Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2002] FCA 906

TRADE MARKS – sale of unauthorised copies of computer games – reproduction of electronic representations of trade marks – whether infringement of trade marks.

FAIR TRADING – sale of unauthorised copies of computer games – whether respondent represented that the copies had the sponsorship, approval or affiliation of the applicants.

COPYRIGHT – Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 116A – “technological protection measure” – “circumvention device” – computer games contain an access code – games can be played on console only if the access code is recognised by a Boot ROM – whether the access code and Boot ROM constitute a “technological protection measure” within s 10(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) – whether the device is “designed, in the ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright” – whether it is enough for a device to deter or discourage copyright infringement – whether a substantial part of the game’s computer program is reproduced in the console’s RAM – whether part of the program is reproduced “in a material form”.

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 10, 21(6), 21(1A), 24, 31, 36(1), 37, 38, 47AB, 47B, 47C, 52, 86(a), 98(2), 116A, 116D, 131, 132(5B)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss 120, 122
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth)
Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), ss 42, 44, 49

Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Bill 2002 (Cth)
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (Cth)
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda Bill) 2000 (Cth)

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), s 296

CopyrightAct (17 USC § 101)

WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, art 11
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996, art 18
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society (Directive 2001/29/EC)

Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2001] FCA 1379, cited.
Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 8, followed.
Sony Computer Entertainment Aust Pty Ltd v Jakopcevic [2001] FCA 1520, cited.
Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 1) (1992) 173 CLR 330, cited.
Australian Video Retailers Association Ltd v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd (2001) 52 IPR 242, followed.
Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300, cited.
Sony Computer Entertainment v Owen [2002] EWHC 45, cited.
MAI Systems Corporation v Peak Computer Inc 991 F2d 511 (9th Cir 1993), distinguished.
Intellectual Reserve, Inc v Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc 75 F Supp 2d 1290 (D Utah 2000), distinguished.
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, cited.
Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd (1999) 202 CLR 1, cited.
Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited [2002] FCAFC 112, cited.
Dyason v Autodesk Inc (1990) 24 FCR 147, distinguished.
Microsoft Corporation v Business Boost Pty Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 573, distinguished.
Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Commissioner…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 906
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment, Sony Computer Entertainment (Europe) Limited, and Sony Australia Limited (the applicants) brought an action against Mr Stevens, a resident of New South Wales, regarding alleged copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and contravention of consumer protection laws. The applicants argued that Mr Stevens had infringed their rights by modifying the PlayStation console to enable it to play unlicensed computer games, effectively circumventing the technological protection measures in place. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues revolved around whether the storage of substantial parts of copyrighted films in the PlayStation's RAM constituted copyright infringement, whether the Boot ROM and access codes were technological protection measures under the Copyright Act 1968, and whether Mr Stevens' actions violated the trade mark and Fair Trading Act. The court had to determine the nature of the storage in RAM and its implications under copyright law, as well as the applicability of the technological protection measures.

Justice Tamberlin held that storing substantial parts of copyrighted films in the RAM of the PlayStation console constituted copyright infringement. However, he found that the RAM storage did not amount to a 'technological protection measure' as defined in the Copyright Act. Consequently, the applicants' claim under section 116A(5) of the Act failed. Justice Tamberlin also found that Mr Stevens had infringed the Sony trademarks but did not contravene the Fair Trading Act. The court concluded that the applicants were entitled to declarations of trademark infringement but declined to make any orders for costs at that stage.

The court ordered that Mr Stevens had infringed the Sony trademarks. It declined to make any orders for costs in relation to the liability proceedings at that time but invited submissions from the parties if they wished to make any.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

According to Mr Bannon, the operation of a PlayStation game involves storing in the RAM of the PlayStation console a substantial part of each of the Films. This constitutes making a copy of the Film since, with the aid of the CPU (Central Processing Unit), the sources and images are capable of being reproduced on screen from the RAM. The Boot ROM and access code prevent infringement of copyright in the Films by this form of copying.THE FACTSTHE SONY COMPANIES Sony Japan was established in Japan in November 1993, as a subsidiary of Sony Corporation. Sony Europe is a subsidiary of Sony Japan. The third applicant Sony Australia is a subsidiary of Sony Europe and was incorporated on 4 June 1997. Sony Japan’s business includes the manufacture and distribution of·the Sony PlayStation console;·the PlayStation 2 computer entertainment system; and·software and accessories for use with the PlayStation and PlayStation 2 consoles.Sony Europe is responsible for the development, marketing and distribution of PlayStation hardware, software and accessories in a number of European countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand. The present case concerns the PlayStation console and related software and accessories, not the PlayStation 2 computer entertainment system. Sony Australia’s business includes the sale, marketing and distribution of PlayStation consoles, games and accessories. Sony Japan exercises complete control over Sony Australia’s trading activities. In particular, Sony Australia is required to order all consoles, games and accessories from Sony Europe or third parties licensed by Sony Europe. Sony Europe has the right to limit the quantity supplied to Sony Australia during any given period and the right to set the transfer price of the products acquired by Sony Australia. In turn, Sony Japan controls Sony Europe’s activities. The PlayStation console was launched by Sony Japan in Japan in December 1994; by Sony Entertainment America Inc (“Sony America”) in the United States in September 1995; by Sony Europe in various European countries in September 1995; and by Sony Music Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd (“Sony Music Australia”) in November 1995. Sony Australia took over the supply and distribution in Australia of the Sony products following its incorporation in 1997.THE PLAYSTATION SYSTEM The PlayStation console is essentially a video apparatus featuring a deck, a control and software designed for the playing of CD-ROMs. The PlayStation console, when used in conjunction with compatible computer game software, simulates three dimension action for the player. The PlayStation console plugs into the back of a television set or monitor. The console itself consists of the CPU, a custom graphics processing unit (“GPU”), a sound processing unit, a read-only memory (“ROM”) based internal operating system, RAM, video memory and, when inserted, CD–ROM based software media. The components of the PlayStation console communicate together via a main “bus” and a “sub bus”. All CD controller functions communicate via the “sub-bus”. The PlayStation console supports two game controllers that connect to the front of the console and communicate directly with the CPU, via a serial communication protocol.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SACKVILLE J
It follows from what I have said that the applicants have not established that the copyright work, comprising the computer program in the PlayStation game, was protected by a “technological protection measure” as that expression is used in s 116A(1) of the Copyright Act. Their claim to relief under s 116A(5) therefore fails.CONCLUSION In summary, the applicants’ claim for infringement of trade mark succeeds; the applicants’ claim for contravention of s 42 of the Fair Trading Act fails; the applicants’ claim under s 116A of the Copyright Act fails. I propose at this stage to make declarations that Mr Stevens has infringed the Sony Trade Marks. However, I shall list the matter in order to make directions for the further conduct of the proceedings. At that time the form of any declaratory orders can be settled. My present view is that there should be no order for costs in respect of the proceedings in relation to liability, but I shall give the parties the opportunity to make submissions on this question if they wish.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SACKVILLE J

His Honour found, on the evidence, that the loading of computer programs into a hard disk is a form of storage from which a copyright work or adaptation can be reproduced. For that reason he held (at 576) that “unauthorised copying of computer programs onto a hard disk does amount to copyright infringement”. His Honour dealt with the question of the RAM as follows (at 576):“In relation to RAM, it is possible for a computer program to remain stored in RAM indefinitely until the computer system is shut down or otherwise powered down. Accordingly, in my opinion, it follows from this evidence that the period of time during \which the instructions or data are stored in RAM can be substantial. For example, it is not infrequently the case that computers are left on for a considerable period of time with one or more programs running. The RAM storage continues over this period. The fact that that memory is vacated when power is extinguished does not necessarily mean that there has not been a substantial period of storage of the instructions and data comprised in the RAM memory.It is to be noted that the definition of ‘material form’ in the Act makes no reference to the duration of the storage and is consistent with storage being either for a short or long period. The crucial concept is ‘storage’. The present case is one where I consider regard can be had to the explanatory memorandum directed to the Copyright Amendment Bill 1984 introducing the present definition. That relevantly reads:28.The definition of ‘material form’ is new and makes it clear that the material form includes such methods as storage or reproduction on magnetic tape, read only or random access computer memory, magnetic or laser disks, bubble memories and other forms of storage which will doubtless be developed [emphasis added].It is evident from this that the definition was intended to be far-reaching and to cover not only ROM and RAM but also other types of storage to be developed in the future.” (Emphasis in original.) His Honour thought that support for this conclusion could be obtained from the United States authorities, particularly MAI Systems v Peak. Tamberlin J did not state specifically whether he considered that the definition of “material form” was satisfied because the copyright work could be reproduced from the data stored on the RAM, or for some other reason. His Honour may have taken the view that the evidence supported the former proposition. If so, Microsoft v Business Boost is distinguishable from the present case. If his Honour did not form that view, it is not clear why he regarded the transfer of data in electronic form to the RAM as a reproduction of the data in a material form. In the third case, AVRA v Warner, an issue arose as to whether the copying on to the RAM of a DVD player of a substantial part of the program instructions on a DVD involved the reproduction of a computer program in a material form. (“DVD” was apparently once an acronym of “digital video disk”. It refers to a system whereby material, both video and audio, is stored on a disc in digital form and is capable of being retrieved by a device such that the material can be converted into moving images on a screen accompanied by sound: see AVRA v Warner, at 243).