed limit in a suburban area.

DECISION

The Arbitrator’s determination of 4 February 2013 is confirmed.

COSTS

Each party is to pay her or its own costs of the appeal.

Bill Roche
Deputy President

8 May 2013

I, KATHRYN CAMP, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF BILL ROCHE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

ASSOCIATE