Karim v Commissioner for Act Revenue
[2014] ACAT 76
•16 December 2014
ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
KARIM v COMMISSIONER FOR ACT REVENUE
(Administrative Review) [2014] ACAT 76
AT 14/49 & 14/81
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – First Home Owner Grant (FHOG) – failure to meet residence requirement for FHOG – applicant, who was sole registered proprietor, never residing in house – applicant residing overseas - applicant’s wife and children residing in the house - belief formed by applicant from conversation with a government officer that his wife, who was not a registered proprietor of the property, could be joint applicant for FHOG and meet residence requirement – decision to require applicant to repay the amount of FHOG – liability for penalty tax and interest – applicant’s failure to formally communicate with the Department before investigation – whether absence overseas could exempt the Applicant from FHOG requirements – opportunity to seek the exercise of the commissioner’s discretion expired - matters to consider for imposing penalty under the First Home Owner Grant Act 2000 – whether there is reasonable basis for remission of penalty and interest
Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, s.68
First Home Owner Grant Act 2008, ss. 5, 7, 12, 13, 15, 20, 23, 31, 47, 48 & 49
Revenue Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (No 1 of 2010), ss. 4
Taxation Administration Act 1999, ss. 31, 48
Regulations cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2) (ACT), Rule 7
Cases cited:Bates v Chief Commissioner for State Revenue [2004] NSWADT 13
Calcaro v Commissioner for State Revenue [2004] NSWADT
158Chakravarty and Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2012] ACAT 68 (affirmed on appeal: Chakravarty and Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 11
Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington (GD) [2004] NSWADTAP 41
Daniell v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [[2008] ACTAAT 1Davey v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2008] ACTAAT 30
Johnston and Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2007] ACTAAT 18
Mcarthur v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2012] ACAT 65
Scott and Anor v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 73
Steele v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2010] ACAT 15
Theron & Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 33
Texts Cited:Black’s Law Dictionary Free, 2nd Edition
Macquarie Dictionary
Western Australian Commissioner’s Practice FHOG 2.1 – Principal Place of Residence
Tribunal: Ms E. Symons – Presidential Member
Date of Orders: 16 December 2014
Date of Reasons for Decision: 16 December 2014
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL )
AT 14/49 and AT 14/81 BETWEEN:
MD MASUD KARIM
Applicant (AT 14/49
AND:
NILUFA SULTANA KARIM
Applicant (AT 14/81)
AND: COMMISSIONER FOR ACT REVENUE
Respondent
TRIBUNAL: Ms E. Symons – Presidential Member
DATE: 16 December 2014
ORDER
The Tribunal Orders that:
1.The decision of AT 14/49 under review is confirmed.
2.The decision of AT 14/81 under review is confirmed.
………………………………..
Ms E. Symons
Presidential Member
REASONS FOR DECISION
These are two applications for review of decision which were heard together on 29 October 2014. They concerned the same reviewable decision of the respondent dated 19 June 2014 relating to a grant paid to the applicant, Mr MD Masud Karim (Mr Karim), under the First Home Owner Grant Act 2000 (the FHOG Act).
The decision under review
The respondent decided to disallow an objection made by Mr Karim to an earlier decision made on 25 March 2013. The earlier decision was to reverse a First Home Owner Grant and First Home Owner Grant Boost paid to Mr Karim totaling $21,000 pursuant to section 23 of the FHOG Act and to impose interest pursuant to section 48 of the FHOG Act and to impose 25% penalty pursuant to section 47 of the FHOG Act.
The decision to disallow the objection is a reviewable decision pursuant to section 31 of the FHOG Act.
The Applications and Hearing
The first application under the FHOG Act was matter AT 14/49 in which Mr Karim was the applicant. The second application was matter AT 14/81 in which Mr Karim’s wife, Nilufa Karim (Mrs Karim), was the applicant. It appears that Mrs Karim’s application was made pursuant to Order 1 made at a Directions Hearing on 20 August 2014 in AT 14/49. Order 1 stated:
The Tribunal orders that:
1. By 5 September 2014, the applicant is to arrange for Mrs Karim to file and serve an application to be joined as an applicant in this matter.
Mrs Karim filed a separate application on 2 September 2014 rather than an application to be joined as an applicant in Mr Karim’s application. Mrs Karim’s application was lodged more than 28 days from the date of the reviewable decision. Pursuant to rule 7 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2) (ACT) on 5 September 2014 the Tribunal ordered that the time for making this application for review of the decision is extended to 2 September 2014.
Further Orders were made at a subsequent Directions Hearing on 24 September 2014 in relation to the respondent filing a statement of facts and contentions, witness statements and any other material, the applicants filing any material in reply, the parties’ list of authorities and setting the matter for hearing on 29 October 2014.
Mr Karim and Mrs Karim each filed with the Tribunal a General Power of Attorney appointing Mr Saifur Rahman their attorney.
The hearing
The matter was heard on 29 October 2014. Mr Saifur appeared for the applicants at the hearing and Ms Robinson of Counsel represented the Commissioner. The Tribunal had before it the documents (T docs) relevant to the decision under review together with the Applicants’ Statement of Facts and Contentions and the respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions.
The hearing proceeded by way of submissions as the facts were largely agreed. At the conclusion of the hearing the Tribunal reserved its decision.
The agreed facts
At the commencement of the hearing an Agreed Statement of Facts was handed up to the Tribunal. The Tribunal adopts the agreed facts from that statement:
1. On 8 January 2009, the applicant in 14/49 (Mr Karim) entered into a contract for sale with the Land Development Agency (LDA) for the purchase of a Block 11, Section 77 Franklin (the Property).
2. On 27 July 2009 Mr Karim entered into an ACT Home Building Contract with GE Shaw & Associates (ACT) Pty Ltd for the construction of a home on the Property (the Home).
3. On 17 August 2009, Mr Karim and the applicant in 14/81 (Mrs Karim) lodged with the Respondent an application (the Application) for the First Home Owner Grant (FHOG) and the First Home Owner Boost (FHOB).
4. On page 9 of the Application for the FHOG there were (inter alia) the following two questions, both of which were ticked ‘yes’:
6.Will each applicant be occupying the home as their principal place of residence for a continuous period of 6 months commencing within 12 months of completion of the eligible transaction?
7.Has each applicant on or after 1 July 2000 either:
- Entered into a contract for the purchase of a home in the ACT; or
- Entered into a contract to build a home in the ACT; …
3.(sic). On pages 13-14 of the Application there is a declaration signed by both applicants. The declaration includes the following:
7. I will be residing in the home to which this application relates as my principal place of residence for a continuous period of at least 6 months, with the period of occupation starting within 1 year after the completion date of the eligible transaction (A non-complying applicant must apply for exemption from the residency requirements).
5. On 1 September 2009, before the Application had been determined, Mr Karim departed Australia for Bangladesh. He has not returned to Australia since.
6. Mr Karim’s stated reason for departing Australia was to pursue better employment opportunities in Bangladesh.
7. On 12 November 2009 the Respondent advised Mr Karim that the Application had been approved in the full amount of $21,000 (notification letter).
8. The notification letter:
(a) Was addressed to Mr Karim at his then residence in Lakemba, New South Wales;
(b) Contained the following condition: “This grant is paid on the condition that all applicants will occupy the home as their principal place of residence for a continuous period of six (6) months, commencing within 12 months of settlement or completion of construction of the home”; and
(c) Contained a further condition that: “[i]f the residency requirement is not met, you must advise the Commissioner for ACT Revenue in writing and repay the grant in full to the ACT Revenue Office within 14 days after the relevant date. There are no provisions to allow an extension to the residency requirement once the relevant period has expired.”
9. On 28 October 2009 Mr Karim authorized Mr Saifur Rahman to act as his agent in relation to the Application.
10. A Certificate of Occupancy and Use was issued for the House on 21 December 2009.
11. Mr Karim:
(a)Never physically lived in the House;
(b)Maintained a NSW drivers licence with his Lakemba address;
(c)At all times, maintained his Westpac accounts with his Lakemba address;
12. However, Mr Karim was the addressee for:
(a)The electricity account for the Property for the period 1 January 2010 to 4 May 2010 issued to his name; and
(b)The natural gas account for the Property for the period 2 February to 4 May 2010 issued in his name.
13. Mrs Karim and her children moved into the House on or around 8 January 2010. She registered the Property as her address with Centrelink and her children attended Term 1 at Gold Creek School (from 1 February 2010 to 18 June 2010).
14. Mrs Karim was the addressee for:
(a)The transACT accounts for the property for the months of June and July 2010;
(b)The final electricity account payable 20 August 2010;
15. On 10 May 2010 the House was listed for sale on allhomes and with a local real estate agent.
16. On 30 May 2010, Mr Karim appointed a property manager to rent the house and to act as agent for rates and land tax.
17. The House was rented to third parties from 22 July 2010.
18. On 9 July 2010 Mrs Karim and her children left Australia for Bangladesh, where they currently reside.
19. On 5 October 2010 the Applicant sold the House, with the sale effected by transfer registered on 22 November 2010.
20. Mr Karim’s reason for selling the Property is that he was unable to service the mortgage with the income from his current employment.
21. On 4 December 2012, the Respondent issued Mr Karim a notice to provide certain information pursuant to section 39 of the First Home Owner Grant Act 2000 (FHOG Act).
22. On 11 December 2012, Mr Karim responded to the notice by providing a statutory declaration declared by Mrs Karim and supporting documentation confirming that she lived in the House from 8 January 2010 to 9 July 2010.
23. On 21 January 2013, the Respondent’s office sent a further email to Mr Karim, advising him that as Mrs Karim did not have a ‘relevant interest’ in the House she could not constitute an applicant for the FHOG and that Mr Karim was required to provide a personal response to the section 39 notice.
24. When Mr Karim did not reply, the Respondent’s office sent a further email to him on 4 February 2013.
25. On 14 March 2013 Mr Karim provided a Statutory Declaration confirming that he had not lived in the House.
26. On 25 March 2013, the Respondent sent a letter to Mr Karim advising that, pursuant to section 23 of the FHOG Act he had reversed the decision to grant the FHOG; and indicating that further interest would accrue on amounts remaining unpaid after 30 days pursuant to the Taxation Administration Act 1999.
27. The amount repayable was calculated at the combined FHOG and FHOB amount of $21,000 in addition to interest of $8,420.21 and penalty tax of $5,250.00.
28. On 7 May 2013, the Respondent received from Mr Karim an objection to the Respondent’s assessment on 25 March 2013.
29. On 19 September 2013, the Respondent wrote to Mr Karim’s bank, relevantly advising that they were required to pay to the Respondent the sum of $35,763.01, being the combined total of the FHOG, the penalty tax and accrued interest payable by Mr Karim.
30. On 1 October 2013, the Respondent received a letter from Mr Karim, requesting an update as to the status of his objection, and why enforcement proceedings to recover the FHOG amount had been already initiated.
31. On 19 June 2014, the Respondent’s office wrote to Mr Karim’s representative Mr Rahman, disallowing his objection.
32. On 14 July 2014, Mr Karim applied to the tribunal for review of the respondent’s decision dated 19 June 2014.
33. On 21 July 2014 the Applicant repaid the Respondent the FHOG, interest and penalties.
34. Mrs Karim also applied for review of the Commissioner’s decision on 2 September 2014. The Tribunal extended the time for Mrs Karim to make her application on 5 September 3014, and indicated that her matter would be joined with Mr Karim’s application for review.
Other material
On 21 October 2014 the applicants provided the Tribunal with their response (applicants’ response) to the respondent’s facts and contentions. On 23 October 2014 Mr Saifur provided a revised version of the applicants’ response.
At the hearing Mr Saifur provided the Tribunal with a printout entitled ‘What is OCCUPATION?’ from Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd ed., an American online legal dictionary, and further written submissions.
The Applicants’ claim
The applicants claim that the term ‘occupy’ is not defined in the FHOG Act. They rely on the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary Free, 2nd edition, namely:
In its usual sense “occupation” is where a person exercises physical control over land. Thus, the lessee of a house is in occupation of it so long as he has the power of entering into and staying there at pleasure, and of excluding all other persons (or all except one or more specified persons) from the use of it. Occupation is therefore the same thing as actual possession.[1]
[1] Applicant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, Residency Requirement, at page 4
The applicants contend that during the period in question Mr Karim had possession of the property because:
(a)his family constituting his wife and children were physically residing in the property;
(b)the house was not rented so he had absolute control to decide who resides or not resides in the property;
(c)he was paying the mortgages and other expenses for the property; and
(d)he did not have any other house in Australia.
The applicants also contend that Mrs Karim’s name was rightly placed as ‘Applicant 2’ in the FHOG application as she has an equitable right to any property Mr Karim owns.
The applicants claim the Commissioner has not afforded Mr Karim natural justice or procedural fairness when considering his objection. They assert the Commissioner did not mention in the letter of demand that recovery would be pursued and not stayed while it was conducting the review. Further, the Commissioner did not acknowledge or reply to Mr Karim’s letter dated 1 October 2013 seeking clarification regarding the status of the matter. Instead, without notice to him, the Commissioner treated him harshly by pursuing recovery of the “debt” by garnisheeing his bank account.
The applicants further contend that Mr Karim did not have any bad intention when applying for the FHOG or when he had an unexpected change of situation which saw him leave Australia to take up employment in Bangladesh before the house was completed. Therefore, while reviewing his objection, the Commissioner could have, pursuant to subsection 12(2)(a) and (b) of the FHOG, approved a shorter period than six months for the property being his principal place of residence or the Commissioner should have exempted him from the requirement to comply with subsection 12(1) of the FHOG.
The applicants ask the Tribunal to:
(a)set aside the Commissioner’s decision and order that the Commissioner repay the monies paid by the Applicants; or
(b)set aside the Commissioner’s decision to impose interest of $8,420.21 and penalty tax of $5,250.00; and
(c)issue an order that would allow the applicants to reapply for FHOG when they buy a house in Australia again.
The Respondent’s contentions
The respondent informed the Tribunal that it did not claim that the applicant acted dishonestly in applying for the FHOG.
The respondent seeks that the decisions under review be confirmed.
Relevant Legislation
ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (the ACAT Act)
Section 68 of the ACAT Act sets out the powers of the tribunal on review. It states:
68Review of decisions
(1)This section applies if the tribunal reviews a decision by an entity.
(2)The tribunal may exercise any function given by an Act to the entity for making the decision.
NoteA reference to an Act includes a reference to the statutory instruments made or in force under the Act, including regulations (see Legislation Act, s 104).
(3)The tribunal must, by order—
(a)confirm the decision; or
(b)vary the decision; or
(c)set aside the decision and—
(i)make a substitute decision; or
(ii)remit the matter that is the subject of the decision for reconsideration by the decision-maker in accordance with any direction or recommendation of the tribunal.
First Home Owner Grant Act 2000 (FHOG Act)
Section 5 of the FHOG Act refers to the ownership of land and homes and states:
5Ownership of land and homes
(1)A person is an owner of a home or a home owner if the person has a relevant interest in land on which a home is built.
(2)Each of the following is a relevant interest in land:
(a)a leasehold interest in the land granted by the Commonwealth;
(b)a life estate in the land approved by the commissioner;
(c)a licence or right of occupancy granted by the Commonwealth that gives, in the commissioner’s opinion, the licensee or the holder of the right reasonable security of tenure;
(d)an interest in a company’s shares if the commissioner is satisfied that—
(i)the interest entitles the holder of the interest to exclusive occupation of a particular home owned by the company; and
(ii)the value of the shares is not less than the value of the company’s interest in the home.
(3)However—
(a)an interest is not a relevant interest in land at a particular time unless the holder of the interest has, or will have within 12 months after that time (or a longer time allowed by the commissioner), a right to immediate occupation of the land; and
(b)an interest is not a relevant interest in land in the hands of a person who holds it subject to a trust; and
(c)an equitable interest is not a relevant interest in land unless it is the interest of a person under a legal disability for whom a guardian holds the interest on trust.
(4)Despite subsections (2) and (3), the regulations may provide for recognition of an interest (a noncomplying interest) as a relevant interest in land—
(a)even though the interest may not comply with the subsections; and
(b)even though the interest may not be recognised at law or in equity as an interest in land.
(5)If a first home owner grant is to be paid because of the recognition of a noncomplying interest as a relevant interest in land, the commissioner may impose appropriate conditions on the payment of the grant to ensure its recovery if criteria prescribed under the regulations about future conduct or events are not satisfied.
Section 7 sets out who is entitled to make an application for a grant. It states:
7Entitlement to grant
(1) A first home owner grant is payable on an application under this Act if—
(a) the applicant or, if there are 2 or more of them, each of the applicants complies with the eligibility criteria; and
(b) the transaction for which the grant is sought—
(i)is an eligible transaction; and
(ii) has been completed; and
…
Section 15 relates to ‘interested persons’ and states:
15All interested persons to join in application
(1)All interested persons must be applicants.
(2)An interested person is a person who is, or will be on completion of the eligible transaction to which the application relates, an owner of the relevant home except such a person who is excluded from the application of this section under the regulations.
Section 12 sets out the residency requirements at the time when Mr Karim applied for the FHOG. It states:
12Criterion 5—Residence requirements
(1) An applicant for a first home owner grant must occupy the home to which the application relates as the applicant’s principal place of residence for a continuous period of at least 1 year.
(2) However, if the commissioner is satisfied there are good reasons to do so, the commissioner may—
(a) approve a shorter period; or
(b) exempt the applicant from the requirement to comply with subsection (1).
(3) The period of occupation required under subsection (1), or the shorter period approved under subsection (2) (a), must start within 1 year after completion of the eligible transaction to which the application relates or a longer period approved by the commissioner.
(4) The commissioner may give an approval or exemption under this section within 18 months after completion of the eligible transaction to which the application relates.
(5) If an application is made by joint applicants and at least 1 (but not all) of the applicants complies with the residence requirements, the non-complying applicant or applicants are exempted from compliance with the residence requirements.
With effect from 17 February 2010, the Revenue Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (No 1 of 2010)[2] substituted subsection 12(4) and inserted a new subsection 12(5) in the FHOG Act which now state:
(4)The commissioner may give an approval or exemption under this section within 18 months after completion of the eligible transaction to which the application relates.
(5)If an application is made by joint applicants and at least 1 (but not all) of the applicants complies with the residence requirements, the non-complying applicant or applicants are exempted from compliance with the residence requirements.
[2] Section 4
At the time that Mr Karim applied for the FHOG[3], an ‘eligible transaction’ was defined in section 13(b) of the FHOG Act to include:
a comprehensive home building contract made on or after 1 July 2000 by the owner of land in the ACT, or a person who will on completion of the contract be the owner of land in the ACT, to have a home built on the land;
[3] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraph 37
A ‘comprehensive home building contract’ is, in turn, defined in subsection 13(7) of the FHOG to mean[4]:
comprehensive home building contract means a contract under which a builder undertakes to build a home on land from the inception of the building work to the point where the home is ready for occupation and if, for any reason, the work to be carried out under such a contract is not completed, including any further contract under which the work is to be completed
[4] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraph 38
At the time Mr Karim applied for the FHOG, section 20 of the FHOG Act dealt with payments of FHOG in anticipation of compliance with the residence requirements and stated:
20Payment in anticipation of compliance with residence requirements or first home owner grant cap
(1)The commissioner may authorise payment of a first home owner grant in anticipation of compliance with the residence requirements if the commissioner is satisfied that each applicant intends to comply with the residence requirements.
(2)If a first home owner grant is paid in anticipation of compliance with the residence requirements, the payment is made on condition that, if the residence requirements are not complied with, the applicant must within 14 days after the relevant date—
(a)give written notice of that fact to the commissioner; and
(b)repay the amount of the grant.
(3)The relevant date is the earlier of the following:
(a)the end of the period allowed for compliance with the residence requirements;
(b)the date it first becomes apparent that the residence requirements will not be complied with during the period allowed for compliance.
(4)The commissioner may authorise payment of a first home owner grant in anticipation of compliance with the first home owner grant cap if—
(a)the grant is to be paid in relation to an eligible transaction that involves the building of a home by an owner builder before the completion of the eligible transaction; and
(b)the first home owner grant cap applies to the eligible transaction.
(5)If a first home owner grant is paid in anticipation of compliance with the first home owner grant cap, the payment is made on condition that, if the applicant becomes aware that the total value of the eligible transaction is, or will be, more than the first home owner grant cap, the applicant must, within 14 days after the day the applicant becomes aware of that fact—
(a)give written notice of that fact to the commissioner; and
(b)repay the amount of the grant.
(6)If a first home owner grant is paid to a person on the condition mentioned in subsection (2) or (5), the person must comply with the condition.
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units.
(7)An offence against this section is a strict liability offence.
Section 23 of the FHOG refers to the commissioner’s powers to vary or reverse a decision and states:
23Power to correct decision
(1)If the commissioner decides an application, and is later satisfied (independently of an objection under this Act) that the decision is incorrect, the commissioner may vary or reverse the decision.
(2)A decision cannot be varied or reversed under this section more than 5 years after it was made.
Section 31 of the FHOG Act refers to applications for review and states:
31Applications for review
The following may apply to the ACAT for review of a decision of the commissioner under section 29:
(a)the objector in relation to the decision;
(b)any other person whose interests are affected by the decision.
The Commissioner’s powers to require repayment and to impose a penalty are set out in section 47 of the FHOG which states:
47Power to require repayment and impose penalty
(1)The commissioner may, by written notice, require an applicant (or former applicant) for a first home owner grant to repay an amount paid on the application if—
(a)the amount was paid in error; or
(b)the commissioner reverses the decision under which the amount was paid for any other reason.
(2)If, because of an applicant’s dishonesty, an amount is paid by way of a first home owner grant, the commissioner may, by the notice in which repayment is required or a separate notice, impose a penalty of not more than the amount the applicant is required to repay.
(3)If an applicant (or former applicant) for a first home owner grant fails to make a repayment required under this section or the conditions of the grant, the commissioner may, by written notice, impose a penalty of not more than the amount the applicant is required to repay.
(4)If an amount is paid in error on an application for a first home owner grant to a third party, the commissioner may, by written notice, require the third party to repay the amount to the commissioner.
Section 48 of the FHOG imposes a liability to pay interest, and defines the date from which interest is payable when section 20(2)(b) or section 47 applies[5] and states:
[5] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraph 41
48Interest in relation to repayments
(1)A person is liable to pay interest under this section on the amount of a first home owner grant paid to the person if the amount is repayable under section 20 (2) (b) or section 21 (2).
(2)A person is liable to pay interest under this section on an amount paid to the person on an application for a first home owner grant if the amount is repayable under section 47.
(3)Interest under this section is to be calculated on a daily basis from—
(a)if the amount is repayable under section 20 (2) (b)—the relevant date as defined in section 20 (3); or
(b)if the amount is repayable under section 21 (2)—the day the notice mentioned in section 21 (2) (a) is given to the commissioner; or
(c)if the amount is repayable under section 47 (1)—the date the amount was paid to the applicant.
(4)For this section, the interest rate is the interest rate mentioned in the Taxation Administration Act 1999, section 26.
Section 49(6) of the FHOG provides discretion to remit interest. It states:
49Power to recover amount paid in error etc
…
(6)The commissioner may remit or refund all or part of an amount of interest paid or payable by a person.
…
Issues
The issues for consideration are:
(a)Whether Mr Karim satisfied the residency requirement. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether he occupied the premises as his principal place of residence.
(b)Whether Mrs Karim could have satisfied the occupancy requirement for herself and her husband. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether she is an interested person for the purposes of the FHOG Act.
(c)Whether the applicants were denied natural justice. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the respondent’s demand for payment prior to determination of the applicant’s objection was reasonable;
(d)Whether the applicants are entitled to a refund of the FHOG, interest and penalties paid by the applicant to the respondent on 21 July 2014; and
(e)Whether the imposition of the Penalty and Interest is appropriate in the circumstances.
While the applicants request that the Tribunal issues an order that would allow them to reapply for the FHOG when they buy a house in Australia again this is not an issue that arises out of the decision under review.
CONSIDERATION
Whether Mr Karim satisfied the residency requirement.
The residency requirement has two elements, both of which must be satisfied in order to comply with the residency requirement[6]. The elements are:
(1)The applicant must occupy the premises; and
(2)The applicant must occupy the premises as his principal place of residence.
[6] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [33]
These two elements were considered by Higgins S in the decision of the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal in Bates v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue[7] (Bates) where he stated:
“(a) The terms ‘occupy’ and principal place of residence’ should be given their ordinary meaning having regard to the objects and purposes of the Act….. in the context of this Act[8], in my opinion, ‘occupy’ means to reside in the property……(it) requires the occupation to be ongoing and involves an element of permanence;
(b)Whether an applicant has ‘occupied’ a property as his/her ‘principal place of residence’, as prescribed under the Act is a matter of fact that has to be assessed objectively having regard to all the circumstances. The intention of the applicant is relevant but is not determinative of the issue…… each case must be considered in the context of its own particulars facts.”
[7]Bates v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) NSWADT 13 at [39(a) and (b)]
[8] First Home Owner Grant Act 2000 (NSW)
The applicant, in his Statement of Facts and Contentions[9], also referred the Tribunal to the decision in Bates and, in particular, paragraph 34 where Higgins S referred to the High Court consideration of “occupied” in relation to rateable land under the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) in Newcastle City Council v Royal Newcastle Hospital[10]. Higgins J stated:
34. The High Court considered the word “occupied” as it appeared in s.132(1)(d) of the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) in the case of Council of the City of Newcastle v Royal Newcastle Hospital (1956) 96 CLR 493. The statutory provision in question provided that all land in the municipality or shire was rateable except land, which belonged to a public hospital and was “used or occupied” by the hospital for the purposes as a hospital. The question at issue was whether the defendant hospital, who used a particular area of land, was rateable under s.144 of the Local Government Act, 1919. In that decision Williams J stated the following at page 501:
“As to “occupation” I feel no doubt. It was not “occupied” as the word is used in rating law. As was pointed out by Isaacs J in Knowles v Newcastle Corporation (1909) 9 CLR 534 at p.544 “occupation” is not synonymous with mere legal possession. It includes possession, but it also includes something more (1956) 1 LGRA at pp.23, 24. His Honour referred to the well known passage in the judgment of Lush J in Reg v St Pancras Assessment Committee (1877) 2 QBD 581:- “The owner of a vacant house is in possession and may maintain trespass against anyone who invades it, but as long as he leaves it vacant he is not rateable for it as an occupier. If, however, he furnishes it, and keeps it ready for habitation whenever he pleases to go to it, he is an occupier, though he may not reside in it one day in a year” (1877 2 QBD at p.588). But it must be remembered that Lush J was there dealing with the meaning of rateable occupation in England where, to be rateable, the occupation must be beneficial, and his Lordship was discussing what constitutes beneficial occupation of a house and there is a great difference between what constitutes the occupation of a house and the occupation of vacant land”. [this Tribunal’s underlining]
[9] page 2
[10] (1956) 96 CLR
The applicant relied on the above statement of Lush J in Reg v St Pancras Assessment Committee, which this Tribunal has underlined, as authority for his submission that a person does not have to be physically residing in the property to qualify as occupant.
However, paragraphs 33 and 35 of the Bates decision are pertinent and state:
33. The courts have held that the word “occupy” must be construed in its legislative context.
35. In that same decision, Kitto J, stated that great care must be taken in using the English authorities as to rateable occupation out of context. Kitto J went on to comment that the relevant statutory provision in the case before the Court required not only proof of occupation but also proof of actual and continuous possession directed to the specific purposes as set out in that provision.
While the English authority of Reg v St Pancras Assessment Committee, provides interesting reading, the Tribunal is cognizant of the compelling statements of Kitto J in Newcastle City Council v Royal Newcastle Hospital set out in the previous paragraph. In the present matter, the Tribunal is required to construe the word “occupy” in the legislative context of the FHOG Act.
Mr Saifur submitted that the applicant had met the residency requirements during the relevant period because:
(a)the home was his principal place of residence as it was his only residence. It was his only house in Australia. The applicant was in Bangladesh for work purposes and living with his parents. Now that his family has joined him in Bangladesh they are living in a house provided by Mr Karim’s employer.
(b) the applicant had absolute control over the home. He did not rent it. He was paying the mortgages and other expenses for the property. His family occupied the home for a period of 6 months and 1 day. They ate their meals there and slept there. Mr Karim intended to come back to the home and reoccupy it. This shows that there was the degree of permanence, continuity and regularity required to support the property being Mr Karim’s principal place of residence.
(c) the applicant’s intention when he bought the property and built the home with the FHOG was to hold onto it after his wife and children joined him in Bangladesh but he was forced to sell the property when he found it was not possible by renting alone to keep it. His wages in Bangladesh did not leave him with enough cash flow to pay for the difference.
The Tribunal has also considered the applicant’s submissions in relation to the FHOG extract from the Commissioner’s Practice FHOG 2.1 – Principal Place of Residence on the Western Australian Department of Finance website.
“Occupy’ is not defined in the FHOG Act. The applicant relied on the definition of ‘occupy’ in the Black’s Law Dictionary. The respondent referred[11] the Tribunal to the Macquarie Dictionary definition of ‘occupy’, namely “to be resident or established in (a place) as its tenant; to tenant” and to the definition of the verb “tenant” as “to hold or occupy as a tenant; dwell in; inhabit”.
[11] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [34]
The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal has considered the term ‘occupy’ in the decision in Chakravarty & Commissioner for ACT Revenue[12]. That tribunal observed that “to meet the requirement of the section, actual residence is required.”
[12] Chakravarty & Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2012] ACAT 68
It is not in dispute that Mr Karim never resided in the home. The applicant was advised of the residency requirement in the FHOG application and signed the declaration stating that he will be residing in the home as his principal place of residence. He left Australia two weeks after he had lodged the FHOG application.
The Tribunal notes the respondent’s submission[13] that, as Mr Karim was never resident in the home he could not have occupied it. This inevitably would result in the Tribunal not having to determine whether the home was the applicant’s principal place of residence and the applicant’s application for review would then be unsuccessful.
[13] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [36]
While this may well be determinative of the application, before reaching its decision the Tribunal has considered the parties’ submissions in relation to the applicant’s “Principal Place of Residence.”
The applicant submitted that the Tribunal should take into consideration that the home was his principal place of residence in Australia although he, himself, was living in Bangladesh.
The Tribunal agrees with the respondent’s submission[14] that the applicant’s submission in the previous paragraph is ill-founded. The fact that the applicant has no other property in Australia is not relevant.
[14] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [44]
The Tribunal has considered the six factors identified by the respondent in their submissions[15] as providing general guidance for this Tribunal in determining when a home is being used as a principal place of residence. These six factors come from the 2007 decision of the ACT Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Johnston and Commissioner for ACT Revenue[16] which adopted the multifactorial approach of the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal in Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington (GD). The factors are:
(1)the phrase ‘principal place of residence’ should be given its ordinary meaning;
(2) determining whether the applicant occupied the home as their ‘principal place of residence’ is an objective assessment in relation to the ‘actual occupation of the dwelling’;
(3) the applicant’s intention to occupy is to be assessed objectively, but does not solely determine whether the residency requirement has been fulfilled;
(4) occupation of a home as a ‘principal place of residence’ must have a degree of permanence to it;
(5) the length of occupation is relevant but not determinative to whether the residence requirement has been fulfilled – a short stay will make it hard as a matter of evidence to prove; and
(6) the reasons for an applicant’s departure from the home prior to fulfillment of the residency requirement must be reasonable and adequately explained.
[15] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [39]
[16] [2007] ACTAAT 18
Considering the available information in applying these factors to Mr Karim, the Tribunal finds that:
(a)the applicant, having applied for the FHOG while still residing in Lakemba, NSW, and intending to move to Canberra, left Australia before the application was approved and the grant made;
(b)the respondent’s letter, dated 12 November 2009, notifying the applicant of the approval of the FHOG clearly stated that “the grant is on the condition that all applicants will occupy the home as their principal place of residence for a continuous period of six (6) months….” [Tribunal’s underlining]
(c)the applicant did not move to Canberra and did not live in the home during the residency period or at all;
(d)the applicant did not change his residential address on his Driver’s Licence to the home, leaving it as his Lakemba address; nor did the applicant enrol on the ACT Electoral Roll.
(e)the applicant moved to Bangladesh to pursue better career opportunities rather than remaining in Australia and taking up residence in the home and fulfilling a requirement the FHOG imposed on him;
(f)the applicant did not provide evidence of reasons, apart from choosing to pursue better career opportunities, that would satisfy the Tribunal that he was prevented from taking up residence at the home such as would justify him keeping the Territory funded FHOG;
(g)the applicant has remained living in Bangladesh since leaving Australia on 1 September 2009;
(h)while Mrs Karim and the children lived in the home they stayed there for the minimum period of six months and left for Bangladesh the following day; and
(i)Mrs Karim’s occupation of the home did not have the necessary degree of permanency. Neither the applicant nor Mrs Karim provided any evidence that may have persuaded the Tribunal that they or Mrs Karim intended to stay in the home for an extended period or intended to establish permanency here. Before the six months residency period had expired the home was listed for sale on 10 May 2010 and a property manager was appointed on 30 May 2010 to rent the house.
The Tribunal agrees with the respondent’s submission[17] that when the applicant knew he would not be returning to live in the home during the residency period, either he should not have accepted the grant or he should have notified the respondent within 14 days he would be unable to meet the residency requirement.
[17] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [46]
Mr Karim submitted[18] that his overseas job “was an unexpected change of situation. FHOG Act is flexible enough to safeguard people and as such the Act has given enough jurisdiction and power to cater for special situations like that of mine.” The reality is that the applicant did not notify the respondent that he was unable to meet the residency requirement, or apply for an extension of time or apply for an exemption pursuant to section 12(2) of the FHOG Act.
[18] Applicant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions 16 September 2014 – page 3 Residency Requirement – sections 12(1) and 12(2)(a) and (b)
In February 2010 section 12 of the FHOG Act was amended to include a time limit of ‘within 18 months of the eligible transaction’ for an application for an extension of time. That time limit expired in the present matter on 20 June 2011.
The Tribunal decision in McArthur v Commissioner for ACT Revenue[19] (McArthur) is authority for the Tribunal denying the applicant’s application to have the Tribunal, for the first time, exercise the discretion in subsection 12(2)(a) – approval of a shorter period of residence. In Mcarthur’s case the tribunal referred to the tribunal decision of Daniell v Commissioner for ACT Revenue[20] (Daniell) where an applicant had to travel overseas for work. In Daniell’s case the tribunal found that the discretion to exempt the applicant from the residence requirement could not be made subsequent to the time for complying with the requirement having passed.
[19] [2012] ACAT 65 at [73]-[74] and [103]
[20] [2008] ACTAAT 1 at [103]
The Tribunal noted that the applicant maintained that he did not apply for reconsideration under section 12 of the FHOG Act as he thought Mrs Karim, who was a joint applicant on the FHOG application and was residing at the home, was meeting the residency requirement. This does not alter the Tribunal’s decision.
The Tribunal finds that the applicant, himself, did not occupy the home as his principal place of residence and, therefore, did not meet the residency requirement of the FHOG.
Whether Mrs Karim could have satisfied the occupancy requirement for herself and her husband.
In determining this issue it is necessary for the Tribunal to consider whether Mrs Karim is an interested person for the purposes of the FHOG Act.
The applicant contended in his Statement of Facts and Contentions that Mrs Karim’s name was rightly placed as ‘applicant #2’ in his FHOG application form; that she had a relevant interest, namely an equitable interest in any property he owned as his spouse as well as on her non-financial contributions to the household and that his wife’s and children’s occupation of the home did fulfill the FHOG residency requirement.
The respondent contended[21] that Mrs Karim was not capable of being a joint applicant because she did not hold a ‘relevant interest’ in the property that would entitle her to be a joint applicant and she was not a party to any ‘eligible transaction’ in relation to which the FHOG was paid.
[21] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [58]
The Tribunal has referred to the relevant sections above. Section 5 of the FHOG Act defines ‘owner’ as a person who ‘has a relevant interest in the land on which the house is built’. What is a relevant interest is set out in subsection 5(2) and what interests are not relevant interests are found in subsection 5(3) of the FHOG. Paragraph 7(1)(b) states that the grant may only be obtained in respect of an ‘eligible transaction’ and subsection 15(1) requires all ‘interested parties’, namely the person or persons who will be, on completion of the eligible transaction, an owner of the relevant home, to be applicants.
It is not in dispute that Mrs Karim was not a party to the ‘eligible transaction’ which was the contract to build a new home on the property. Her name was not on the title to the property.
While Mrs Karim may have an equitable interest in the applicant’s property in the family law jurisdiction, the Tribunal agrees with the respondent’s submissions[22] that paragraph 5(3)(c) of the FHOG Act expressly excludes equitable interests from the definition of ‘relevant interest’ unless it is held by a person with a legal disability for whom the guardian holds the interest on trust. Mrs Karim is not such a person.
[22] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [65]
The Tribunal, having considered all of the submissions and available material, is satisfied that Mrs Karim was not eligible to be an applicant for the FHOG. There is no eligible transaction enabling her to be an applicant. Her signing the FHOG application does not change her legal position.
The Tribunal finds that Mrs Karim could not satisfy the occupancy requirement for herself and Mr Karim.
Whether the applicants were denied natural justice.
The applicant contended that he was denied natural justice as the respondent garnisheed his bank account before completing the review of his objection and without responding to his letter dated 1 October 2013. In this letter the applicant had requested an update as to the status of his objection and why enforcement proceedings to recover the FHOG amount had already been initiated.
The applicant reiterated in his submissions that he did not have a bad or criminal intention in applying for the FHOG. He had sought advice from LDA and genuinely thought he was entitled to include Mrs Karim’s name on the FHOG application. He also stated, through Mr Rahman, that the FHOG, was a public body that should be serving the people; and could have and should have, itself, checked the names and title particulars and the land details which could have avoided the present situation.
While noting that it was not part of the respondent’s case that the applicant had been dishonest, the Tribunal was troubled by the following answers in Mr Karim’s Westpac Personal Finance Application (T7) for Construction of Dwelling which he signed and dated 31 August 2009:
Marital Status No. of dependents (excl. spouse)
Single0
The applicants’ marriage certificate (T6, page 74) states that they were married on 3 October 1995. Their Medicare card and Health Care Card (T6, page 69) show both applicants’ names and the names of their three children. These inconsistencies were not explained during the hearing.
The respondent does not deny that it took debt recovery action against the applicant’s bank account on 19 September 2013 and contends that it was entitled to demand repayment at a point prior to making a decision upon the applicants’ objection. The review of the objection, which disallowed the objection, was not completed until 19 June 2014. The respondent conceded that it received the applicant’s letter of 1 October 2013 and did not respond to it.
The respondent contended[23] that its demand for repayment did not impair the applicant’s ability to seek administrative review of the objection decision and, therefore, the applicants were not denied procedural fairness or natural justice.
[23] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [84]
Repayment and recovery of the grant are dealt with in Part 4 of the FHOG ACT. Section 49(1) of the FHOG Act provides that a repayment required by the Commissioner and any penalty or interest is a ‘recoverable amount’.
Pursuant to section 49(4) of the FHOG Act a ‘recoverable amount’ is a debt payable by the applicant to the Territory[24]. The Tribunal is satisfied that once the respondent has made a decision, in this case on 25 March 2013, the debt is immediately payable to the respondent. This finding is consistent with other like payments that demand immediate payment under Territory tax legislation.[25]
[24] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [83]
[25] For example, section 48(1) Taxation Administration Act 1999
The respondent’s notification letter (T291) to the applicant stated that he had 30 days from the date of the letter in which to pay the amount outstanding of $34,670.21. The 30 days expired on 24 April 2013. The applicant’s failure to pay the debt by 24 April 2013 was a tax default. Pursuant to section 25 of the TAA the applicant became liable to pay interest on the outstanding amount from the date of tax default.
The Tribunal is satisfied and finds that the respondent was entitled to pursue other recovery action, such as the action it took against the applicant’s Westpac account, when the applicant failed to pay the outstanding amount by the due date. There is no provision in the FHOG Act for proceedings to be stayed.
The Tribunal concurs with the respondent’s submission and finds that the demand for repayment did not impair the applicant’s ability to seek administrative review of the objection decision. Accordingly, the applicants were not denied procedural fairness or natural justice.
Whether the applicants are entitled to a refund of the debt recovered by the respondent
Having considered all of the available information the Tribunal is satisfied and finds that the applicants did not meet the FHOG eligibility requirements. The Commissioner’s decision to reverse the FHOG was, in the particular circumstances of this matter, the correct decision. Therefore the applicants are not entitled to a refund of the FHOG.
Whether the imposition of the Penalty and Interest is appropriate in the circumstances.
The applicant seeks a refund of the penalty and interest imposed by the respondent. In his application for review, the applicant reiterates that he had no intention of misappropriating Government money; that he had to go overseas as his situation changed and that he could have included his spouse in the title deed to the property. He also stated that he repaid the amount claimed by the respondent on 20 July 2014 by putting himself in debt and financial hardship, which he did not deserve.
The respondent contended[26] that the imposition of 25% penalty and interest was appropriate in the circumstances.
[26] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [71]
The Tribunal noted that the applicant always maintained that he had obtained advice from the LDA and understood by including Mrs Kamir’s name on the FHOG application she would be able to fulfil the eligibility requirements as she and their children would be and indeed, did reside, in the home for a period of six months.
However, the Tribunal also noted that in his objection letter (T21) the applicant stated:
Before applying for the grant I went through relevant sections of FHOG ACT 2000. To me the sections were not clear and room for different interpretation (as per case and situation).
The applicant had a solicitor acting for him on the purchase of the land. It is surprising, given the matters in the previous paragraph, that the applicant did not seek legal advice to clarify his concerns. It appears that the applicant had sufficient time after buying the land and before applying for the FHOG to obtain legal advice.
Pursuant to section 47 of the FHOG ACT the respondent has discretion to impose a penalty, up to 100%, where an applicant fails to make a repayment. Pursuant to section 20(2) of the FHOG Act, the applicant’s failure to repay the grant, satisfied section 47.
Interest is imposed by section 48 of the FHOG. While imposition is not discretionary, pursuant to section 49(6) the respondent has discretion to remit or refund interest paid.
It appears, as in Mcarthur’s case, the applicant was relying on the LDA advice as amounting “to exceptional circumstances and this should be taken into account by the Tribunal so that he should be given the benefit of the positive exercise of the Tribunal of its discretion in regard to penalty.”[27]
[27] At paragraph 109
Senior Member Hatch, in an earlier tribunal case of Davey v Commissioner for ACT Revenue[28], referred to a line of cases having their origin in the case of Calcaro v Chief Commissioner for State Revenue[29]. He set out a number of matters taken from the earlier cases that are relevant to considering whether a penalty should be applied. Eight considerations were identified, namely:
(a)the deterrent effect of the penalty;
(b)the nature and extent of the contravention;
(c)any loss or damage suffered, or gain made, as a result of the contravention;
(d)the circumstances in which the contravention took place including the deliberateness of the conduct and the period over which it extended;
(e)whether professional advice had been obtained in relation to the contravention, prior to the breach;
(f)whether the person has previously been found by a court to have engaged in any related or similar conduct;
(g)the degree of cooperation with the authorities; and
(h)in the case of natural persons, the attitude of the offender.
[28] [2008] ACTAAT 30
[29] [2004] NSWADT 158.
The considerations relevant to this matter are (a), (b), (d), (e), (g) and (h).
Consistent with (a) above, it is appropriate that a penalty be imposed for its deterrent effect to others failing to meet their obligations. The Tribunal agrees with the respondent’s submission[30] that FHOG recipients “who accept the grant on a conditional basis are expected to exercise a degree of diligence to ensure that they meet the conditions of the grant or return the money”.
[30] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [74]
As to (b) above, while the respondent accepts that the contravention likely occurred through a lack of care and prudence rather than a deliberate attempt at deception”,[31] the Tribunal is satisfied that grant recipients have an obligation to comply with the grant conditions. A careful reading of the FHOG Application form and the letter to the applicant advising approval should have alerted the applicant to the FHOG recipients’ obligations. That Mrs Karim and the children resided in the home for exactly six months and left for Bangladesh the following day shows only some cursory and inadequate consideration had been given to this obligation.
[31] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [74](b)
As to (d) above, there is no evidence which would support the Tribunal finding that this was other than a one off incident.
As to (e) above, the Tribunal has already noted that Mr Karim could have obtained professional advice. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that he had done so.
As to (g) and (h) above, the Tribunal notes the respondent’s statement that Mr Karim has been cooperative during the investigation.
Conclusion
The tribunal has previously considered the absence of a deliberate intention to defraud the respondent in Theron & Commissioner for ACT Revenue[32] (Theron). In Theron the tribunal considered the earlier tribunal decision of Steele v Commissioner for ACT Revenue[33]which also concerned an absence of a deliberate intention to defraud the respondent. The Tribunal is satisfied that it is not a sufficient basis upon which remission of the penalty can be imposed.
[32] [2013] ACAT 33, at [65]
[33] [2010] ACAT 15, at [17]
It is appropriate that a penalty be imposed. The applicant took no steps to repay the grant until the investigation was instituted and the imposition will have a deterrent effect.
The respondent has provided[34] the Tribunal with the following helpful comparison of the regime for penalty tax under the cognate Taxation Administration Act 1999 (TAA). Subsection 31(1) of the TAA imposes 25% penalty tax where a taxpayer has failed to pay their tax liability. Pursuant to subsection 31(2) it increases to 50% where the ‘default was caused wholly or partly by a failure of the person (or person acting on behalf of the taxpayer) to take reasonable care to fulfill the taxpayer’s obligation…’. Subsection 31(3) provides that the 50% penalty tax does not apply ‘if the taxpayer … had a reasonable excuse for the failure.’
[34] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at [79]
The respondent contends that the applicants’ circumstances probably fall closer to the second criteria than the first.
In Scott and Anor v Commissioner for ACT Revenue[35] the tribunal confirmed the imposition of a 50% penalty. In that case the taxpayer erred through ignorance and oversight and failed to disclose the nature and extent of the failure prior to the respondent commencing an investigation.
[35] [2013] ACAT 73, at [39]
The Tribunal finds that the 25% penalty imposed under the FHOG Act by the delegate is consistent with the rates imposed in other jurisdictions and this tribunal.
Interest is payable under section 48(1) of the FHOG Act, since the grant is repayable as the result of reversal under section 47(1)(b). In the Tribunal’s view, the matters advanced by the applicants do not provide a reasonable basis for remission of interest pursuant to section 49(6). The applicants had the benefit of the capital amount of the grant, they earned income from the property by renting it out and they retained the capital amount of the grant when they sold the property in 2010 and received the net proceeds.
Therefore pursuant to section 68 of the ACAT Act, the Tribunal confirms the decisions under review.
………………………………..
Ms E. Symons
Presidential Member
HEARING DETAILS
FILE NUMBER: | AT 14/49 & AT 14/81 |
PARTIES, APPLICANT: | MD Masud Karim & Nilufa Karim |
PARTIES, RESPONDENT: | Commissioner for ACT Revenue |
COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT | Ms H. Robinson |
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT | Ms L. Tomlins, ACT Government Solicitor |
TRIBUNAL MEMBERS: | Ms E. Symons, Presidential Member |
DATES OF HEARING: | 29 October 2014 |
PLACE OF HEARING: | ACAT Canberra ACT |
0
11
0