Charles Dupois Appellant v Queensland Police

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[2024] QCA 230

COURT OF APPEAL

BOND JA
BODDICE JA
WILSON J

Appeal No 2979 of 2024
SC No 4348 of 2023
SC No 5226 of 2023

CHARLES DUPOIS  Appellant

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE  First Respondent

MAGISTRATE STROFIELD  Second Respondent

MAGISTRATE PREVITERA  Third Respondent

BRISBANE

WEDNESDAY, 20 NOVEMBER 2024

JUDGMENT

BOND JA:  The Court indicated to the parties here present that the appellant’s email of 18 November 2024, which is exhibit 1 before the Court today, would be treated as a further application for adjournment by the appellant.  The application was opposed by the respondents.

The Court has had regard to the unreported judgment of Mullins P of 23 September 2024 and my unreported judgment of 28 October 2024, which dealt with previous adjournment applications by the appellant.

In the present circumstances where the appellant has advanced no evidence beyond his assertions in his email of 18 November 2024 and

(a)the appellant had the benefit of the additional time which I gave him in the directions hearing of 17 May 2024;

(b)the appellant agitated the issue of an adjournment before Mullins P on 23 September 2024 and again before me on 28 October 2024, obtaining about a six-week adjournment from Mullins P and failing before me; and

(c)no challenge has been advanced to those two decisions and no new evidence provided,

I conclude that an adjournment should not be granted, and the hearing should proceed.

BODDICE JA:  I agree.

WILSON J:  I agree.

BOND JA:  The Court orders that the informal adjournment application is refused.

…

BOND JA:  Turning now to treating exhibit 1 as a recusal application addressed to me.  …  I will proceed to rule on the application.  I treat the email, which is exhibit 1, as an informal application to me that I should recuse myself.  The appellant’s email contends that Mullins P, Morrison JA and I, have a clearcut bias, “towards him”.  I take it that he means “against him.”

If his case is that of actual bias, then the test is that explained recently in Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service [2023] QCA 217 at [182]-[183]. The allegation would be a grave one. Making it good would require proof that I have, in fact, approached the issues concerning the appellant with a closed mind or have so prejudged them that I was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented.” The appellant advances no evidence of actual bias. If his argument is founded on actual bias, I reject it.

The test for recusal for apparent bias is the well-known Ebner test, as explained by the High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; and, QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419.

The question is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind…

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Details
Case
[2024] QCA 230
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Charles Dupois is appealing against the decisions of the Queensland Police and two Magistrates, Strofield and Previtera, in a case heard before the Queensland Court of Appeal. The appeal, number 2979 of 2024, is against earlier decisions made in proceedings SC No 4348 of 2023 and SC No 5226 of 2023. The primary legal issues the court needed to address were whether the appeal was correctly filed and whether it demonstrated any error in the earlier decisions by Justice Morrison, a single judge of appeal. The respondents argued that the appeal was incorrectly filed and was, in essence, an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal examined the nature of the appeal and found it to be improperly filed. The appeal should have been an application to the Court of Appeal for review or discharge of the orders made by the single judge of appeal, as per section 44(4) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991. Despite this procedural flaw, the court considered whether it should treat the appeal as an application under section 44(4). The appellant had been informed of the procedural issues in previous hearings but chose to proceed with the appeal anyway. The Court concluded that this decision was fatal to the proceeding, rendering it incompetent. Additionally, the court found that the appellant had not identified any substantive error in the earlier decisions, and his appeal documents were scandalous and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, struck out the notice of appeal, and ordered Dupois to pay the costs of the first and second respondents, including their costs for the summary dismissal applications. The third respondent, Magistrate Previtera, chose not to participate in the proceedings beyond her initial notification, and no costs were sought against her. The Court emphasized that the appellant’s right to appeal was not being denied but that the manner in which it was pursued was inappropriate and abusive.

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