JPGY and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 86 (5 February 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2018/6821
Re:JPGY
APPLICANT
AndMinister for Home Affairs
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member D. J. Morris
Date:5 February 2019
Place:Melbourne
The Tribunal decides to affirm the decision under review.
.........[sgd]...............................................................
Senior Member D. J. Morris
Catchwords
MIGRATION – cancellation of visa – pleas of guilty – conviction for sexually based offences – consideration of character test – consideration of ministerial Direction No. 65 – primary considerations – other considerations – other relevant matters – decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33, 35
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 499, 500(6F), 501
Migration Regulations 2004, Sch 2Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic).
Cases
Lam and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re [1999] AATA 56
Maxwell v R [1996] HCA 46; 184 CLR 501
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234
R v Inglis [1917] VLR 672Weston v R (2016) 48 VR 413; [2015] VSCA 354
Secondary Materials
Migration Act 1958 – Direction under section 499 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA (Dated 22 December 2014)
New Zealand Pharmaceutical Schedule, February 2019, Vol 26, Number 0 (accessed 29 January 2019)
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954).REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member D. J. Morris
5 February 2019
Background
In this matter, the Tribunal has made a confidentiality order under section 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act) prohibiting the publication of the name of the Applicant and any material that might tend to identify him. He is described in these reasons with the pseudonym JPGY. In addition, where necessary the names of other persons related to the offences for which JPGY was convicted have been redacted.
JPGY was born in New Zealand in 1942. He is a citizen of that country. In
December 2012 he immigrated to Australia, accompanied by his wife. On 2 August 2015 JPGY was granted a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa. This is a class of temporary visa granted to a New Zealand citizen allowing him or her to reside in Australia. On 2 June 2017 an officer of the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection gave JPGY a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of his visa and invited him to provide any comments (GD7, p 61). JPGY made representations dated
11 and 28 July 2017 which the delegate said were carefully considered. On
31 October 2018 JPGY’s visa was cancelled by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the Respondent) under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act), exercising discretionary power because the delegate was not satisfied that…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read JPGY and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] AATA 86
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether JPGY met the character test as defined by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and its associated regulations, and whether the cancellation of his visa was the correct and preferable decision in all the circumstances. This involved considering the seriousness of his offending, the risk of re-offending, and any mitigating factors presented by JPGY, all within the framework of Ministerial Direction No. 65, which outlines considerations for visa cancellation.
The Tribunal reasoned that JPGY’s convictions for sexually based offences involving children were serious, notwithstanding his claims that the offending was isolated or that he did not fully appreciate the nature of his guilty pleas. Applying the principle that a guilty plea constitutes an admission of all essential elements of the offence, the Tribunal found it could not go behind the court's convictions. While acknowledging the significant adverse impact visa cancellation would have on JPGY’s wife and son, and noting JPGY’s age and health concerns, the Tribunal concluded that the seriousness of the offending and the inability to make a safe assessment of re-offending risk outweighed these considerations.
Ultimately, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel JPGY’s visa, finding it to be the correct and preferable outcome.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In answer to a direct question from the Tribunal about what JPGY did accept he did wrong, the Applicant said he accepted that he tickled Victim One. He said the three charges were presented to him and he was asked to plead guilty to all or nothing, which he did.Consideration of the DirectionPrimary consideration: Protection of the Australian community (paragraph 9.1)The nature and seriousness of the conduct (paragraph 9.1.1) The Direction requires decision-makers to have regard to factors including, at (1)(a) of the paragraph, the principle that sexual crimes are viewed very seriously and, at (1)(b), the principle that crimes committed against vulnerable members of the community, such as minors, are serious. Section 2 of the Direction, relating to the application of the character test, makes clear that sexually based offences involving a child include indecent dealings with a child (paragraph 7(2)(b)). There is no doubt in the Tribunal’s mind that the crimes for which JPGY was convicted were serious. While the offences may not have been at the higher end of the offending scale, there are factors which must be considered which are relevant in the circumstances of the offending. JPGY had built up a friendship with Victim One (particularly) and Victim Two, and an acquaintanceship with their families. Victim One’s parents extended trust that their young daughter was able to play and be in the presence of JPGY in a safe manner. The Tribunal notes that the relationship between JPGY and his wife and Victim One and her parents was such that the Applicant and his wife had attended her primary school for ‘grandparent’s day’. The Tribunal accepts the well-articulated principle set out in SRT that administrative tribunals undertaking merits reviews of administrative decisions may not go behind convictions made by courts of competent jurisdiction. It is also settled law, as the Tribunal made plain during the hearing, that a plea of guilt, such as that entered by JPGY’s legal representative at the Magistrates’ Court on his behalf, means that a person admits to, and accepts, all the elements of the offence. The authority is Maxwell v R [1996] HCA 46; 184 CLR 501, at [19]: An accused is entitled to plead guilty to an offence with which he is charged and, if he does so, the plea will constitute an admission of all the essential elements of the offence. Of course, if the trial judge forms the view that the evidence does not support the charge or that for any other reason the charge is not supportable, he should advise the accused to withdraw his plea and plead not guilty. But he cannot compel an accused to do so and if the accused refuses, the plea must be considered final, subject only to the discretion of the judge to grant leave to change the plea to one of not guilty at any time before the matter is disposed of by sentence or otherwise. (Footnote: R v Inglis [1917] VLR 671)(Emphasis added.) The Courts have accepted that there may be limited cases where a plea of guilt may be impugned. Redlich JA said in Weston v R (2015) 48 VR 413; [2015] VSCA 354, at [109]: To impugn the integrity of the plea, whether before or after conviction, the applicant must show an ‘issuable question of guilt’ and the existence of some circumstance which affects the integrity of the plea so that it would be a miscarriage of justice to hold the applicant to his plea. Some of the more common examples cited that may justify the conclusion that the applicant should not be held to his plea are that the applicant may not have appreciated the nature of the plea which he had entered, there may be no evidence upon which he could have been convicted, he may not have intended to admit he was guilty, or his plea may have been induced by fraud or other impropriety or that it was not offered with a consciousness of guilt.