Kapugama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kapugama v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 337

MIGRATION – protection visas – review of decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) – whether there was no evidence to justify the making of the decision – whether comments made by the Tribunal in relation to evidence constitute “particular facts” found by the Tribunal – whether the Tribunal set out its findings on all material questions of fact – whether the Tribunal had properly applied the “real chance” test in determining whether the applicants had a well founded fear of persecution

WORDS AND PHRASES – “particular fact”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 430(1), s 476(1)(a), s 476(1)(e), s 476(1)(g), s 476(4)(b)

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 referred to
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 referred to
Chen Xin He v MIEA (Nicholson J, 23 November 1995, unreported) referred to
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547 referred to
Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 264 at [15] referred to
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287 followed
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 followed
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 at [31] followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 at [56] followed
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [67] followed

JUNIKKU H S SUDESH KAPUGAMA, SUMACHANDRANI K K DEWAGE AND ROWAYNE KAPUGAMA V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1261 OF 2000

STONE J
2 APRIL 2001

SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1261 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

JUNIKKU H S SUDESH KAPUGAMA
FIRST APPLICANT

SUMACHANDRANI K K DEWAGE
SECOND APPLICANT

ROWAYNE KAPUGAMA
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 APRIL 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   the application be dismissed;

2.   the applicants pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1261 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

JUNIKKU H S SUDESH KAPUGAMA
FIRST APPLICANT

SUMACHANDRANI K K DEWAGE
SECOND APPLICANT

ROWAYNE KAPUGAMA
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE:

2 APRIL 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicants arrived in Australia on 8 March 1996. The first and second applicants are husband and wife respectively; the third applicant is their son. On 4 June 1996, they lodged an application for protection visas with the Department of Immigration…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 337
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kapugama, an applicant for judicial review, challenged the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) that his claim for refugee status was not valid. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the RRT's decision was legally sound. Key issues included whether the RRT based its decision on non-existent facts, failed to properly outline its findings, misinterpreted the applicable law, and misapplied the "real chance" test regarding the applicant's fear of persecution.

The court examined the applicant's claims that specific factual findings by the RRT were incorrect and thus undermined the validity of the decision. One such claim was that the RRT incorrectly stated the date when the applicant's father reported the alleged mistreatment to the police. The court found that the RRT did not make the error as alleged by the applicant; it had, in fact, referenced an earlier complaint date. Consequently, this claim was dismissed. The court also reviewed other factual assertions made by the applicant, including the timing and nature of complaints made to human rights organisations, and concluded that the RRT's findings were supported by the evidence.

The Federal Court held that the RRT's decision was legally sound and dismissed the application for judicial review. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the application be dismissed;

2. the applicants pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Kapugama, filed an amended application for an order of review on 28 February 2001, seeking to challenge a decision made by the Tribunal. The grounds for review included allegations that the Tribunal based its decision on particular facts that did not exist, failed to set out its findings on material questions of fact, made a decision not authorised by the Act, incorrectly interpreted the applicable law, and failed to properly apply the "real chance" test regarding the applicant's fear of persecution. Specifically, the applicant contested the Tribunal's finding that the first report of the applicant's mistreatment to the police was made in May 1996, rather than in August 1995 as the applicant claimed. The Tribunal had found that the report made in May 1996 was unclear and not helpful to the applicant's case. The respondent argued that the Tribunal did not actually find that the May 1996 report was the first, as it had referred to an earlier complaint made on 25 August 1995.

The case involved an application for an order of review filed by the applicant on 28 February 2001, following leave granted by Registrar Hedge on 14 December 2001. The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the Tribunal on multiple grounds, including errors in the Tribunal's findings of fact and interpretation of the law. The matter was brought before the court to determine the validity of the application for review and to decide on the appropriate orders in relation to the application and costs.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

A fully particularised amended application for an order of review was filed by the applicant on 28 February 2001, pursuant to leave given by Registrar Hedge on 14 December 2001. The grounds set out in the application for an order of review are:1. the Tribunal based its decision on the existence of particular facts which did not exist (s 476(1)(g));2. the Tribunal failed to set out its findings on material questions of fact as required by s 430(1)(c) and failed to observe requisite procedures (s 476(1)(a), made a decision not authorised by the Act (s 476 (1)(c)) and incorrectly interpreted the applicable law (s 476(1)(e)).3. the Tribunal failed to properly apply the “real chance” test as to whether the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution (s 476(1)(a), s 476(1)(e)).No evidence The applicant claims that there are a number of findings of fact on which the Tribunal’s decision is based (either together or separately) and which do not exist. In the absence of those facts it is claimed that there is no evidence to justify the making of the Tribunal’s decision. The first of the findings of fact challenged by the applicant relates to the reporting of the applicant’s mistreatment to the police. According to the applicant, the Tribunal found that the first report to the police of the detention, questioning and mistreatment that the applicant suffered in February 1995 was made in May 1996, well over a year after the alleged detention. The applicant contends, however, that the evidence before the Tribunal was that the first complaint was made to the police in 25 August 1995. He relies on the fact that the police report dated 25 May 1996 states, inter alia, “On 25-8-1995 I made a complaint to this police CIB IV – 232 / 368.”. The Tribunal’s comment was:“The tribunal finds that the report made by the Applicant’s father to the Police does not assist the Applicant’s case; the report was allegedly made in May 1996, well over a year after detention and torture of the Applicant and its purpose is unclear especially given the extremely vague content.” The respondent submitted that the Tribunal did not make any express finding that the report made in May 1996 was the first report made to the police and, to the contrary, had referred earlier in its reasons to the fact that a complaint was made on 25 August 1995. The respondent is clearly correct in submitting that the Tribunal did not make the error alleged and in relation to this finding the applicant’s claim cannot succeed. The second finding of fact challenged by the applicant relates to the applicant’s father’s complaint to the Sri Lanka Foundation Human Rights Centre. In relation to this issue the Tribunal made the following comment:“The Tribunal finds that the letter of complaint written by the Applicant’s father to the lawyer, and resultant correspondence, also does not assist the Applicant’s case. The initial letter was written in March 1997, 3 years after the Applicant’s alleged detention and torture and it is incredibly vague in relation to what happened to the Applicant and when, about the background to his alleged detention and torture and about the alleged inquiries about him from unknown people. The Tribunal is satisfied that the report and letter are not serious attempts to seek inquiry and redress.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE J
Issues
1. Whether the Tribunal based its decision on the existence of particular facts which did not exist.
2. Whether the Tribunal failed to set out its findings on material questions of fact as required by the Act.
3. Whether the Tribunal made a decision not authorised by the Act.
4. Whether the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the applicable law.
5. Whether the Tribunal failed to properly apply the "real chance" test as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution.

Held
1. The court held that the Tribunal did not base its decision on the existence of particular facts which did not exist.
2. The court held that the Tribunal did not fail to set out its findings on material questions of fact as required by the Act.
3. The court held that the Tribunal did not make a decision not authorised by the Act.
4. The court held that the Tribunal did not incorrectly interpret the applicable law.
5. The court held that the Tribunal did not fail to properly apply the "real chance" test as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE J

The court examined the particularised amended application for an order of review filed by the applicant. It noted that the applicant's claims included that the Tribunal based its decision on the existence of particular facts which did not exist, the Tribunal failed to set out its findings on material questions of fact, the Tribunal made a decision not authorised by the Act, the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the applicable law, and the Tribunal failed to properly apply the "real chance" test. The court first addressed the applicant's claim that the Tribunal based its decision on the existence of particular facts which did not exist. The court noted that the Tribunal did not make any express finding that the report made in May 1996 was the first report made to the police, and in relation to this finding the applicant's claim could not succeed. The court also noted that the Tribunal had referred earlier in its reasons to the fact that a complaint was made on 25 August 1995. The court then addressed the applicant's claim that the Tribunal failed to set out its findings on material questions of fact as required by the Act. The court noted that the Tribunal's reasons for decision included a detailed statement of the relevant facts, and thus the applicant's claim could not succeed. The court then addressed the applicant's claim that the Tribunal made a decision not authorised by the Act. The court noted that the Tribunal's decision was within the scope of its authority, and thus the applicant's claim could not succeed. The court then addressed the applicant's claim that the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the applicable law. The court noted that the Tribunal's interpretation of the applicable law was correct, and thus the applicant's claim could not succeed. Finally, the court addressed the applicant's claim that the Tribunal failed to properly apply the "real chance" test. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the relevant evidence and applied the correct legal test, and thus the applicant's claim could not succeed. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that a reviewing court should not interfere with a Tribunal's decision unless it is shown to be plainly wrong or unjust. The court distinguished prior authority that suggested a lower threshold for review in cases involving the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to particular evidence.