JWG v WA Police
[2023] WASC 485
•22 DECEMBER 2023
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: JWG -v- WA POLICE [2023] WASC 485
CORAM: LUNDBERG J
HEARD: 4 DECEMBER 2023
DELIVERED : 22 DECEMBER 2023
FILE NO/S: SJA 1067 of 2023
BETWEEN: JWG
Appellant
AND
WA POLICE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
For File No: SJA 1067 of 2023
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE B AYLING
File Number : PE 52933/2021, PE 52934/2021 & PE 52935/2021
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against refusal to grant spent conviction orders - Two counts of common assault and one count of disorderly behaviour in public - Assaults against security officers and urinating in public - Whether miscarriage of justice in refusing to grant spent conviction orders - Whether convictions of such a nature they are relevant to prospective employers - Public interest considerations - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 6, s 7, s 8, s 9, s14 and s 40
Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 74A(2)(a) and s 313(1)(b)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 39(2) and s 45
Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA)
Result:
Leave to adduce further evidence granted
Leave to appeal allowed and appeal allowed
Spent conviction orders made
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | N R Sinton |
| Respondent | : | H M Cowie |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Legal Aid - Perth - Criminal Appeals |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] WASC 112
Brewer v Bayens [2002] WASCA 271; (2002) 26 WAR 510
GNR v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 5
Hull v Castledine [2005] WASC 225
Indich v Bracknell [2005] WASC 225
JJF v Tattersall [2018] WASC 170
Pagnoni v Jones [2023] WASC 356
R v Tognini [2000] WASCA 31
Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473
Wright v McMurchy [2012] WASCA 257
Table of Contents
A. Introduction
B. The proceedings below
C. Evidence on appeal
D. Relevant principles
E. Disposition
F. Conclusion and orders
LUNDBERG J:
A. Introduction
The appellant applies for leave to appeal against the decision by the Learned Magistrate on 20 July 2023 to refuse to grant him spent convictions orders. The sole ground of appeal is that the refusal to grant those orders resulted in a miscarriage of justice.[1]
[1] Appeal notice dated 15 August 2023, pg 1. By consent, an order has been made to amend the appeal notice to substitute the miscarriage of justice ground for the previous ground. See ts 2-3, 4 December 2023.
The appellant's application for leave to appeal is made under div 2 of pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CA Act).
An aggrieved party may appeal a sentence imposed as a result of a conviction.[2] The grounds of appeal may include where there has been an error of law, where a sentence has been imposed that was inadequate, and where there has been a miscarriage of justice.[3]
[2] CA Act, s 6(f) and s 7(1).
[3] CA Act, s 8(1)(a) and (b).
Leave to appeal must not be granted on a ground of appeal unless the court is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding,[4] meaning that the ground is required to have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding.[5] Unless leave to appeal is granted on at least one ground, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed.[6]
[4] CA Act, s 9(2).
[5] Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [56] (Steytler P, Wheeler & Roberts-Smith JJA).
[6] CA Act, s 14(2).
Even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.[7]
[7] CA Act, s 9(3).
B. The proceedings below
The appellant was convicted of three offences following trial, being two counts of common assault committed on two security officers (contrary to s 313(1) of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) (Code)) and one count of disorderly behaviour in public (contrary to s 74A of the Code). The appellant was legally represented throughout the proceedings below.
The conduct which grounded the charges, and resulting convictions, occurred on 7 November 2021.
Approximately an hour before sunrise at 5.50am, the appellant was observed by two security officers to be urinating in the bushes at the front of a hostel in Stirling Street, Perth. He was affected by alcohol. The security officers confronted the appellant. The appellant spat twice on the first security officer. The second security officer then pushed the appellant away. The appellant punched the second security officer in the face. Both officers then attempted to restrain the appellant by pinning him to the ground. While being held to the ground, the appellant punched one of the security officers and bit the arm of the other who was holding him down.[8]
[8] ts 110 - 111, 20 July 2023; ts 4, 19 July 2023.
Section 313(1) of the Code provides as follows:
313. Common assault
(1)Any person who unlawfully assaults another is guilty of a simple offence and is liable —
…
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for 18 months and a fine of $18,000.
Section 74A of the Code provides as follows:
74A. Disorderly behaviour in public
(1) In this section —
behave in a disorderly manner includes —
(a) to use insulting, offensive or threatening language; and
(b) to behave in an insulting, offensive or threatening manner.
(2) A person who behaves in a disorderly manner —
(a) in a public place or in the sight or hearing of any person who is in a public place; or
(b) in a police station or lock-up, is guilty of an offence and is liable to a fine of $6,000.
(3) A person who has the control or management of a place where food or refreshments are sold to or consumed by the public and who permits a person to behave in a disorderly manner in that place is guilty of an offence and is liable to a fine of $4,000.
The Magistrate imposed fines of $1,000 for each of the assault convictions and $500 for the disorderly behaviour conviction, with $800 of each of the first two fines ordered to be paid directly to the victims.[9] The appellant discharged the fines by undertaking community work.
[9] Appeal notice dated 15 August 2023, pg 1.
The Magistrate declined to exercise the power in s 39(2) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act) to grant spent conviction orders. Her Honour concluded that it would not be in the public interest to make such orders, despite the appellant's prior good character, noting that the actions of the appellant were 'deplorable'.[10]
[10] ts 118, 20 July 2023.
The conditions for the making of a spent conviction order are set out in s 45 of the Sentencing Act. Section 45 provides as follows:
45. Spent conviction order, making and effect of
(1)Under section 39(2), a court sentencing an offender is not to make a spent conviction order unless -
(a) it considers that the offender is unlikely to commit such an offence again; and
(b) having regard to -
(i) the fact that the offence is trivial; or
(ii) the previous good character of the offender,
it considers the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender.
…
As explained by McGrath J in ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions,[11] the foregoing provision requires three conditions to be satisfied:
[11] ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] WASC 112 (McGrath J).
[31]Accordingly, s 45 of the Sentencing Act directs the court not to make a spent conviction order unless three conditions are satisfied. The conditions, which are prerequisites to the making of the spent conviction order, are:
1.The court must consider that the offender is unlikely to commit such an offence again;
2.The offence must be trivial, or the offender must be of previous good character; and
3.Having regard to the pre-condition that the offence must be trivial, or the offender must be of previous good character, the court must consider that the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender.
[32]Therefore, the first two pre-conditions must be established before the court considers whether it is satisfied that the discretion can be exercised to make a spent conviction order.
The Magistrate in the present matter ultimately found the criterion in s 45(1)(a) was satisfied although her Honour was plainly concerned about the appellant's attempts during the trial to justify his behaviour. The appellant had maintained he was entitled to be on public access land and maintained that he had not been the aggressor.[12]
[12] ts 118, 20 July 2023.
The Magistrate was more readily satisfied that the appellant was of previous good character, as required by s 45(1)(b)(ii).
However, on the basis of the information before the court, her Honour exercised the discretion so as to refuse the granting of any spent conviction orders. That is, having regard to the pre-condition that her Honour found the appellant was of previous good character, her Honour did not accept it was appropriate to relieve the appellant immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on him. The evidentiary material before the court at first instance was sparse, and indeed, far less than one might expect if an application for spent conviction orders was to be seriously advanced.
The Magistrate was informed that the appellant was a 26 year old Colombian citizen who had been in Western Australia for the last 4 years on a student visa. He had been studying an Advanced Diploma in Networking Telecommunications with the Skills Australia Institute. He had been working part-time. It was contended that he would require a post-graduate visa to work and most jobs he would seek to apply for required a police clearance.
Her Honour concluded:
It's submitted that he will suffer an adverse impact in terms of a character test to either remain in this country or potentially to working his country of origin.
There has been no information put before this court to allow me to draw a conclusion that he would suffer an adverse impact. In fact, the ordinary course is that there ought to be a conviction follow the event. Whilst the preconditions are satisfied it needs to be for the accused or offender, rather, to put forward information to demonstrate that he would be adversely impacted by a conviction for this matter. And given his circumstances that he's here on a temporary visa, he in due course will no doubt go back to his country of origin, I don't consider that there is to be an adverse impact.
I don't accept that section 501 of the Migration Act is such that the application of a fine for these matters is going to cause an adverse impact for him. But even if I'm wrong about that conclusion I nonetheless don't consider that it's in the public interest for there to be a spent conviction. These were deplorable acts that the offender had engaged against two security officers in a position where he was intoxicated. Whilst he had the benefit of prior good character they should never have occurred and so I'm unpersuaded that there ought to be a spent conviction. Thank you.[13]
[13] ts 118, 20 July 2023.
The appellant sought to correct the evidentiary deficiencies by adducing further material on appeal.[14] That material consisted of the appellant's affidavit affirmed on 4 October 2023.[15] The material contained in the appellant's affidavit was highly germane to the question whether spent conviction orders should be made, as will be seen. The respondent accepted that I had a wide discretion to grant the application to adduce further evidence, and did not oppose the application (but did not concede the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate the asserted miscarriage of justice). In the circumstances, I allowed the application to adduce the appellant's affidavit, for the purposes of further establishing any adverse effects that may be experienced by the appellant arising from the convictions.[16] I also allowed that affidavit evidence to be supplemented with brief oral evidence during the appeal.
[14] Application in an appeal filed 27 October 2023.
[15] Affidavit of appellant affirmed on 4 October 2023.
[16] CA Act, s 40(1)(e). See also ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [27] – [29].
C. Evidence on appeal
The evidence adduced by the appellant included the appellant's criminal record history from his home country, Colombia. The record confirmed that the appellant had no criminal record in Colombia. The affidavit included a brief character reference from the appellant's friend who had worked with him in hospitality, which describes the appellant to be 'decent, hardworking and trustworthy' and that the event which led to his conviction was a one-off event.
The appellant adduced a copy of his bridging visa issued on 24 June 2023, which he is reliant upon while he awaits to apply for a post-graduate visa in December.
Additionally, a screenshot was adduced of an email that the appellant received from an employment agency. The email stated that a police clearance would be required for the particular job in respect of which the appellant had applied. This evidence was supplemented by the viva voce evidence of the appellant at the appeal. Given the appellant's difficulties with the English language, the appellant gave evidence with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter. The appellant deposed that:[17]
(a) He had applied for positions through many different platforms, such as LinkedIn and Seek, and had proceeded through the application process until the application asked for a police clearance.[18]
(b) He had submitted approximately 20 to 30 applications, and that 'most' of the jobs required a police clearance.[19]
(c) No application for a telecommunications engineer position had progressed after the appellant disclosed that he had convictions.[20]
(d) Despite not actually being informed that his applications did not progress due to his criminal record, he believed that it is 'quite evident that is the reason [employers] do not want anything to do with him'.[21]
(e) He had previously been temporarily employed in Australia as a field engineer in telecommunications from August 2022 to April 2023. This was, however, prior to his convictions being recorded, which was in July 2023.[22]
(f) It is important to him to be able to work in the field of telecommunications engineering because he has devoted time to study for it and he wants to grow professionally and personally in that space.[23]
[17] ts 13 - 18, 4 December 2023.
[18] ts 13, 4 December 2023.
[19] ts 15, 4 December 2023.
[20] ts 15, 4 December 2023.
[21] ts 16, 4 December 2023.
[22] ts 17, 4 December 2023. This clarification, in terms of the relative timing of the employment and the convictions being recorded, addressed the submission of the respondent that the appellant had in fact been able to secure employment in his chosen field despite having convictions: Respondent's Submissions [32].
[23] ts 16, 4 December 2023.
The appellant was subject to only limited cross-examination and there was no challenge to the substance of his evidence or his credibility. My overall assessment of the appellant was that he genuinely believed his inability to provide a police clearance certificate was preventing him securing further employment. The single email which was presented in evidence shows that, at least for that particular opportunity, a police clearance certificate was required, but I am able to comfortably draw the inference that many employers require such certificates as part of the employment hiring process.
D. Relevant principles
I have earlier outlined the statutory pre-conditions to the exercise of the discretion to grant a spent conviction order. Those pre-conditions must be established by convincing evidence.[24] The exercise of the discretion to grant a spent conviction order is regarded as being of an exceptional character.[25]
[24] Brewer v Bayens [2002] WASCA 271; (2002) 26 WAR 510 [14]; ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [33].
[25] R v Tognini [2000] WASCA 31 [27] ‑ [28].
It has been observed that the sentencing court has a discretion, not a duty, to make a spent conviction order.[26] Further, consideration must be given to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender as well as the public interest.[27]
[26] GNR v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 5 [44]; ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [34].
[27] Wright v McMurchy [2012] WASCA 257 [59]; ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [34].
The relevant principles concerning the discretion to order a spent conviction order were summarised by McGrath J in ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions, and much earlier by the Court of Appeal in R v Tognini. In that latter case, the court held:
It should take as the ordinary rule the fact that a conviction will be a matter of record with all of the consequences that may entail into the future. It should therefore look to see whether there is some particular circumstance to show that it would be desirable, not only from the point of view of the offender but also, having regard to his or her rehabilitation, from the point of view of the community, why the adverse effect of the conviction should be immediately set aside.
That may often be found in the fact that the conviction, if not declared to be spent, might be a particular impediment to the offender following a particular career, practising a particular profession or undertaking particular employment. It may be that it will be the case that that would be productive of exceptional hardship to the offender and his family, or it may simply be that it can be seen that to relieve the offender of the adverse effects of the conviction would positively aide that person's rehabilitation in a way which may be seen to best accord with the interests of the community. The court may be aided to reach that conclusion if it thinks that there is no pressing public interest in being able to continue to have access to the fact of conviction as part of the process of securing the protection of the community.[28]
[28] R v Tognini [27] – [28]
McGrath J in ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions commented:
Therefore, the public interest must be considered by the court. The public interest includes maintaining the community's confidence in the judicial system and ensuring general deterrence by the public record of convictions. The public interest also comprises a consideration of employers being aware of an offender's conduct, where that conduct is relevant in assessing the offender's reliability and suitability for the type of work undertaken by the offender.[29]
[29] ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [37], citing Brewer v Bayens [17] – [18].
The decision in ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions provides a useful illustration of the application of the foregoing principles. The appellant in that case was convicted, upon her own plea, of one offence of assaulting a public officer who was performing a function of his employment, contrary to s 318(1)(d) of the Code. The Magistrate imposed a $1,000 fine and declined to grant the appellant a spent conviction order. The appellant appealed the decision contending that the Magistrate erred when she determined not to make a spent conviction order when it was reasonably open, in the proper exercise of her Honour's discretion, to do so.
The appellant had returned from Victoria to Western Australia and was required to complete 14 days of quarantine as part of the COVID-19 safety protocol. The appellant quarantined by herself at a private residence for the mandatory 14 days quarantine. She entered into quarantine two days prior to the offending.[30]
[30] ADA [5] - [6].
When considering whether the appellant should be relieved of the adverse effect of the conviction, McGrath J found that her offending occurred in peculiar and 'extenuating' circumstances.[31] Those circumstances were:
[48]The offending occurred in the most extenuating of circumstances. The appellant was required to undertake 14 days mandatory quarantine upon arriving in Western Australia from Victoria. Within two days of commencing the 14 days mandatory quarantine, the appellant received a telephone call from her ex-husband demanding a divorce and stating that her possessions could not be collected from their home and that she should not return to Victoria. At the time of receiving that telephone call the appellant was, in effect, in home detention, given that she was undertaking 14 days quarantine, without any support, and was not able to leave the residence. The appellant became intoxicated with alcohol. The appellant became so emotionally distressed that police officers, undertaking a routine check, determined that it was necessary to take the appellant to hospital.
[49]The appellant suffers from depression and anxiety. The medical practitioners at the hospital determined that it was necessary that the appellant required a sedative. The appellant did voluntarily become intoxicated with alcohol after receiving the telephone call from her husband. I accept that the alcohol must have affected the appellant's judgment and behaviour. However, the appellant did not become intoxicated and then choose to attend the hospital. The appellant was taken to the hospital by the police officers.
[50]The act of assaulting a security officer at a hospital is a serious offence. General deterrence is a significant sentencing factor in such cases, including in the circumstances in which the appellant committed the offence. However, the seriousness of the offending must be considered in the context of the offending. The assault of the security guard occurred as the medical practitioner was administering a sedative due to the emotional state of the appellant who was consequently not compliant. The acts of the appellant did not result in any bodily harm to the security guard. I accept that the incident was distressing for the security officer. The fact that the security guard did not suffer bodily harm is most fortunate and most likely was a consequence of the fact that the appellant was wearing a facemask. However, the fact remains that the appellant was convicted, on her own plea, of one count of assault without causing bodily harm.
[31] ADA [46] - [47]
His Honour took into account the adverse consequences for the appellant if convicted of the offence, particularly as to her ability to continue in the accounting profession. This was a factor to be weighed with all other considerations, according to McGrath J, but was sufficiently significant in the overall context of that case, combined with the particular extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed.[32] Ultimately, his Honour allowed the appeal and granted a spent conviction order.
[32] ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [52] - [56].
A further example of a decision of this court in which the impact on employment opportunities has been regarded as an important factor in favour of the grant of spent conviction orders is JJF v Tattersall.[33] In that case, Derrick J observed that there was likely to be no direct connection between the cannabis offence in that case and the appellant's reliability or suitability for project engineering work. The public interest in ensuring employers were aware of the past conviction was therefore not a strong factor in that case. There were factors present weighing against the grant of a spent conviction order in that case, including the fact the appellant had previously (and recently) been granted a spent conviction order for another offence, and that the appellant had committed the offence whilst on bail.[34]
[33] JJF v Tattersall [2018] WASC 170. See also Pagnoni v Jones [2023] WASC 356.
[34] JJF v Tattersall [69] – [70].
In the balance, Derrick J considered it appropriate to exercise the discretion to grant a spent conviction order, so as to positively aid in his rehabilitation in a way which may best be seen to accord with the interests of the community.[35]
[35] JJF v Tattersall [71].
E. Disposition
The Learned Magistrate concluded that the first two pre-conditions to the grant of spent conviction orders were satisfied in this case, in that she found the appellant was unlikely to commit such offences again and the offender was of previous good character. Quite properly in my view, these propositions were not seriously contested by the respondent on this appeal.[36]
[36] Respondent's Submissions [22] and [25].
I am similarly satisfied that these matters are demonstrated on the available evidence, given the appellant's lack of prior convictions and the character reference provided to the court.[37] Thus the focus of this appeal is fundamentally on whether the Magistrate's exercise of the discretion to decline to grant the orders amounts to a miscarriage of justice. In this regard, it is necessary to weigh the competing factors.
[37] I recognise that, in forming this assessment, I must disregard the conduct which constituted the offences for which the offender is being sentenced: Hull v Castledine [2005] WASC 225 [27].
On appeal, the appellant has clarified that his intention is to remain in Australia and to seek employment in the networking telecommunications area, using the qualification he has spent some years working to obtain. I find accordingly. This clarification was important, given the apprehension the Magistrate was under that the appellant was more likely to return to his home country, Colombia. It weighs in favour of the utility of the grant of any spent conviction orders.
I accept that, in seeking employment positions in this field, it is highly likely that the appellant will be required to present a police clearance certificate and in the absence of such a certificate, his employment prospects will diminish rapidly. I reach this finding having regard to the singular email presented in evidence, the appellant's oral evidence as to the requirement for such certificates, and the fact the court can take judicial notice that many employers will typically ask for such clearance certificates as part of their employment due diligence processes.
So, a factor weighing in favour of the grant of spent conviction orders is the potential adverse effect of these convictions on the appellant's ability to secure gainful employment in his chosen field. Importantly, in my view, the appellant has been studying for some years to secure the necessary qualification to enter this field. It is not a case in which the appellant has mere aspirations to enter a profession or field, in respect of which convictions may inhibit or preclude that aspiration being fulfilled. There is evidence before the court that the appellant has undertaken some 4 years of studies to achieve the qualification, and I find accordingly.
There is a question in my mind whether future employers of the appellant would be concerned to know whether he had convictions for offences of this nature. The conduct in question involved disorderly behaviour and physical assaults on security officers. Admittedly, though, the appellant was affected by alcohol at the time and the offences occurred in a late night/early morning setting, not connected with the appellant's workplace or work environment. On my assessment, the character of these offences is not likely to be of direct relevance to the appellant's future employers in the telecommunications networking area. The offences do not concern conduct at the workplace, nor do they impact the honesty of the appellant. They are not offences involving a breach of trust. I therefore consider the public interest in ensuring prospective employers are aware of the appellant's convictions for these offences is not a strong factor in the present matter.
There are factors pointing against the grant of spent conviction orders. One of these is that the acts of assaulting security officers, who were performing their lawful duties, is a serious matter. The court obviously does not countenance such conduct. Further, as I have earlier noted, the Magistrate observed that the appellant sought to (unsuccessfully) justify his behaviour during the trial. To some extent, this suggests the appellant did not, at least the trial stage of this matter, recognise the seriousness of his conduct and the unlawfulness of his behaviour.
The prospect of exposure to public scrutiny of a conviction may also have a general deterrent effect, a factor which the Magistrate in this case correctly recognised in the course of her assessment of the matter.[38] This is a factor which weighs against the appellant's contentions on this appeal.
[38] ts 117, 20 July 2023.
When the foregoing matters are weighed in all the circumstances, I reach the conclusion that a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned by the Magistrate not granting spent conviction orders. I am further satisfied that it cannot be said this is not a substantial miscarriage, in the particular circumstances of this case.
In reaching this conclusion, in addition to the matters set out in the course of these reasons, I should emphasise two points.
First, I do not consider the nature of the conduct which grounds the offences, nor the broader public interest considerations to which I have referred, are such as to outweigh the competing interest of ensuring the rehabilitation of the appellant. He is a young man, with no prior convictions or criminal history at all. He has chosen to study in this country, rather than in Colombia, in order to obtain a vocational qualification which will improve his life. He has worked some years towards achieving that goal. He has discharged the fines through community work. I consider the overall public interest would be better served if the appellant was given a further opportunity to be rehabilitated.[39]
[39] To adapt the language of McKechnie J in Indich v Bracknell [2005] WASC 225 [9].
Second, there is likely to be a substantial adverse effect upon the appellant in the circumstances of this case, over and above the penalties imposed upon him for these offences, in the event the spent conviction orders are not made. Those adverse effects include the greater difficulties in securing employment in his chosen field, as well as the resulting impact on his ability to secure appropriate visas to ultimately obtain permanent residency in Australia. Being able to obtain gainful employment is the first step in this process and the inability to obtain a police clearance certificate operates as a substantial barrier in this regard.
F. Conclusion and orders
For the foregoing reasons, I will grant leave to appeal on the sole ground advanced, and allow the appeal. I will order as follows and hear from the parties as to any costs orders which are sought:
1.The application for leave to adduce further evidence is allowed.
2. The application for leave to appeal is allowed.
3.The appeal is allowed.
4.The appellant's convictions for the offences the subject of charges PE 52933/2021, PE 52934/2021 and PE 52935/2021 are spent convictions for the purposes of the Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA).
5.The appellant's name be anonymised and replaced with the initials JWG.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
SAO
Associate to the Honourable Justice Lundberg
22 DECEMBER 2023
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