Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service

Link copied
Case Copied 77 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service & Ors [2023] QCA 217

PARTIES:

TASO KARAMAROUDIS
(appellant)
v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(first respondent)
MAGISTRATE TINA PREVITERA
(second respondent)
MAGISTRATE SUZETTE COATES
(third respondent)
CHIEF MAGISTRATE JANELLE BRASSINGTON
(fourth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 5783 of 2023
SC No 13401 of 2022

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2023] QSC 72 (Wilson J)

DELIVERED ON:

7 November 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 September 2023 and 24 October 2023

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Morrison JA and North J

ORDERS:

1.   Application to adduce further evidence dismissed.

2.   Appeal dismissed.

3.   Application for an interlocutory injunction dismissed.

4.   The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the applications and the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – REFERENCE AND REMOVAL OF PROCEEDINGS AND APPEAL AND REVIEW WITHIN COURT – GENERALLY – where the appellant made an application to the Supreme Court to re-hear a partially heard committal from the Magistrates Court – where the Magistrates Court does not have the power to permanently stay a partially heard committal under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld)

COURTS AND JUDGES – COURTS – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where the appellant sought relief that the respondents be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Legal Services Commission – where there is no cause of action available at common law to the appellant to seek relief in the form of an order referring material to prosecuting or investigation authorities – where a “public official” is bound by the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) – where the appellant sought leave to amend the originating application to join a further nine respondents to his claim – where the application to amend the originating application was dismissed

COURTS AND JUDGES – JUDGES – DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS – PARTICULAR GROUNDS – CONDUCT, INCLUDING PUBLISHED STATEMENTS – where the appellant alleged apprehended and actual bias due to the magistrate’s conduct during a hearing – where the appellant contends that the primary judge demonstrated actual and apprehended bias and concealed corrupt practices of the Magistrates Court – whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness because he could not ventilate his whole argument at administrative mentions – where the appellant misunderstands the scope of procedural fairness – where the appellant contends that the Magistrates Court cannot bring a impartial mind to hearing his matter

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46, cited
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; [2011] HCA 2, cited
Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd v Hennessey Building Pty Ltd[2022] QCA 232, cited
Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29, cited
Dupois v Queensland Police & Anor [2022] QSC 241, cited
Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63, cited
Hassan v Sydney Local Health…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] QCA 217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Mr Karamaroudis, filed an application in the Supreme Court to re-hear a partially heard committal from the Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court had previously refused his application for a permanent stay of the proceedings. The respondents were the Queensland Police Service, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the Legal Services Commission. The primary legal issues were whether the Magistrates Court had the power to permanently stay a partially heard committal and whether the appellant had a cause of action to seek relief in the form of an order referring material to prosecuting or investigation authorities. Additionally, the appellant sought leave to amend the originating application to join a further nine respondents to his claim.

The court dismissed the appellant's application to adduce further evidence and his appeal. The court held that the Magistrates Court does not have the power to permanently stay a partially heard committal under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). The court also held that there is no cause of action available at common law for a person to seek relief in the form of an order referring a person for investigation when that is sought by a private individual. The appellant's application to join a further nine respondents to his claim was also dismissed.

The court further held that the appellant had misunderstood the scope of procedural fairness and that the Magistrates Court could bring an impartial mind to hearing his matter. The court also dismissed the appellant's application for an interlocutory injunction.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's application to re-hear a partially heard committal from the Magistrates Court. The court held that the Magistrates Court does not have the power to permanently stay a partially heard committal and that there is no cause of action available at common law for a person to seek relief in the form of an order referring a person for investigation when that is sought by a private individual. The appellant's application to join a further nine respondents to his claim was also dismissed. The court ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the applications and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application to adduce further evidence dismissed.

2. Appeal dismissed.

3. Application for an interlocutory injunction dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the applications and the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The relevant chronology of events was summarised by the learned primary judge in a way not criticised by the appellant:[5][5]Reasons below [5]-[22].“[5] On 25 March 2021 the applicant was charged with unlawfully stalking his neighbour from between 1 February 2018 and 25 March 2021. On this date, a bail affidavit was sworn by the arresting officer opposing bail.[6]At the first mention on 26 March 2021, the applicant was denied bail and it was not until 12 April 2021 that he was granted bail.[7]This matter then had a number of mentions and between November 2021 and February 2022, various legal representatives of the applicant were given leave to withdraw.[8]On 7 March 2022, directions were made by Magistrate Coates for the filing of applications and the matter was listed for 11 April 2022.[9]On 17 March 2022, there was a directions hearing before Acting Magistrate Paul Byrne. The applicant made an application for disclosure and an order was made requiring police disclosure within 21 days in relation to a copy of a list of dates and reasons for police call-out and attendance upon the applicant during the period of March 2011 and March 2021. The applicant’s other applications were dismissed. It is difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred at this hearing as no transcript has been provided.[10]The applicant then made an application to re-open the directions hearing of 17 March 2022. On 21 March 2022 this application was refused in chambers with the matter to remain as listed for 31 March 2022.[11]On 31 March 2022, the applicant made two applications before Magistrate Previtera:(a)an application to re-open the directions hearing of 17 March 2022; and(b)an application for a permanent stay of the proceedings.[12]Both applications were refused. Directions were made for the serving of a notice [Pursuant to section 110B(3) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld)] by 14 April 2022 requiring police to respond by 28 April 2022. An application for leave to cross-examine was listed for half a day on 14 June 2022.[13]On 4 April 2022, the applicant filed an application to re-open a hearing. The application did not particularise which hearing he wished to re-open. The then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington proceeded on the basis it was the 31 March 2022 hearing and refused the application on 5 April 2022.[14]Pursuant to section 110B of the Justices Act the applicant sent correspondence (dated 14 April 2022 and 28 June 2022) to Brisbane Police Prosecutions stating that he wished to cross-examine:(a) the arresting officer;(b) the complainant; and(c) a witness who gave a statement for the prosecution.[15]The prosecution responded on 20 April 2022 and on 4 July 2022. Whilst the prosecution did consent to some topics, they did not consent to a range of topics of cross-examination as set out by the applicant.[16]On 14 June 2022, O’Sullivan Lawyers was given a Legal Aid grant and appeared on the record. Directions were made for the parties to file and serve material.[17]On 7 July 2022, O’Sullivan Lawyers was no longer acting for the applicant.[18]On 25 August 2022, the applicant represented himself before Magistrate Previtera in relation to an:(a)application to recuse Magistrate Previtera; and(b)application for leave to cross-examine three witnesses at a committal hearing.[19]Magistrate Previtera refused the application to recuse herself.[20]Later in the afternoon, the applicant had difficulty with his breathing and applied for an adjournment of the hearing. Her Honour stood the matter down for five minutes, during which, an ambulance was called. The applicant was unable to return to court to finalise the leave to cross-examine hearing.[21]The magistrate has not made a decision in relation to the three witnesses required for cross-examination by the applicant. This matter remains part heard.[22]On 1 November the applicant filed this application in the Supreme Court.”Refusal to admit evidence and joinder of new respondents

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant them submitted that unless there was an assurance that the committal hearing date would be vacated he wished to proceed with the application in the Supreme Court. He added that he had “agreed conditionally to an adjournment”, at which point Ms Donkin said:[145]“MS DONKIN: Which is what we intend to do. … I have communicated that with the applicant, and that is certainly the path that we will proceed with. I cannot speak for the magistrate’s decision, although I don’t anticipate that it’s likely that an adjournment would not be granted.HIS HONOUR: Yes.MS DONKIN: And I say that for the benefit of the applicant.”[145]Transcript 1-6 lines 1-8. Emphasis added. It was at this point that Counsel for the respondent Magistrates prosed to say something:[146]“MR NEVARD: Your Honour, perhaps I should briefly say something on the matter.….MR NEVARD: I hesitate to rise. As your Honour would appreciate, I’m instructed for three members of the magistracy, including the chief magistrate. And so the position, ultimately, that my clients will be taking in this matter is consistent with the Hardiman principle.HIS HONOUR: Yes.MR NEVARD; Which is that they will abide the orders of the court, and they do intend to seek some small exceptions to that on the issue of costs, and there’s also a separate issue, unrelated to final orders, where there’s been some agitation about the court’s power to make a referral to various bodies, and we may, jurisdictionally only, seek to be heard on that. But your Honour would appreciate that I am not in any position to give any sorts of guarantees … or comment on the merits on my client’s part.”[146]Transcript 1-8 lines 12-32. Emphasis added. The appellant continued to make submissions including an application that the judge “formally stand aside from this matter”, which lead to the judge saying:[147]“HIS HONOUR: Could you be quiet for a minute? Thank you. What I understand the position to be is that the prosecution have agreed to an adjournment of the hearing for 10 November 2022 and they will ask the Magistrates Court to adjourn that hearing by consent.APPLICANT: Okay.HIS HONOUR: Now, in those circumstances, I would not make an order directing another court to adjourn something.”[147]Transcript 1-11 lines 23-31. Emphasis added. The appellant contends that it is evident from the transcript that Counsel for the respondent magistrates was a party to the agreement to vacate the hearing date for the committal.[148] That point was at the forefront of his oral submissions.[148]Application outline paragraph 2.1. A fair reading of those exchanges compels the conclusion that there was no such agreement by Counsel for the Crown. It is, in our view, plain that whilst the QPS representative agreed to seek an adjournment of the committal hearing, that was something ultimately for the Magistrates Court to consider when that was sought. Of course, as the QPS representative said, there was an expectation that if the parties consented to the requested adjournment it was likely to be granted, but there is no rational suggestion that the Magistrate respondents bound themselves to do so. In fact, Counsel for the Magistrates made that clear when he said that he was “not in any position to give any sorts of guarantees”.Breach of the agreement on 10 November 2022?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant’s contentions were that:(a)Hassan[7] and McEwan[8] contradicted one another, and were irrelevant or inapplicable; the absurdity of those cases could be seen by the court’s referral of material to the Legal Services Commission in Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd v Hennessey Building Pty Ltd;[9] and(b)the court had power to direct the prosecution or investigation of a person under:(i)s 36 and s 38 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld);(ii)s 429 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld);(iii)s 5E(1) of the Law Society Act; or(iv)the common law.[7][2021] NSWCA 97.[8][2022] QSC 81.[9][2022] QCA 232.Consideration The appellant’s attempt to distinguish Hassan and McEwan is misconceived. He persistently failed to come to grips with the two distinct situations. One is where a court, of its own motion, refers material to relevant authorities in the course of proceedings. That falls within the court’s jurisdiction. The other case is where that form of relief is sought by a party to the proceedings or a private person. In the second case there is no cause of action available for a person to seek such relief. No support is available from Chapel of Angels, as that is a case in the first category, not the second. Hassan and McEwan were both relevant and persuasive, if not binding. The problem identified by Brereton JA in paragraph [40] of Hassan (see paragraph [21] above) was later endorsed in a subsequent edition of the Hassan litigation, Hassan v Sydney Local Health District (No 5).[10] There the Court of Appeal of New South Wales referred to a decision of Brereton JA where he refused an order sought by Mrs Hassan to refer a person to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions:[11]“his Honour was correct to conclude that Mrs Hassan was not entitled to an order that numerous named persons associated with the RPA, and judicial officers who had heard her claims, should be referred to the CDPP for allegedly breaching the Crimes Act 1914 and the Criminal Code. Leaving aside the profound and insurmountable constitutional problems with Mrs Hassan’s suggestion, not the slightest evidence was provided warranting referral of anybody to any (federal or state) investigatory or disciplinary body;”[10][2021] NSWCA 197.[11]Hassan v Sydney Local Health District at [31](2). Emphasis added. The learned primary judge was, in our respectful view, correct to apply both Hassan and McEwan. Nothing in s 36 or s 38 of the Crime and Corruption Act has the effect of enabling the court to grant relief in the form of an order referring a person for investigation when that is sought by a private individual. Section 36 governs when a person can make a complaint about corruption to the Crime and Corruption Commission:“36 Complaining about corruption(1)A person may make a complaint about corruption to the commission for the purpose of the commission dealing with the complaint under section 35.(2)Subsection (1) does not limit to whom a person can complain about corruption.Examples—1A person may complain directly to the commissioner of police about corruption.2A person may complain directly to the chief executive of a government department about corruption happening within the department.”