Joubert & Anor and Verhoeven & Anor
[2018] FamCA 879
•29 October 2018
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| JOUBERT AND ANOR & VERHOEVEN AND ANOR | [2018] FamCA 879 |
| FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where the wife joined a company and the husband’s brother to the substantive proceedings as the second and third respondents – Where the second and third respondents seek that the proceedings be bifurcated to determine the issue of whether the husband is a beneficial owner of any ordinary shares in the second respondent – Consideration of r 10.13 and r 10.14 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) as well as relevant case law – Where the court is not persuaded that bifurcation will result in an expeditious disposal of the proceedings – Where in this case a bifurcated hearing would not involve a narrow point – Where the issue of bifurcation is one of discretion – Where the court will not order a bifurcated hearing. FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where it is sought that a bifurcated issue be transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales whilst the remainder of the proceedings stay in the Family Court of Australia for later completion – Consideration of s 45(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where s 45(2) on its face contains no power to transfer a bifurcated issue in the manner sought – Where there is a risk of conflicting findings of fact and credit by two different judges – Where the application is dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 45, 79 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 10.13, 10.14 |
| Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSW SC 1372 |
| FIRST APPLICANT: | Mr C Joubert |
| SECOND APPLICANT: | B Pty Ltd |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: | Ms Verhoeven |
| SECOND RESPONDENT: | Mr A Joubert |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 4981 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 29 October 2018 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Stevenson J |
| HEARING DATE: | 13 September 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND APPLICANTS: | Mr Lloyd SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND APPLICANTS: | Blanchfield Nicholls Partners |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | Mr Richardson SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | Edwards Family Lawyers |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: | KD Holmes Solicitors |
Orders
The Further Amended Application in a Case filed by Mr C Joubert and B Pty Ltd on 11 September 2018 is dismissed.
Proceedings number SYC4981/2016 are expedited.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Joubert & Verhoeven has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: SYC 4981 of 2016
| Mr C Joubert |
First Applicant
And
| B Pty Ltd |
Second Applicant
And
| Ms Verhoeven |
First Respondent
And
| Mr A Joubert |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The proceedings
Ms Verhoeven (“the wife”) and Mr A Joubert (“the husband”) are parties to proceedings in relation to alteration of property interests and spouse maintenance. By an Amended Initiating Application filed on 25 January 2018 the wife joined a company known as B Pty Ltd (“BPL”) and the husband's brother, Mr C Joubert, as second and third respondents to the proceedings.
Written submissions dated 11 September 2018 on behalf of the wife stated that the basis of her claim against the second and third respondents is as follows:
The Applicant contends that there is a secret trust constituted on express terms (i.e. an express trust which has been kept secret) and in the alternative (if the foregoing is rejected) a constructive trust would be imposed recognising that certain shares held by the third respondent in the second respondent are held beneficially for the first respondent…
On 11 September 2018 the second and third respondents filed a Further Amended Application in a Case, by which they sought the following orders:
1. That this Application be listed on an urgent basis.
2. That short service be granted.
3.That pursuant to Rule 10.13 of the Family Law Rules the proceedings be bifurcated, for this Honourable Court to determine as a threshold issue and as a matter of urgency within 55 days from the date this Amended Application is filed whether the husband [Mr A Joubert] ("the husband") is a beneficial owner of any ordinary shares in [B Pty Ltd].
4.That leave be granted to the parties to approach each registry of the Family Court of Australia to ascertain whether there are any hearing dates available within 55 days from the date this Amended Application is filed, for the hearing and determination of the Applications as to the husband's alleged ownership of any ordinary shares in [B Pty Ltd].
5.In the event that the Family Court of Australia is unable to hear and determine the Applications concerning the ownership of the ordinary shares in [BPL], that those proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, for determination of that discrete issue.
6.That within 14 days the wife [Ms Verhoeven] ("the wife") provide particulars of her case against [Mr C Joubert] and [B Pty Ltd] and file all evidence upon which she intends to rely on in support of the orders sought against [Mr C Joubert] and [B Pty Ltd].
7.That within 21 days [Mr C Joubert] and [B Pty Ltd] file all evidence upon which they intend to rely on.
8.That any orders sought by the wife [
Ms Verhoeven] ("the wife"),against B Pty Ltd and [Mr C Joubert] be dismissed.9.That the wife give an undertaking as to damages to [B Pty Ltd] and [Mr C Joubert].
10.In the event that the wife is unable or unwilling to give an undertaking as to damages to [B Pty Ltd] and [Mr C Joubert], that her Application for any orders sought against [B Pty Ltd] and [Mr C Joubert] be summarily dismissed.
11.That the wife be injuncted from discussing these proceedings and providing any documents connected with these proceedings in relation to entitlements in or ownership of or officeholding in [B Pty Ltd], or any other matter concerning or related to [B Pty Ltd], with any other person other than her legal representatives who are advising her in the current proceedings.
12.That all applications concerning [B Pty Ltd] and [Mr C Joubert] be heard in closed Court.
13.That the wife pay the costs of [B Pty Ltd] and [Mr C Joubert] on an indemnity basis.
14.That the Notice to Produce to [Mr C Joubert] and [B Pty Ltd] dated 7 September 2018 issued by the wife, be set aside.
Written submissions dated 12 September 2018 on behalf of the second and third respondents set out the orders which they seek as follows:
1.Order that the question "whether the third respondent holds his ordinary shares in the second respondent for himself, or on trust for himself and the first respondent in the proportions proposed by the applicant" in her Amended Initiating Application filed 25 January 2018, be decided as a separate question ("Separate Question") under r.10.13 Family Law Rules 2004.
2.Order pursuant to s.45(2) Family Court [sic] Act 1975 and r.11.17(2) Family Law Rules 2004 that the proceedings be transferred to the NSW Supreme Court for the purpose of that Court determining the Separate Question.
3.Order that the Applicant pay the Second and Third Respondents' costs of their Application in a Case filed 11 September 2018 on an indemnity basis.
The respondent husband supported the application for a bifurcated hearing. He did not oppose the application for expedition. At the interim hearing on 13 September 2018, counsel for the husband indicated that he would participate in a bifurcated hearing.
Background
The husband and the wife, who are aged 46 and 45 respectively, began to cohabit in March 2000 and married in 2003. They separated on 28 November 2015 and were divorced by an order made on 1 May 2017. The parties are the parents of two children, X and Y, who are aged respectively 14 and 11 years.
When the parties began to live together the husband was employed as vice president by D Group. Between August 2003 and April 2006 he was employed as a manager with Company E. In approximately April 2006 the husband resigned from Company E and gave a notice period of six months. A condition of the husband's resignation from Company E was that he would not enter into employment with BPL during that six month period.
The third respondent, Mr C Joubert, gave an account of his work history in his affidavit of 23 August 2018. In 1995 he graduated with a degree, and commenced employment with the F Bank.
Mr C Joubert indicated that he worked as a consultant at G Bank and Company H in 1995 and 1996. In October 1996 he acquired a shelf company known as J Pty Ltd (“JPL”), of which he was the sole director and shareholder. This company's name was changed to BPL on 2 December 2004.
Mr C Joubert deposed that he worked in the UK in 1997 and 1998, during which period he did no consulting work through JPL/BPL. He provided these services via a company registered in the United Kingdom. He returned to Sydney in 1999 and gained a position as a consultant with Company K "through [JPL/BPL]". The division of Company K to which Mr C Joubert provided consulting services was sold to Company L. After this sale he provided consulting services to Company L.
Mr C Joubert deposed that he commenced work as a consultant with Company E Australia in February 2004. This consulting work was undertaken pursuant to a contract between himself, JPL and Company E.
In late 2004 Company E engaged Mr C Joubert to take over a failed project. He carried out this work via BPL. A term of this contract was that he would retain all intellectual property delivered to Company E in this project. After approximately nine months this project was completed and BPL then took on additional consulting work with Company E, D Group, Company L and Company M.
Mr C Joubert deposed that he invited the husband to join BPL as a manager in 2006 and that he did so in approximately September 2006. .
In approximately 2010 a C-class share in BPL was issued to the husband. Mr C Joubert deposed that he directed the issue of this share "to enable me to provide dividends to [the husband] at my absolute discretion". This share carried no voting rights or entitlements on the winding up of the company. In April 2012 a D-class share was issued to the wife and an E-class share to Mr N, who was the former de facto partner of Mr C Joubert. Similarly, the D-class and E-class shares carried no voting rights or entitlements on the winding up of the company.
Mr C Joubert deposed that he held discussions with his accountant Mr O, of P Accountants, in relation to the acquisition by the husband of shares in BPL. He deposed that these discussions continued over a period of several years after the husband joined BPL. No ordinary shares in the company were ever issued to the husband. He has held only one C-class share and all ordinary shares have been owned by Mr C Joubert. The only director of BPL is and has been Mr C Joubert.
Mr C Joubert deposed that BPL has an annual turnover of approximately $8,500,000 and that the company entered into a "strategic agreement" with Company Q in August 2016 which has the potential to increase the gross annual income by some $7,750,000. Mr C Joubert deposed also that negotiations were on foot with a potential purchaser for the sale of a part or whole of BPL.
Consideration
Bifurcation
Rule 10.13 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”) empowers the court to hear and determine a discrete issue in a case. This Rule provides as follows:
10.13 Application for separate decision
A party may apply for a decision on any issue, if the decision may:
(a) dispose of all or part of the case;
(b) make a trial unnecessary;
(c) make a trial substantially shorter; or
(d) save substantial costs.
Rule 10.14 of the Rules provides that the court has a discretion as follows:
10.14 What the court may order under this Part
On an application under this Part, the court may:
(a) dismiss any part of the case;
(b) decide an issue;
(c) make a final order on any issue;
(d) order a hearing about an issue or fact; or
(e)with the consent of the parties, order arbitration about the case or part of the case.
The written submissions on behalf of the wife referred to a decision of Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSW SC 1372 where Hallen AsJ set out the principles which apply to a determination whether to order a separate hearing of a question under the relevant Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. His Honour said inter alia:
15I take the principles that apply in determining whether to make an order for the separate determination of a question under the rule to be:
(a)The rule speaks of “questions” and not “issues” and does not differentiate between questions of fact, or law, or partly of fact and partly of law.
(b)The judicial determination of a “question” must involve a conclusive, or final, decision based on concrete and established, or agreed, facts, for the purpose of quelling a controversy between the parties: Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334, at [45] and [51].
(c)The rule permits the Court to hear and determine the separate question at any point before, at, or after, any trial or further trial in the proceedings, rather than only as a preliminary question.
(d)Whether such an order should be made is a matter for the court’s discretion, which discretion must be exercised judicially, but cannot otherwise be fettered: Dunstan v Simmie & Co Pty Ltd [1978] VR 669, at 670; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215 at [7].
(e)As a general rule, the discretionary power to order separate determination of a question should be approached with caution: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36; (1999) 198 CLR 180 at [436], per Callinan J; Tepko Pty Limited v The Water Board [2001] HCA 19; (2001) 206 CLR 1, at [168]–[170] per Kirby and Callinan JJ: Commonwealth Bank v Clune [2008] NSWSC 1125 at [6], per Johnson J; Bailey and Bailey v Director-General Department of Energy Climate Change and Water and Ors [2010] NSWSC 979 at [4] per Studdert AJ.
(f)In exercising its discretion, the overriding purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, namely the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings (s 56) must be given effect.
(g)Generally, all questions of fact and law should be determined at the one time: Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130 at 141-42; SPI Spirits (Cyprus) Ltd v Diageo Australia Ltd [2006] FCA 14. If the Court is to depart from that position, the party seeking the separate determination of a question must satisfy the Court that it would be ‘just and convenient’ for that order to be made: Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1999] FCA 718 at [8]-[9], see also Energy Australia v Australian Energy Limited [2001] FCA 1049.
(h)While it may appear attractive, superficially, to order the trial of a separate question, experience often shows that it will not be so, for example, because of the complications that can arise in relation to appeals, or to overlapping factual issues, or to questions of credit, if the same witnesses have to give evidence in relation to a question that is separated and those questions that are not: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215 at [7(6)] per Einstein J.; Owners Corporation Sp 70672 v Trustees of Roman Catholic Church [2010] NSWSC 946 at [16] per Ball J.
(i)The experience of courts suggests that the separation of proceedings often does not result in the quicker and cheaper resolution of proceedings, but often has the reverse effect. It sometimes happens that it turns out to be productive of the disadvantages of delay, extra expense, appeals and uncertainty of outcome which it is intended to avoid: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd; Tepko Pty Limited v The Water Board at [168].
(j)Before a question is to be separately determined, it must be possible to clearly see that it will facilitate the quicker and cheaper resolution of the proceedings: Tallglen v Pay TV Pty Ltd at 142, per Giles CJ in Comm D; Parramatta Stadium Trust v Civil and Civic Pty Ltd; Century Medical v THLD (NSWSC, 27 August 1996, unreported).
(k)Where findings as to the credit of a witness is, or of witnesses are, or may be, involved in the consideration of the evidence relevant to the question, it is inappropriate to order a separate trial: ABB v Freight Rail [1999] NSWSC 1037.
(l)Often, a separate question is heard on the basis of:
(i) agreed statements of fact;
(ii) a narrow point to be determined; and
(iii)a hearing that is able to be conducted within a short time (or a short time relative to the total length if the hearing of the separate question were not to be dealt with).
(m)Factors that tend to support the making of an order, include that the separate determination of the question may:
(i)contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the issues for trial, or even lead to disposal of the proceedings: Tallglen v Pay TV Holdings;
(ii)contribute to the settlement of the litigation (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 602 per Kirby P at 607).
(n)It may be appropriate to determine a separate question, even if it will not resolve all the issues, provided that there is a strong prospect that the parties will agree upon the result when the core of the dispute has been decided, or if the decision will obviate unnecessary and expensive hearings of other questions: City of Swan v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd [2009] FCA 784; (2009) 73 ACSR 86 at [27] per Rares J. The determination of the one question should enable a sensible reassessment of litigation risks, which is generally likely to encourage some form of settlement discussions.
(o)Relevantly, one factor that may tell against the making of an order would be where there is likely to be a significant overlap between the evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial — possibly involving the calling of the same witnesses at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding: Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society at [8]. There is always a risk of inconsistent findings arising from determination of separate questions.
(p)Whilst the decision is ultimately one for the court to determine, it will have regard to the attitude of the parties: TVW Enterprises Limited v Duffy (Federal Court of Australia, 28 March 1985, unreported) Toohey J.
(q)It is a relevant consideration to weigh the time likely to be taken in the hearing of a separate question and the availability of hearing dates for that purpose, against the time and expense of a substantive hearing and the length of time likely to elapse before such a hearing will take place: TVW Enterprises Limited v Duffy at pp 4-5.
(r)Each case will have its own dynamics that dictate the relative importance of various factors to be considered in exercising the discretion conferred.
(s)It is necessary that there be precision, both in formulating the question, and in specifying the facts upon which it is to be decided: Jacobson v Ross [1995] 1 VR 337 at 341
Senior counsel for the second and third respondents made the following submissions in favour of bifurcation:
1.the wife seeks a declaration in relation to shareholding in BPL and then the taking of accounts and transfer of shares;
2.the consequential orders sought by the wife would require:
-mathematical calculations of dividends to which the husband was entitled for the years 2006 to date;
-amended tax returns for BPL and the husband for the years 2006 to date, with the potential for penalties and fines;
-amended balance sheets and profit and loss statements for BPL from 2006 to date;
-calculation of capital gains tax affecting BPL for the years 2006 to date, with the potential for fines and penalties; and
-valuation of the husband's interest in BPL as at March 2006, 1 July 2007, 1 July 2010 and the date of trial.
3.the tasks identified above would be "enormous" and involve significant cost;
4.determination of the preliminary issue could be contained to a three day hearing;
5.bifurcation would enable the second and third respondents to depart the proceedings if they are successful;
6."there is a significant and real danger of an extremely large loss being occasioned as a consequence of [Mr C Joubert] having to disclose to any potential purchaser the existence of proceedings awaiting hearing in the Family Court of Australia at Sydney"; and
7.BPL may not survive financially the declarations sought by the wife.
The legal representative for the husband made the following submissions in support of bifurcation:
1.resolution of the question of ownership of the shares in BPL will assist the husband and wife to resolve the issue of alteration of property interests;
2.the Balance Sheet cannot be determined until the wife's equitable claim is decided;
3.the husband and wife should not be burdened with the cost of valuation evidence of the shareholdings in BPL until the wife establishes that the husband holds a beneficial interest in those shares;
4.the husband and wife should not be put to the cost of affidavit evidence in relation to contributions to an asset which does not exist at present; and
5.the wife should be directed to put on her exhaustive evidence in support of her claim in equity and the husband then given an opportunity to respond and, if appropriate, to seek an order for summary dismissal.
Senior counsel for the wife put the following submissions in opposition to the application for bifurcation:
1.the proceedings came before the court on 27 August 2018 on the application of the wife, as the second and third respondents had taken no steps at all since she filed her Amended Application on 25 January 2018;
2.the wife's lawyers estimate that the bifurcated hearing would occupy four to five days;
3."[t]he credibility of witnesses critical to the final outcome [of the hearing] heavily mitigates against separate determination of issues";
4.the hearing of the section 79 issues otherwise would add little further time, as the major assets of the husband and wife are the former matrimonial home and a self-managed superannuation fund;
5.the discretionary power to order separate determination of a question should be treated with caution;
6.there is a substantial risk of delay to the ultimate proceedings if there is a bifurcated hearing and then an appeal from those orders;
7.there are substantive credit issues and two different judges may come to contrary views as to the evidence of relevant witnesses; and
8.a single expert could be instructed to give valuation opinions based on assumptions as to beneficial ownership of shareholding.
It seems likely that the wife, the husband, Mr C Joubert and Mr O would be included as witnesses at a bifurcated hearing. The affidavit of the wife of 25 January 2018 suggests that findings as to the credit of witnesses will be a significant consideration in the outcome of the bifurcated hearing. For example, the wife asserts that various conversations took place as to the intended beneficial ownership of BPL between herself, the husband and Mr C Joubert. Additionally, there may well be significant issues of credit involved in the correct interpretation of material contained in the files of Mr O.
I am not persuaded that bifurcation will result in an expeditious disposal of the proceedings. It seems to me to be likely that there would be an appeal by the unsuccessful party, which would leave completion of the section 79 proceedings subject to delay. I accept the submission on behalf of the wife, to the effect that the residue of the proceedings would add little in terms of time and cost.
I am of the view that it is not "possible to clearly see that [a bifurcated hearing] will facilitate the quicker and cheaper resolution of the proceedings". Instead, I can envisage that the proceedings may become bogged down by that process.
In these proceedings, a bifurcated hearing could not be determined on the basis of agreed facts and would not involve "a narrow point". I am unable to contemplate that complex issues of law and fact, necessarily involving findings of credit, could be conducted "within a short time (or a short time relative to the total length if the hearing of the separate question were not to be dealt with)".
It seems to me that these considerations militate against a bifurcated hearing. Obviously, there are factors which weigh in favour of bifurcation as well. Such factors might include the prospect of settlement between the husband and the wife, once there has been a determination of the issue of beneficial ownership of the shares in BPL. By that stage, however, considerable time and expense would have been devoted to the proceedings.
The second and third respondents relied upon the "significant and real danger of an extremely large loss being occasioned as a consequence of [Mr C Joubert] having to disclose to any potential purchaser the existence of proceedings". If there in fact exists such "a significant and real danger", it seems to me to be unlikely that Mr C Joubert would have taken no steps to seek the intervention of the court before the wife caused the proceedings to be relisted on 29 August 2018. In his affidavit of 23 August 2018 Mr C Joubert deposed that he has “been attending various meetings ... with [Company R] this year and especially in recent months, to pursue these opportunities ...".
The issue of bifurcation is one of discretion and involves a weighing of relevant considerations. In the exercise of my discretion, I conclude that the potential benefits are outweighed by competing disadvantages and I will not order a bifurcated hearing.
Transfer to the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Senior counsel for the wife submitted that there is no power to transfer a bifurcated issue to the Supreme Court and drew attention to section 45(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). This section provides as follows:
45 Stay and transfer of proceedings
…
(2)Where there are pending in a court proceedings that have been instituted under this Act or are being continued in accordance with any of the provisions of section 9 and it appears to that court that it is in the interests of justice, or of convenience to the parties, that the proceedings be dealt with in another court having jurisdiction under this Act, the court may transfer the proceedings to the other court. However, this subsection does not apply to particular proceedings if:
(a) the first‑mentioned court is the Family Court and the other court is the Federal Circuit Court of Australia; or
(b) the first‑mentioned court is the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and the other court is the Family Court.
…
On its face, section 45(2) contains no power to transfer a bifurcated issue to the Supreme Court and leave the remainder of the proceedings in the Family Court of Australia for later completion. The dangers implicit in such a scenario are readily apparent and include the prospect that two different judges may form opposite views of certain evidence and the credibility of witnesses.
It would be possible for the entirety of the proceedings to be transferred to the Supreme Court. I am not prepared to do so, in the absence of evidence as to a likely timeframe for an overall completion of the proceedings in that venue.
Written submissions on behalf of the second and third respondents stated inter alia:
●"... it would be a real possibility that if the Family Court did transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court, the Expedition List Judge could set the "Separate Question" down for hearing within a relatively short period, and within the timeframe required by the second and third respondent"; and
●"[a] more certain forecast of whether a trial of the Separate Question could be heard in the NSW Supreme Court within the timeframe required by the second and third respondent is not possible without the proceedings first being transferred"; and
●"[o]nce the Separate Question is decided by the NSW Supreme Court, that Court will most likely transfer the proceedings back to this Court so the question whether an order pursuant to s79 of the Act should be made can be decided by this Court."
In my view, these submissions encapsulate the risk of conflicting findings of fact and credit by two different judges.
I am conscious that Mr C Joubert and BPL are strangers to the marriage of the husband and the wife and that they have separate commercial interests. For that reason, I will order expedition of the proceedings.
I do not propose to grant leave to the second and third respondents to approach each Registry of the Family Court of Australia to ascertain the availability of hearing dates. In my view, each litigant could offer reasons in support for a speedy hearing and I see nothing which persuades me to afford this advantage to these parties.
I had the benefit of no submissions in relation to the remainder of the relief sought by the second and third respondents in their Further Amended Application in a Case of 11 September 2018. That being so, I assume that these paragraphs were not pressed and such will be the subject of an order for dismissal.
Similarly, no submissions were put on behalf of the wife in support of the remainder of the relief sought by way of the Minute annexed to her Outline of Case Document. Similarly, I will assume that these paragraphs were not pressed and such will be the subject of an order for dismissal.
I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Stevenson delivered on 29 October 2018.
Associate:
Date: 29 October 2018
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