FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Joy v UGL Operations and Maintenance Pty Limited (No 2) [2022] FCA 1086
File number: WAD 31 of 2021 Judgment of: FEUTRILL J Date of judgment: 14 September 2022 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – application to dismiss proceedings under r 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) due to default by the applicant – circumstances and preconditions giving rise to the Court’s discretionary exercise of power to dismiss proceedings under r 5.23 – impact of history of non-compliance and impact of delay – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A(2), 37M, 37P
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.61, 5.22, 5.22(d), 5.23, 5.23(1)(b)(i), 16.21, 26.01
Cases cited: Geneva Laboratories Ltd v Prestige Premium Deals Pty Ltd (No 4) [2016] FCA 867; (2016) 120 IPR 133
Joy v UGL Operations and Maintenance Pty Limited [2021] FCA 1282
Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Limited (1990) 27 FCR 388
Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180; (2012) 295 ALR 52
Trade Practices Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1990) 22 FCR 305
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 37 Date of hearing: 21 July 2022 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr ND Ellery Solicitor for the Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth ORDERS
WAD 31 of 2021 BETWEEN: NAVIN VELLAPARAMBIL JOY
Applicant
AND: UGL OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PTY LIMITED
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
FEUTRILL J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 SEPTEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent's interlocutory application lodged 28 January 2022 is dismissed.
2.There is no order as to the costs of the application.
3.By 4.00 pm on 12 October 2022, the respondent is to file and serve its defence.
4.The matter is listed for a further case management hearing at not before 9.15 am (AWST) on 19 October 2022.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FEUTRILL J:
Introduction
The respondent made an interlocutory application for orders to dismiss the proceedings pursuant to r 5.23(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on the ground that the applicant is in default. The foundation for the application is a contention that the applicant is in default for failing to comply with an order of the Court made on 21 October 2021 and (or) for failing to prosecute the proceedings with due diligence.
For the reasons which follow, the respondent’s application is dismissed.
Background
On 18 February 2021, the applicant commenced the proceedings by originating application. That application was supported by an affidavit of the applicant affirmed on 19 March 2021 and filed on 22 March 2021. On 29 March 2021, the respondent filed a notice of appointment of a lawyer.
On 15 April 2021, the Court made orders, amongst others, requiring the applicant to file and serve a concise…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1086
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the applicant's repeated non-compliance with court orders constituted a default warranting the dismissal of the proceedings under rule 5.23 and whether the history of non-compliance and delay justified the exercise of the court's discretion to dismiss the proceedings. The court considered the circumstances and preconditions for exercising the power to dismiss proceedings under rule 5.23, recognising that while a finding of default is a precondition, the power must be exercised sensibly and with an appreciation of the serious consequences of dismissal.
The court's reasoning was that the applicant was not in default of the orders made on 21 October 2021 as the orders did not require the filing of a further amended statement of claim within a specified period. The court emphasised that the power to dismiss proceedings under rule 5.23 is discretionary and should be exercised only in cases of a history of non-compliance indicating an inability or unwillingness to cooperate, or where there is a significant continuing default causing undue prejudice and expense to the other party. Given that the applicant was not in default of the specific orders, the court dismissed the respondent's application to dismiss the proceedings.
In summary, the court dismissed the respondent's application to dismiss the applicant's proceedings, ordered the respondent to file and serve its defence by a specified date, and listed the matter for a further case management hearing. The court declined to award costs for the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent's interlocutory application lodged 28 January 2022 is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to the costs of the application.
3. By 4.00 pm on 12 October 2022, the respondent is to file and serve its defence.
4. The matter is listed for a further case management hearing at not before 9.15 am (AWST) on 19 October 2022.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 37M of the FCA Act provides that the Rules and provisions made by or under the FCA Act or any other Act with respect to the practice and procedure of the Court must be interpreted and applied, and any power conferred or duty imposed by them must be exercised or carried out, in the way that best promotes the facilitation of the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Nonetheless, the power conferred by r 5.23 of the Rules is a discretion and it is unconfined except that a party must be in default: Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180; (2012) 295 ALR 52 at [35]. That is, a finding that a party is in default is a precondition to the exercise of the power under r 5.23. Further, the power must be exercised and the Rules administered sensibly and with an appreciation that some defaults are unavoidable and unpredictable, even by the most conscientious parties and their lawyers, and having regard to the serious consequences of summarily dismissing proceedings: Geneva Laboratories Ltd v Prestige Premium Deals Pty Ltd (No 4) [2016] FCA 867; (2016) 120 IPR 133 at [54]‑[55]; Professional Administration Service Centres at [37]‑[38]; Lenijamar Pty Ltd v AGC (Advances) Limited (1990) 27 FCR 388 at 395‑396 In general, there are two circumstances in which exercise of the power will be warranted:(a)where there is a history of non‑compliance indicating an inability or an unwillingness to cooperate with the Court and the other party in having the matter ready for trial within an acceptable period; and(b)where there is a significant continuing default giving rise to undue prejudice and expense to the other party.Although the history of the matter will always be relevant, it is more likely to be decisive in the first of those two situations. Even though the most recent non‑compliance may be minor, the cumulative effect of an applicant's defaults may be such as to satisfy the Court that the applicant is either subjectively unwilling to cooperate or, for some reason, is unable to do so. Such a conclusion would not readily be reached; but, where it is, fairness to the respondent would normally require the summary dismissal of the proceedings. In the second circumstance, the continuation of non‑compliance is the essence of the situation. If, when the Court looks at the matter, the direction has already been complied with, the defaulting applicant may be ordered to pay any wasted costs; but it would be difficult to justify the dismissal of proceedings solely because of that default: Professional Administration Service Centres at [39]‑[41]; and Lenijamar at 396‑397.Disposition The respondent submitted that the applicant was ‘in default’ for failing to comply with the orders of 21 October 2021 in that a further amended statement of claim was not filed within 30 days of those orders. It will be apparent from the description of the orders made on 21 October 2021 and the effect of those orders set out earlier in these reasons, that the applicant was not in default of the 21 October 2021 orders by not filing a further amended statement of claim.