SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service & Ors [2023] QCA 217
PARTIES:
TASO KARAMAROUDIS
(appellant)
v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(first respondent)
MAGISTRATE TINA PREVITERA
(second respondent)
MAGISTRATE SUZETTE COATES
(third respondent)
CHIEF MAGISTRATE JANELLE BRASSINGTON
(fourth respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 5783 of 2023
SC No 13401 of 2022DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2023] QSC 72 (Wilson J)DELIVERED ON:
7 November 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
1 September 2023 and 24 October 2023
JUDGES:
Mullins P and Morrison JA and North J
ORDERS: 1. Application to adduce further evidence dismissed.
2. Appeal dismissed.
3. Application for an interlocutory injunction dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the applications and the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – REFERENCE AND REMOVAL OF PROCEEDINGS AND APPEAL AND REVIEW WITHIN COURT – GENERALLY – where the appellant made an application to the Supreme Court to re-hear a partially heard committal from the Magistrates Court – where the Magistrates Court does not have the power to permanently stay a partially heard committal under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld)
COURTS AND JUDGES – COURTS – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where the appellant sought relief that the respondents be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Legal Services Commission – where there is no cause of action available at common law to the appellant to seek relief in the form of an order referring material to prosecuting or investigation authorities – where a “public official” is bound by the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) – where the appellant sought leave to amend the originating application to join a further nine respondents to his claim – where the application to amend the originating application was dismissed
COURTS AND JUDGES – JUDGES – DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS – PARTICULAR GROUNDS – CONDUCT, INCLUDING PUBLISHED STATEMENTS – where the appellant alleged apprehended and actual bias due to the magistrate’s conduct during a hearing – where the appellant contends that the primary judge demonstrated actual and apprehended bias and concealed corrupt practices of the Magistrates Court – whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness because he could not ventilate his whole argument at administrative mentions – where the appellant misunderstands the scope of procedural fairness – where the appellant contends that the Magistrates Court cannot bring a impartial mind to hearing his matter
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46, cited
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; [2011] HCA 2, cited
Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd v Hennessey Building Pty Ltd[2022] QCA 232, cited
Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29, cited
Dupois v Queensland Police & Anor [2022] QSC 241, cited
Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63, cited
Hassan v Sydney Local Health…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] QCA 217
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court dismissed the appellant's application to adduce further evidence and his appeal. The court held that the Magistrates Court does not have the power to permanently stay a partially heard committal under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). The court also held that there is no cause of action available at common law for a person to seek relief in the form of an order referring a person for investigation when that is sought by a private individual. The appellant's application to join a further nine respondents to his claim was also dismissed.
The court further held that the appellant had misunderstood the scope of procedural fairness and that the Magistrates Court could bring an impartial mind to hearing his matter. The court also dismissed the appellant's application for an interlocutory injunction.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's application to re-hear a partially heard committal from the Magistrates Court. The court held that the Magistrates Court does not have the power to permanently stay a partially heard committal and that there is no cause of action available at common law for a person to seek relief in the form of an order referring a person for investigation when that is sought by a private individual. The appellant's application to join a further nine respondents to his claim was also dismissed. The court ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the applications and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application to adduce further evidence dismissed.
2. Appeal dismissed.
3. Application for an interlocutory injunction dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the applications and the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant’s contentions were that:(a)Hassan[7] and McEwan[8] contradicted one another, and were irrelevant or inapplicable; the absurdity of those cases could be seen by the court’s referral of material to the Legal Services Commission in Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd v Hennessey Building Pty Ltd;[9] and(b)the court had power to direct the prosecution or investigation of a person under:(i)s 36 and s 38 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld);(ii)s 429 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld);(iii)s 5E(1) of the Law Society Act; or(iv)the common law.[7][2021] NSWCA 97.[8][2022] QSC 81.[9][2022] QCA 232.Consideration The appellant’s attempt to distinguish Hassan and McEwan is misconceived. He persistently failed to come to grips with the two distinct situations. One is where a court, of its own motion, refers material to relevant authorities in the course of proceedings. That falls within the court’s jurisdiction. The other case is where that form of relief is sought by a party to the proceedings or a private person. In the second case there is no cause of action available for a person to seek such relief. No support is available from Chapel of Angels, as that is a case in the first category, not the second. Hassan and McEwan were both relevant and persuasive, if not binding. The problem identified by Brereton JA in paragraph [40] of Hassan (see paragraph [21] above) was later endorsed in a subsequent edition of the Hassan litigation, Hassan v Sydney Local Health District (No 5).[10] There the Court of Appeal of New South Wales referred to a decision of Brereton JA where he refused an order sought by Mrs Hassan to refer a person to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions:[11]“his Honour was correct to conclude that Mrs Hassan was not entitled to an order that numerous named persons associated with the RPA, and judicial officers who had heard her claims, should be referred to the CDPP for allegedly breaching the Crimes Act 1914 and the Criminal Code. Leaving aside the profound and insurmountable constitutional problems with Mrs Hassan’s suggestion, not the slightest evidence was provided warranting referral of anybody to any (federal or state) investigatory or disciplinary body;”[10][2021] NSWCA 197.[11]Hassan v Sydney Local Health District at [31](2). Emphasis added. The learned primary judge was, in our respectful view, correct to apply both Hassan and McEwan. Nothing in s 36 or s 38 of the Crime and Corruption Act has the effect of enabling the court to grant relief in the form of an order referring a person for investigation when that is sought by a private individual. Section 36 governs when a person can make a complaint about corruption to the Crime and Corruption Commission:“36 Complaining about corruption(1)A person may make a complaint about corruption to the commission for the purpose of the commission dealing with the complaint under section 35.(2)Subsection (1) does not limit to whom a person can complain about corruption.Examples—1A person may complain directly to the commissioner of police about corruption.2A person may complain directly to the chief executive of a government department about corruption happening within the department.”